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1 | 1 | (arch-defence)= |
2 | 2 | # Defence in Depth |
3 | 3 |
|
4 | | -- Defence in depth |
5 | | - - at K8s |
6 | | - - PSS |
7 | | - - Network (Cilium) |
8 | | - - RBAC (and namespaces) |
9 | | - - Data-at-rest encryption (protects from bad actors, compromise at infrastructure provider) |
10 | | - - at infrastructure |
11 | | - - network (vnet) isolation (out of band!) |
12 | | - - Compromising the host is very unlikely |
13 | | - - And even if it does happen, and privilege escalation occurs, there is no access to other networks |
14 | | - - No access to data from other projects |
15 | | - - The worst that can happen is a researcher trashes their own environment |
| 4 | +A FRIDGE instance is a {term}`TRE <Trusted Research Environment>` and so needs to be designed to provide a high level of protection. |
| 5 | +Some aspects of security are enforced by the [Kubernetes clusters](#arch-arch-tenancy-network) and others at the [infrastructure level](#arch-arch-tenancy-requirements). |
| 6 | +Therefore, responsibility for the security of FRIDGE is [shared](#arch-shared-responsibility) between the {term}`TRE Operator Organisation` and {term}`FRIDGE Hosting Organisation`. |
| 7 | + |
| 8 | +A principle in the design of FRIDGE was defence in depth. |
| 9 | +That is, that no single failure should make it possible for sensitive data to be exfiltrated from the TRE in an unauthorised manner. |
| 10 | +Furthermore, the goal should be for security features to be enforced by two independent systems or roles so that a compromise of one is not sufficient to break security. |
| 11 | + |
| 12 | +## Networking |
| 13 | + |
| 14 | +- Network (Cilium) |
| 15 | +- at infrastructure network (vnet) isolation (out of band!) |
| 16 | + |
| 17 | +## Privilege Escalation |
| 18 | + |
| 19 | +### In Kubernetes |
| 20 | + |
| 21 | +- RBAC (and namespaces) |
| 22 | + |
| 23 | +### On Cluster Nodes |
| 24 | + |
| 25 | +- PSS |
| 26 | +- Compromising the host is very unlikely |
| 27 | + - And even if it does happen, and privilege escalation occurs, there is no access to other networks |
| 28 | + - No access to data from other projects |
| 29 | + - The worst that can happen is a researcher trashes their own environment |
| 30 | + |
| 31 | +## Data |
| 32 | + |
| 33 | +- Data-at-rest encryption (protects from bad actors, compromise at infrastructure provider) |
| 34 | + _e.g._ access from host |
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