.env.example

# NetClaw Environment Variables
# Copy this to .env and fill in your values:
#   cp .env.example .env

# Device credentials (used by pyATS testbed via %ENV{} syntax)
NETCLAW_USERNAME=admin
NETCLAW_PASSWORD=changeme
NETCLAW_ENABLE_PASSWORD=changeme

# Anthropic API Key (if not using Claude Code CLI auth)
# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...

# Token Optimization - Override default model pricing (optional)
# Format: JSON string with model-specific input/output prices per 1M tokens
# NETCLAW_TOKEN_PRICING_OVERRIDE={"claude-opus-4-6": {"input": 5.0, "output": 25.0}}

# pyATS paths (set automatically by install.sh)
# PYATS_TESTBED_PATH=./testbed/testbed.yaml
# PYATS_MCP_SCRIPT=./mcp-servers/pyATS_MCP/pyats_mcp_server.py

# GitHub MCP (Personal Access Token)
# GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN=ghp_...

# Packet Buddy MCP (pcap analysis)
# PACKET_BUDDY_MCP_SCRIPT=./mcp-servers/packet-buddy-mcp/server.py
# PCAP_UPLOAD_DIR=/tmp/netclaw-pcaps

# NetBox (DCIM/IPAM source of truth)
# NETBOX_URL=https://netbox.example.com
# NETBOX_TOKEN=your_netbox_api_token

# Nautobot (alternative to NetBox for IPAM/DCIM source of truth)
# NAUTOBOT_URL=https://nautobot.example.com
# NAUTOBOT_TOKEN=your_nautobot_api_token

# OpsMill Infrahub (schema-driven infrastructure source of truth)
# INFRAHUB_ADDRESS=http://infrahub.example.com:8000
# INFRAHUB_API_TOKEN=your_infrahub_api_token

# Itential Automation Platform (65+ tools: config mgmt, compliance, workflows, golden config)
# ITENTIAL_MCP_PLATFORM_HOST=itential.example.com
# ITENTIAL_MCP_PLATFORM_USER=admin
# ITENTIAL_MCP_PLATFORM_PASSWORD=changeme
# ITENTIAL_MCP_PLATFORM_PORT=443
# ITENTIAL_MCP_PLATFORM_TIMEOUT=30

# Cisco Modeling Labs (CML) MCP
# CML_URL=https://cml.example.com
# CML_USERNAME=admin
# CML_PASSWORD=changeme
# CML_VERIFY_SSL=true

# Cisco NSO MCP (Network Services Orchestrator)
# NSO_SCHEME=https
# NSO_ADDRESS=sandbox-nso-1.cisco.com
# NSO_PORT=443
# NSO_USERNAME=admin
# NSO_PASSWORD=changeme
# NSO_VERIFY=true
# NSO_TIMEOUT=10

# AWS Cloud (IAM credentials for 6 AWS MCP servers)
# AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIA...
# AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=wJalr...
# AWS_REGION=us-east-1
# Or use a named profile instead:
# AWS_PROFILE=my-profile

# Google Cloud Platform (4 GCP remote MCP servers)
# GCP_PROJECT_ID=my-project-123
# GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS=/path/to/service-account-key.json
# Or use gcloud auth instead: gcloud auth application-default login

# Azure Network MCP (19 tools: VNets, NSGs, ExpressRoute, VPN, Firewall, LB, DNS)
# Create service principal: az ad sp create-for-rbac --name "netclaw-reader" --role "Reader" --scopes /subscriptions/<sub-id>
# AZURE_TENANT_ID=xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
# AZURE_CLIENT_ID=xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
# AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET=your-client-secret-value
# AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID=xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx

# Cisco Meraki — official remote MCP (494 read-only Dashboard capabilities, 2 tools)
# Use a READ-ONLY dashboard key: Dashboard > My Profile > API access.
# Org and network IDs are discovered at runtime (getOrganizations), not configured here.
# Writes are structurally absent upstream, so there is no read-only toggle to set.
# MERAKI_DASHBOARD_API_KEY=your_read_only_api_key_here

# Cisco ThousandEyes (community + official MCP servers)
# TE_TOKEN=your_oauth_bearer_token_here

# Cisco RADKit (cloud-relayed remote device access)
# RADKIT_IDENTITY=user@example.com
# RADKIT_DEFAULT_SERVICE_SERIAL=your_service_serial
# For container/CI deployment (base64-encoded credentials):
# RADKIT_CERT_B64=base64_encoded_certificate
# RADKIT_KEY_B64=base64_encoded_private_key
# RADKIT_CA_B64=base64_encoded_ca_chain
# RADKIT_KEY_PASSWORD_B64=base64_encoded_password

# Juniper JunOS (PyEZ/NETCONF device automation — 10 tools)
# JUNOS_DEVICES_FILE=devices.json       # Path to device inventory JSON
# JUNOS_TIMEOUT=360                     # Default command timeout in seconds

# Juniper Mist (spec 095 / R5 — measured, NOT yet registered; see specs/095-juniper-mist/)
# MIST_API_HOST=api.mist.com            # Regional cloud: api.eu / api.gc1 / api.ac5 ... — a wrong
#                                       # region 401s identically to a bad token. Take it from the
#                                       # manage.<region>.mist.com URL you log in to.
# MIST_ORG_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000   # Org UUID (the org NAME is not usable by the API)
# MIST_API_TOKEN=your_observer_role_org_token        # Observer role — an admin token holds write reach

# Arista ANTA validation (spec 098 / R25 — 4 tools, 208 tests, read-only, own venv)
# Verdicts are pass/fail/not_applicable/skipped/error. A test for a feature the device does
# not run reports not_applicable, NEVER a failure. No health percentage is ever emitted.
# ANTA_USERNAME=admin                   # EOS device credentials — environment only, never tool args
# ANTA_PASSWORD=your_device_password
# ANTA_ENABLE_PASSWORD=                 # Optional, if tests need enable mode
# ANTA_VERIFY_TLS=false                 # Lab switches ship self-signed certs; always DISCLOSED in output
# ANTA_TIMEOUT=30                       # Per-device timeout in seconds

# Elasticsearch Logs (adopted Elastic MCP, 5 tools, read-only — spec 096)
# ES_URL is resolved INSIDE the container: a cluster on this host is host.docker.internal,
# NOT localhost. Counting via ESQL or track_total_hits — a bare search total caps at 10,000.
# ES_URL=http://host.docker.internal:9200   # Local cluster; remote: https://<host>:9243
# ES_API_KEY=your_read_only_api_key         # Preferred; grant read + view_index_metadata only
# ES_USERNAME=elastic                       # Basic-auth alternative to ES_API_KEY
# ES_PASSWORD=your_password
# ES_SSL_SKIP_VERIFY=false                  # true only for lab clusters with self-signed certs

# Arista CloudVision Portal (CVP) — inventory, events, connectivity, tags (4 tools)
# CVP=www.arista.io                     # CloudVision hostname (no https://)
# CVPTOKEN=your_service_account_token   # Service account token from CVP Settings

# UML MCP (27+ diagram types via Kroki rendering)
# KROKI_SERVER=https://kroki.io               # Default: public Kroki; set to local instance for sensitive data
# PLANTUML_SERVER=http://localhost:8080        # Optional: local PlantUML server
# MCP_OUTPUT_DIR=./output                      # Diagram output directory

# Protocol Participation (BGP + OSPF + GRE — live control-plane peering)
# NETCLAW_ROUTER_ID=4.4.4.4                                    # BGP/OSPF router ID
# NETCLAW_LOCAL_AS=65001                                        # BGP local AS number
# NETCLAW_BGP_PEERS=[{"ip":"172.16.0.1","as":65000}]           # JSON array of BGP peers
# NETCLAW_OSPF_AREAS=["0.0.0.0"]                               # JSON array of OSPF area IDs
# NETCLAW_GRE_TUNNELS=[{"name":"gre-netclaw","local":"10.0.100.100","remote":"10.0.100.1","inside_local":"172.16.0.2/30"}]
# NETCLAW_LAB_MODE=true                                         # Relaxes ServiceNow CR requirement for lab

# NetClaw-to-NetClaw (N2N) Federation (feature 052) — capability exchange,
# remote tool/skill invocation, and claw-to-claw chat over the existing BGP mesh.
# N2N_ENABLED=false                             # Master switch for the federation layer
# N2N_DISPLAY_NAME=                             # Operator display name in n2n/hello (default: hostname)
# N2N_DAILY_REQUESTS=200                        # Default per-peer daily request budget
# N2N_DAILY_TOKENS=500000                       # Default per-peer daily token budget
# N2N_RATE_PER_MIN=10                           # Default per-peer requests/minute
# N2N_APPROVAL_WINDOW_S=900                     # Human-approval expiry window (seconds)
# N2N_INVENTORY_REFRESH_S=21600                 # Periodic inventory re-advertisement (seconds)
# N2N_TOOL_TIMEOUT_S=120                        # Remote tool invocation timeout (seconds)
# N2N_SKILL_TIMEOUT_S=600                       # Delegated skill task timeout (seconds)
# N2N_CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_S=300                   # Chat session idle close (seconds)
# N2N Ergonomics & Reliability (feature 053)
# N2N_TASK_RETENTION_S=3600                     # Completed delegated-task result retention (seconds)
# N2N_TASK_POLL_S=15                            # Requester-side task status poll cadence (seconds)
# N2N_RECONNECT_BACKOFF_MIN_S=5                 # Channel auto-reconnect backoff floor (seconds)
# N2N_RECONNECT_BACKOFF_MAX_S=60                # Channel auto-reconnect backoff cap (seconds)
# N2N_RECONNECT_UNREACHABLE_AFTER=5             # Consecutive reconnect failures before "unreachable" display

# ── Dead-peer log dampening (feature 100) ──────────────────────────────────────
# A permanently-unreachable peer used to be re-dialled every 60s forever, one WARNING
# per attempt — 23,366 log lines in 7 days, which buried the inbound calls that matter.
# These bound that volume WITHOUT delaying any peer that is only transiently down:
# escalation requires BOTH many consecutive failures AND a stale endpoint.
# N2N_RECONNECT_DAMPEN=1                        # 0 = full bypass: per-attempt WARNING + flat 60s ceiling (pre-100 behavior)
# N2N_RECONNECT_DEAD_CEILING_S=900              # Retry ceiling for a durably-dead peer (15 min)
# N2N_RECONNECT_DEAD_AFTER=20                   # Consecutive failures before a peer is ELIGIBLE for the escalated ceiling
# N2N_RECONNECT_ENDPOINT_STALE_S=86400          # Endpoint older than this counts as stale (second required signal)
# N2N_RECONNECT_SUMMARY_INTERVAL_S=300          # Cadence of the collapsed failure summary (also probe summaries)
# N2N_RECONNECT_STABLE_AFTER_S=120              # Uptime required before dampening clears — a flapping peer stays dampened
# iN2N — Internal NetClaw Federation (feature 056): a "risk" of focused claws
# behind one Border. Members dial the Border outbound; no ngrok, no public mesh.
# N2N_ROLE=standalone                           # standalone | border | member (default standalone = risk of one)
# N2N_RISK_NAME=                                # the risk's name (border/member roles)
# N2N_RISK_DESCRIPTION=                         # the risk's description
# N2N_ENABLED_STACKS=en2n                       # border only: en2n | in2n | both
# N2N_IN2N_PORT=                                # border only: optional dedicated iN2N listener port
# N2N_BORDER_ENDPOINT=                          # member only: host:port to dial the Border outbound
# N2N_QUARANTINE_THRESHOLD=5                    # consecutive member auth/health failures before auto-quarantine
# N2N_EDGE_WS_PORT=                             # border only: WebSocket listener port for NetClaw Mobile
#                                                #  edge nodes (feature 066) — TLS via the same domain-verified
#                                                #  or self-signed host credential as eN2N/iN2N (host_credential())
# Push-notification fallback for a disconnected edge node (feature 066, US3) — only
# needed if you want delivery to a backgrounded/offline phone; connected-phone push
# (n2n_notify_phone while the app is foregrounded) works without any of these.
# FCM_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON=                     # path to a Firebase service account JSON
#                                                #  (Firebase console > Project settings >
#                                                #  Service accounts > Generate new private key)
# APNS_KEY_PATH=                                # path to the APNs auth key (.p8) from your
#                                                #  Apple Developer account (Certificates, IDs &
#                                                #  Profiles > Keys)
# APNS_KEY_ID=                                  # the .p8 key's Key ID
# APNS_TEAM_ID=                                 # your Apple Developer Team ID
# APNS_BUNDLE_ID=                               # the app's bundle identifier (apns-topic)
# APNS_USE_SANDBOX=                             # 1/true to use api.sandbox.push.apple.com (dev builds)
# --- iN2N production enforcement + durable runtime (feature 057) ---
# N2N_RISK_MODE=testing                         # testing (guards off) | production (enforce: OpenShell sandbox + DefenseClaw guard + GAIT audit, fail-closed)
# N2N_STRICT_ALL=                               # set 1/true to block delegations on ANY missing control, incl. audit (default: audit gap warns, containment gap blocks)
# N2N_GAIT_DIR=~/.openclaw/n2n/gait             # immutable GAIT git audit trail location (unbounded; git gc only)
# DEFENSECLAW_GUARD_PORT=4000                   # DefenseClaw LLM guardrail proxy port (model-guard)
# Production model-guard requires the DefenseClaw guardrail sidecar running:
#   defenseclaw setup guardrail --mode action   # patches OpenClaw to route model I/O through the proxy
#   defenseclaw-gateway start                   # start the proxy (:4000) + tool-policy sidecar
# The member sandbox is host-level systemd confinement (no extra config; applied by
# scripts/in2n-services.py). OpenShell is NOT required for the member sandbox.
# --- Claw certification: TLS channel security + cert rotation (feature 060) ---
# N2N_CERT_MODE=off                             # off | on (TLS + channel-bound mutual auth) | enforce (also refuse cleartext eN2N)
# Domain-verified identity (optional — pinned/TOFU model needs none of this):
# N2N_CLAW_DOMAIN=                              # e.g. netclaw.automateyournetwork.ca (a name you control; need not resolve)
# N2N_ACME_DNS_PROVIDER=                        # lego DNS provider id: godaddy | cloudflare | route53 | acme-dns | ...
# N2N_ACME_EMAIL=                               # ACME account contact address
# N2N_ACME_STAGING=                             # 1/true to use Let's Encrypt staging (testing)
# N2N_LEGO_BIN=~/.openclaw/n2n/bin/lego         # path to the lego ACME client (installed by scripts/lib/fetch-lego.sh)
#   Provider credentials per lego's convention, e.g.:
#   GODADDY_API_KEY= / GODADDY_API_SECRET=      # GoDaddy (needs production API access; else use acme-dns delegation)
#   CLOUDFLARE_DNS_API_TOKEN=                   # Cloudflare (zone-scoped token)
#   ACME_DNS_API_BASE= / ACME_DNS_STORAGE_PATH= # acme-dns delegation (universal fallback: one CNAME, then automatic)
# Rotation tunables (defaults shown):
# N2N_CERT_RENEW_FRACTION=0.667                 # renew at 2/3 of lifetime elapsed (~30d left on a 90d cert)
# N2N_CERT_MEMBER_DAYS=90                        # hub + member leaf lifetime
# N2N_CERT_CA_DAYS=730                           # risk CA anchor lifetime (~2y)
# N2N_CERT_RENEW_CHECK_S=3600                    # renewal scheduler check cadence
# --- NCFED wire hardening (feature 063) ---
# Endpoint persistence (P1) is automatic — a successful dial now remembers the peer's
# address so the supervisor auto-reconnects; no config needed.
# N2N_PQ_MODE=opportunistic                     # opportunistic (offer PQ hybrid where the stack supports it,
#                                               #   accept classical fallback) | require (hard-refuse classical).
#                                               # 'require' FAILS FAST at startup on a stack without PQ
#                                               #   (needs OpenSSL >= 3.5 / Python >= 3.13 for X25519MLKEM768).
# Mesh-layer TLS (P2) is a coordinated flag day, gated by the SAME N2N_CERT_MODE flag
#   as the eN2N channel (enforce = require mesh TLS + refuse un-upgraded mesh peers).
#   Enable on ALL mesh peers together, exactly like the 060 rollout.

# --- Cloudflare Tunnel transport (feature 108) ---
# N2N_TRANSPORT_HEALTH_CHECK=true               # Controls whether the daemon performs the local Cloudflare
#                                                #   Tunnel / DNS health probe (data-model.md §2). When disabled,
#                                                #   `local_transport_healthy` reports `n/a` without attempting
#                                                #   any check. Operators who never adopt Cloudflare Tunnel can
#                                                #   leave this at the default (enabled) — the probe is a no-op
#                                                #   when no peer uses transport=cloudflare_tunnel.
#                                                # Values: true | false (default: true)

# --- Chroma-to-chroma vector replication (feature 065) ---
# N2N_REPLICATION_MAX_CHUNKS=20000                # max chunks a single replication/re-sync
#                                                  #   will transfer; a source collection over
#                                                  #   this is refused before any batch is sent
# N2N_REPLICATION_BATCH_SIZE=200                  # chunks requested per replicate_batch call

# ContainerLab (containerized network labs via API)
# CLAB_API_SERVER_URL=http://localhost:8080     # ContainerLab API server URL
# CLAB_API_USERNAME=netclaw                     # Linux user on ContainerLab host (PAM auth)
# CLAB_API_PASSWORD=changeme                    # Linux user password

# Cisco SD-WAN (vManage read-only monitoring — 12 tools)
# VMANAGE_IP=10.10.10.1                         # vManage IP or hostname
# VMANAGE_USERNAME=admin                         # vManage username
# VMANAGE_PASSWORD=changeme                      # vManage password

# Grafana (observability platform — 75+ tools: dashboards, Prometheus, Loki, alerting, incidents, OnCall)
# GRAFANA_URL=http://grafana.example.com:3000    # Grafana instance URL
# GRAFANA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN=glsa_abc123...   # Service account token (preferred auth)
# GRAFANA_USERNAME=admin                          # Alternative: basic auth username
# GRAFANA_PASSWORD=changeme                       # Alternative: basic auth password
# GRAFANA_ORG_ID=1                                # Optional: organization ID for multi-org setups

# Prometheus (direct PromQL queries — 6 tools: instant/range queries, metric discovery, targets, health)
# PROMETHEUS_URL=http://prometheus:9090            # Prometheus server endpoint
# PROMETHEUS_USERNAME=admin                         # Optional: basic auth username
# PROMETHEUS_PASSWORD=changeme                      # Optional: basic auth password
# PROMETHEUS_TOKEN=eyJhbG...                        # Optional: bearer token (Grafana Cloud, Thanos, Cortex)
# PROMETHEUS_URL_SSL_VERIFY=true                    # Optional: set false for self-signed certs
# PROMETHEUS_REQUEST_TIMEOUT=30                     # Optional: request timeout in seconds
# PROMETHEUS_DISABLE_LINKS=true                     # Optional: disable UI links (saves context window)

# Kubeshark (Kubernetes L4/L7 traffic analysis — 6 tools: capture, pcap export, snapshots, flows, TLS decryption)
# KUBESHARK_MCP_URL=http://localhost:8898/mcp        # Kubeshark MCP endpoint (requires Kubeshark in K8s cluster)
# KUBESHARK_MCP_PORT=8898                             # Optional: MCP server port (default: 8898)

# TTS (edge-tts voice synthesis — 2 tools: text_to_speech, list_voices)
# TTS_MCP_SCRIPT=./mcp-servers/tts-mcp/server.py
# TTS_DEFAULT_VOICE=en-US-GuyNeural   # Optional: override default voice
# TTS_OUTPUT_DIR=/tmp/netclaw-tts      # Optional: override MP3 output directory

# Cisco WebEx (Bidirectional: inbound @mentions + outbound alerts/reports/incidents)
# Bot token from https://developer.webex.com/my-apps (long-lived, does not expire)
# WEBEX_BOT_TOKEN=your_bot_access_token_here
# Room/space IDs for outbound message routing (use same ID for all, or separate spaces)
# WEBEX_ALERTS_ROOM_ID=your_alerts_space_id
# WEBEX_REPORTS_ROOM_ID=your_reports_space_id
# WEBEX_INCIDENTS_ROOM_ID=your_incidents_space_id
# Webhook URL for inbound messages — must point to {base_url}/webhooks/webex/default
# Development: use ngrok (ngrok http 18789) to get a public HTTPS URL
# Production: use your public HTTPS domain
# WEBEX_WEBHOOK_URL=https://your-domain.com/webhooks/webex/default
# Optional: HMAC-SHA1 secret for webhook signature verification (recommended for production)
# WEBEX_WEBHOOK_SECRET=your_webhook_secret

# SuzieQ (Network Observability — 5 read-only tools: show, summarize, assert, unique, path)
# SUZIEQ_API_URL=http://suzieq-host:8000          # SuzieQ REST API base URL
# SUZIEQ_API_KEY=your_suzieq_api_key               # SuzieQ REST API access token
# SUZIEQ_VERIFY_SSL=true                            # Verify SSL certificates (default: true)
# SUZIEQ_TIMEOUT=30                                 # Query timeout in seconds (default: 30)

# Batfish (network configuration analysis via Docker container)
# BATFISH_HOST=localhost                              # Batfish service hostname or IP
# BATFISH_PORT=9997                                   # Batfish coordinator port
# BATFISH_NETWORK=netclaw                             # Default Batfish network name

# Cisco FMC (Secure Firewall Management Center)
# FMC_BASE_URL=https://fmc.example.com
# FMC_USERNAME=api-user
# FMC_PASSWORD=changeme
# FMC_VERIFY_SSL=false
# FMC_PROFILES_DIR=./profiles    # Optional: multi-FMC profile directory
# FMC_PROFILE_DEFAULT=dc-east    # Optional: default FMC profile

# gNMI Streaming Telemetry MCP Server (10 tools: Get, Set, Subscribe, Capabilities, Browse, Compare)
# GNMI_TARGETS=[{"name":"router1","host":"10.1.1.1","port":57400,"username":"admin","password":"changeme","vendor":"cisco-iosxr"}]
# GNMI_TLS_CA_CERT=/path/to/ca.pem                 # CA certificate for TLS server verification
# GNMI_TLS_CLIENT_CERT=/path/to/client.pem          # Client certificate for mTLS (optional)
# GNMI_TLS_CLIENT_KEY=/path/to/client.key            # Client private key for mTLS (optional)
# GNMI_TLS_SKIP_VERIFY=false                         # Skip TLS verification (lab mode only)
# GNMI_DEFAULT_PORT=6030                             # Override default gNMI port
# GNMI_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE=1048576                     # Response truncation threshold in bytes (default 1MB)
# GNMI_MAX_SUBSCRIPTIONS=50                          # Max concurrent telemetry subscriptions (default 50)

# Canvas/A2UI Network Visualization (inline chat visualizations — no new credentials needed)
# This skill uses existing MCP server connections (pyATS, Grafana, Prometheus, ServiceNow, SuzieQ).
# No additional environment variables are required.
# The skill auto-discovers available data sources at visualization time.

# GitLab MCP (98+ tools: issues, merge requests, pipelines, repos, wikis, labels, milestones, releases)
# Community server: @zereight/mcp-gitlab via npx (any GitLab tier, SaaS or self-hosted)
# PAT scopes: "api" for full access, "read_api" for read-only
# GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN=glpat-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
# GITLAB_API_URL=https://gitlab.com                       # Override for self-hosted: https://gitlab.example.com
# GITLAB_READ_ONLY_MODE=false                              # Set true to restrict to read-only operations

# Jenkins MCP (16 tools: jobs, builds, pipelines, SCM, system health)
# Official Jenkins plugin — runs natively inside Jenkins via Streamable HTTP
# Requires: Jenkins 2.533+ with MCP Server plugin v0.158+ installed
# Auth: HTTP Basic with API token (User → Configure → API Token in Jenkins)
# JENKINS_URL=https://jenkins.example.com
# JENKINS_USERNAME=your-username
# JENKINS_API_TOKEN=your-api-token
# JENKINS_AUTH_BASE64=                                      # Base64 of "username:api_token" — generate: echo -n "$JENKINS_USERNAME:$JENKINS_API_TOKEN" | base64

# Atlassian MCP (72 tools: Jira issues, transitions, comments, projects, links; Confluence pages, comments, spaces)
# Community server: mcp-atlassian by sooperset via uvx (Cloud + Server/DC support)
# Atlassian Cloud: API token from https://id.atlassian.com/manage-profile/security/api-tokens
# Server/DC: Personal Access Token from Profile → Personal Access Tokens
# At least one product (Jira or Confluence) must be configured
# JIRA_URL=https://your-domain.atlassian.net
# JIRA_USERNAME=your-email@example.com
# JIRA_API_TOKEN=your-api-token
# CONFLUENCE_URL=https://your-domain.atlassian.net/wiki
# CONFLUENCE_USERNAME=your-email@example.com
# CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN=your-api-token

# GNS3 Network Lab Management (26 tools: projects, nodes, links, captures, snapshots)
# Lab-only operations — no ServiceNow CR gating required
# GNS3_URL=http://localhost:3080                       # GNS3 server URL (REST API v3)
# GNS3_USER=admin                                       # GNS3 username
# GNS3_PASSWORD=changeme                                # GNS3 password
# GNS3_VERIFY_SSL=true                                  # Verify SSL certificates (default: true)
# GNS3_TOKEN_TTL=3000                                   # Token cache TTL in seconds (default: 50 min)

# Palo Alto Networks Prisma SD-WAN (15+ tools: sites, elements, topology, status, alarms, config)
# Read-only visibility into Prisma SD-WAN fabric — no ServiceNow CR gating required
# Service account from Prisma Access/SASE portal with SD-WAN API permissions
# PAN_CLIENT_ID=name@tsg.iam.panserviceaccount.com      # Service account client ID
# PAN_CLIENT_SECRET=your-secret-key                     # Service account secret
# PAN_TSG_ID=your-tenant-service-group-id               # Tenant Service Group ID
# PAN_REGION=americas                                   # API region: americas (default) or europe

# Datadog MCP Server (16+ tools: logs, metrics, incidents, APM, dashboards)
# Full observability stack with all optional toolsets (apm, error_tracking, feature_flags, dbm, security, llm_observability)
# API keys from https://app.datadoghq.com/organization-settings/api-keys
# DD_API_KEY=your_datadog_api_key                       # Datadog API key (required)
# DD_APP_KEY=your_datadog_app_key                       # Datadog application key (required)
# DD_SITE=datadoghq.com                                 # Datadog site (datadoghq.eu for EU customers)

# PagerDuty MCP Server (70 tools: incidents, on-call, services, event orchestration)
# Full incident management with read/write operations (--enable-write-tools)
# API token from https://support.pagerduty.com/docs/api-access-keys
# PAGERDUTY_USER_API_KEY=your_pagerduty_api_token       # PagerDuty User API key (required)
# PAGERDUTY_API_HOST=https://api.pagerduty.com          # API host (https://api.eu.pagerduty.com for EU)

# Splunk MCP Server (30 tools: search, indexes, saved searches, alerts)
# Full Splunk Enterprise/Cloud integration with SPL queries
# SPLUNK_HOST=https://splunk.example.com:8089           # Splunk management port (required)
# SPLUNK_TOKEN=your_splunk_token                        # Splunk authentication token (required)
# SPLUNK_VERIFY_SSL=true                                # Verify SSL certificates (default: true)

# HashiCorp Terraform Cloud MCP Server (40+ tools: workspaces, runs, state, variables)
# Terraform Cloud/Enterprise integration with workspace management
# TFC_TOKEN=your_terraform_cloud_token                  # Terraform Cloud API token (required)
# TFC_ORG=your-organization                             # Terraform Cloud organization name (required)
# TFC_HOST=app.terraform.io                             # Terraform Cloud host (default: app.terraform.io)

# HashiCorp Vault MCP Server (35+ tools: secrets, PKI, auth, transit)
# Secrets management with multiple auth methods and secret engines
# VAULT_ADDR=https://vault.example.com:8200             # Vault server address (required)
# VAULT_TOKEN=your_vault_token                          # Vault authentication token (required for token auth)
# VAULT_NAMESPACE=admin                                 # Vault namespace (Enterprise only)

# Zscaler MCP Server (300+ tools: ZIA, ZPA, ZDX, identity, insights)
# Complete Zscaler security platform integration (Zero Trust)
# Create API keys in Zscaler admin portal (ZIA/ZPA)
# ZSCALER_ZIA_API_KEY=your_zia_api_key                  # ZIA API key
# ZSCALER_ZIA_USERNAME=admin@example.com                # ZIA admin username
# ZSCALER_ZIA_PASSWORD=your_password                    # ZIA admin password
# ZSCALER_ZIA_CLOUD=zscaler.net                         # ZIA cloud (zscaler.net, zscalerone.net, etc.)
# ZSCALER_ZPA_CLIENT_ID=your_client_id                  # ZPA API client ID
# ZSCALER_ZPA_CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secret          # ZPA API client secret
# ZSCALER_ZPA_CUSTOMER_ID=your_customer_id              # ZPA customer ID

# Cloudflare MCP Server (5 remote servers: DNS, security, Zero Trust, analytics, Workers)
# Domain-specific remote MCP servers for complete Cloudflare platform coverage
# API token from https://dash.cloudflare.com/profile/api-tokens
# CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN=your_cloudflare_api_token        # Cloudflare API token (required)
# CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID=your_account_id                 # Cloudflare account ID (required)
# CLOUDFLARE_ZONE_ID=your_zone_id                       # Default zone ID (optional)

# Blender MCP Server (3D Network Topology Visualization)
# Community server: blender-mcp via uvx (requires Blender on Windows with addon)
# Addon: https://github.com/ahujasid/blender-mcp
# BLENDER_HOST=                                           # Windows host IP (WSL: cat /etc/resolv.conf | grep nameserver)
# BLENDER_PORT=9876                                       # Blender addon socket port (default: 9876)

# Aruba CX MCP Server (16 tools: 11 read-only, 5 write for HPE Aruba CX switches)
# Community server: https://github.com/slientnight/aruba-cx-mcp-server
# Read: system info, interfaces, VLANs, configs, routing, LLDP, MAC table, DOM, ISSU, firmware, VSF
# Write: interface config, VLAN management, config save, ISSU upgrade, firmware (requires ITSM CR)
# ARUBA_CX_TARGETS='[{"name":"switch1","host":"10.1.1.1","username":"admin","password":"secret"}]'
# ARUBA_CX_CONFIG=/path/to/aruba-cx-config.json           # Alternative: config file path
# ARUBA_CX_TIMEOUT=30                                     # Request timeout in seconds (default: 30)
# ITSM_ENABLED=false                                      # Enable ServiceNow CR gating for write ops
# ITSM_LAB_MODE=false                                     # Validate CR format without ServiceNow call

# MemPalace AI Memory (19 tools: palace read/write, knowledge graph, navigation, agent diary)
# Persistent, structured, local-only memory across sessions — no API keys required
# Source: https://github.com/milla-jovovich/mempalace
# MEMPALACE_MCP_SCRIPT=./mcp-servers/mempalace/mempalace/mcp_server.py

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Check Point Security Platform (15 MCP servers: policy, threat intel, gateway, SASE)
# Official Check Point MCPs from https://github.com/CheckPointSW/mcp-servers
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

# Management Server (on-premises) — required for policy, logs, threat prevention MCPs
# CHKP_MGMT_HOST=192.168.1.100                          # Management server IP/hostname
# CHKP_MGMT_PORT=443                                    # Web API port (default: 443)
# CHKP_MGMT_API_KEY=your-api-key-here                   # API key auth (preferred)
# Alternative: username/password authentication
# CHKP_MGMT_USERNAME=admin                              # Management username
# CHKP_MGMT_PASSWORD=your-password                      # Management password
# CHKP_MGMT_DOMAIN=                                     # Domain name (MDS deployments only)

# Smart-1 Cloud (alternative to on-prem management)
# CHKP_S1C_API_KEY=your-smart1-cloud-key                # Smart-1 Cloud API key
# CHKP_S1C_URL=https://your-tenant.maas.checkpoint.com  # Smart-1 Cloud Web-API URL

# Harmony SASE — cloud-delivered security for distributed networks
# CHKP_SASE_API_KEY=your-sase-api-key                   # Harmony SASE API key
# CHKP_SASE_MGMT_HOST=https://api.us1.sase.checkpoint.com/api  # SASE management endpoint
# CHKP_SASE_ORIGIN=https://your-tenant.sase.checkpoint.com     # SASE origin domain

# Reputation Service — IP/URL/file threat intelligence lookups
# Contact TCAPI_SUPPORT@checkpoint.com for API key
# CHKP_REPUTATION_API_KEY=your-reputation-api-key       # Reputation Service API key

# Threat Emulation — cloud sandboxing for malware analysis
# CHKP_TE_API_KEY=your-threat-emulation-key             # Threat Emulation API key

# Spark Management — MSP-oriented distributed firewall management
# Authenticates via Infinity Portal (client_id / secret_key), NOT a bare API key.
# CHKP_SPARK_CLIENT_ID=your-spark-client-id             # Infinity Portal client ID (required)
# CHKP_SPARK_SECRET_KEY=your-spark-secret-key           # Infinity Portal secret key (required)
# CHKP_SPARK_INFINITY_PORTAL_URL=https://cloudinfra-gw.portal.checkpoint.com  # Portal URL (required)
# CHKP_SPARK_REGION=                                    # Portal region (optional)

# Documentation Tool — Check Point Documentation Tool API
# Authenticates via Infinity Portal (client_id / secret_key + auth URL).
# CHKP_DOCS_CLIENT_ID=your-docs-client-id               # Infinity Portal client ID (required)
# CHKP_DOCS_SECRET_KEY=your-docs-secret-key             # Infinity Portal secret key (required)
# CHKP_DOCS_AUTH_URL=https://cloudinfra-gw.portal.checkpoint.com/auth/external  # Auth URL (required)
# CHKP_DOCS_REGION=                                     # Portal region (optional)

# Argos ERM — exposure and risk management platform
# Authenticates via its own server URL + integration token, NOT a bare API key.
# CHKP_ARGOS_SERVER_URL=https://your-argos-server       # Argos server URL (required)
# CHKP_ARGOS_INTEGRATION_TOKEN=your-argos-token         # Argos integration token (required)
# CHKP_ARGOS_CUSTOMER_ID=                               # Argos customer ID (optional)

# Gaia OS — networking/routing on a gateway; uses interactive dialog auth (prompts
# for gateway IP/user/password per call, cached ~15 min). No credential env vars.
# CHKP_GAIA_VERBOSE=false                               # Verbose logging (optional)

# Global Settings
# CHKP_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=true                          # Disable Check Point telemetry
# CHKP_LOG_LEVEL=standard                               # minimal|standard|verbose (query logging)

# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# IP Fabric Network Assurance Platform (10 MCP tools: health, path analysis, diagrams)
# Official IP Fabric MCP Server built into IP Fabric appliances
# Documentation: https://docs.ipfabric.io/latest/IP_Fabric_Settings/integration/mcp/
# Developed in collaboration with Daren Fulwell (Field CTO, IP Fabric)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

# IP Fabric Appliance Connection
# IPFABRIC_HOST=https://ipfabric.example.com            # IP Fabric appliance URL (no trailing slash)
# IPFABRIC_API_TOKEN=your-api-token-here                # API token from IP Fabric UI → Settings → API Tokens

# Token RBAC permissions determine accessible data:
#   - Read-only token: health, path lookups, inventory queries
#   - Full access token: all capabilities including intent configuration

# Twitter/X MCP Server (9 tools: tweet posting, threads, heartbeat, deduplication)
# Free tier: one-way broadcast only (post tweets, no reading mentions)
# Create app at https://developer.twitter.com/en/portal/dashboard
# Required: OAuth 1.0a User Context credentials (for posting on behalf of user)
# TWITTER_API_KEY=your_consumer_api_key                   # Consumer Key (API Key)
# TWITTER_API_SECRET=your_consumer_api_secret             # Consumer Secret (API Secret)
# TWITTER_ACCESS_TOKEN=your_access_token                  # Access Token for @John_Capobianco
# TWITTER_ACCESS_SECRET=your_access_token_secret          # Access Token Secret
# TWITTER_HEARTBEAT_ENABLED=false                         # Enable autonomous tweets (default: false)
# TWITTER_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL=14400                        # Seconds between heartbeats (default: 4 hours)
# TWITTER_MENTION_POLL_INTERVAL=300                       # Seconds between mention checks (default: 5 minutes)
# TWITTER_OAUTH2_TOKEN=your_oauth2_bearer_token           # OAuth 2.0 token for reading mentions (pay-as-you-go)

# Claroty xDome MCP Server (21 tools: 15 read + 6 ITSM-gated writes)
# OT / IoT / IoMT visibility, vulnerability triage, alert response, Purdue Model classification
# Token: Admin Settings > User Management in xDome dashboard
# Reuses NETCLAW_LAB_MODE for ITSM-gate bypass — do NOT introduce a CLAROTY_LAB_MODE
# CLAROTY_API_URL=https://api.medigate.io                  # xDome base URL (default: Claroty SaaS)
# CLAROTY_API_TOKEN=your-bearer-token-here                 # Required Bearer token
# CLAROTY_VERIFY_SSL=true                                  # Verify TLS certificates (default: true)
# CLAROTY_TIMEOUT=30                                       # Per-request timeout in seconds
# CLAROTY_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN=2000                          # Sliding-window cap (xDome upstream is 2000/min/endpoint)

# Twitter/X Integration (OAuth 1.0a for posting, OAuth 2.0 for reading)
# Get these from https://developer.twitter.com/en/portal/projects-and-apps
# TWITTER_API_KEY=your_api_key
# TWITTER_API_SECRET=your_api_secret
# TWITTER_ACCESS_TOKEN=your_access_token
# TWITTER_ACCESS_SECRET=your_access_secret

# OAuth 2.0 with auto-refresh (for reading mentions - required for pay-as-you-go)
# Get from Developer Portal -> Your App -> Keys and Tokens -> OAuth 2.0
# TWITTER_CLIENT_ID=your_client_id
# TWITTER_CLIENT_SECRET=your_client_secret
# TWITTER_OAUTH2_ACCESS_TOKEN=your_oauth2_access_token
# TWITTER_OAUTH2_REFRESH_TOKEN=your_oauth2_refresh_token

# Twitter Heartbeat settings
# TWITTER_HEARTBEAT_ENABLED=false
# TWITTER_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL=14400
# TWITTER_MENTION_POLL_INTERVAL=300

# Twilio Voice MCP Server (6 tools: emergency calls, on-demand calls, inbound conversations)
# Bidirectional voice calling for emergency alerts, status updates, and voice commands
# Get credentials from https://console.twilio.com (Account → API Keys)
# TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID=ACxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx   # Account SID (starts with AC)
# TWILIO_API_KEY_SID=SKxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx   # API Key SID (starts with SK)
# TWILIO_API_SECRET=your_api_secret                       # API Key Secret
# TWILIO_PHONE_NUMBER=+1XXXXXXXXXX                        # Twilio phone number for inbound calls
# TWILIO_WEBHOOK_URL=https://your-domain/webhooks/twilio/voice  # Public webhook URL (ngrok/Tailscale)

# Unreal Engine 5.8 MCP Server (3D Network Topology Visualization)
# Built-in UE5.8 MCP plugin — no external dependencies required
# Enable plugin: Edit > Plugins > "Unreal MCP" (or "ModelContextProtocol")
# Auto-starts on editor launch or manually: ModelContextProtocol.StartServer in console
# UE5_MCP_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8000/mcp                         # UE5 MCP server endpoint (default: localhost:8000)

# Sketchfab MCP Server (3D model search/download for real-stencil mode, spec 046)
# Get an API token from https://sketchfab.com/settings/password (API Tokens section)
# SKETCHFAB_API_KEY=your_sketchfab_api_token
# SKETCHFAB_USERNAME=your_sketchfab_username

# Chrome DevTools MCP Server (browser automation/inspection: viz QA, controller GUI gap-fill,
# undocumented API discovery, general web-GUI automation — spec 048). No environment variables
# to set here — chrome-devtools-mcp takes all of its configuration as CLI flags, not env vars,
# and its own default profile directory (~/.cache/chrome-devtools-mcp/chrome-profile) already
# works out of the box. No credentials involved; target-site auth happens via a one-time manual
# sign-in into that profile — see mcp-servers/chrome-devtools-mcp/README.md for the two patterns.
# Run ./scripts/chrome-devtools-enable.sh to check prerequisites (Node.js 18+, a Chrome binary).

# Computer Use (full-desktop automation for legacy tools with no browser or API path — spec 050).
# No environment variables to set here — this is an OpenClaw ClawHub skill (`computer-use`), not
# an MCP server, installed via `openclaw skills install --global computer-use` plus system apt
# packages (Xvfb/XFCE/x11vnc/noVNC). No credentials involved; a legacy app's own login (if any)
# happens manually through the VNC/noVNC live viewer — see workspace/skills/desktop-gui-inspect/SKILL.md.
# Run ./scripts/install.sh --components computer-use to provision it.

# ============================================================
# RAG Knowledge Base MCP Server (rag-mcp) — Feature 062
# Fully offline document knowledge base. No credentials needed.
# ============================================================
# Persistent data directory (ChromaDB + SQLite + BM25 + retained sources)
RAG_DATA_DIR=~/.openclaw/rag
# Local embedding model (downloaded once at install; upgrade: BAAI/bge-base-en-v1.5)
RAG_EMBEDDING_MODEL=BAAI/bge-small-en-v1.5
# Local cross-encoder reranker (upgrade: BAAI/bge-reranker-base)
RAG_RERANKER_MODEL=cross-encoder/ms-marco-MiniLM-L-6-v2
# Set false on low-resource hosts to skip reranking (hybrid fusion only)
RAG_RERANK_ENABLED=true
# Results scoring below this floor are flagged low_confidence (never dropped)
RAG_RELEVANCE_FLOOR=0.3
# Per-document ingestion soft caps (whichever is hit first)
RAG_MAX_DOC_MB=100
RAG_MAX_DOC_PAGES=1000
# Max same-domain pages listed in a depth-1 URL crawl preview
RAG_CRAWL_MAX_PAGES=30
# Snapshots older than this many days are flagged stale (warn only, never auto-deleted)
RAG_SNAPSHOT_WARN_DAYS=90
# Hard cap on retrieval rounds per sub-query (initial + refinements)
RAG_MAX_ROUNDS=3

# Auvik Network Management (20 read-only tools: inventory, alerts, lifecycle/warranty, performance)
# API credentials from Auvik Settings → API Credentials (requires admin or manager role)
# Auth: HTTP Basic (user email + API key) — no extra OAuth required
# AUVIK_USERNAME=your-email@example.com                           # Auvik account email address
# AUVIK_API_KEY=your-auvik-api-key                               # Auvik API key from Settings → API Credentials
# AUVIK_BASE_URL=https://auvikapi.us1.my.auvik.com               # API base URL; use us2/eu1/etc for other regions
# AUVIK_VERIFY_SSL=true                                           # Verify SSL certificates (default: true)
# AUVIK_TIMEOUT=30                                                # Request timeout in seconds (default: 30)
# AUVIK_RATE_LIMIT=600                                            # Max API calls per minute (default: 600)
# AUVIK_MAX_PAGES=50                                              # Max result pages per paginated request (default: 50)

# HaloPSA / HaloITSM MCP Server (18 tools: change requests + asset/ticket context)
# OAuth2 client-credentials. Create an API application in Halo:
#   Configuration > Integrations > Halo API > New (Client Credentials)
# HALO_BASE_URL=https://your-tenant.halopsa.com   # Halo host (no trailing /api)
# HALO_TENANT=your-tenant                          # hosted multi-tenant id (blank for single-tenant)
# HALO_CLIENT_ID=your-client-id                    # API application client id
# HALO_CLIENT_SECRET=your-client-secret            # API application secret
# HALO_SCOPE=all                                   # OAuth scope (default: all)
# HALO_VERIFY_SSL=true                             # verify TLS certificates (default: true)
# HALO_TIMEOUT=30                                  # request timeout seconds (default: 30)
# HALO_PAGE_SIZE=50                                # list page size (default 50, cap 100)
# HALO_MAX_PAGES=20                                # max pages per list call (default: 20)

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Multivendor CLI Driver (spec 076) — ~90 platform families via Nornir/NAPALM/Netmiko
# Read-only by default. Cisco/Juniper stay with pyATS/junos-mcp.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Inventory source: live_sot | generated | operator | auto (default auto)
MULTIVENDOR_INVENTORY_SOURCE=
# Operator-authored inventory. The server NEVER writes to this file.
MULTIVENDOR_INVENTORY_PATH=
# Generated inventory cache. Rendered from a source of truth; OVERWRITTEN on refresh.
MULTIVENDOR_GENERATED_PATH=
# Expose write tools at all. Absent from tools/list unless set (default off).
MULTIVENDOR_WRITE_ENABLED=
# Concurrency bound for fleet queries (default 10 — devices often cap sessions at 5-15)
MULTIVENDOR_MAX_WORKERS=
# Per-device timeout in seconds (default 30)
MULTIVENDOR_TIMEOUT_S=
# Credentials. NEVER put these in an inventory file. Vault preferred; these are the
# documented fallback and are fully supported (Vault is not required).
MULTIVENDOR_USERNAME=
MULTIVENDOR_PASSWORD=
MULTIVENDOR_ENABLE=
# Per-reference overrides for per-device/site/platform credentials, e.g.
# MULTIVENDOR_EDGE_SITE_USERNAME / MULTIVENDOR_EDGE_SITE_PASSWORD for credential_ref "edge-site"

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ServiceNow — ITSM change gating (Constitution Principle III)
# Required for production configuration changes: human approval and an approved
# Change Request are DISTINCT gates. Lab-classified devices are exempt.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SERVICENOW_AUTH_TYPE=
SERVICENOW_INSTANCE_URL=
SERVICENOW_USERNAME=
SERVICENOW_PASSWORD=

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Cisco PSIRT openVuln API (spec 078) — is a running version affected by an advisory?
# Register a SERVICE application with the Client Credentials grant at
# apiconsole.cisco.com and select "Cisco PSIRT openVuln API".
# Read-only. Never contacts a device — versions come from pyATS/multivendor-cli.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISCO_CLIENT_ID=
CISCO_CLIENT_SECRET=
# Advisory cache location (default ~/.openclaw/cisco-psirt). Advisories only —
# the OAuth token is a credential and is never written to disk.
CISCO_PSIRT_CACHE_DIR=
# Cache lifetime in seconds (default 21600 = 6h). The rate budget is 5/sec and
# 30/min shared across every caller, so shortening this has a real cost.
CISCO_PSIRT_CACHE_TTL_S=

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Globalping (spec 079) — outside-in measurement from ~4,800 global probes
# Free token from https://www.globalping.io. Remote MCP, nothing to install.
# The endpoint returns 401 without a token; the token raises the hourly
# allowance from 250 to 500 probe-measurements. Charged PER PROBE, so a
# limit:20 test spends 20 units.
# Public targets only — private/internal addresses are refused.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GLOBALPING_TOKEN=

# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Fortinet — spec 080 (roadmap R3). Server: mcp-servers/fortinet-mcp
# Three planes, each independently optional. A plane with no credentials
# is simply not consulted, and NetClaw says so rather than answering
# from another plane.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Command the three Fortinet skills invoke (one server serves all planes)
FORTINET_MCP_CMD=
# Manager plane — FortiManager (policy intent: ADOMs, packages, objects)
FORTIMANAGER_HOST=
FORTIMANAGER_API_TOKEN=
# Device plane — FortiGate (observed state: interfaces, routes, VPN, HA)
FORTIGATE_HOST=
FORTIGATE_API_TOKEN=
# Analyzer plane — FortiAnalyzer (observed traffic: logs, policy activity)
# Token auth requires FortiAnalyzer 7.2.2 or later
FORTIANALYZER_HOST=
FORTIANALYZER_API_TOKEN=
# TLS verification. Defaults to true. Fortinet appliances ship self-signed
# certificates; import the appliance CA rather than disabling this, since
# disabling it exposes the API token to interception.
FORTINET_VERIFY_SSL=
# Write path. Defaults to false. Enabling it does NOT authorise a write —
# it only makes the two gates reachable. Every write additionally requires
# human approval AND an approved ServiceNow change record.
FORTINET_ALLOW_WRITES=

# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# BGP & Registry Intelligence — spec 081 (roadmap R9)
# Server: mcp-servers/bgp-intel-mcp
#
# NO CREDENTIALS REQUIRED. All five sources (RPKI validator, RDAP, RIPEstat,
# PeeringDB, RIPE Atlas) are public unauthenticated APIs. There is nothing here
# to leak, rotate or scope — the only variables are optional tuning.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Command the bgp-registry-intel skill invokes
BGP_INTEL_MCP_CMD=
# Contact string sent to public APIs. These are volunteer-funded community
# services and identifying yourself is the courtesy they ask of automated
# consumers. Defaults to a NetClaw string with the project URL.
BGP_INTEL_USER_AGENT=
# Requests per second per source. Default 4, enforced as a true sliding window.
# May be LOWERED to be more polite; values above 4 are clamped, not honoured.
BGP_INTEL_MAX_RPS=
# GAIT audit trail path. Defaults under ~/.openclaw/gait/
BGP_INTEL_AUDIT_LOG=

# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Document Generation — spec 082 (roadmap R18)
# Server: mcp-servers/document-mcp
#
# NO CREDENTIALS REQUIRED. This server writes files and touches no device
# and no ticket. Everything below is optional tuning; the defaults are
# what you want unless you have a reason otherwise.
#
# The four libraries it needs (python-docx, openpyxl, python-pptx,
# PyMuPDF) are already installed by rag-mcp (feature 062), which READS
# these formats. This server WRITES them.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Command the two document skills invoke
DOCUMENT_MCP_CMD=
# Where generated documents land. Defaults to workspace/output/document-mcp/
# — persistent, timestamped, and never overwritten, so a regenerated report
# cannot replace one already attached to a ticket. There is deliberately no
# fallback to a temp directory: an unwritable path is reported as a failure.
DOCUMENT_OUTPUT_DIR=
# Data rows per worksheet before truncation. Default 50000. When a bound is
# applied it is written INTO the document, not only into the tool response.
DOCUMENT_MAX_ROWS=
# Blocks per Word document before truncation. Default 5000.
DOCUMENT_MAX_BLOCKS=
# Slides per deck before truncation. Default 200.
DOCUMENT_MAX_SLIDES=
# GAIT audit trail path. Defaults under ~/.openclaw/gait/
DOCUMENT_AUDIT_LOG=

# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Zabbix SNMP-Poller NMS — spec 083 (roadmap R11)
# Server: mcp-servers/zabbix-mcp  (VENDORED third-party, GPL-3.0, unmodified)
#
# Runs from a DEDICATED VIRTUALENV. Not optional: it needs fastmcp 3.x while
# five NetClaw servers pin fastmcp<3. A shared install breaks all five.
#
# Strictly READ-ONLY. There is no write path in this integration.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Command the three zabbix skills invoke (the venv interpreter)
ZABBIX_MCP_CMD=
# Base URL of your Zabbix front end, e.g. https://zabbix.example.com
# (the API lives at <url>/api_jsonrpc.php)
ZABBIX_URL=
# API TOKEN, not a password. Users -> API tokens in the Zabbix UI.
# Token auth is required for forward-compatibility: the older in-request
# credential property still works on 7.0 but is REMOVED in 7.2+.
ZABBIX_TOKEN=
# TLS verification. Defaults to true. Import your CA rather than disabling
# this — disabling it exposes the API token to interception.
VERIFY_SSL=
# Read-only. NetClaw FORCES this to true in config/openclaw.json and you
# should not override it. The reason it is forced rather than inherited:
# the upstream library defaults it to true (utils.py:29) but the upstream
# LAUNCHER defaults it to false (scripts/start_server.py:139), so running
# it the documented upstream way would enable writes.
READ_ONLY=
# Destructive-method deny-list (regex, comma separated). Second layer, set
# in config/openclaw.json. Holds even if READ_ONLY is misconfigured.
ZABBIX_API_BLACKLIST=

# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Kubernetes (read-only) — spec 084 (roadmap R14)
# Server: mcp-servers/k8s-mcp  (VENDORED third-party, Apache-2.0, pinned v0.0.66)
#
# STRICTLY READ-ONLY. No write path. Secrets are denied.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Command the three k8s skills invoke (the pinned binary)
K8S_MCP_CMD=
# Path to a kubeconfig. THIS MUST BE EXPLICIT AND DEDICATED.
#
# Do NOT point this at ~/.kube/config. Every Kubernetes MCP server defaults to
# the ambient current-context, so a server started against your personal
# kubeconfig talks to whatever cluster you last used — possibly production.
#
# Generate a token-only kubeconfig for a dedicated ServiceAccount bound to a
# ClusterRole with get/list/watch on pods, services, ingresses, networkpolicies,
# endpointslices, namespaces and events — and NO secrets.
#
# It must be TOKEN-ONLY: a kubeconfig that also carries a client certificate
# silently ignores the token and authenticates as the cert's identity instead.
#
# Cluster-wide read is required, not optional. With it, the upstream server's
# silent-narrowing path is unreachable; without it, a cluster-wide question can
# come back scoped to one namespace with no error and no caveat.
K8S_KUBECONFIG=

# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Cisco Catalyst Center (read-only) — spec 087
# Server: mcp-servers/catc-mcp  (NetClaw client over Cisco's official catalogue)
#
# STRICTLY READ-ONLY. All 514 GET operations; the one mutating operation in
# the upstream bundle is excluded from the catalogue entirely.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Base URL, e.g. https://sandboxdnac.cisco.com
# NOTE the DevNet always-on sandboxes share credentials and are NOT equivalent:
#   sandboxdnac.cisco.com   -> 4 devices, 25 sites   (use this one)
#   sandboxdnac2.cisco.com  -> 0 devices,  1 site    (authenticates, but empty)
# An inventory answer from the second looks identical to a real empty estate,
# which is why every response names the appliance it came from.
CATALYST_CENTER_HOST=
# Use a DEDICATED, LEAST-PRIVILEGE, READ-ONLY account. The upstream project is
# explicit that its catalogue "does not enforce read-only access"; NetClaw's
# curation is one control and this account's RBAC is the other.
CATALYST_CENTER_USERNAME=
CATALYST_CENTER_PASSWORD=
# TLS verification. Defaults to true. The DevNet sandboxes use self-signed
# certificates, so a lab needs false — never disable it against production.
CATALYST_CENTER_VERIFY_SSL=

# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Lantronix Percepxion + SLC — spec 104. External/on-demand, not vendored:
# both are Lantronix's own actively co-developed repos. See
# specs/104-percepxion-oob-integration/spec.md and workspace/skills/
# percepxion-oob/SKILL.md for the full env var reference and install steps.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# percepxion-mcp-server: fleet-wide OOB console-server SaaS
PERCEPXION_USERNAME=
PERCEPXION_PASSWORD=
# Default: https://api.percepxion.ai/api. Use api.gopercepxion.ai only for the
# Lantronix internal sandbox — the wrong domain causes silent auth failures.
PERCEPXION_API_URL=

# slc-mcp-server: direct, synchronous single-device OOB console-server access.
# {KEY} is the device identifier, uppercased, non-alphanumeric replaced with
# `_` (e.g. device_id "slc9000-dc-a" -> SLC_SLC9000_DC_A_IP). SLC_DEFAULT_IP/
# USERNAME/PASSWORD below apply when device_id isn't in the per-device set.
SLC_DEFAULT_IP=
SLC_USERNAME=
SLC_PASSWORD=
# SLC_{KEY}_IP=
# SLC_{KEY}_USERNAME=
# SLC_{KEY}_PASSWORD=

# --- Session Budget Guardrails (spec 109) ---
# Per-session cost ceiling in USD. Sessions halt when cumulative cost reaches this.
# Override this to set a quick cap without modifying openclaw.json.
# Default: 5.0 (safe for hobby/personal deployments)
NETCLAW_SESSION_BUDGET_USD=5.0

# --- NetClaw for Zoom: Meeting Intelligence (spec 118) ---
# Zoom Marketplace app credentials (General App, User-managed OAuth) — see
# docs/ZOOM-MEETING-INTELLIGENCE.md for setup.
ZOOM_CLIENT_ID=
ZOOM_CLIENT_SECRET=
ZOOM_ACCOUNT_ID=
# Event Subscription secret token — verifies the RTMS webhook handshake.
ZOOM_RTMS_WEBHOOK_SECRET=
# zoom-rtms-mcp's own local ports (not exposed publicly by NetClaw itself —
# front with your own HTTPS ingress, e.g. a tunnel or reverse proxy).
ZOOM_RTMS_WEBHOOK_PORT=8899
ZOOM_PANEL_FEED_PORT=8900
# Loopback-only channel between zoom-rtms-mcp and the Border federation daemon
# (bgp/federation/zoom_channel.py). Both must agree on the same port/secret.
N2N_ZOOM_CHANNEL_HOST=127.0.0.1
N2N_ZOOM_CHANNEL_PORT=
N2N_ZOOM_CHANNEL_SECRET=
# Official Zoom Meetings MCP credential (historical meeting search/assets) —
# exact shape TBD pending confirmation against Zoom's own connector setup flow.
ZOOM_MEETING_MCP_CREDENTIAL=