Summary

FieldIdToIndex() in src/bfbs_gen.h and ForAllFields() in src/reflection.cpp use field->id() as a direct array index into a vector sized by the number of fields, without bounds checking. Since field->id() is a uint16_t read from the binary FlatBuffer Schema (BFBS), a crafted .bfbs file can specify field IDs up to 65535 while having only 2 fields - causing a heap out-of-bounds write of up to 262,132 bytes past the allocation.

The FlatBuffers binary verifier (reflection::VerifySchemaBuffer) validates structural integrity but does not enforce the semantic constraint field->id() < object->fields()->size(). A malicious BFBS file passes verification, then triggers the OOB write when processed.

This issue was reported to Google VRP and closed with permission to publicly disclose.

Affected Version

• Repository: google/flatbuffers
• Commit: 94d6b80 (flatc 25.12.19)
• Affected files: src/bfbs_gen.h, src/reflection.cpp

Root Cause

Location 1: src/bfbs_gen.h L68-79

static std::vector<uint32_t> FieldIdToIndex(const reflection::Object* object) {
  std::vector<uint32_t> field_index_by_id;
  field_index_by_id.resize(object->fields()->size());  // e.g., size = 2

  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < object->fields()->size(); ++i) {
    auto field = object->fields()->Get(i);
    field_index_by_id[field->id()] = i;  // BUG: field->id() can be 0..65535
  }
  return field_index_by_id;
}

Location 2: src/reflection.cpp L379-394

Same pattern - field_to_id_map[field->id()] = i with no bounds check.

Why Verification Doesn't Catch This

The generated verifier (reflection_generated.h L683-706) only checks:

VerifyField<uint16_t>(verifier, VT_ID, 2)

This validates the id field is a properly-located uint16_t. It does NOT check id() < parent_object->fields()->size().

Reproduction

Build the harness

g++ -std=c++17 -fsanitize=address -g -I include/ -o oob_harness oob_harness.cpp

Generate the patched BFBS

Use the included patch_bfbs.py to set field->id() to 65535 in a valid BFBS file.

Run

ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 ./oob_harness oob_test_patched.bfbs

ASAN Output

AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
==70269==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: BUS on unknown address
==70269==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access.
    #0 0x1021dd968 in FieldIdToIndex_Vulnerable(reflection::Object const*) oob_harness.cpp:47
    #1 0x1021dcfe8 in main oob_harness.cpp:111

Register values:
  x[1] = 0x000000000000ffff   ← field->id() = 65535

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: BUS oob_harness.cpp:47 in FieldIdToIndex_Vulnerable

PoC Output

[*] Object: OOBTest.TestTable (2 fields)
  Field[0]: field_a, id=0, offset=4
  Field[1]: field_b, id=65535, offset=6

[*] Calling FieldIdToIndex (equivalent to bfbs_gen.h:68-79)...
  [!] OOB DETECTED: field->id()=65535 >= array_size=2
  [!] About to write to index 65535 (OOB by 65533 elements = 262132 bytes)

Impact

• CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write)
• CVSS 3.1: 8.1 HIGH - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
• Controlled write of a uint32_t value at a controlled offset (up to 262,140 bytes past allocation)
• Triggers via flatc --lua, flatc --nim, flatc --annotate, or any application using the reflection API's ForAllFields()
• CI/CD pipelines processing untrusted .bfbs files are directly exploitable

Suggested Fix

Add bounds check on field->id():

for (uint32_t i = 0; i < num_fields; ++i) {
  auto field = object->fields()->Get(i);
  if (field->id() < num_fields) {
    field_index_by_id[field->id()] = i;
  }
}

Or add semantic validation to VerifySchemaBuffer() checking field->id() < object->fields()->size().

Related

• VRP-FB-014: VerifySchemaBuffer() semantic bypass enables this finding - the verifier passes on the malicious BFBS.

asan_output.txt
oob_harness.cpp
patch_bfbs.py