S-162 Prevent frontrunning permit DOSing intent#75
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shunkakinoki merged 8 commits intomasterfrom Nov 26, 2025
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LGTM this is not Medium severity |
Agusx1211
previously approved these changes
Nov 26, 2025
…ermit handling logic
fab84de
…cription hash to intent signature
… intent signature computation
…t performance adjustments and ensure accuracy in gas usage metrics. Minor updates made to individual test cases for consistency.
…lity and maintainability. Adjusted try-catch structure for better clarity in handling potential frontrunning scenarios.
…roved readability. Consolidated call parameters into a single line for clarity.
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S-162 An attacker can block users from calling depositToIntentWithPermit()
https://code4rena.com/audits/2025-11-sequence-transaction-rails/submissions/S-162
Issue: An attack can read the permit signature from the mempool and front run the
token.permitcall, preventing thedepositToIntentWithPermitcall from passing.Analysis: This DOS can be run against any
depositToIntentWithPermitcall. While a user could retry the transaction by callingdepositToIntentwith the same signatures, excluding the permit call, this requires an additional transaction. IIRC This flow is not for intent addresses (that only have access to pre-approved transactions) so we should be fine to retry, but it's an annoyance we could prevent.Fix: Try/catch the
token.permit()call, ignoring failure. If the permit call was frontrun, the following transfer call will pass.