Security Audit: PrimeSkill Gaming Protocol

Independent Security Assessment of Solana Gaming Program

Overview

This repository contains a comprehensive security audit of PrimeSkill Studio's gaming protocol built on Solana. The protocol implements a Win-2-Earn gaming platform with wagered gameplay, player matching, and automated prize distribution.

Audit Summary

Metric	Value
Total Findings	34 Issues
Critical	7 Issues
High	9 Issues
Medium	13 Issues
Low	3 Issues
Informational	2 Issues
Audit Date	September 26, 2025
Auditor	AlphaR

Key Vulnerabilities

Critical Issues (Must Fix Before Launch)

• FC-002: Integer underflow allowing unlimited spawn exploit
• FC-001: Space calculation errors causing deployment failures
• FC-006: Players can join both teams in same game
• FC-004: Unsafe AccountInfo usage bypassing type safety
• FC-005: Missing vault balance reconciliation

Economic Model Flaws

• Pay-to-spawn system rewards purchasing over skill
• Same pricing for game entry vs additional spawns
• No spawn limits allowing game manipulation
• Winner determination lacks proper validation

Architecture Risks

• Centralized backend controls all game outcomes
• Individual vaults per game increase costs
• Missing duplicate player prevention
• No proper authority validation

Repository Structure

├── README.md                    # This file
├── AUDIT-REPORT.md             # Complete technical audit report
├── findings/
│   ├── CRITICAL.md             # 7 critical vulnerabilities
│   ├── HIGH.md                 # 9 high severity issues  
│   ├── MEDIUM.md               # 13 medium priority findings
│   └── LOW.md                  # 3 low + 2 informational issues
├── exploits/
│   ├── exploit.rs    # Demonstrates All Exploits
│  
├── fixes/
│   ├── critical.rs       # Required fixes for deployment
│   ├── high.rs 
│   ├── low.rs 
│   ├── medium.rs 
└── artifacts/        
    └── outputs/          # Exploit demonstration results

Critical Vulnerabilities

1. Spawn System Integer Underflow (FC-002)

Severity: Critical | Impact: Game-breaking exploit

When players have 0 spawns and get killed, the underflow creates 65,535 spawns:

// Vulnerable code
self.team_a.player_spawns[victim_player_index] -= 1;  // 0 - 1 = 65,535

2. Space Calculation Error (FC-001)

Severity: Critical | Impact: Deployment failure

Space calculations treat u16 as 16 bytes instead of 2 bytes, causing 66% rent overpayment:

// Wrong: 731 bytes allocated
// Should be: 441 bytes

3. Economic Exploitation (FC-006 + Economic Model)

Severity: Critical | Impact: Platform manipulation

• Players can join both teams and guarantee wins
• Pay-to-spawn rewards buying spawns over skill
• No limits on spawn purchases create unfair advantages

Recommendations

Immediate Actions (Deployment Blockers)

1. Fix integer underflow with proper bounds checking
2. Correct space calculations using Anchor's InitSpace
3. Implement duplicate player prevention
4. Add proper vault state tracking
5. Validate all input parameters

Architecture Improvements

1. Consider central vault vs individual vaults
2. Implement proper economic model for pay-to-spawn
3. Add comprehensive input validation
4. Create configuration account for game parameters

Security Enhancements

1. Implement spawn limits and validation
2. Add proper authority checks
3. Create emergency pause functionality
4. Establish monitoring and alerting systems

Testing

The audit includes proof-of-concept exploits demonstrating:

• Spawn overflow attack vectors
• Economic manipulation scenarios
• Space calculation failures
• Account validation bypasses

See fixes/ directory for working demonstrations.

Impact Assessment

Financial Risk: High - Multiple vectors for fund drainage and manipulation
Operational Risk: Critical - Deployment will fail with current space calculations
Operational Cost: Due to improper size calculations and too much space allocations, there might be increase to compute cost

Audit Methodology

• Manual Code Review: Line-by-line analysis of all the logic in the program
• Attack Vector Analysis: Systematic vulnerability assessment
• Economic Model Review: Game theory and incentive analysis
• Integration Testing: End-to-end flow validation

Disclaimer

This audit represents an independent security assessment conducted on September 26, 2025. The findings are based on the code provided at the time of review. Any subsequent changes may introduce new vulnerabilities not covered in this assessment.

Contact

Auditor: AlphaR
GitHub: @AlphaR2

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