Merge pull request #1003 from Nikoleta-v3/references

References

Author: drvinceknight

.gitignore

@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ ENV/
 # Rope project settings
 .ropeproject
 
+
+# Pycharm Files
+.idea/
+
 # Sublime Text settings
 *.sublime-*
 

axelrod/strategies/better_and_better.py

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ class BetterAndBetter(Player):
     Therefore it is less and less likely to defect as the round goes on.
 
     Names:
-        - Better and Better: [PRISON1998]_
+        - Better and Better: [Prison1998]_
 
     """
 

axelrod/strategies/doubler.py

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ class Doubler(Player):
 
     Names:
 
-    - Doubler: [PRISON1998]_
+    - Doubler: [Prison1998]_
     """
 
     name = 'Doubler'

axelrod/strategies/grudger.py

@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ class GrudgerAlternator(Player):
 
     Names:
 
-    - c_then_per_dc: [PRISON1998]_
+    - c_then_per_dc: [Prison1998]_
     - Grudger Alternator: Original name by Geraint Palmer
     """
 
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ class EasyGo(Player):
 
     Names:
 
-    - Easy Go [PRISON1998]_
+    - Easy Go [Prison1998]_
     """
 
     name = 'EasyGo'

axelrod/strategies/prober.py

@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ class Prober4(Player):
 
     Names:
 
-    - prober4: [PRISON1998]_
+    - prober4: [Prison1998]_
     """
 
     name = 'Prober 4'

axelrod/strategies/titfortat.py

@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ class SpitefulTitForTat(Player):
 
     Names:
 
-    - Spiteful Tit For Tat [PRISON1998]_
+    - Spiteful Tit For Tat [Prison1998]_
     """
 
     name = 'Spiteful Tit For Tat'
@@ -603,14 +603,15 @@ def reset(self):
         super().reset()
         self.retaliating = False
 
+
 class SlowTitForTwoTats2(Player):
     """
     A player plays C twice, then if the opponent plays the same move twice,
     plays that move, otherwise plays previous move.
 
     Names:
 
-    - Slow Tit For Tat [PRISON1998]_
+    - Slow Tit For Tat [Prison1998]_
     """
 
     name = 'Slow Tit For Two Tats 2'

axelrod/strategies/worse_and_worse.py

@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ class WorseAndWorse(Player):
     Defects with probability of 'current turn / 1000'. Therefore
     it is more and more likely to defect as the round goes on.
 
-    Source code available at the download tab of [PRISON1998]_
+    Source code available at the download tab of [Prison1998]_
 
 
     Names:
-        - Worse and Worse: [PRISON1998]_
+        - Worse and Worse: [Prison1998]_
     """
 
     name = 'Worse and Worse'
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ class WorseAndWorse2(Player):
     Therefore it is more and more likely to defect as the round goes on.
 
     Names:
-        - Worse and Worse 2: [PRISON1998]_
+        - Worse and Worse 2: [Prison1998]_
     """
 
     name = 'Worse and Worse 2'
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ class WorseAndWorse3(Player):
     proportion of the turns.
 
     Names:
-        - Worse and Worse 3: [PRISON1998]_
+        - Worse and Worse 3: [Prison1998]_
     """
 
     name = 'Worse and Worse 3'

docs/reference/bibliography.rst

@@ -18,8 +18,10 @@ documentation.
 .. [Axelrod1984]  The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-02121-2.
 .. [Axelrod1995] Wu, J. and Axelrod, R. (1995). How to cope with noise in the Iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39(1), pp. 183–189. doi: 10.1177/0022002795039001008.
 .. [Banks1980] Banks, J. S., & Sundaram, R. K. (1990). Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity. Games and Economic Behavior, 2(2), 97–117.  http://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90024-O
+.. [Bendor1993] Bendor, Jonathan, et al. “Cooperation Under Uncertainty: What Is New, What Is True, and What Is Important.” American Sociological Review, vol. 61, no. 2, 1996, pp. 333–338., www.jstor.org/stable/2096337.
 .. [Beaufils1997] Beaufils, B. and Delahaye, J. (1997). Our Meeting With Gradual: A Good Strategy For The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.42.4041
 .. [Berg2015] Berg, P. Van Den, & Weissing, F. J. (2015). The importance of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 282.
+.. [Flood1958] Merrill M. Flood. Some Experimental Games, 1958.
 .. [Frean1994] Frean, Marcus R. “The Prisoner's Dilemma without Synchrony.” Proceedings: Biological Sciences, vol. 257, no. 1348, 1994, pp. 75–79. www.jstor.org/stable/50253.
 .. [Hilde2013] Hilbe, C., Nowak, M.A. and Traulsen, A. (2013). Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance, PLoS ONE, 8(11), p. e77886. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0077886.
 .. [Kraines1989] Kraines, D. & Kraines, V. Theor Decis (1989) 26: 47.  doi:10.1007/BF00134056
@@ -33,7 +35,7 @@ documentation.
 .. [Nowak1992] Nowak, M. a., & May, R. M. (1992). Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature. http://doi.org/10.1038/359826a0
 .. [Nowak1993] Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1993). A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Nature, 364(6432), 56–58. http://doi.org/10.1038/364056a0
 .. [Press2012] Press, W. H., & Dyson, F. J. (2012). Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(26), 10409–10413.  http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1206569109
-.. [PRISON1998] LIFL (1998) PRISON. Available at: http://www.lifl.fr/IPD/ipd.frame.html (Accessed: 19 September 2016).
+.. [Prison1998] LIFL (1998) PRISON. Available at: http://www.lifl.fr/IPD/ipd.frame.html (Accessed: 19 September 2016).
 .. [Robson1989] Robson, Arthur, (1989), EFFICIENCY IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES: DARWIN, NASH AND SECRET HANDSHAKE, Working Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory, http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:michet:89-22.
 .. [Singer-Clark2014] Singer-Clark, T. (2014). Morality Metrics On Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Players.
 .. [Shakarian2013] Shakarian, P., Roos, P. & Moores, G. A Novel Analytical Method for Evolutionary Graph Theory Problems.

docs/tutorials/further_topics/noisy_tournaments.rst

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Noisy tournaments
 A common variation on iterated prisoner’s dilemma tournaments is to add
 stochasticity in the choice of actions, simply called noise. This noise is
 introduced by flipping plays between ‘C’ and ‘D’ with some probability that is
-applied to all plays after they are delivered by the player.
+applied to all plays after they are delivered by the player [Bendor1993]_.
 
 The presence of this persistent background noise causes some strategies to
 behave substantially differently. For example, :code:`TitForTat` can fall into

docs/tutorials/further_topics/probabilistict_end_tournaments.rst

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Probabilistic Ending Tournaments
 
 It is possible to create a tournament where the length of each Match is not
 constant for all encounters: after each turn the Match ends with a given
-probability::
+probability, [Axelrod1980b]_::
 
     >>> import axelrod as axl
     >>> players = [axl.Cooperator(), axl.Defector(),