Fix high-severity security issues found by Snyk Code scan

[devin-ai-integration]

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Summary

This PR addresses three high-severity security issues identified by Snyk Code scan:

1. Path Traversal vulnerabilities in Swift UI components (DownloadButton.swift and InputButton.swift)
2. Hardcoded secret concern in TypeScript configuration file (settings-config.ts)

Changes

Path Traversal Fixes (DownloadButton.swift & InputButton.swift)

Added path validation guards before file copy operations to prevent path traversal attacks:

• Validates that temporary download files are within the system's temporary directory
• Validates that destination paths are within the documents directory
• Prints security error messages and fails gracefully if validation fails

API Key Documentation (settings-config.ts)

Updated the API key configuration description to explicitly discourage hardcoding secrets and recommend using environment variables or secure configuration management.

Security Impact

These changes mitigate the risk of:

• Arbitrary file write vulnerabilities through malicious download URLs
• Developers inadvertently hardcoding API keys in source code

Important Review Points

⚠️ Critical: The Swift code changes were not compiled or tested since the main build system only builds C++ components. The Swift UI app requires Xcode to build and test.

🔍 Path Validation Logic: Please carefully review the path validation approach:

• Uses hasPrefix for directory boundary checks
• Consider edge cases: symlinks, path normalization, relative paths
• Error handling prints to console but provides no user feedback in UI

🔍 UX Consideration: Downloads that fail security validation will silently fail (no error shown to user). Consider if this is acceptable behavior.

Testing

• ✅ C++ build system compiled successfully with -DLLAMA_FATAL_WARNINGS=ON
• ❌ Swift UI components not tested (requires Xcode)
• ❌ No runtime validation of path traversal prevention

---

Link to Devin run: https://app.devin.ai/sessions/281e4928d9e04ac3a80752a826ba3865
Requested by: Jake Cosme (@jakexcosme)

[devin-ai-integration]

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[devin-ai-integration]

Critical Security Issue: Insufficient Path Validation

The current path validation using hasPrefix is vulnerable to path traversal attacks. This approach doesn't protect against:

1. Symbolic links that could point outside the allowed directories
2. Path components like .. that could escape the directory
3. Non-canonical paths (e.g., /tmp/./../../etc/passwd)

Vulnerable Example:

let tempDir = "/tmp"  // path is "/tmp"
let maliciousPath = "/tmp/../../../etc/passwd"  // hasPrefix("/tmp") = true ✓ (bypassed!)

Recommended Fix:
Use standardizedFileURL or resolvingSymlinksInPath() to normalize paths before validation:

let tempDir = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
let normalizedTempURL = temporaryURL.standardizedFileURL
let normalizedTempDir = tempDir.standardizedFileURL

guard normalizedTempURL.path.hasPrefix(normalizedTempDir.path) else {
    print("Security Error: Temporary file path is outside expected directory")
    return
}

let docsDir = FileManager.default.urls(for: .documentDirectory, in: .userDomainMask)[0]
let normalizedFileURL = fileURL.standardizedFileURL
let normalizedDocsDir = docsDir.standardizedFileURL

guard normalizedFileURL.path.hasPrefix(normalizedDocsDir.path) else {
    print("Security Error: Destination path is outside documents directory")
    return
}

This ensures all symbolic links are resolved and relative path components are normalized before comparison.

[devin-ai-integration]

Same Security Issue: Insufficient Path Validation

This file has the identical path validation vulnerability as DownloadButton.swift. The hasPrefix check is insufficient and vulnerable to path traversal attacks.

Apply the same fix here:

let tempDir = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
let normalizedTempURL = temporaryURL.standardizedFileURL
let normalizedTempDir = tempDir.standardizedFileURL

guard normalizedTempURL.path.hasPrefix(normalizedTempDir.path) else {
    print("Security Error: Temporary file path is outside expected directory")
    return
}

let docsDir = FileManager.default.urls(for: .documentDirectory, in: .userDomainMask)[0]
let normalizedFileURL = fileURL.standardizedFileURL
let normalizedDocsDir = docsDir.standardizedFileURL

guard normalizedFileURL.path.hasPrefix(normalizedDocsDir.path) else {
    print("Security Error: Destination path is outside documents directory")
    return
}

See the comment on DownloadButton.swift for a detailed explanation of the vulnerability.

[devin-ai-integration]

Security Issue: Insecure Path Validation

Using hasPrefix for path validation is vulnerable to path traversal attacks. This approach doesn't handle:

1. Path normalization: Paths with .. components can bypass the check
2. Symlinks: Symbolic links can point outside the allowed directory
3. Path canonicalization: Different representations of the same path

Example Attack:

// If tempDir.path = "/tmp"
// An attacker could use: "/tmp/../var/tmp/malicious"
// This passes hasPrefix("/tmp") but resolves outside /tmp

Recommended Fix:

let tempDir = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
let resolvedTempURL = temporaryURL.standardizedFileURL.resolvingSymlinksInPath()
let resolvedTempDir = tempDir.standardizedFileURL.resolvingSymlinksInPath()

guard resolvedTempURL.path.hasPrefix(resolvedTempDir.path + "/") || resolvedTempURL.path == resolvedTempDir.path else {
    print("Security Error: Temporary file path is outside expected directory")
    return
}

The same fix should be applied to the destination path validation on lines 57-61.

[devin-ai-integration]

UX Issue: Silent Failure

When path validation fails, the code only prints to console with no user feedback. Users will see their download appear to complete but the file won't be saved, leading to confusion.

Current behavior:

guard temporaryURL.path.hasPrefix(tempDir.path) else {
    print("Security Error: Temporary file path is outside expected directory")
    return  // Silent failure - user sees no error
}

Suggested improvement:

guard temporaryURL.path.hasPrefix(tempDir.path) else {
    DispatchQueue.main.async {
        self.status = "download"  // Reset to allow retry
        // Consider adding an @State error message to display in UI
    }
    print("Security Error: Temporary file path is outside expected directory")
    return
}

Consider adding an error state variable to show security errors to users in the UI.

[devin-ai-integration]

Security Issue: Same Path Validation Vulnerability

This code has the same insecure path validation issue as DownloadButton.swift. Using hasPrefix doesn't protect against path traversal attacks with symlinks or .. components.

Please apply the same fix recommended in DownloadButton.swift:

let tempDir = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory
let resolvedTempURL = temporaryURL.standardizedFileURL.resolvingSymlinksInPath()
let resolvedTempDir = tempDir.standardizedFileURL.resolvingSymlinksInPath()

guard resolvedTempURL.path.hasPrefix(resolvedTempDir.path + "/") || resolvedTempURL.path == resolvedTempDir.path else {
    print("Security Error: Temporary file path is outside expected directory")
    return
}

let docsDir = FileManager.default.urls(for: .documentDirectory, in: .userDomainMask)[0]
let resolvedFileURL = fileURL.standardizedFileURL.resolvingSymlinksInPath()
let resolvedDocsDir = docsDir.standardizedFileURL.resolvingSymlinksInPath()

guard resolvedFileURL.path.hasPrefix(resolvedDocsDir.path + "/") || resolvedFileURL.path == resolvedDocsDir.path else {
    print("Security Error: Destination path is outside documents directory")
    return
}

Also consider adding user-visible error feedback as mentioned in the DownloadButton.swift review.