chore(deps): update dependency vue-i18n to v9.14.5 [security] #1311

renovate · 2024-12-02T17:43:51Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
vue-i18n (source)	`9.14.1` → `9.14.5`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-52809

Vulnerability type

XSS

Description

vue-i18n can be passed locale messages to createI18n or useI18n.
we can then translate them using t and $t.
vue-i18n has its own syntax for local messages, and uses a message compiler to generate AST.
In order to maximize the performance of the translation function, vue-i18n uses bundler plugins such as @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n and bulder to convert the AST in advance when building the application.
By using that AST as the locale message, it is no longer necessary to compile, and it is possible to translate using the AST.

The AST generated by the message compiler has special properties for each node in the AST tree to maximize performance. In the PoC example below, it is a static property, but that is just one of the optimizations.
About details of special properties, see https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/blob/master/packages/message-compiler/src/nodes.ts

In general, the locale messages of vue-i18n are optimized during production builds using @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n,
so there is always a property that is attached during optimization like this time.
But if you are using a locale message AST in development mode or your own, there is a possibility of XSS if a third party injects.

Reproduce (PoC)

<!doctype html>
<html>
  <head>
    <meta charset="utf-8" />
    <title>vue-i18n XSS</title>
    <script src="https://unpkg.com/vue@3"></script>
    <script src="https://unpkg.com/vue-i18n@10"></script>
    <!-- Scripts that perform prototype contamination, such as being distributed from malicious hosting sites or injected through supply chain attacks, etc. -->
    <script>
      /**
       * Prototype pollution vulnerability with `Object.prototype`.
       * The 'static' property is part of the optimized AST generated by the vue-i18n message compiler.
       * About details of special properties, see https://github.com/intlify/vue-i18n/blob/master/packages/message-compiler/src/nodes.ts
       *
       * In general, the locale messages of vue-i18n are optimized during production builds using `@intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n`,
       * so there is always a property that is attached during optimization like this time.
       * But if you are using a locale message AST in development or your own, there is a possibility of XSS if a third party injects prototype pollution code.
       */
      Object.defineProperty(Object.prototype, 'static', {
        configurable: true,
        get() {
          alert('prototype polluted!')
          return 'prototype pollution'
        }
      })
    </script> 
 </head>
  <body>
    <div id="app">
      <p>{{ t('hello') }}</p>
    </div>
    <script>
      const { createApp } = Vue
      const { createI18n, useI18n } = VueI18n

      // AST style locale message, which build by `@intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n`
      const en = {
        hello: {
          type: 0,
          body: {
            items: [
              {
                type: 3,
                value: 'hello world!'
              }
            ]
          }
        }
      }

      const i18n = createI18n({
        legacy: false,
        locale: 'en',
        messages: {
          en
        }
      })

      const app = createApp({
        setup() {
          const { t } = useI18n()
          return { t }
        }
      })
      app.use(i18n)
      app.mount('#app')
    </script>
  </body>
</html>

Workarounds

Before v10.0.0, we can work around this vulnerability by using the regular compilation (jit: false of @intlify/unplugin-vue-i18n plugin configuration) way instead of jit compilation.

jit compilation: https://vue-i18n.intlify.dev/guide/advanced/optimization.html#jit-compilation
bundler plugin option: https://github.com/intlify/bundle-tools/tree/main/packages/unplugin-vue-i18n#jitcompilation

References

Simillar case: Vue 2 XSS vulnerability with prototype pollution

CVE-2024-52810

Vulnerability type: Prototype Pollution

Affected Package:

Product: @intlify/shared
Version: 10.0.4

Vulnerability Location(s):

node_modules/@intlify/shared/dist/shared.cjs:232:26

Description:

The latest version of @intlify/shared (10.0.4) is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the entry function(s) lib.deepCopy. An attacker can supply a payload with Object.prototype setter to introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain, causing denial of service (DoS) the minimum consequence.

Moreover, the consequences of this vulnerability can escalate to other injection-based attacks, depending on how the library integrates within the application. For instance, if the polluted property propagates to sensitive Node.js APIs (e.g., exec, eval), it could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the application's context.

PoC:

// install the package with the latest version
~$ npm install @&#8203;intlify/[email protected]
// run the script mentioned below 
~$ node poc.js
//The expected output (if the code still vulnerable) is below. 
// Note that the output may slightly differs from function to another.
Before Attack:  {}
After Attack:  {"pollutedKey":123}

(async () => {
const lib = await import('@&#8203;intlify/shared');
var someObj = {}
console.log("Before Attack: ", JSON.stringify({}.__proto__));
try {
// for multiple functions, uncomment only one for each execution.
lib.deepCopy (JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"pollutedKey":123}}'), someObj)
} catch (e) { }
console.log("After Attack: ", JSON.stringify({}.__proto__));
delete Object.prototype.pollutedKey;
})();

References

Prototype Pollution Leading to Remote Code Execution - An example of how prototype pollution can lead to command code injection.

OWASP Prototype Pollution Prevention Cheat Sheet - Best practices for preventing prototype pollution.

PortSwigger Guide on Preventing Prototype Pollution - A detailed guide to securing your applications against prototype pollution.

CVE-2025-27597

Vulnerability type:
Prototype Pollution

Vulnerability Location(s):

# v9.1
node_modules/@&#8203;intlify/message-resolver/index.js

# v9.2 or later
node_modules/@&#8203;intlify/vue-i18n-core/index.js

Description:

The latest version of @intlify/message-resolver (9.1) and @intlify/vue-i18n-core (9.2 or later), (previous versions might also affected), is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the entry function(s) handleFlatJson. An attacker can supply a payload with Object.prototype setter to introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain, causing denial of service (DoS) a the minimum consequence.

Moreover, the consequences of this vulnerability can escalate to other injection-based attacks, depending on how the library integrates within the application. For instance, if the polluted property propagates to sensitive Node.js APIs (e.g., exec, eval), it could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the application's context.

PoC:

// install the package with the latest version
~$ npm install @&#8203;intlify/[email protected]
// run the script mentioned below 
~$ node poc.js
//The expected output (if the code still vulnerable) is below. 
// Note that the output may slightly differs from function to another.
Before Attack:  {}
After Attack:  {"pollutedKey":123}

// poc.js
(async () => {
    const lib = await import('@&#8203;intlify/message-resolver');
    var someObj = {}
    console.log("Before Attack: ", JSON.stringify({}.__proto__));
    try {
        // for multiple functions, uncomment only one for each execution.
        lib.handleFlatJson ({ "__proto__.pollutedKey": "pollutedValue" })
    } catch (e) { }
    console.log("After Attack: ", JSON.stringify({}.__proto__));
    delete Object.prototype.pollutedKey;
})();

CVE-2025-53892

Summary

The escapeParameterHtml: true option in Vue I18n is designed to protect against HTML/script injection by escaping interpolated parameters. However, this setting fails to prevent execution of certain tag-based payloads, such as <img src=x onerror=...>, if the interpolated value is inserted inside an HTML context using v-html.

This may lead to a DOM-based XSS vulnerability, even when using escapeParameterHtml: true, if a translation string includes minor HTML and is rendered via v-html.

Details

When escapeParameterHtml: true is enabled, it correctly escapes common injection points.

However, it does not sanitize entire attribute contexts, which can be used as XSS vectors via:

<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>

PoC

In your Vue I18n configuration:

const i18n = createI18n({
  escapeParameterHtml: true,
  messages: {
    en: {
      vulnerable: 'Caution: <img src=x onerror="{payload}">'
    }
  }
});

Use this interpolated payload:

const payload = '<script>alert("xss")</script>';
Render the translation using v-html (even not using v-html):

<p v-html="$t('vulnerable', { payload })"></p>
Expected: escaped content should render as text, not execute.

Actual: script executes in some environments (or the payload is partially parsed as HTML).

Impact

This creates a DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability despite enabling a security option (escapeParameterHtml) .

Release Notes

intlify/vue-i18n (vue-i18n)

`v9.14.5`

Compare Source

What's Changed

🔒 Security Fixes

fix: DOM-based XSS via tag attributes for escape parameter by @kazupon in #2230

Full Changelog: intlify/vue-i18n@v9.14.4...v9.14.5

`v9.14.4`

Compare Source

What's Changed

🐛 Bug Fixes

fix: cannot resolve the ast messages which has json path for v9 by @kazupon in #2162

Full Changelog: intlify/vue-i18n@v9.14.3...v9.14.4

`v9.14.3`

Compare Source

What's Changed

🔒 Security Fixes

fix: prototype pollution in handleFlatJson, about details see GHSA-p2ph-7g93-hw3m

Full Changelog: intlify/vue-i18n@v9.14.2...v9.14.3

`v9.14.2`

Compare Source

What's Changed

🔒 Security Fixes

fix: XSS vulnerability with prototype pollution on AST: GHSA-9r9m-ffp6-9x4v
fix: prototype pollusion on deepCopy: GHSA-hjwq-mjwj-4x6c

Full Changelog: intlify/vue-i18n@v9.14.1...v9.14.2

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

codecov · 2024-12-02T17:46:47Z

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 18.35%. Comparing base (222042a) to head (dc05771).

Additional details and impacted files

@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##           master    #1311   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   18.35%   18.35%           
=======================================
  Files         454      454           
  Lines       74865    74865           
  Branches     1594     1594           
=======================================
  Hits        13743    13743           
  Misses      61122    61122

Flag	Coverage Δ
unitTests	`18.35% <ø> (ø)`

Flags with carried forward coverage won't be shown. Click here to find out more.

☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry.
📢 Have feedback on the report? Share it here.

🚀 New features to boost your workflow:

❄️ Test Analytics: Detect flaky tests, report on failures, and find test suite problems.
📦 JS Bundle Analysis: Save yourself from yourself by tracking and limiting bundle sizes in JS merges.

github-actions · 2024-12-02T17:55:23Z

Playwright test results

2 failed
4 skipped

Details

6 tests across 3 suites
18 minutes, 6 seconds
dc05771

Failed tests

chromium-setup › auth.setup.ts › authenticate as user - ( @primary @slow @read @development @staging @production )
chromium-setup › auth.setup.ts › authenticate as admin - ( @primary @slow @read @development @staging @production )

Skipped tests

chromium › pages/myOrganization.test.ts › MyOrganization › Invitation Management: should display all required elements - ( @primary @slow @read @development @staging @production )
chromium › pages/myOrganization.test.ts › MyOrganization › User Management: should display all required elements - ( @primary @slow @read @development @staging @production )
chromium › pages/myOrganization.test.ts › MyOrganization › Organization Profile: should display all required elements - ( @primary @slow @read @development @staging @production )
chromium › pages/otherOrganizations.test.ts › OtherOrganizations › should have visible data-testids - ( @primary @slow @read @development @staging @production )

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 795f2ac to bb0685d Compare December 6, 2024 15:36

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from b8ca7b0 to a0e03f6 Compare December 13, 2024 17:02

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 3 times, most recently from c618d9b to 84dd9ef Compare January 1, 2025 20:06

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch from 84dd9ef to 3096b35 Compare January 8, 2025 21:19

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 3 times, most recently from 0843ef2 to c9474c8 Compare January 29, 2025 18:02

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from bb064ea to 16666e7 Compare February 6, 2025 17:27

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 4 times, most recently from 3ba7ebb to 7f200e7 Compare February 14, 2025 17:45

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 091766a to 8a8c0dd Compare February 21, 2025 20:48

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 3 times, most recently from 3bb140d to e6d8d8e Compare March 7, 2025 19:02

renovate bot changed the title ~~fix(deps): update dependency vue-i18n to v9.14.2 [security]~~ fix(deps): update dependency vue-i18n to v9.14.3 [security] Mar 7, 2025

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch from e6d8d8e to 55e0953 Compare March 11, 2025 13:05

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from cce4c99 to c980c8b Compare April 1, 2025 12:12

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch from c980c8b to a0f6dc4 Compare April 8, 2025 14:24

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch from a0f6dc4 to 3fd93ec Compare April 24, 2025 09:49

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch from e5dd9e9 to f8bedcd Compare July 31, 2025 18:45

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 4 times, most recently from 38134b5 to d76fe05 Compare August 14, 2025 06:42

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 7 times, most recently from 816299e to 551ff4e Compare August 22, 2025 19:53

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 3487643 to 4e6eaed Compare August 31, 2025 11:01

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 2d7703d to 2183977 Compare September 12, 2025 19:08

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 4 times, most recently from 2197e38 to c1cb01f Compare September 23, 2025 01:46

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch from c1cb01f to bd32ecf Compare September 23, 2025 06:28

renovate bot changed the title ~~fix(deps): update dependency vue-i18n to v9.14.5 [security]~~ chore(deps): update dependency vue-i18n to v9.14.5 [security] Sep 25, 2025

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from d1475d5 to 712db38 Compare October 3, 2025 05:57

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch from 712db38 to 1e57a10 Compare October 7, 2025 15:35

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch from 1e57a10 to 0c5c82a Compare October 21, 2025 17:16

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch from 0c5c82a to 84fc044 Compare November 10, 2025 20:45

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch from 84fc044 to a47cdf4 Compare November 18, 2025 10:52

chore(deps): update dependency vue-i18n to v9.14.5 [security]

dc05771

renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vue-i18n-vulnerability branch from a47cdf4 to dc05771 Compare December 31, 2025 16:04

Provide feedback

Saved searches

Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly

Uh oh!

chore(deps): update dependency vue-i18n to v9.14.5 [security] #1311

chore(deps): update dependency vue-i18n to v9.14.5 [security] #1311

Uh oh!

renovate bot commented Dec 2, 2024 •

edited

Loading

Uh oh!

codecov bot commented Dec 2, 2024 •

edited

Loading

Uh oh!

github-actions bot commented Dec 2, 2024 •

edited

Loading

Uh oh!

Reviewers

Assignees

Labels

Projects

Milestone

Development

Uh oh!

1 participant

chore(deps): update dependency vue-i18n to v9.14.5 [security] #1311

Are you sure you want to change the base?

chore(deps): update dependency vue-i18n to v9.14.5 [security] #1311

Uh oh!

Conversation

renovate bot commented Dec 2, 2024 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

Uh oh!

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

Vulnerability type

Description

Reproduce (PoC)

Workarounds

References

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Release Notes

What's Changed

🔒 Security Fixes

What's Changed

🐛 Bug Fixes

What's Changed

🔒 Security Fixes

What's Changed

🔒 Security Fixes

Configuration

Uh oh!

codecov bot commented Dec 2, 2024 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

Uh oh!

Codecov Report

Uh oh!

github-actions bot commented Dec 2, 2024 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

Uh oh!

Playwright test results

Details

Uh oh!

Reviewers

Assignees

Labels

Projects

Milestone

Development

Uh oh!

1 participant

renovate bot commented Dec 2, 2024 •

edited

Loading

codecov bot commented Dec 2, 2024 •

edited

Loading

github-actions bot commented Dec 2, 2024 •

edited

Loading