update on : Enhance Authentication Security with Rate Limiting and Input Validation #61 #101
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WalkthroughThis update introduces multiple security enhancements to the authentication system, including in-memory rate limiting, password complexity validation, account lockout after repeated failed logins, and security headers for HTTP responses. It also streamlines error handling, logging, and request validation across authentication-related modules, with minor improvements to route and middleware configuration. Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant FastAPI
participant RateLimiter
participant AuthService
participant MongoDB
Client->>FastAPI: POST /login/email (with credentials)
FastAPI->>RateLimiter: Check request count for client IP
RateLimiter-->>FastAPI: Allow or HTTP 429 if limit exceeded
FastAPI->>AuthService: authenticate_user_with_email()
AuthService->>MongoDB: Fetch user by email
AuthService->>MongoDB: Check lockout status, verify password
alt Account locked
AuthService-->>FastAPI: Raise HTTP 403 (locked)
else Password incorrect
AuthService->>MongoDB: Increment failed_login_attempts
alt Attempts >= 5
AuthService->>MongoDB: Set lockout_until
AuthService-->>FastAPI: Raise HTTP 403 (locked)
else
AuthService-->>FastAPI: Raise HTTP 401 (invalid)
end
else Success
AuthService->>MongoDB: Reset failed_login_attempts
AuthService-->>FastAPI: Return user info
end
FastAPI-->>Client: Response (success or error)
Estimated code review effort🎯 4 (Complex) | ⏱️ ~35 minutes Possibly related issues
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Actionable comments posted: 9
🧹 Nitpick comments (11)
backend/app/auth/security.py (1)
10-10: Consider restoring bcrypt fallback for robustness.The removal of the try-except fallback for bcrypt configuration could cause startup failures if bcrypt dependencies are missing. While the direct instantiation is cleaner, the fallback provided better error handling.
Consider restoring a basic fallback:
-pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["bcrypt"], deprecated="auto") +try: + pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["bcrypt"], deprecated="auto") +except Exception: + pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["bcrypt"])backend/app/auth/routes.py (4)
1-1: Remove unused import.The
Requestimport is flagged as unused by static analysis and should be removed since rate limiting is now handled via dependency injection.Apply this diff:
-from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, status, Depends, Request +from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, status, Depends
6-6: Remove unused ErrorResponse import.Static analysis correctly identifies that
ErrorResponseis imported but never used in this file.Apply this diff:
from app.auth.schemas import ( EmailSignupRequest, EmailLoginRequest, GoogleLoginRequest, RefreshTokenRequest, PasswordResetRequest, PasswordResetConfirm, - TokenVerifyRequest, AuthResponse, TokenResponse, SuccessResponse, - UserResponse, ErrorResponse + TokenVerifyRequest, AuthResponse, TokenResponse, SuccessResponse, + UserResponse )
9-9: Remove unused oauth2_scheme import.The
oauth2_schemeimport is unused in this file since OAuth2 dependency is handled in the security module.Apply this diff:
-from app.auth.security import create_access_token, oauth2_scheme +from app.auth.security import create_access_token
153-153: Remove unnecessary empty line.There's an extra empty line that should be removed for consistency.
backend/app/auth/schemas.py (2)
11-21: Strong password complexity validation with room for improvement.The password complexity requirements are comprehensive and security-focused. However, there's code duplication between the two validators.
Consider extracting the validation logic to a reusable function:
+def validate_password_complexity(password: str) -> str: + """Validate password complexity requirements.""" + if not re.search(r'[A-Z]', password): + raise ValueError('Password must contain at least one uppercase letter') + if not re.search(r'[a-z]', password): + raise ValueError('Password must contain at least one lowercase letter') + if not re.search(r'[0-9]', password): + raise ValueError('Password must contain at least one digit') + if not re.search(r'[!@#$%^&*(),.?":{}|<>]', password): + raise ValueError('Password must contain at least one special character') + return password + class EmailSignupRequest(BaseModel): # ... other fields ... @validator('password') def password_complexity(cls, v): - if not re.search(r'[A-Z]', v): - raise ValueError('Password must contain at least one uppercase letter') - # ... rest of validation ... - return v + return validate_password_complexity(v)Also applies to: 40-50
19-19: Consider expanding special character set.The current special character set is good but could be more comprehensive. Consider including additional commonly used special characters like
-_+=[]\/;'.Also applies to: 48-48
backend/main.py (3)
10-10: Remove unused import.Static analysis correctly identifies that
JSONResponseis imported but never used.Apply this diff:
-from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
36-36: Consider more restrictive CSP for production.The current CSP policy allows
'self'for default sources, which is good, but consider making it more restrictive for production environments.Consider environment-specific CSP policies:
- response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none';" + if settings.environment == "production": + response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = "default-src 'none'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; object-src 'none';" + else: + response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none';"
15-18: Consider restoring connection status logging.Removing the print statements reduces debugging capability. Consider using proper logging instead of completely removing connection status information.
+import logging + +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) + @asynccontextmanager async def lifespan(app: FastAPI): # Startup await connect_to_mongo() + logger.info("Application startup completed") yield # Shutdown await close_mongo_connection() + logger.info("Application shutdown completed")backend/app/auth/service.py (1)
59-353: Consider restoring method documentationThe AI summary indicates that all docstrings were removed. While focusing on security improvements, maintaining documentation is crucial for code maintainability and team collaboration.
Consider adding concise docstrings to public methods describing their purpose, parameters, and return values. This helps other developers understand the authentication flows without diving into implementation details.
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📒 Files selected for processing (6)
backend/app/auth/ratelimit.py(1 hunks)backend/app/auth/routes.py(5 hunks)backend/app/auth/schemas.py(2 hunks)backend/app/auth/security.py(2 hunks)backend/app/auth/service.py(9 hunks)backend/main.py(2 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
📓 Path-based instructions (5)
backend/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
Backend code must be implemented using FastAPI with Python 3.9+ and organized under the /backend/ directory.
Files:
backend/app/auth/security.pybackend/app/auth/ratelimit.pybackend/app/auth/routes.pybackend/app/auth/schemas.pybackend/main.pybackend/app/auth/service.py
backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py: Backend services should be modular, with authentication and user registration in app/auth/, user profile management in app/user/, group management in app/groups/, and expense tracking in app/expenses/.
When adding a new API endpoint, add the route to the appropriate service router file in the backend.
Files:
backend/app/auth/security.pybackend/app/auth/ratelimit.pybackend/app/auth/routes.pybackend/app/auth/schemas.pybackend/app/auth/service.py
backend/app/auth/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
JWT authentication with refresh token rotation must be implemented in the backend.
Files:
backend/app/auth/security.pybackend/app/auth/ratelimit.pybackend/app/auth/routes.pybackend/app/auth/schemas.pybackend/app/auth/service.py
backend/app/auth/security.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
To troubleshoot authentication issues, check JWT token handling in app/auth/security.py.
Files:
backend/app/auth/security.py
backend/main.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
The main FastAPI application entry point must be in backend/main.py.
Files:
backend/main.py
🧠 Learnings (6)
📓 Common learnings
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/security.py : To troubleshoot authentication issues, check JWT token handling in app/auth/security.py.
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/**/*.py : JWT authentication with refresh token rotation must be implemented in the backend.
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/auth/security.py : to troubleshoot authentication issues, check jwt token han...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/security.py : To troubleshoot authentication issues, check JWT token handling in app/auth/security.py.
Applied to files:
backend/app/auth/security.pybackend/app/auth/routes.pybackend/main.pybackend/app/auth/service.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : when adding a new api endpoint, add the...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : When adding a new API endpoint, add the route to the appropriate service router file in the backend.
Applied to files:
backend/app/auth/routes.pybackend/main.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/auth/**/*.py : jwt authentication with refresh token rotation must be impleme...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/**/*.py : JWT authentication with refresh token rotation must be implemented in the backend.
Applied to files:
backend/app/auth/routes.pybackend/app/auth/service.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/database.py : mongodb must be used for persistent data storage in the backend...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/database.py : MongoDB must be used for persistent data storage in the backend, with connection logic in backend/app/database.py.
Applied to files:
backend/main.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/config.py : backend configuration settings must be managed in backend/app/con...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/config.py : Backend configuration settings must be managed in backend/app/config.py.
Applied to files:
backend/app/auth/service.py
🧬 Code Graph Analysis (2)
backend/app/auth/security.py (1)
backend/app/auth/routes.py (1)
verify_token(172-188)
backend/main.py (1)
backend/app/database.py (2)
connect_to_mongo(10-18)close_mongo_connection(20-29)
🪛 Ruff (0.12.2)
backend/app/auth/routes.py
1-1: fastapi.Request imported but unused
Remove unused import: fastapi.Request
(F401)
6-6: app.auth.schemas.ErrorResponse imported but unused
Remove unused import: app.auth.schemas.ErrorResponse
(F401)
9-9: app.auth.security.oauth2_scheme imported but unused
Remove unused import: app.auth.security.oauth2_scheme
(F401)
18-18: Do not perform function call Depends in argument defaults; instead, perform the call within the function, or read the default from a module-level singleton variable
(B008)
backend/main.py
10-10: fastapi.responses.JSONResponse imported but unused
Remove unused import: fastapi.responses.JSONResponse
(F401)
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🔇 Additional comments (11)
backend/app/auth/security.py (1)
14-53: LGTM! Core security functions remain intact.The removal of docstrings and comments doesn't affect the security functionality. All critical functions (password hashing, token creation/verification, user authentication) maintain their original logic and security properties.
backend/app/auth/routes.py (2)
42-42: Excellent rate limiting integration.The rate limiting dependency is correctly applied to the most critical authentication endpoints (signup and login) where brute force attacks are most likely to occur. The implementation properly uses FastAPI's dependency injection system.
Also applies to: 74-74
24-24: Parameter mapping is correct and requires no changes.The
form_data.usernamefield is only used here to populate the
auth_service.authenticate_user_with_email. No other codepaths referenceform_data.username, and this aligns with the OAuth2PasswordRequestForm semantics (it uses “username” to carry the end-user’s email).• Occurrence verified in:
– backend/app/auth/routes.py:24
• No additional references toform_data.usernamefound in the codebase.backend/app/auth/schemas.py (2)
8-8: Excellent password security enhancement.Increasing the minimum password length from 6 to 8 characters significantly improves security against brute force attacks and aligns with current security best practices.
Also applies to: 38-38
9-9: Good addition of name length constraint.The maximum length constraint of 100 characters for the name field prevents potential buffer overflow issues and database storage problems.
backend/main.py (2)
29-37: Excellent security headers implementation.The security headers middleware provides strong protection against common web vulnerabilities:
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniffprevents MIME type sniffingX-Frame-Options: DENYprevents clickjackingX-XSS-Protectionenables XSS filteringContent-Security-Policyrestricts resource loading
50-51: Verify CORS wildcard configuration for production.Using wildcards for
allow_methodsandallow_headersis convenient for development but may be too permissive for production environments.Consider making CORS configuration environment-specific:
app.add_middleware( CORSMiddleware, allow_origins=allowed_origins, allow_credentials=True, - allow_methods=["*"], - allow_headers=["*"], + allow_methods=["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"] if settings.environment == "production" else ["*"], + allow_headers=["Authorization", "Content-Type", "Accept"] if settings.environment == "production" else ["*"], )backend/app/auth/service.py (4)
37-37: Good improvements to Firebase initializationThe changes improve the Firebase initialization:
- Proper handling of escaped newlines in the private key from environment variables
- Clear logging messages for debugging initialization issues
Also applies to: 49-49, 55-55, 57-57
84-86: Proper initialization of security fieldsNew user documents correctly initialize the account lockout fields with appropriate defaults.
152-157: Correct implementation of login attempt resetThe method properly resets both the failed attempt counter and lockout timestamp on successful login.
271-271: Correct ObjectId conversion for database queryGood fix - properly converts the string user ID from JWT to ObjectId for MongoDB query.
| # In-memory storage for rate limiting | ||
| # In a production environment, you might want to use Redis or another shared storage. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Add cleanup mechanism for production readiness.
The comment correctly identifies the need for Redis in production, but the current implementation lacks any cleanup mechanism for stale entries.
Consider adding a cleanup mechanism:
+import threading
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta
+
+# Cleanup stale entries periodically
+def cleanup_stale_entries():
+ current_time = time.time()
+ with _rate_limit_lock:
+ stale_ips = [
+ ip for ip, data in rate_limit_data.items()
+ if current_time - data["timestamp"] > RATE_LIMIT_DURATION * 2
+ ]
+ for ip in stale_ips:
+ del rate_limit_data[ip]Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/ratelimit.py around lines 5 to 6, the comment notes the use
of in-memory storage for rate limiting but lacks a cleanup mechanism for stale
entries. To fix this, implement a cleanup process that periodically removes
outdated or expired rate limit records from the in-memory store to prevent
memory bloat. This can be done by tracking timestamps for entries and scheduling
a cleanup function to purge stale data at regular intervals.
|
|
||
| # In-memory storage for rate limiting | ||
| # In a production environment, you might want to use Redis or another shared storage. | ||
| rate_limit_data = defaultdict(lambda: {"count": 0, "timestamp": 0}) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical memory leak and thread safety issues.
The defaultdict will grow indefinitely without cleanup, causing memory leaks in production. Additionally, the implementation is not thread-safe for concurrent requests from the same IP.
Apply this diff to add basic cleanup and improve thread safety:
-rate_limit_data = defaultdict(lambda: {"count": 0, "timestamp": 0})
+import threading
+from collections import defaultdict
+
+_rate_limit_lock = threading.Lock()
+rate_limit_data = defaultdict(lambda: {"count": 0, "timestamp": 0})Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/ratelimit.py at line 7, the use of defaultdict to store rate
limit data causes unbounded memory growth and is not thread-safe. To fix this,
implement a cleanup mechanism that periodically removes stale entries from
rate_limit_data to prevent memory leaks, and protect access to rate_limit_data
with a threading lock or other synchronization method to ensure thread safety
during concurrent requests.
| """ | ||
| Rate limiting dependency to prevent brute force attacks. | ||
| """ | ||
| client_ip = request.client.host |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
IP spoofing vulnerability.
Using request.client.host is vulnerable to IP spoofing through X-Forwarded-For headers. Consider using request.headers.get("x-real-ip") or implementing proper proxy IP detection.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/ratelimit.py at line 15, replace the usage of
request.client.host with a safer method to obtain the client IP address. Instead
of directly using request.client.host, retrieve the IP from the "x-real-ip"
header using request.headers.get("x-real-ip") or implement logic to properly
detect the real client IP behind proxies to prevent IP spoofing vulnerabilities.
| if current_time - rate_limit_data[client_ip]["timestamp"] > RATE_LIMIT_DURATION: | ||
| # Reset counter if duration has passed | ||
| rate_limit_data[client_ip]["count"] = 1 | ||
| rate_limit_data[client_ip]["timestamp"] = current_time | ||
| else: | ||
| rate_limit_data[client_ip]["count"] += 1 | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Logic error in counter reset and missing thread safety.
The counter is set to 1 instead of 0 when resetting, causing an off-by-one error. The first request after reset is incorrectly counted as the second request.
Apply this diff to fix the logic and add thread safety:
+ with _rate_limit_lock:
if current_time - rate_limit_data[client_ip]["timestamp"] > RATE_LIMIT_DURATION:
# Reset counter if duration has passed
- rate_limit_data[client_ip]["count"] = 1
+ rate_limit_data[client_ip]["count"] = 0
rate_limit_data[client_ip]["timestamp"] = current_time
- else:
- rate_limit_data[client_ip]["count"] += 1
+
+ rate_limit_data[client_ip]["count"] += 1📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| if current_time - rate_limit_data[client_ip]["timestamp"] > RATE_LIMIT_DURATION: | |
| # Reset counter if duration has passed | |
| rate_limit_data[client_ip]["count"] = 1 | |
| rate_limit_data[client_ip]["timestamp"] = current_time | |
| else: | |
| rate_limit_data[client_ip]["count"] += 1 | |
| with _rate_limit_lock: | |
| if current_time - rate_limit_data[client_ip]["timestamp"] > RATE_LIMIT_DURATION: | |
| # Reset counter if duration has passed | |
| rate_limit_data[client_ip]["count"] = 0 | |
| rate_limit_data[client_ip]["timestamp"] = current_time | |
| rate_limit_data[client_ip]["count"] += 1 |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/ratelimit.py around lines 18 to 24, the rate limit counter
is incorrectly reset to 1 instead of 0, causing an off-by-one error. Change the
reset value to 0 so the first request after reset is counted correctly.
Additionally, add thread safety by using a lock or synchronization mechanism
around the code that reads and updates rate_limit_data to prevent race
conditions in concurrent environments.
| # Configure logging | ||
| logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO) | ||
| logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Avoid using basicConfig in module-level code
Using logging.basicConfig() at the module level affects the entire application's logging configuration, which can interfere with other modules or the main application's logging setup. This should be configured at the application entry point instead.
Remove the basicConfig call:
-# Configure logging
-logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+# Configure logging
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)The logging level should be configured in the main application setup or through environment configuration.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| # Configure logging | |
| logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO) | |
| logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) | |
| # Configure logging | |
| logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/service.py around lines 16 to 18, remove the call to
logging.basicConfig() from the module-level code to avoid affecting the global
logging configuration. Keep only the logger initialization with
logging.getLogger(__name__), and ensure that logging configuration such as
setting the logging level is done in the main application entry point or through
environment-based configuration.
| # Account lockout settings | ||
| MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = 5 | ||
| LOCKOUT_DURATION = timedelta(minutes=15) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Move security constants to configuration settings
Account lockout parameters should be configurable through the settings module rather than hardcoded, allowing adjustment without code changes. This aligns with the backend configuration management pattern.
Move these constants to app/config.py and import them:
-# Account lockout settings
-MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = 5
-LOCKOUT_DURATION = timedelta(minutes=15)
+# Account lockout settings
+from app.config import settings
+
+MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = settings.max_failed_login_attempts
+LOCKOUT_DURATION = timedelta(minutes=settings.lockout_duration_minutes)Then add the corresponding settings in your config module with appropriate defaults.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| # Account lockout settings | |
| MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = 5 | |
| LOCKOUT_DURATION = timedelta(minutes=15) | |
| # Account lockout settings | |
| from app.config import settings | |
| MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = settings.max_failed_login_attempts | |
| LOCKOUT_DURATION = timedelta(minutes=settings.lockout_duration_minutes) |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/service.py around lines 20 to 22, the account lockout
constants MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS and LOCKOUT_DURATION are hardcoded. Move these
constants to the app/config.py file as configurable settings with appropriate
default values, then import them into service.py. This allows adjusting lockout
parameters without code changes and aligns with the existing configuration
management pattern.
backend/app/auth/service.py
Outdated
|
|
||
| if not user: | ||
| logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt for non-existent user: {email}") | ||
| raise HTTPException( | ||
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | ||
| detail="Incorrect email or password" | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
||
| if user.get("lockout_until") and user["lockout_until"] > datetime.now(timezone.utc): | ||
| raise HTTPException( | ||
| status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, | ||
| detail="Account is locked. Please try again later." | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
||
| if not verify_password(password, user.get("hashed_password", "")): | ||
| await self._handle_failed_login(user) | ||
| raise HTTPException( | ||
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | ||
| detail="Incorrect email or password" | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Security: Timing attack vulnerability in authentication flow
The current implementation has different response times and messages for:
- Non-existent users (immediate return)
- Locked accounts (immediate return)
- Invalid passwords (password verification performed)
This allows attackers to enumerate valid usernames and determine which accounts are locked.
Restructure the authentication flow to maintain consistent timing:
async def authenticate_user_with_email(self, email: str, password: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
db = self.get_db()
user = await db.users.find_one({"email": email})
- if not user:
- logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt for non-existent user: {email}")
- raise HTTPException(
- status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
- detail="Incorrect email or password"
- )
-
- if user.get("lockout_until") and user["lockout_until"] > datetime.now(timezone.utc):
- raise HTTPException(
- status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
- detail="Account is locked. Please try again later."
- )
-
- if not verify_password(password, user.get("hashed_password", "")):
- await self._handle_failed_login(user)
+ # Always perform password verification to maintain consistent timing
+ is_valid_password = False
+ if user:
+ is_valid_password = verify_password(password, user.get("hashed_password", ""))
+ else:
+ # Perform dummy password verification to maintain timing
+ verify_password(password, get_password_hash("dummy"))
+ logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt for non-existent user")
+
+ # Check lockout status
+ if user and user.get("lockout_until") and user["lockout_until"] > datetime.now(timezone.utc):
+ raise HTTPException(
+ status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+ detail="Incorrect email or password"
+ )
+
+ # Handle authentication result
+ if not user or not is_valid_password:
+ if user:
+ await self._handle_failed_login(user)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Incorrect email or password"
)Also, avoid logging email addresses directly to prevent PII leakage in logs.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| if not user: | |
| logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt for non-existent user: {email}") | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | |
| detail="Incorrect email or password" | |
| ) | |
| if user.get("lockout_until") and user["lockout_until"] > datetime.now(timezone.utc): | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, | |
| detail="Account is locked. Please try again later." | |
| ) | |
| if not verify_password(password, user.get("hashed_password", "")): | |
| await self._handle_failed_login(user) | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | |
| detail="Incorrect email or password" | |
| ) | |
| async def authenticate_user_with_email(self, email: str, password: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: | |
| db = self.get_db() | |
| user = await db.users.find_one({"email": email}) | |
| # Always perform password verification to maintain consistent timing | |
| is_valid_password = False | |
| if user: | |
| is_valid_password = verify_password(password, user.get("hashed_password", "")) | |
| else: | |
| # Perform dummy password verification to maintain timing | |
| verify_password(password, get_password_hash("dummy")) | |
| logger.warning("Failed login attempt for non-existent user") | |
| # Check lockout status (return generic 401 to avoid info leakage) | |
| if user and user.get("lockout_until") and user["lockout_until"] > datetime.now(timezone.utc): | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | |
| detail="Incorrect email or password" | |
| ) | |
| # Handle authentication result | |
| if not user or not is_valid_password: | |
| if user: | |
| await self._handle_failed_login(user) | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | |
| detail="Incorrect email or password" | |
| ) | |
| # Reset failed login attempts on successful authentication | |
| await self._reset_failed_login_attempts(user) | |
| # ... continue with token generation and return |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/service.py around lines 109 to 129, the authentication flow
leaks timing information by returning early for non-existent users and locked
accounts, and by logging email addresses directly. To fix this, restructure the
code to always perform password verification regardless of user existence or
lockout status, ensuring consistent response times. Remove or anonymize email
addresses in log messages to prevent PII exposure. Raise the same generic
HTTPException for all authentication failures without revealing specific
reasons.
| async def _handle_failed_login(self, user: Dict[str, Any]): | ||
| db = self.get_db() | ||
| new_attempts = user.get("failed_login_attempts", 0) + 1 | ||
|
|
||
| Verifies the provided Firebase ID token, retrieves or creates the corresponding user in the database, updates user information if needed, and issues a new refresh token. Raises an HTTP 400 error if the email is missing or if authentication fails, and HTTP 401 if the token is invalid. | ||
| update_data = {"$set": {"failed_login_attempts": new_attempts}} | ||
|
|
||
| Args: | ||
| id_token: The Firebase ID token obtained from Google OAuth. | ||
| if new_attempts >= MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS: | ||
| lockout_until = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + LOCKOUT_DURATION | ||
| update_data["$set"]["lockout_until"] = lockout_until | ||
| logger.warning(f"Account for user {user['email']} has been locked.") | ||
|
|
||
| Returns: | ||
| A dictionary containing the user data and a new refresh token. | ||
| """ | ||
| await db.users.update_one({"_id": user["_id"]}, update_data) | ||
| logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt for user: {user['email']}") | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
💡 Verification agent
❓ Verification inconclusive
Potential race condition in failed login counter
The current implementation reads the counter, increments it, and writes it back, which could lead to lost updates under concurrent login attempts.
Use MongoDB's atomic increment operation:
async def _handle_failed_login(self, user: Dict[str, Any]):
db = self.get_db()
- new_attempts = user.get("failed_login_attempts", 0) + 1
-
- update_data = {"$set": {"failed_login_attempts": new_attempts}}
-
- if new_attempts >= MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS:
- lockout_until = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + LOCKOUT_DURATION
- update_data["$set"]["lockout_until"] = lockout_until
- logger.warning(f"Account for user {user['email']} has been locked.")
-
- await db.users.update_one({"_id": user["_id"]}, update_data)
- logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt for user: {user['email']}")
+ # Atomically increment the counter and get the new value
+ result = await db.users.find_one_and_update(
+ {"_id": user["_id"]},
+ {"$inc": {"failed_login_attempts": 1}},
+ return_document=True
+ )
+
+ new_attempts = result.get("failed_login_attempts", 1)
+
+ if new_attempts >= MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS:
+ lockout_until = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + LOCKOUT_DURATION
+ await db.users.update_one(
+ {"_id": user["_id"]},
+ {"$set": {"lockout_until": lockout_until}}
+ )
+ logger.warning(f"Account locked for user ID: {user['_id']}")
+
+ logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt {new_attempts} for user ID: {user['_id']}")Also consider using user ID instead of email in logs to avoid PII exposure.
Use atomic increments and avoid logging email PII in _handle_failed_login
Prevent a race condition by using MongoDB’s $inc instead of reading and writing the counter, and replace email-based logs with user ID to avoid exposing PII.
• File: backend/app/auth/service.py, method _handle_failed_login
• Replace this block:
new_attempts = user.get("failed_login_attempts", 0) + 1
update_data = {"$set": {"failed_login_attempts": new_attempts}}
if new_attempts >= MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS:
lockout_until = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + LOCKOUT_DURATION
update_data["$set"]["lockout_until"] = lockout_until
logger.warning(f"Account for user {user['email']} has been locked.")
await db.users.update_one({"_id": user["_id"]}, update_data)
logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt for user: {user['email']}")With an atomic increment and ID-based logging:
# Atomically increment failed_login_attempts and retrieve the updated document
result = await db.users.find_one_and_update(
{"_id": user["_id"]},
{"$inc": {"failed_login_attempts": 1}},
return_document=True
)
new_attempts = result.get("failed_login_attempts", 1)
if new_attempts >= MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS:
lockout_until = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + LOCKOUT_DURATION
await db.users.update_one(
{"_id": user["_id"]},
{"$set": {"lockout_until": lockout_until}}
)
logger.warning(f"Account locked for user ID: {user['_id']}")
logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt #{new_attempts} for user ID: {user['_id']}")This ensures updates are atomic under concurrency and removes email from logs.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/service.py lines 138 to 151, replace the current manual
increment of failed_login_attempts with an atomic MongoDB $inc operation using
find_one_and_update to avoid race conditions. Then retrieve the updated count
from the result. If the new count exceeds MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS, update the
lockout_until field separately with update_one. Also, change all logger.warning
calls to reference user["_id"] instead of user["email"] to prevent logging PII.
backend/app/auth/service.py
Outdated
| logger.info(f"Password reset token for {email}: {reset_token}") | ||
| logger.info(f"Reset link: https://yourapp.com/reset-password?token={reset_token}") |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical Security: Never log password reset tokens
Logging the actual reset token and reset link is a severe security vulnerability. Anyone with access to logs could take over user accounts.
Remove the token from logs:
- logger.info(f"Password reset token for {email}: {reset_token}")
- logger.info(f"Reset link: https://yourapp.com/reset-password?token={reset_token}")
+ logger.info(f"Password reset requested for user email")
+ # TODO: Implement email sending logic hereThe reset token should only be sent to the user via secure email, never logged.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| logger.info(f"Password reset token for {email}: {reset_token}") | |
| logger.info(f"Reset link: https://yourapp.com/reset-password?token={reset_token}") | |
| logger.info(f"Password reset requested for user email") | |
| # TODO: Implement email sending logic here |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/service.py around lines 299 to 300, remove the logging of
the password reset token and reset link to prevent exposing sensitive
information in logs. Instead, only send the reset token securely via email to
the user and avoid including it in any log statements.
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Actionable comments posted: 1
🔭 Outside diff range comments (5)
ui-poc/Home.py (1)
20-25: Duplicatest.set_page_config()call will crash the app
streamlit.set_page_config()may be invoked only once. A second invocation (Lines 20-25) will raise aRuntimeErrorand prevent the app from starting.-# Configure the page -st.set_page_config( - page_title="Splitwiser", - page_icon="💰", - layout="wide", - initial_sidebar_state="expanded", -)backend/main.py (4)
15-31: Critical: Duplicate lifespan code blocksThe lifespan function contains duplicate MongoDB connection code. The first block (lines 18-21) is correct, but it's followed by duplicate code with logging statements.
Remove the duplicate code:
@asynccontextmanager async def lifespan(app: FastAPI): # Startup await connect_to_mongo() yield # Shutdown await close_mongo_connection() - - logger.info("Lifespan: Connecting to MongoDB...") - await connect_to_mongo() - logger.info("Lifespan: MongoDB connected.") - yield - # Shutdown - logger.info("Lifespan: Closing MongoDB connection...") - await close_mongo_connection() - logger.info("Lifespan: MongoDB connection closed.")
54-141: Critical: Malformed CORS configuration with syntax errorsThe CORS configuration section has severe syntax errors and duplicate code blocks that will prevent the application from running.
Replace the entire CORS configuration section with:
-# CORS middleware -allowed_origins = [] -if settings.allow_all_origins: - allowed_origins = ["*"] - -elif settings.allowed_origins: - allowed_origins = [origin.strip() - for origin in settings.allowed_origins.split(",")] - - logger.debug("Development mode: CORS configured to allow all origins") -elif settings.allowed_origins: - # Use specified origins in production mode - allowed_origins = [ - origin.strip() - for origin in settings.allowed_origins.split(",") - if origin.strip() - ] -else: - # Fallback to allow all origins if not specified (not recommended for production) - allowed_origins = ["*"] +# CORS middleware +allowed_origins = [] +if settings.allow_all_origins: + allowed_origins = ["*"] + logger.debug("Development mode: CORS configured to allow all origins") +elif settings.allowed_origins: + allowed_origins = [ + origin.strip() + for origin in settings.allowed_origins.split(",") + if origin.strip() + ] logger.info(f"Allowed CORS origins: {allowed_origins}") app.add_middleware(RequestResponseLoggingMiddleware) app.add_middleware( CORSMiddleware, allow_origins=allowed_origins, allow_credentials=True, - allow_methods=["*"], allow_headers=["*"], ) - - -@app.get("/health") -async def health_check(): - return {"status": "healthy"} - - allow_methods = ["GET", "POST", "PUT", - "DELETE", "OPTIONS", "HEAD", "PATCH"], - allow_headers = [ - "Accept", - "Accept-Language", - "Content-Language", - "Content-Type", - "Authorization", - "X-Requested-With", - "Origin", - "Cache-Control", - "Pragma", - "X-CSRFToken", - ], - expose_headers = ["*"], - max_age = 3600, # Cache preflight responses for 1 hour -) +@app.get("/health") +async def health_check(): + return {"status": "healthy"}
111-143: Critical: Remove malformed OPTIONS handlerThe OPTIONS handler has severe indentation errors and appears to be incorrectly placed. FastAPI's CORS middleware already handles OPTIONS requests.
Remove the entire malformed OPTIONS handler block (lines 111-143). The CORS middleware will handle OPTIONS requests automatically.
145-169: Critical: Fix indentation errors in router inclusion and main blockThe router inclusion and main execution block have severe indentation errors.
Fix the indentation:
- # Health check - @ app.get("/health") - async def health_check(): - """ - Returns the health status of the Splitwiser API service. - - This endpoint can be used for health checks and monitoring. - """ - return {"status": "healthy", "service": "Splitwiser API"} - - - # Include routers - - app.include_router(auth_router) - app.include_router(user_router) - app.include_router(groups_router) - app.include_router(expenses_router) - app.include_router(balance_router) - - if __name__ == "__main__": - import uvicorn - - uvicorn.run("main:app", host="0.0.0.0", - port = 8000, reload = settings.debug) +# Include routers +app.include_router(auth_router) +app.include_router(user_router) +app.include_router(groups_router) +app.include_router(expenses_router) +app.include_router(balance_router) + +if __name__ == "__main__": + import uvicorn + + uvicorn.run("main:app", host="0.0.0.0", port=8000, reload=settings.debug)
♻️ Duplicate comments (5)
backend/app/auth/service.py (5)
23-25: Avoid usingbasicConfigin module-level codeUsing
logging.basicConfig()at the module level affects the entire application's logging configuration.Remove the
basicConfigcall:-# Configure logging -logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO) -logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) +# Configure logging +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
27-29: Move security constants to configuration settingsAccount lockout parameters should be configurable through the settings module.
Move these constants to
app/config.py:-# Account lockout settings -MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = 5 -LOCKOUT_DURATION = timedelta(minutes=15) +from app.config import settings + +MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = settings.max_failed_login_attempts +LOCKOUT_DURATION = timedelta(minutes=settings.lockout_duration_minutes)
124-157: Security: Timing attack vulnerability in authentication flowThe authentication has different response times for non-existent users, locked accounts, and invalid passwords.
Restructure to maintain consistent timing:
async def authenticate_user_with_email(self, email: str, password: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: db = self.get_db() user = await db.users.find_one({"email": email}) - if not user: - logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt for non-existent user: {email}") - raise HTTPException( - status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, - detail="Incorrect email or password" - ) - - if user.get("lockout_until") and user["lockout_until"] > datetime.now(timezone.utc): - raise HTTPException( - status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, - detail="Account is locked. Please try again later." - ) - - if not verify_password(password, user.get("hashed_password", "")): - await self._handle_failed_login(user) + # Always perform password verification to maintain consistent timing + is_valid_password = False + if user: + is_valid_password = verify_password(password, user.get("hashed_password", "")) + else: + # Perform dummy password verification to maintain timing + verify_password(password, get_password_hash("dummy")) + logger.warning("Failed login attempt for non-existent user") + + # Check lockout status + if user and user.get("lockout_until") and user["lockout_until"] > datetime.now(timezone.utc): + raise HTTPException( + status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, + detail="Incorrect email or password" + ) + + # Handle authentication result + if not user or not is_valid_password: + if user: + await self._handle_failed_login(user) raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Incorrect email or password" ) - await self._reset_failed_login_attempts(user) - refresh_token = await self._create_refresh_token_record(str(user["_id"])) - + await self._reset_failed_login_attempts(user) + refresh_token = await self._create_refresh_token_record(str(user["_id"])) + return {"user": user, "refresh_token": refresh_token}
159-173: Race condition in failed login counterThe current implementation could lose updates under concurrent login attempts.
Use MongoDB's atomic increment:
async def _handle_failed_login(self, user: Dict[str, Any]): db = self.get_db() - new_attempts = user.get("failed_login_attempts", 0) + 1 - - update_data = {"$set": {"failed_login_attempts": new_attempts}} - - if new_attempts >= MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS: - lockout_until = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + LOCKOUT_DURATION - update_data["$set"]["lockout_until"] = lockout_until - logger.warning(f"Account for user {user['email']} has been locked.") - - await db.users.update_one({"_id": user["_id"]}, update_data) - logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt for user: {user['email']}") + # Atomically increment the counter and get the new value + result = await db.users.find_one_and_update( + {"_id": user["_id"]}, + {"$inc": {"failed_login_attempts": 1}}, + return_document=True + ) + + new_attempts = result.get("failed_login_attempts", 1) + + if new_attempts >= MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS: + lockout_until = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + LOCKOUT_DURATION + await db.users.update_one( + {"_id": user["_id"]}, + {"$set": {"lockout_until": lockout_until}} + ) + logger.warning(f"Account locked for user ID: {user['_id']}") + + logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt {new_attempts} for user ID: {user['_id']}")Also avoid logging email addresses to prevent PII exposure.
317-320: Critical Security: Never log password reset tokensLogging the reset token is a severe security vulnerability.
Remove the token from logs:
- logger.info(f"Password reset token for {email}: {reset_token}") - logger.info( - f"Reset link: https://yourapp.com/reset-password?token={reset_token}" - ) + logger.info("Password reset requested for user") + # TODO: Implement email sending logic here
🧹 Nitpick comments (3)
ui-poc/Home.py (1)
2-2: Remove unuseddatetimeimport
datetimeis imported but not referenced anywhere in the file. Leaving unused imports in production code bloats the dependency graph and triggers linter warnings (see Ruff F401).-from datetime import datetimebackend/app/auth/service.py (2)
235-243: Add exception chaining for better error trackingWhen re-raising exceptions, use
fromto preserve the original exception context.- except firebase_auth.InvalidIdTokenError: + except firebase_auth.InvalidIdTokenError as e: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid Google ID token", - ) + ) from e except Exception as e: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail=f"Google authentication failed: {str(e)}", - ) + ) from e
5-5: Remove unused importsStatic analysis identified unused imports.
-from typing import Any, Dict, Optional +from typing import Any, Dict import firebase_admin -from app.auth.schemas import UserResponseAlso applies to: 8-8
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (7)
backend/app/auth/ratelimit.py(1 hunks)backend/app/auth/routes.py(6 hunks)backend/app/auth/schemas.py(2 hunks)backend/app/auth/security.py(6 hunks)backend/app/auth/service.py(6 hunks)backend/main.py(5 hunks)ui-poc/Home.py(1 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (3)
- backend/app/auth/ratelimit.py
- backend/app/auth/schemas.py
- backend/app/auth/security.py
🧰 Additional context used
📓 Path-based instructions (5)
backend/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
Backend code must be implemented using FastAPI with Python 3.9+ and organized under the /backend/ directory.
Files:
backend/main.pybackend/app/auth/service.pybackend/app/auth/routes.py
backend/main.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
The main FastAPI application entry point must be in backend/main.py.
Files:
backend/main.py
backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py: Backend services should be modular, with authentication and user registration in app/auth/, user profile management in app/user/, group management in app/groups/, and expense tracking in app/expenses/.
When adding a new API endpoint, add the route to the appropriate service router file in the backend.
Files:
backend/app/auth/service.pybackend/app/auth/routes.py
backend/app/auth/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
JWT authentication with refresh token rotation must be implemented in the backend.
Files:
backend/app/auth/service.pybackend/app/auth/routes.py
ui-poc/Home.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
ui-poc/Home.py: Frontend POC must be implemented using Streamlit, with the entry point in ui-poc/Home.py.
Streamlit session state must be used to manage user sessions in the frontend, as shown in Home.py.
Files:
ui-poc/Home.py
🧠 Learnings (9)
📓 Common learnings
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/security.py : To troubleshoot authentication issues, check JWT token handling in app/auth/security.py.
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/**/*.py : JWT authentication with refresh token rotation must be implemented in the backend.
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : when adding a new api endpoint, add the...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : When adding a new API endpoint, add the route to the appropriate service router file in the backend.
Applied to files:
backend/main.pybackend/app/auth/routes.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/main.py : the main fastapi application entry point must be in backend/main.py....
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/main.py : The main FastAPI application entry point must be in backend/main.py.
Applied to files:
backend/main.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/database.py : mongodb must be used for persistent data storage in the backend...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/database.py : MongoDB must be used for persistent data storage in the backend, with connection logic in backend/app/database.py.
Applied to files:
backend/main.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : backend services should be modular, wit...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : Backend services should be modular, with authentication and user registration in app/auth/, user profile management in app/user/, group management in app/groups/, and expense tracking in app/expenses/.
Applied to files:
backend/main.pybackend/app/auth/service.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/auth/security.py : to troubleshoot authentication issues, check jwt token han...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/security.py : To troubleshoot authentication issues, check JWT token handling in app/auth/security.py.
Applied to files:
backend/app/auth/service.pybackend/app/auth/routes.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/auth/**/*.py : jwt authentication with refresh token rotation must be impleme...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/**/*.py : JWT authentication with refresh token rotation must be implemented in the backend.
Applied to files:
backend/app/auth/service.pybackend/app/auth/routes.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/config.py : backend configuration settings must be managed in backend/app/con...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/config.py : Backend configuration settings must be managed in backend/app/config.py.
Applied to files:
backend/app/auth/service.py
📚 Learning: applies to ui-poc/home.py : streamlit session state must be used to manage user sessions in the fron...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to ui-poc/Home.py : Streamlit session state must be used to manage user sessions in the frontend, as shown in Home.py.
Applied to files:
ui-poc/Home.py
🧬 Code Graph Analysis (1)
backend/main.py (1)
backend/app/database.py (2)
connect_to_mongo(13-21)close_mongo_connection(24-33)
🪛 Ruff (0.12.2)
backend/main.py
108-108: SyntaxError: Expected a statement
108-109: SyntaxError: Expected a statement
112-112: SyntaxError: Unexpected indentation
127-127: SyntaxError: unindent does not match any outer indentation level
130-130: SyntaxError: Unexpected indentation
131-131: SyntaxError: Unexpected indentation
137-137: SyntaxError: Unexpected indentation
147-148: SyntaxError: Expected an indented block after function definition
148-148: SyntaxError: Expected a statement
153-153: SyntaxError: Unexpected indentation
160-160: SyntaxError: Expected a statement
161-161: SyntaxError: Unexpected indentation
165-165: SyntaxError: Expected an indented block after if statement
backend/app/auth/service.py
5-5: typing.Optional imported but unused
Remove unused import: typing.Optional
(F401)
8-8: app.auth.schemas.UserResponse imported but unused
Remove unused import: app.auth.schemas.UserResponse
(F401)
235-238: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
240-243: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
backend/app/auth/routes.py
18-18: app.auth.security.oauth2_scheme imported but unused
Remove unused import: app.auth.security.oauth2_scheme
(F401)
21-21: fastapi.Request imported but unused
Remove unused import: fastapi.Request
(F401)
28-28: Do not perform function call Depends in argument defaults; instead, perform the call within the function, or read the default from a module-level singleton variable
(B008)
ui-poc/Home.py
2-2: datetime.datetime imported but unused
Remove unused import: datetime.datetime
(F401)
🔇 Additional comments (4)
backend/app/auth/routes.py (3)
27-51: OAuth2 token endpoint implementation looks goodThe implementation correctly handles OAuth2 form data authentication and token generation.
53-55: Good addition of rate limiting to signup endpointThe rate limiting dependency helps prevent abuse of the signup endpoint.
87-89: Rate limiting properly applied to login endpointEssential security enhancement to prevent brute force attacks.
backend/main.py (1)
41-52: Good addition of security headers middlewareThe security headers provide protection against common web vulnerabilities. However, the CSP policy might be too restrictive for some applications.
Consider if the Content-Security-Policy needs adjustment based on your application's requirements (e.g., if you need inline scripts or external resources).
| UserResponse, | ||
| ) | ||
| from app.auth.security import create_access_token, oauth2_scheme # Import oauth2_scheme | ||
| from app.auth.security import create_access_token, oauth2_scheme |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Remove unused imports
The static analysis correctly identified unused imports that should be removed:
oauth2_schemeon line 18Requeston line 21
-from app.auth.security import create_access_token, oauth2_scheme
+from app.auth.security import create_access_token
from app.auth.service import auth_service
from app.config import settings
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, statusAlso applies to: 21-21
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.12.2)
18-18: app.auth.security.oauth2_scheme imported but unused
Remove unused import: app.auth.security.oauth2_scheme
(F401)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/routes.py at lines 18 and 21, remove the unused imports
oauth2_scheme and Request respectively to clean up the code and avoid
unnecessary imports.
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
for more information, see https://pre-commit.ci
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Actionable comments posted: 2
🔭 Outside diff range comments (1)
backend/app/auth/security.py (1)
69-76: Consolidate get_current_user implementationsThe codebase currently defines two
get_current_userdependencies:
backend/app/auth/security.py
– Synchronous, returns only the user ID from a verified JWT (this is what all routes actually import).backend/app/dependencies.py
– Asynchronous, performs token verification and a database lookup, but is never imported by any route.To avoid confusion and eliminate dead code, please pick one of the following:
• Remove the unused
async def get_current_user(lines 12–58) frombackend/app/dependencies.py.
• Or, if you prefer to centralize token + database validation, update all route imports to use thedependencies.pyversion and removesecurity.get_current_user.
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
backend/main.py (1)
12-12: Remove unused importThe
JSONResponseimport is unused and should be removed as flagged by the static analysis tool.-from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (2)
backend/app/auth/security.py(2 hunks)backend/main.py(2 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
📓 Path-based instructions (5)
backend/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
Backend code must be implemented using FastAPI with Python 3.9+ and organized under the /backend/ directory.
Files:
backend/app/auth/security.pybackend/main.py
backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py: Backend services should be modular, with authentication and user registration in app/auth/, user profile management in app/user/, group management in app/groups/, and expense tracking in app/expenses/.
When adding a new API endpoint, add the route to the appropriate service router file in the backend.
Files:
backend/app/auth/security.py
backend/app/auth/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
JWT authentication with refresh token rotation must be implemented in the backend.
Files:
backend/app/auth/security.py
backend/app/auth/security.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
To troubleshoot authentication issues, check JWT token handling in app/auth/security.py.
Files:
backend/app/auth/security.py
backend/main.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
The main FastAPI application entry point must be in backend/main.py.
Files:
backend/main.py
🧠 Learnings (6)
📓 Common learnings
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/security.py : To troubleshoot authentication issues, check JWT token handling in app/auth/security.py.
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/**/*.py : JWT authentication with refresh token rotation must be implemented in the backend.
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/auth/security.py : to troubleshoot authentication issues, check jwt token han...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/security.py : To troubleshoot authentication issues, check JWT token handling in app/auth/security.py.
Applied to files:
backend/app/auth/security.pybackend/main.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/auth/**/*.py : jwt authentication with refresh token rotation must be impleme...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/**/*.py : JWT authentication with refresh token rotation must be implemented in the backend.
Applied to files:
backend/app/auth/security.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/database.py : mongodb must be used for persistent data storage in the backend...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/database.py : MongoDB must be used for persistent data storage in the backend, with connection logic in backend/app/database.py.
Applied to files:
backend/main.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : when adding a new api endpoint, add the...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : When adding a new API endpoint, add the route to the appropriate service router file in the backend.
Applied to files:
backend/main.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : backend services should be modular, wit...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : Backend services should be modular, with authentication and user registration in app/auth/, user profile management in app/user/, group management in app/groups/, and expense tracking in app/expenses/.
Applied to files:
backend/main.py
🧬 Code Graph Analysis (2)
backend/app/auth/security.py (2)
backend/app/dependencies.py (1)
get_current_user(12-59)backend/app/auth/routes.py (1)
verify_token(191-206)
backend/main.py (1)
backend/app/database.py (2)
close_mongo_connection(24-33)connect_to_mongo(13-21)
🪛 Ruff (0.12.2)
backend/app/auth/security.py
62-62: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
backend/main.py
12-12: fastapi.responses.JSONResponse imported but unused
Remove unused import: fastapi.responses.JSONResponse
(F401)
🔇 Additional comments (3)
backend/app/auth/security.py (1)
11-11: LGTM: Clean CryptContext initializationThe simplified CryptContext initialization removes unnecessary fallback configuration while maintaining bcrypt hashing with automatic deprecation handling.
backend/main.py (2)
34-44: Excellent security headers implementationThe security headers middleware adds comprehensive protection against common web vulnerabilities:
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniffprevents MIME type sniffingX-Frame-Options: DENYprevents clickjacking attacksX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=blockenables XSS filteringContent-Security-Policyrestricts resource loadingThis aligns perfectly with the PR objectives of enhancing authentication security.
66-66: LGTM: Simplified health check endpointThe health check endpoint is appropriately simplified to return only essential status information, reducing unnecessary complexity.
| def verify_token(token: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: | ||
| """ | ||
| Verifies and decodes a JWT token. | ||
| If the token is invalid or cannot be verified, raises an HTTP 401 Unauthorized exception. | ||
| Returns the decoded token payload as a dictionary. | ||
| Verifies the JWT token and returns the payload. | ||
| Raises HTTPException for invalid tokens. | ||
| """ | ||
| credentials_exception = HTTPException( | ||
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | ||
| detail="Could not validate credentials", | ||
| headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}, | ||
| ) | ||
| try: | ||
| payload = jwt.decode( | ||
| token, settings.secret_key, algorithms=[settings.algorithm] | ||
| ) | ||
| return payload | ||
| except JWTError: | ||
| raise HTTPException( | ||
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | ||
| detail="Could not validate credentials", | ||
| headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}, | ||
| ) | ||
| raise credentials_exception |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Fix exception chaining in JWT error handling
The static analysis tool correctly identifies that exception chaining should be used when re-raising exceptions within except blocks. This helps preserve the original error context for debugging.
Apply this diff to fix the exception chaining:
except JWTError:
- raise credentials_exception
+ raise credentials_exception from NoneThe from None suppresses the original JWTError from the traceback since we're intentionally converting it to a more user-friendly HTTPException.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| def verify_token(token: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: | |
| """ | |
| Verifies and decodes a JWT token. | |
| If the token is invalid or cannot be verified, raises an HTTP 401 Unauthorized exception. | |
| Returns the decoded token payload as a dictionary. | |
| Verifies the JWT token and returns the payload. | |
| Raises HTTPException for invalid tokens. | |
| """ | |
| credentials_exception = HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | |
| detail="Could not validate credentials", | |
| headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}, | |
| ) | |
| try: | |
| payload = jwt.decode( | |
| token, settings.secret_key, algorithms=[settings.algorithm] | |
| ) | |
| return payload | |
| except JWTError: | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | |
| detail="Could not validate credentials", | |
| headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}, | |
| ) | |
| raise credentials_exception | |
| def verify_token(token: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: | |
| """ | |
| Verifies the JWT token and returns the payload. | |
| Raises HTTPException for invalid tokens. | |
| """ | |
| credentials_exception = HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | |
| detail="Could not validate credentials", | |
| headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"}, | |
| ) | |
| try: | |
| payload = jwt.decode( | |
| token, settings.secret_key, algorithms=[settings.algorithm] | |
| ) | |
| return payload | |
| except JWTError: | |
| raise credentials_exception from None |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.12.2)
62-62: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/security.py around lines 46 to 62, the JWTError exception is
caught and re-raised as an HTTPException without proper exception chaining. To
fix this, modify the raise statement to use "raise credentials_exception from
None" to suppress the original JWTError traceback while preserving the context,
improving error clarity and debugging.
| allow_methods=["*"], | ||
| allow_headers=["*"], |
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💡 Verification agent
🧩 Analysis chain
Review CORS wildcard configuration for production security
The CORS configuration now uses wildcards for both methods and headers, which may be overly permissive for production environments. While this simplifies development, it could expose the API to cross-origin requests from any domain.
Consider whether this configuration is appropriate for your deployment environment. For production, you might want to be more restrictive:
- allow_methods=["*"],
- allow_headers=["*"],
+ allow_methods=["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"],
+ allow_headers=["Authorization", "Content-Type", "Accept"],🌐 Web query:
What are the security implications of using CORS wildcards in production FastAPI applications?
💡 Result:
Using CORS wildcards (i.e., allowing all origins via allow_origins=["*"]) in production FastAPI applications introduces serious security risks. This configuration disables origin-based access controls, allowing any website to make requests to your API, which can expose sensitive data and permit unauthorized actions[1][5][6][7][9][10].
Key Security Implications:
-
Data Exposure: With a wildcard CORS policy, any malicious or compromised website can make requests to your API endpoints. If those endpoints return sensitive user data, an attacker can easily steal it using JavaScript from another domain[5][6][10].
-
Increased Attack Surface: Attackers can perform actions (such as creating, updating, or deleting resources) on behalf of users if other protections (auth, CSRF) are misconfigured or missing[3][5][6][9][10].
-
Bypassing Same-Origin Policy: The browser's default Same-Origin Policy is overridden, erasing an important security mechanism intended to prevent cross-origin access[5][6][8][10].
-
CORS with Credentials: Never combine
allow_credentials=Truewithallow_origins=["*"]. This combination can enable browsers to send cookies or authentication tokens with cross-origin requests from any domain, leading to full account compromise[2][6][9][10]. Modern browsers may block this specific pairing, but FastAPI and some middleware have been misconfigured to unintentionally allow it, resulting in severe vulnerabilities[2][9]. If authentication is later introduced without tightening CORS, attackers can trivially bypass protections. -
Blind Origin Reflection Pitfall: Some implementations mistakenly reflect the
Originheader as the allowed origin without proper validation, which is an even worse misconfiguration than a wildcard, as it can allow credentials from any origin[5].
Security Best Practices for FastAPI CORS in Production:
- Restrict Origins: Always set
allow_originsto a list of trusted, specific domains[1][3][7]. - Avoid Wildcards: Never use
["*"]in production except for open public APIs that serve non-sensitive, non-personalized, public data[1][4][7][10]. - Credentials Protection: Only set
allow_credentials=Truewhen you control the front-end origins precisely and never with a wildcard[2][6][9][10]. - Environment Separation: Differentiate CORS settings between development (wildcards allowed for ease of testing) and production (strict allow list)[3][7].
- Layered Security: Pair CORS with proper authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, and rate limiting for robust API security[3][7][10].
In summary:
A wildcard CORS policy in a FastAPI production application makes your backend accessible to all websites, increases the risk of data leaks, and can completely undermine authentication and authorization mechanisms if combined with credentials[1][2][3][5][6][7][9][10]. Always use a restrictive CORS policy for sensitive and authenticated APIs.
Citations:
- 1: https://notes.kodekloud.com/docs/Python-API-Development-with-FastAPI/Deployment/What-Is-CORS
- 2: GHSA-fmg4-x8pw-hjhg
- 3: https://blog.greeden.me/en/2025/07/29/fastapi-security-best-practices-from-authentication-authorization-to-cors/
- 4: https://www.blueshoe.io/blog/django-cors-in-production/
- 5: https://www.stackhawk.com/blog/what-is-cors/
- 6: https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/11-Client-side_Testing/07-Testing_Cross_Origin_Resource_Sharing
- 7: https://app-generator.dev/docs/technologies/fastapi/security-best-practices.html
- 8: https://shanechang.com/p/understanding-cors-developers-journey/
- 9: https://github.blog/security/application-security/localhost-dangers-cors-and-dns-rebinding/
- 10: https://snyk.io/blog/security-implications-cors-node-js/
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
# Find where CORSMiddleware is configured and show surrounding context
rg -n "CORSMiddleware" -A 5 -B 5
rg -n "allow_origins" -A 2 -B 2Length of output: 1400
Lock down CORS methods and headers in production
The CORS middleware in backend/main.py is currently allowing every HTTP method and header, which can expose your API to unnecessary risk in production. Only permit the methods and headers your clients actually need.
• File: backend/main.py (lines 59–60)
- allow_methods=["*"],
- allow_headers=["*"],
+ allow_methods=["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"],
+ allow_headers=["Authorization", "Content-Type", "Accept"],Next steps:
• Confirm that allow_origins is scoped to your trusted domains (no wildcards) in production.
• Ensure allow_credentials=True is only used with a locked-down allow_origins list.
• Consider separate CORS settings for development (wide open) vs. production (strict allow list).
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| allow_methods=["*"], | |
| allow_headers=["*"], | |
| allow_methods=["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"], | |
| allow_headers=["Authorization", "Content-Type", "Accept"], |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/main.py around lines 59 to 60, the CORS middleware currently allows
all HTTP methods and headers, which is insecure for production. Restrict
allow_methods and allow_headers to only those necessary for your clients, such
as specific HTTP methods like GET, POST, and headers your API expects. Also,
verify that allow_origins is limited to trusted domains without wildcards and
that allow_credentials=True is only set when allow_origins is properly
restricted. Implement separate CORS configurations for development (permissive)
and production (strict) environments.
|
@ishita051 please resolve the critical review comments by coderabbit |
|
okay ill fix them by today |
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Actionable comments posted: 3
♻️ Duplicate comments (8)
backend/app/auth/security.py (1)
67-67: Fix exception chaining in JWT error handlingThe static analysis tool correctly identifies that exception chaining should be used when re-raising exceptions within except blocks. This preserves proper error context for debugging.
Apply this diff to fix the exception chaining:
except JWTError: - raise credentials_exception + raise credentials_exception from NoneThe
from Nonesuppresses the original JWTError from the traceback since we're intentionally converting it to a more user-friendly HTTPException.backend/app/auth/routes.py (1)
18-18: Remove unused importsThe static analysis correctly identified unused imports that should be removed as noted in previous reviews.
-from app.auth.security import create_access_token, oauth2_scheme +from app.auth.security import create_access_token from app.auth.service import auth_service from app.config import settings -from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, status +from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, statusAlso applies to: 21-21
backend/main.py (1)
58-59: Review CORS wildcard configuration for production securityThe CORS configuration now uses wildcards for both methods and headers, which may be overly permissive for production environments. This contradicts previous security guidance about restricting CORS policies.
Consider whether this configuration is appropriate for your deployment environment. For production, you should be more restrictive:
- allow_methods=["*"], - allow_headers=["*"], + allow_methods=["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"], + allow_headers=["Authorization", "Content-Type", "Accept"],backend/app/auth/service.py (5)
23-25: Avoid usingbasicConfigin module-level codeUsing
logging.basicConfig()at the module level affects the entire application's logging configuration, which can interfere with other modules or the main application's logging setup.Remove the
basicConfigcall:-# Configure logging -logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO) -logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) +# Configure logging +logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)The logging level should be configured in the main application setup or through environment configuration.
27-29: Move security constants to configuration settingsAccount lockout parameters should be configurable through the settings module rather than hardcoded, allowing adjustment without code changes.
Move these constants to
app/config.pyand import them:-# Account lockout settings -MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = 5 -LOCKOUT_DURATION = timedelta(minutes=15) +# Account lockout settings +from app.config import settings + +MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = settings.max_failed_login_attempts +LOCKOUT_DURATION = timedelta(minutes=settings.lockout_duration_minutes)
132-153: Security: Timing attack vulnerability in authentication flowThe current implementation has different response times and messages for non-existent users, locked accounts, and invalid passwords, allowing attackers to enumerate valid usernames and determine account status.
Restructure the authentication flow to maintain consistent timing:
async def authenticate_user_with_email(self, email: str, password: str) -> Dict[str, Any]: db = self.get_db() user = await db.users.find_one({"email": email}) - if not user: - logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt for non-existent user: {email}") - raise HTTPException( - status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, - detail="Incorrect email or password" - ) - - if user.get("lockout_until") and user["lockout_until"] > datetime.now(timezone.utc): - raise HTTPException( - status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, - detail="Account is locked. Please try again later." - ) - - if not verify_password(password, user.get("hashed_password", "")): - await self._handle_failed_login(user) + # Always perform password verification to maintain consistent timing + is_valid_password = False + if user: + is_valid_password = verify_password(password, user.get("hashed_password", "")) + else: + # Perform dummy password verification to maintain timing + verify_password(password, get_password_hash("dummy")) + logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt for non-existent user") + + # Check lockout status + if user and user.get("lockout_until") and user["lockout_until"] > datetime.now(timezone.utc): + raise HTTPException( + status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, + detail="Incorrect email or password" + ) + + # Handle authentication result + if not user or not is_valid_password: + if user: + await self._handle_failed_login(user) raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Incorrect email or password" )
159-171: Use atomic increments and avoid logging email PII in_handle_failed_loginPrevent a race condition by using MongoDB's
$incinstead of reading and writing the counter, and replace email-based logs with user ID to avoid exposing PII.Apply this diff to use atomic operations and remove PII from logs:
async def _handle_failed_login(self, user: Dict[str, Any]): db = self.get_db() - new_attempts = user.get("failed_login_attempts", 0) + 1 - - update_data = {"$set": {"failed_login_attempts": new_attempts}} - - if new_attempts >= MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS: - lockout_until = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + LOCKOUT_DURATION - update_data["$set"]["lockout_until"] = lockout_until - logger.warning(f"Account for user {user['email']} has been locked.") - - await db.users.update_one({"_id": user["_id"]}, update_data) - logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt for user: {user['email']}") + # Atomically increment failed_login_attempts and retrieve the updated document + result = await db.users.find_one_and_update( + {"_id": user["_id"]}, + {"$inc": {"failed_login_attempts": 1}}, + return_document=True + ) + new_attempts = result.get("failed_login_attempts", 1) + + if new_attempts >= MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS: + lockout_until = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + LOCKOUT_DURATION + await db.users.update_one( + {"_id": user["_id"]}, + {"$set": {"lockout_until": lockout_until}} + ) + logger.warning(f"Account locked for user ID: {user['_id']}") + + logger.warning(f"Failed login attempt #{new_attempts} for user ID: {user['_id']}")
347-350: Critical Security: Never log password reset tokensLogging the actual reset token and reset link is a severe security vulnerability. Anyone with access to logs could take over user accounts.
Remove the token from logs:
- logger.info(f"Password reset token for {email}: {reset_token}") - logger.info(f"Reset link: https://yourapp.com/reset-password?token={reset_token}") + logger.info(f"Password reset requested for user email") + # TODO: Implement email sending logic hereThe reset token should only be sent to the user via secure email, never logged.
🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
backend/main.py (1)
12-12: Remove unused importThe static analysis correctly identified an unused import.
-from fastapi.responses import JSONResponsebackend/app/auth/service.py (1)
5-5: Remove unused importsThe static analysis correctly identified unused imports.
-from typing import Any, Dict, Optional +from typing import Any, Dict -from app.auth.schemas import UserResponseAlso applies to: 8-8
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (5)
backend/app/auth/routes.py(6 hunks)backend/app/auth/schemas.py(2 hunks)backend/app/auth/security.py(2 hunks)backend/app/auth/service.py(11 hunks)backend/main.py(2 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
- backend/app/auth/schemas.py
🧰 Additional context used
📓 Path-based instructions (5)
backend/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
Backend code must be implemented using FastAPI with Python 3.9+ and organized under the /backend/ directory.
Files:
backend/main.pybackend/app/auth/routes.pybackend/app/auth/security.pybackend/app/auth/service.py
backend/main.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
The main FastAPI application entry point must be in backend/main.py.
Files:
backend/main.py
backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py: Backend services should be modular, with authentication and user registration in app/auth/, user profile management in app/user/, group management in app/groups/, and expense tracking in app/expenses/.
When adding a new API endpoint, add the route to the appropriate service router file in the backend.
Files:
backend/app/auth/routes.pybackend/app/auth/security.pybackend/app/auth/service.py
backend/app/auth/**/*.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
JWT authentication with refresh token rotation must be implemented in the backend.
Files:
backend/app/auth/routes.pybackend/app/auth/security.pybackend/app/auth/service.py
backend/app/auth/security.py
📄 CodeRabbit Inference Engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
To troubleshoot authentication issues, check JWT token handling in app/auth/security.py.
Files:
backend/app/auth/security.py
🧠 Learnings (7)
📓 Common learnings
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/security.py : To troubleshoot authentication issues, check JWT token handling in app/auth/security.py.
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/database.py : mongodb must be used for persistent data storage in the backend...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/database.py : MongoDB must be used for persistent data storage in the backend, with connection logic in backend/app/database.py.
Applied to files:
backend/main.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : when adding a new api endpoint, add the...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : When adding a new API endpoint, add the route to the appropriate service router file in the backend.
Applied to files:
backend/main.pybackend/app/auth/routes.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/auth/security.py : to troubleshoot authentication issues, check jwt token han...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/security.py : To troubleshoot authentication issues, check JWT token handling in app/auth/security.py.
Applied to files:
backend/main.pybackend/app/auth/routes.pybackend/app/auth/security.pybackend/app/auth/service.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : backend services should be modular, wit...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/{auth,user,groups,expenses}/**/*.py : Backend services should be modular, with authentication and user registration in app/auth/, user profile management in app/user/, group management in app/groups/, and expense tracking in app/expenses/.
Applied to files:
backend/main.pybackend/app/auth/service.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/auth/**/*.py : jwt authentication with refresh token rotation must be impleme...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/auth/**/*.py : JWT authentication with refresh token rotation must be implemented in the backend.
Applied to files:
backend/app/auth/routes.pybackend/app/auth/security.pybackend/app/auth/service.py
📚 Learning: applies to backend/app/config.py : backend configuration settings must be managed in backend/app/con...
Learnt from: CR
PR: Devasy23/splitwiser#0
File: .github/copilot-instructions.md:0-0
Timestamp: 2025-07-26T09:41:01.332Z
Learning: Applies to backend/app/config.py : Backend configuration settings must be managed in backend/app/config.py.
Applied to files:
backend/app/auth/service.py
🧬 Code Graph Analysis (2)
backend/main.py (1)
backend/app/database.py (2)
close_mongo_connection(24-33)connect_to_mongo(13-21)
backend/app/auth/service.py (5)
backend/app/auth/schemas.py (1)
UserResponse(64-72)backend/app/auth/security.py (5)
create_refresh_token(47-48)generate_reset_token(70-71)get_password_hash(25-26)verify_password(21-22)verify_token(51-67)backend/app/database.py (1)
get_database(36-42)backend/app/auth/routes.py (2)
refresh_token(148-182)verify_token(186-201)backend/tests/conftest.py (1)
mock_firebase_admin(18-61)
🪛 Ruff (0.12.2)
backend/main.py
12-12: fastapi.responses.JSONResponse imported but unused
Remove unused import: fastapi.responses.JSONResponse
(F401)
backend/app/auth/routes.py
18-18: app.auth.security.oauth2_scheme imported but unused
Remove unused import: app.auth.security.oauth2_scheme
(F401)
21-21: fastapi.Request imported but unused
Remove unused import: fastapi.Request
(F401)
28-28: Do not perform function call Depends in argument defaults; instead, perform the call within the function, or read the default from a module-level singleton variable
(B008)
backend/app/auth/security.py
67-67: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
backend/app/auth/service.py
5-5: typing.Optional imported but unused
Remove unused import: typing.Optional
(F401)
8-8: app.auth.schemas.UserResponse imported but unused
Remove unused import: app.auth.schemas.UserResponse
(F401)
256-259: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
🔇 Additional comments (3)
backend/app/auth/security.py (1)
51-55: LGTM - Improved exception handling structureGood refactoring to pre-define the credentials exception. This makes the code more readable and aligns with the centralized error handling approach.
backend/app/auth/routes.py (1)
52-54: LGTM - Rate limiting integrationExcellent addition of rate limiting dependencies to the authentication endpoints. This effectively mitigates brute force attacks by limiting requests to 5 per IP per 60 seconds.
Also applies to: 85-87
backend/main.py (1)
34-44: LGTM - Excellent security headers implementationGreat addition of essential security headers middleware. These headers provide important protections against common web vulnerabilities:
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniffprevents MIME sniffing attacksX-Frame-Options: DENYprevents clickjackingX-XSS-Protectionenables browser XSS filteringContent-Security-Policyrestricts resource loading
| "/token", response_model=TokenResponse, include_in_schema=False | ||
| ) # include_in_schema=False to hide from docs if desired, or True to show | ||
| @router.post("/token", response_model=TokenResponse, include_in_schema=False) | ||
| async def login_for_access_token(form_data: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends()): |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Fix function call in argument defaults
Using Depends() in argument defaults can cause issues. The dependency should be resolved at call time, not at function definition time.
Apply this diff to fix the issue:
-async def login_for_access_token(form_data: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends()):
+async def login_for_access_token(form_data: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends(OAuth2PasswordRequestForm)):📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| async def login_for_access_token(form_data: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends()): | |
| async def login_for_access_token(form_data: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends(OAuth2PasswordRequestForm)): |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.12.2)
28-28: Do not perform function call Depends in argument defaults; instead, perform the call within the function, or read the default from a module-level singleton variable
(B008)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/routes.py at line 28, the use of Depends() as a default
argument value causes the dependency to be resolved at function definition time
instead of call time. To fix this, remove the parentheses from Depends so that
the argument is declared as form_data: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends
without calling it. This ensures the dependency is properly injected when the
function is called.
| except firebase_auth.InvalidIdTokenError: | ||
| raise HTTPException( | ||
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | ||
| detail="Invalid Google ID token", | ||
| ) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Fix exception chaining in Firebase error handling
The static analysis tool correctly identifies that exception chaining should be used when re-raising exceptions within except blocks.
Apply this diff to fix the exception chaining:
except firebase_auth.InvalidIdTokenError:
- raise HTTPException(
- status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
- detail="Invalid Google ID token",
- )
+ raise HTTPException(
+ status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+ detail="Invalid Google ID token",
+ ) from None📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| except firebase_auth.InvalidIdTokenError: | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | |
| detail="Invalid Google ID token", | |
| ) | |
| except firebase_auth.InvalidIdTokenError: | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | |
| detail="Invalid Google ID token", | |
| ) from None |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.12.2)
256-259: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/service.py around lines 255 to 259, the exception handling
for InvalidIdTokenError raises a new HTTPException without chaining the original
exception. Modify the raise statement to include "from e" where "e" is the
caught exception variable, by first capturing the exception as "except
firebase_auth.InvalidIdTokenError as e" and then raising the HTTPException with
"from e" to properly chain exceptions.
| new_hash = get_password_hash(new_password) | ||
| await db.users.update_one( | ||
| {"_id": reset_record["user_id"]}, {"$set": {"hashed_password": new_hash}} | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
||
| Creates a refresh token with an expiration date and saves it in the database for token management and rotation. | ||
| await db.password_resets.update_one( | ||
| {"_id": reset_record["_id"]}, {"$set": {"used": True}} | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
||
| Args: | ||
| user_id: The unique identifier of the user for whom the refresh token is created. | ||
| await db.refresh_tokens.update_many( | ||
| {"user_id": reset_record["user_id"]}, {"$set": {"revoked": True}} | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
||
| Returns: | ||
| The generated refresh token string. | ||
| """ | ||
| return True |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Remove duplicate code block
There appears to be duplicate code after the exception handling block that repeats the password reset logic.
Remove the duplicate code block:
- new_hash = get_password_hash(new_password)
- await db.users.update_one(
- {"_id": reset_record["user_id"]}, {"$set": {"hashed_password": new_hash}}
- )
-
- await db.password_resets.update_one(
- {"_id": reset_record["_id"]}, {"$set": {"used": True}}
- )
-
- await db.refresh_tokens.update_many(
- {"user_id": reset_record["user_id"]}, {"$set": {"revoked": True}}
- )
-
- return True📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| new_hash = get_password_hash(new_password) | |
| await db.users.update_one( | |
| {"_id": reset_record["user_id"]}, {"$set": {"hashed_password": new_hash}} | |
| ) | |
| Creates a refresh token with an expiration date and saves it in the database for token management and rotation. | |
| await db.password_resets.update_one( | |
| {"_id": reset_record["_id"]}, {"$set": {"used": True}} | |
| ) | |
| Args: | |
| user_id: The unique identifier of the user for whom the refresh token is created. | |
| await db.refresh_tokens.update_many( | |
| {"user_id": reset_record["user_id"]}, {"$set": {"revoked": True}} | |
| ) | |
| Returns: | |
| The generated refresh token string. | |
| """ | |
| return True |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In backend/app/auth/service.py between lines 404 and 417, there is a duplicate
code block repeating the password reset logic after the exception handling
block. Identify and remove the repeated code that updates the user's hashed
password, marks the password reset as used, and revokes refresh tokens, keeping
only one instance of this logic to avoid redundancy.
2 participants
This pull request addresses critical security vulnerabilities in the authentication system by introducing a multi-layered defense strategy. It tackles the lack of input validation and rate limiting, making the application more resilient to common attacks like brute force and malicious data injection.
Current Security Concerns Addressed
No Rate Limiting: Implemented rate limiting on /auth/login and /auth/signup to prevent brute-force attacks.
Missing Input Sanitization: Added comprehensive input validation and sanitization to all authentication endpoints.
Improved Password Complexity: Enforced stronger password requirements to enhance user account security.
No Account Lockout: Introduced an account lockout mechanism after multiple failed login attempts to deter attackers.
Enhanced Token Security: Implemented a secure token refresh mechanism with token rotation to improve session security.
Security Event Logging: Added logging for critical security events, such as failed logins and suspicious activities.
Security Headers: Included essential security headers in authentication responses to protect against common web vulnerabilities.
Key Changes
Rate Limiting: A new ratelimit.py module has been added to handle rate limiting, and it has been integrated into the authentication routes.
Input Validation: The schemas.py file has been updated with more comprehensive validation for user inputs, including stricter password complexity rules.
Account Lockout & Logging: The service.py file now includes logic for account lockouts after a configurable number of failed attempts and logs security-related events.
Token Security: The security.py file has been enhanced to provide more secure token generation and refresh mechanisms.
Security Middleware: The main.py file has been updated to include new security middleware that adds protective headers to all responses.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Other Changes