Feat/encrypt smp #7
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This pull request addresses some weaknesses in the previous SMP implementation, significantly improving the cryptographic security of the process, and significantly improving plausible unlikability.
Plausible unlinkability significantly improved if server is not actively conducting a MiTM attack, and is rather maliciously passively monitoring requests.
I have added:
I have also changed:
AES-GCM to ChaCha20Poly1305: I have chosen this because less dependent on hardware blackbox accelerators (they could contain implementation flaws, or even backdoors), and ChaCha has simpler software implementation, with less potential side channel attacks.
I've chosen it over XChaCha20Poly1305 because the latter is not widely used in many projects, and is not available in
cryptographypackage we currently depend on.It's not ideal, in the sense that I've also swapped AES for ChaCha for file encryption, but should be fine.