EAP-TLS The most secure option? #1738
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
NCC Group explains why EAP-TLS (WPA2-Enterprise) is often the “gold standard” (certificate-based authentication; no reusable user password to phish/bruteforce like PEAP/MS-CHAP), but also shows two practical security failures that still occur in real deployments: (1) unauthenticated username enumeration via EAP Identity, and (2) “m(?)TLS” server-validation misconfigurations that enable Evil Twin attacks.
Core roles / terminology (802.1X)
- Supplicant: t...
🔧 Technical Details
EAP Identity username harvesting: Because the EAP Identity exchange happens before any TLS confidentiality exists, a network can leak real domain usernames in
EAP-Response/Identity. An attacker in RF range can passively capture EAP traffic and extract identities with standard tooling (e.g., tune to the AP usingairodump-ng -i $IFACE -c $CHAN --bssid $BSSID, then decode/filter EAP frames withtshark -i "$IFACE" -Y eap -Vand grep forIdentity:). Mitigate by using privacy NAI (RFC4282) where supported, or switching to computer authentication so the leaked identity is a machine name rather than a user.EAP-TLS Evil Twin via broken client server-validation (“m(?)TLS”): EAP‑TLS only provides mutual authentication if the supplicant strictly validates the server certificate and expected server identity. If validation is disabled, server names aren’t constrained, or users can override certificate errors (Windows prompt to trust new/u...
🤖 Agent Actions
Summary:
ServerValidationParametersand updated references (NCC blog, RFC 4282, Microsoft docs, Versprite).Tests:
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.