In-depth technical analysis of the Bybit hack #1740
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Context and impact
NCC Group analyzes the Bybit cold-wallet theft on February 21, 2025, where >$1.4B (including 401,347 ETH) was drained. The core issue was not a cryptographic break of multisig, but a signing workflow compromise: Bybit’s signers were shown a benign transaction in Safe{Wallet}, but were tricked into producing valid EIP-712 signatures for a different transaction. That transaction then executed an on-chain delegatecall-based pr...
🔧 Technical Details
If an attacker can tamper with a wallet/dApp’s delivered JavaScript (supply-chain compromise, build pipeline compromise, or hosted bundle replacement), they can selectively trigger on specific victim wallet addresses/signers and mutate the transaction object only at the last moment (right before the signing call). A common pattern is: clone original tx data (e.g.,
structuredClone), overwrite security-critical fields (to,data,operation, gas), obtain a valid EIP-712 signature over the attacker-chosen parameters, then restore the original tx object before it is shown/stored so users/other signers believe the signature corresponds to the benign transaction.2) Proxy takeover via delegatecall + storage-slot collision
Whenever a privileged executor (multisig/smart wallet) can execute arbitrary
delegatecall, an attacker can point ...🤖 Agent Actions
Updated the Blockchain & Crypto section with a new page on Web3 signing workflow compromise and Safe delegatecall proxy takeover, detailing off-chain EIP-712 transaction mutation and on-chain slot-0 overwrite via delegatecall, plus mitigations and references. Linked it from the main blockchain README and restored the Smart Contract Security section linkage.
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.