QtPass

QtPass is a multi-platform GUI for pass, the standard Unix password manager.

Available in 39 languages

Features

• Using pass or git and gpg2 directly
• Cross platform: Linux, BSD, macOS and Windows
• Native widgets and iconography where possible
• Per-folder user selection for multi-recipient encryption
• Multiple profiles support
• OTP (One-Time Password) support
• Password generation with configurable complexity
• Git integration for version control
• Smartcard and USB token support (OpenPGP, YubiKey)
• Configurable shoulder surfing protection
• Experimental WebDAV support
• Easy onboarding for new users

Logo based on Heart-padlock by AnonMoos.

Installation

From package

OpenSUSE & Fedora yum install qtpass dnf install qtpass

Debian, Ubuntu and derivates like Mint, Kali & Raspbian apt-get install qtpass

Arch Linux pacman -S qtpass

Gentoo emerge -atv qtpass

Sabayon equo install qtpass

FreeBSD pkg install qtpass

macOS brew install --cask qtpass

Windows choco install qtpass

From Source

Dependencies

• QtPass requires Qt 5.12 or later (Qt 6 supported)
• The Linguist package is required to compile translations
• For fallback icons, the SVG library is required

Runtime dependencies:

• gpg2 (GnuPG 2.2+) - required
• git - optional, for repository sync
• pass (1.7+) - optional, can use native GPG/Git

Your GPG must be configured with a graphical pinentry when applicable. Same goes for Git authentication. On macOS, pinentry-mac from Homebrew works best (gpgtools also works).

On most Unix systems all you need is:

qmake && make && make install

Using profiles

Profiles allow to group passwords. Each profile might use a different Git repository and/or different gpg key. Each profile also can be associated with a pass store singing key to verify the detached .gpg-id signature. A typical use case is to separate personal and work passwords.

Hint
Instead of using different git repositories for the various profiles passwords could be synchronized with different branches from the same repository. Just clone the repository into the profile folders and checkout the related branch.

Example

The following commands set up two profile folders:

cd ~/.password-store/
# Replace these with your own repositories (HTTPS or SSH).
PERSONAL_REPO_URL="<your-personal-password-repository-url>"
WORK_REPO_URL="<your-work-password-repository-url>"

# Examples:
# git clone https://git.example.com/you/qtpass-personal.git personal
# git clone git@git.example.com:you/qtpass-work.git work

git clone "${PERSONAL_REPO_URL}" personal && echo "personal/" >> .gitignore
git clone "${WORK_REPO_URL}" work && echo "work/" >> .gitignore
pass init -p personal [personal GnuPG-ID] && git -C personal push
pass init -p work [work GnuPG-ID] && git -C work push

Note:

• Replace PERSONAL_REPO_URL and WORK_REPO_URL with repositories you own and control.
• Replace [personal GnuPG-ID] and [work GnuPG-ID] with the ID from the related GnuPG key.
• The parts echo ... >> .gitignore are just needed in case there is a Git repository present in the base directory.

Once the repositories and GnuPG-ID's have been defined the profiles can be set up in QtPass.

Links of interest

• Git Tools - Credential Storage
• Dealing with secrets
• Git Credential Manager
• password-store

Testing

This is done with make check

Codecoverage can be done with make lcov, make gcov, make coveralls and/or make codecov.

Be sure to first run: make distclean && qmake CONFIG+=coverage qtpass.pro

Security considerations

Using this program will not magically keep your passwords secure against compromised computers even if you use it in combination with a smartcard.

It does protect future and changed passwords though against anyone with access to your password store only but not your keys. Used with a smartcard it also protects against anyone just monitoring/copying all files/keystrokes on that machine and such an attacker would only gain access to the passwords you actually use. Once you plug in your smartcard and enter your PIN (or due to CVE-2015-3298 even without your PIN) all your passwords available to the machine can be decrypted by it, if there is malicious software targeted specifically against it installed (or at least one that knows how to use a smartcard).

To get better protection out of use with a smartcard even against a targeted attack I can think of at least two options:

• The smartcard must require explicit confirmation for each decryption operation. Or if it just provides a counter for decrypted data you could at least notice an attack afterwards, though at quite some effort on your part.
• Use a different smartcard for each (group of) key.
• If using a YubiKey or U2F module or similar that requires a "button" press for other authentication methods you can use one OTP/U2F enabled WebDAV account per password (or groups of passwords) as a quite inconvenient workaround. Unfortunately I do not know of any WebDAV service with OTP support except ownCloud (so you would have to run your own server).

Known issues

• Filtering (searching) breaks the tree/model sometimes
• Starting without a correctly set password-store folder gives weird results in the tree view

Planned features

• Plugins based on field name, plugins follow same format as password files
• Colour coding folders (possibly disabling folders you can't decrypt)
• Optional table view of decrypted folder contents
• Opening of (basic auth) URLs in default browser? Possibly with helper plugin for filling out forms?
• WebDAV (configuration) support
• Some other form of remote storage that allows for accountability / auditing (web API to retrieve the .gpg files?)

Further reading

FAQ and CONTRIBUTING documentation. CHANGELOG

Site Source code Issue queue

AI Assistance
Parts of this project were developed with assistance from AI tools (such as OpenCode). AI-generated code is reviewed and tested before inclusion.

License

GNU GPL v3.0

View official GNU site

View the Open Source Initiative site