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Update dependency notebook to v6.4.12 [SECURITY]#159

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renovate/pypi-notebook-vulnerability
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Update dependency notebook to v6.4.12 [SECURITY]#159
renovate[bot] wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
renovate/pypi-notebook-vulnerability

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@renovate renovate bot commented Jan 23, 2023

Mend Renovate

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
notebook ==6.0.3 -> ==6.4.12 age adoption passing confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2020-26215

localhost

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

Open redirect vulnerability - a maliciously crafted link to a notebook server could redirect the browser to a different website.

All notebook servers are technically affected, however, these maliciously crafted links can only be reasonably made for known notebook server hosts. A link to your notebook server may appear safe, but ultimately redirect to a spoofed server on the public internet.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

Patched in notebook 6.1.5

References

OWASP page on open redirects

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or vulnerabilities to report, please email our security list security@ipython.org.

Credit: zhuonan li of Alibaba Application Security Team

CVE-2021-32798

Impact

Untrusted notebook can execute code on load. This is a remote code execution, but requires user action to open a notebook.

Patches

5.7.11, 6.4.1

References

OWASP Page on Injection Prevention

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or vulnerabilities to report, please email our security list security@ipython.org.

Credit: Guillaume Jeanne from Google

Example:

A notebook with the following content in a cell and it would display an alert when opened for the first time in Notebook (in an untrusted state):

{ "cell_type": "code", "execution_count": 0, "metadata": {}, "outputs": [ { "data": { "text/html": [ "<select><iframe></select><img src=x: onerror=alert('xss')>\n"], "text/plain": [] }, "metadata": {}, "output_type": "display_data" } ], "source": [ "" ] }

CVE-2021-32797

Impact

Untrusted notebook can execute code on load. This is a remote code execution, but requires user action to open a notebook.

Patches

Patched in the following versions: 3.1.4, 3.0.17, 2.3.2, 2.2.10, 1.2.21.

References

OWASP Page on Restricting Form Submissions

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or vulnerabilities to report, please email our security list security@ipython.org.

Credit: Guillaume Jeanne from Google

CVE-2022-24758

Anytime a 5xx error is triggered, the auth cookie and other header values are recorded in Jupyter server logs by default. Considering these logs do not require root access, an attacker can monitor these logs, steal sensitive auth/cookie information, and gain access to the Jupyter server.

Upgrade to notebook version 6.4.10

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or vulnerabilities to report, please email our security list security@ipython.org.

Credit: @​3coins for reporting. Thank you!

CVE-2022-29238

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

Authenticated requests to the notebook server with ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False only prevented listing the contents of hidden directories, not accessing individual hidden files or files in hidden directories (i.e. hidden files were 'hidden' but not 'inaccessible'). This could lead to notebook configurations allowing authenticated access to files that may reasonably be expected to be disallowed.

Because fully authenticated requests are required, this is of relatively low impact. But if a server's root directory contains sensitive files whose only protection from the server is being hidden (e.g. ~/.ssh while serving $HOME), then any authenticated requests could access files if their names are guessable. Such contexts also necessarily have full access to the server and therefore execution permissions, which also generally grants access to all the same files. So this does not generally result in any privilege escalation or increase in information access, only an additional, unintended means by which the files could be accessed.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

notebook 6.4.12

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

  • Do not run the notebook server in a directory with hidden files, use subdirectories
  • Use a custom ContentsManager with additional checks for self.is_hidden(path) prior to completing actions

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:


Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate. View repository job log here.

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renovate bot commented Jan 23, 2023

Renovate Ignore Notification

As this PR has been closed unmerged, Renovate will now ignore this update (==6.4.12). You will still receive a PR once a newer version is released, so if you wish to permanently ignore this dependency, please add it to the ignoreDeps array of your renovate config.

If this PR was closed by mistake or you changed your mind, you can simply rename this PR and you will soon get a fresh replacement PR opened.

@renovate renovate bot deleted the renovate/pypi-notebook-vulnerability branch January 23, 2023 14:24
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