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| 1 | +# Title |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +Start as an Experiment |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +# Patlet |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | + |
| 8 | +# Problem |
| 9 | + |
| 10 | +An InnerSource initiative is considered but not started because management is |
| 11 | +unsure about its outcome and, as a result, is not willing to commit to an |
| 12 | +investment. |
| 13 | + |
| 14 | +# Context |
| 15 | + |
| 16 | +The company is considering to leverage InnerSource to increase the efficiency |
| 17 | +of collaboration on software projects. However, most managers are not familiar |
| 18 | +with the Open Source working model and are instead accustomed to hierarchical, |
| 19 | +top-down control style management. The idea of InnerSource is very popular with |
| 20 | +software developers in the company, not the least because many developers use |
| 21 | +or are actively developing Open Source software. |
| 22 | + |
| 23 | +# Forces |
| 24 | + |
| 25 | +- Managers will want to validate the claims of improved collaboration through |
| 26 | + InnerSource before making a long term investment. This usually involves |
| 27 | + measuring the improvements. |
| 28 | +- If the InnerSource initiative will likely have a huge uptake among developers |
| 29 | + and if many projects are likely to rely on it, a decision to shut it down |
| 30 | + will be very unpopular and therefore hard to make. The perceived resulting |
| 31 | + loss of control might deter some managers to even start with InnerSource. |
| 32 | +- Implementing InnerSource style working models are often a radically departure |
| 33 | + from previously practiced working models. It is therefore likely, that |
| 34 | + existing, mandatory processes are no longer applicable and that appropriate |
| 35 | + governing processes are missing. The result might be that one has to operate |
| 36 | + in a regulatory, sometimes legal no-mans land. Examples are tax and export |
| 37 | + control related regulations in large corporations with multiple legal |
| 38 | + entities in multiple countries. |
| 39 | + |
| 40 | +# Solution |
| 41 | + |
| 42 | +Declare the InnerSource initiative as a time limited experiment. Define and |
| 43 | +communicate the criteria for projects to join the InnerSource experiment. The |
| 44 | +criteria should be chosen such that they maximize the chances of building a |
| 45 | +healthy InnerSource community around the selected InnerSource projects. They |
| 46 | +should also help to ensure that the setting of the projects is such that they |
| 47 | +can later be used to gain externally valid insights into the effects of |
| 48 | +applying InnerSource. Examples for such criteria are |
| 49 | + |
| 50 | +- Sufficient geographical distribution of developers |
| 51 | +- Sufficient departmental mix of developers, |
| 52 | +- Openness of communication within community, |
| 53 | +- Career path based on merit within community, |
| 54 | +- Democratic decision making within community. |
| 55 | + |
| 56 | +Consider designating the end of the experiment a _pivot_, _change_ or _pause_ |
| 57 | +point to re-evaluate. Also consider establishing a [Review |
| 58 | +Committee](review-committee.md) to increase the chances of management buy-in |
| 59 | +through participation. Depending on company culture, it might be helpful to |
| 60 | +accompany the experiment with appropriate metrics [First Steps With |
| 61 | +Metrics](introducing-metrics-in-innersource.md). If the projects in the |
| 62 | +experiment don't provide a direct impact on the companies revenue, consider |
| 63 | +introducing [Cross Team Valuation](crossteam-project-valuation.md) to highlight |
| 64 | +their value contributions. |
| 65 | + |
| 66 | +# Resulting Context |
| 67 | + |
| 68 | +Managers are able to kick start InnerSource for the following reasons: |
| 69 | + |
| 70 | +- The experimental setup eases the need of managers to scrutinize the |
| 71 | + InnerSource program numbers in the same way that they would for typical |
| 72 | + projects. |
| 73 | +- The possibility of failure of the experiment is understood and accepted. The |
| 74 | + personal risk for the supporting managers is minimized. |
| 75 | +- Even in case of a failure, the setup ensures that the company will learn from |
| 76 | + the experiment. |
| 77 | +- In case of success, the data gathered during the experiment will allow |
| 78 | + managers to make a longer lasting commitment to InnerSource. |
| 79 | + |
| 80 | +Participants in the InnerSource experiment are now conscious of the fact that |
| 81 | +they have to prove to management that InnerSource yields the promised benefits. |
| 82 | +It will therefore help to focus work on those activites which provide the most |
| 83 | +demonstrable value thus increasing the chances of success. |
| 84 | + |
| 85 | +Finally, starting as an experiment makes it much easier to sidestep regulations |
| 86 | +and forces such as tool and process policies which could decrease the chances |
| 87 | +of success. |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | +# Related Patterns |
| 90 | + |
| 91 | +- _Trial Run_ (from the book [_Fearless |
| 92 | + Change_](http://www.fearlesschangepatterns.com/)) |
| 93 | + |
| 94 | +# Known Instances |
| 95 | + |
| 96 | +- Robert Bosch GmbH (globally distributed software development) |
| 97 | + |
| 98 | +# Author |
| 99 | + |
| 100 | +- Georg Grütter (Robert Bosch GmbH) |
| 101 | + |
| 102 | +# Status |
| 103 | + |
| 104 | +Proven Pattern |
| 105 | + |
| 106 | +# Acknowledgements |
| 107 | + |
| 108 | +- Jason Zink (Robert Bosch GmbH) |
| 109 | +- Diogo Fregonese (Robert Bosch GmbH) |
| 110 | +- Robert Hansel (Robert Bosch GmbH) |
| 111 | +- Hans Malte Kern (Robert Bosch GmbH) |
| 112 | +- Russ Rutledge (Nike) |
| 113 | +- Tim Yao (Nokia) |
| 114 | +- Clint Cain (Optum) |
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