This contract acts as a policy enforcement layer. It does NOT execute actions or hold funds.

• DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is trusted to manage roles
• POLICY_ADMIN_ROLE is trusted to define valid policies
• Off-chain approvals are trusted only when signed by a POLICY_ADMIN_ROLE holder
• Callers may be adversarial

Mitigation:

• Each signed approval is hashed and stored in usedApprovals
• Replays are explicitly rejected
• Nonce-based system prevents signature reuse

Mitigation:

• Role-based access control via OpenZeppelin
• No dynamic role assignment in execution paths
• Explicit role checks on all sensitive operations

Mitigation:

• Policy enforcement separated from execution
• Guard must be explicitly called by protected contracts
• No way to bypass the check-and-record pattern

Notes:

• Cooldown enforcement is per-caller, per-policy
• No global locks or shared execution counters
• DoS on individual caller doesn't affect others

Considerations:

• Signed approvals can be front-run
• Use private mempools or commit-reveal if needed
• Not protected at protocol level

• No Economic Security: Flash loans can be used to manipulate if not carefully integrated
• Relies on Protected Contract: Contract using the guard must actually call it
• Admin Key Risk: Admin key compromise allows policy manipulation
• No Reentrancy Protection: Calling contracts must handle reentrancy

• Byzantine fault tolerance
• Full governance decentralization
• Economic incentive design
• Automated emergency response

⚠️ This code has not been audited. Use at your own risk.

For production use, please:

1. Get a professional security audit
2. Run formal verification
3. Test extensively on testnets
4. Use timelocks for admin operations

Please do NOT file a public issue.

Contact: security@example.com

Provide:

• Vulnerability description
• Steps to reproduce
• Potential impact
• Suggested fix (if any)

We will respond within 48 hours.