feat: add GitHub workflow semgrep rules #12
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ | ||
| rules: | ||
| - id: checkout-pr-on-issue-comment | ||
| languages: | ||
| - yaml | ||
| message: >- | ||
| A workflow triggered by an `issue_comment` event is checking out a pull request. This could allow an attacker to inject malicious code by commenting on an issue in a way that causes unintended execution. Ensure proper validation is in place before checking out PRs. | ||
| severity: ERROR | ||
| patterns: | ||
| - pattern-either: | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| on: | ||
| ... | ||
| issue_comment: ... | ||
| ... | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| on: [..., issue_comment, ...] | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| on: issue_comment | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| jobs: | ||
| ... | ||
| $JOBNAME: | ||
| ... | ||
| steps: | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern: | | ||
| run: $CMD | ||
| - metavariable-regex: | ||
| metavariable: $CMD | ||
| regex: ".*gh pr checkout.*" | ||
| metadata: | ||
| category: security | ||
| cwe: | ||
| - "CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')" | ||
| owasp: | ||
| - A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures | ||
| references: | ||
| - https://docs.github.com/en/actions/learn-github-actions/security-hardening-for-github-actions#understanding-the-risk-of-script-injections | ||
| technology: | ||
| - github-actions | ||
| - actions/checkout | ||
| cwe2022-top25: true | ||
| cwe2021-top25: true | ||
| subcategory: | ||
| - audit | ||
| likelihood: MEDIUM | ||
| impact: HIGH | ||
| confidence: MEDIUM | ||
| regex: actions/cache@.+ | ||
| paths: | ||
| include: | ||
| - ".github/**/*publish*.yml" | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. Overly restrictive paths filter limits rule effectivenessHigh Severity The |
||
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ | ||
| rules: | ||
| - id: curl-eval | ||
| languages: | ||
| - yaml | ||
| severity: ERROR | ||
| metadata: | ||
| tags: [security] | ||
| shortDescription: Risk of code injection through curl and eval combination | ||
| confidence: LOW | ||
| help: | | ||
| ## Remediation | ||
| Avoid eval'ing data fetched from curl commands. If this operation is necessary, | ||
| verify the integrity of downloaded content by checking its SHA sum before evaluation. | ||
| See GitHub's security guidance for more details on script injection risks. | ||
| message: >- | ||
| Data is being eval'd from a `curl` command. An attacker with control of the server in the `curl` | ||
| command could inject malicious code into the `eval`, resulting in a system compromise. Avoid eval'ing | ||
| untrusted data if you can. If you must do this, consider checking the SHA sum of the content returned | ||
| by the server to verify its integrity. | ||
| patterns: | ||
| - pattern-inside: 'steps: [...]' | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| - run: ... | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern: 'run: $SHELL' | ||
| - metavariable-pattern: | ||
| language: bash | ||
| metavariable: $SHELL | ||
| patterns: | ||
| - pattern: | | ||
| $DATA=<... curl ...> | ||
| ... | ||
| eval <... $DATA ...> |
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ | ||
| rules: | ||
| - id: github-script-injection | ||
| languages: | ||
| - yaml | ||
| severity: ERROR | ||
| metadata: | ||
| tags: [security] | ||
| shortDescription: Risk of code injection when using `github` context data in `actions/github-script`. | ||
| confidence: HIGH | ||
| help: | | ||
| ## Remediation | ||
| Instead of using variable interpolation with `github` context data directly in the script, | ||
| use an intermediate environment variable: | ||
|
|
||
| 1. Store the data using `env:` | ||
| 2. Reference the environment variable in the script using double-quotes: "$ENVVAR" | ||
| category: security | ||
| cwe: | ||
| - "CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')" | ||
| owasp: | ||
| - A03:2021 - Injection | ||
| references: | ||
| - https://docs.github.com/en/actions/learn-github-actions/security-hardening-for-github-actions#understanding-the-risk-of-script-injections | ||
| - https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/ | ||
| - https://github.com/actions/github-script | ||
| technology: | ||
| - github-actions | ||
| cwe2022-top25: true | ||
| subcategory: | ||
| - vuln | ||
| likelihood: HIGH | ||
| impact: HIGH | ||
| message: >- | ||
| Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `actions/github-script`'s | ||
| `script:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context | ||
| data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment | ||
| variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes | ||
| the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR". | ||
| patterns: | ||
| - pattern-inside: 'steps: [...]' | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| uses: $ACTION | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| with: | ||
| ... | ||
| script: ... | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern: 'script: $SHELL' | ||
| - metavariable-regex: | ||
| metavariable: $ACTION | ||
| regex: actions/github-script@.* | ||
| - metavariable-pattern: | ||
| language: generic | ||
| metavariable: $SHELL | ||
| patterns: | ||
| - pattern-either: | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.issue.title }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.issue.body }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.comment.body }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.review.body }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.review_comment.body }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pages. ... .page_name}} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.head_commit.message }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.head_commit.author.email }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.head_commit.author.name }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.commits ... .author.email }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.commits ... .author.name }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.label }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.default_branch }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.head_ref }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.inputs ... }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.discussion.title }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.discussion.body }} |
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ | ||
| rules: | ||
| - id: pull-request-target-code-checkout | ||
| languages: | ||
| - yaml | ||
| message: >- | ||
| This GitHub Actions workflow file uses `pull_request_target` and checks out code | ||
| from the incoming pull request. When using `pull_request_target`, the Action | ||
| runs in the context of the target repository, which includes access to all repository | ||
| secrets. Normally, this is safe because the Action only runs code from the target | ||
| repository, not the incoming PR. However, by checking out the incoming PR code, you're now using | ||
| the incoming code for the rest of the action. You may be inadvertently executing arbitrary code | ||
| from the incoming PR with access to repository secrets, which would let an attacker steal repository | ||
| secrets. | ||
| This normally happens by running build scripts (e.g., `npm build` and `make`) or dependency installation | ||
| scripts (e.g., `python setup.py install`). | ||
| Audit your workflow file to make sure no code from the incoming PR is executed. | ||
| Please see https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional | ||
| mitigations. | ||
| metadata: | ||
| tags: [security] | ||
| shortDescription: Unsafe code checkout in pull_request_target workflow | ||
| confidence: LOW | ||
| help: | | ||
| ## Remediation | ||
| When using `pull_request_target`, avoid checking out code from the incoming PR. If you must check out PR code, | ||
| ensure no untrusted code is executed (including build scripts and dependency installation). | ||
| See https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional mitigations. | ||
| category: security | ||
| owasp: | ||
| - A01:2021 - Broken Access Control | ||
| cwe: | ||
| - 'CWE-913: Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources' | ||
| references: | ||
| - https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ | ||
| - https://github.com/justinsteven/advisories/blob/master/2021_github_actions_checkspelling_token_leak_via_advice_symlink.md | ||
| technology: | ||
| - github-actions | ||
| subcategory: | ||
| - audit | ||
| likelihood: LOW | ||
| impact: MEDIUM | ||
| patterns: | ||
| - pattern-either: | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| on: | ||
| ... | ||
| pull_request_target: ... | ||
| ... | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| on: [..., pull_request_target, ...] | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| on: pull_request_target | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| jobs: | ||
| ... | ||
| $JOBNAME: | ||
| ... | ||
| steps: | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern: | | ||
| ... | ||
| uses: "$ACTION" | ||
| with: | ||
| ... | ||
| ref: $EXPR | ||
| - metavariable-regex: | ||
| metavariable: $ACTION | ||
| regex: actions/checkout@.* | ||
| - metavariable-pattern: | ||
| language: generic | ||
| metavariable: $EXPR | ||
| patterns: | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pull_request ... }} | ||
| severity: WARNING |
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ | ||
| rules: | ||
| - id: run-shell-injection | ||
| languages: | ||
| - yaml | ||
| message: 'Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could | ||
| allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets | ||
| and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. | ||
| Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment | ||
| variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".' | ||
| metadata: | ||
| category: security | ||
| cwe: | ||
| - "CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')" | ||
| owasp: | ||
| - A01:2017 - Injection | ||
| - A03:2021 - Injection | ||
| references: | ||
| - https://docs.github.com/en/actions/learn-github-actions/security-hardening-for-github-actions#understanding-the-risk-of-script-injections | ||
| - https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/ | ||
| technology: | ||
| - github-actions | ||
| cwe2022-top25: true | ||
| cwe2021-top25: true | ||
| subcategory: | ||
| - vuln | ||
| likelihood: HIGH | ||
| impact: HIGH | ||
| confidence: HIGH | ||
| tags: [security] | ||
| shortDescription: Shell injection risk in GitHub Actions run steps | ||
| help: | | ||
| ## Remediation | ||
| Instead of using `github` context data directly in `run:` steps, use an intermediate environment variable: | ||
| ```yaml | ||
| steps: | ||
| - run: echo "$MY_VAR" | ||
| env: | ||
| MY_VAR: ${{ github.event.issue.title }} | ||
| ``` | ||
| patterns: | ||
| - pattern-inside: 'steps: [...]' | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| - run: ... | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern: 'run: $SHELL' | ||
| - metavariable-pattern: | ||
| language: generic | ||
| metavariable: $SHELL | ||
| patterns: | ||
| - pattern-either: | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.issue.title }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.issue.body }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.comment.body }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.review.body }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.review_comment.body }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pages. ... .page_name}} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.head_commit.message }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.head_commit.author.email }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.head_commit.author.name }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.commits ... .author.email }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.commits ... .author.name }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.label }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.default_branch }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.head_ref }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.inputs ... }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.discussion.title }} | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.discussion.body }} | ||
| severity: ERROR |
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ | ||
| rules: | ||
| - id: workflow-run-target-code-checkout | ||
| languages: | ||
| - yaml | ||
| message: >- | ||
| This GitHub Actions workflow file uses `workflow_run` and checks out code | ||
| from the incoming pull request. When using `workflow_run`, the Action | ||
| runs in the context of the target repository, which includes access to all repository | ||
| secrets. Normally, this is safe because the Action only runs code from the target | ||
| repository, not the incoming PR. However, by checking out the incoming PR code, you're now using | ||
| the incoming code for the rest of the action. You may be inadvertently executing arbitrary code | ||
| from the incoming PR with access to repository secrets, which would let an attacker steal repository secrets. | ||
| This normally happens by running build scripts (e.g., `npm build` and `make`) or dependency installation | ||
| scripts (e.g., `python setup.py install`). | ||
| Audit your workflow file to make sure no code from the incoming PR is executed. | ||
| Please see https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional | ||
| mitigations. | ||
| metadata: | ||
| category: security | ||
| owasp: "A01:2017 - Injection" | ||
| cwe: "CWE-913: Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources" | ||
| likelihood: MEDIUM | ||
| impact: MEDIUM | ||
| confidence: MEDIUM | ||
| subcategory: | ||
| - vuln | ||
| references: | ||
| - https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ | ||
| - https://github.com/justinsteven/advisories/blob/master/2021_github_actions_checkspelling_token_leak_via_advice_symlink.md | ||
| - https://www.legitsecurity.com/blog/github-privilege-escalation-vulnerability | ||
| technology: | ||
| - github-actions | ||
| tags: [security] | ||
| shortDescription: Unsafe code checkout in workflow_run trigger | ||
| help: | | ||
| ## Remediation | ||
| When using `workflow_run`, avoid checking out code from the triggering workflow. If you must check out external code, | ||
| ensure no untrusted code is executed (including build scripts and dependency installation). | ||
| See https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional mitigations. | ||
| patterns: | ||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| on: | ||
| ... | ||
| workflow_run: ... | ||
| ... | ||
| ... | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. Rule missing array and single-value trigger patternsMedium Severity The |
||
| - pattern-inside: | | ||
| jobs: | ||
| ... | ||
| $JOBNAME: | ||
| ... | ||
| steps: | ||
| ... | ||
| - pattern: | | ||
| ... | ||
| uses: "$ACTION" | ||
| with: | ||
| ... | ||
| ref: $EXPR | ||
| - metavariable-regex: | ||
| metavariable: $ACTION | ||
| regex: actions/checkout@.* | ||
| - metavariable-pattern: | ||
| language: generic | ||
| metavariable: $EXPR | ||
| patterns: | ||
| - pattern: ${{ github.event.workflow_run ... }} | ||
| severity: WARNING | ||
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Stray orphan regex line in semgrep rule file
High Severity
The line
regex: actions/cache@.+at line 52 is orphaned text that doesn't belong in this rule file. It sits between themetadatasection (ending withconfidence: MEDIUM) and thepathssection, with incorrect indentation that doesn't match any valid YAML structure. This appears to be leftover from a copy-paste error or merge conflict from another rule. This will cause the semgrep rule to either fail to parse or behave unexpectedly.