add role permission on code scripts

[iceljc]

PR Type

Enhancement, Bug fix

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Description

• Add role-based permission checks for code scripts page

• Restrict save/reset operations to admin users only

• Fix missing modelType properties in LLM configurations

• Fetch user information on component mount for authorization

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Diagram Walkthrough

flowchart LR
  A["User Authentication"] -- "Fetch user info" --> B["Check Admin Role"]
  B -- "Admin" --> C["Show Save/Reset Buttons"]
  B -- "Non-Admin" --> D["Hide Save/Reset Buttons"]
  E["LLM Config Components"] -- "Add missing modelType" --> F["Audio & Realtime Models"]

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File Walkthrough

	Relevant files
Enhancement	+page.svelte Implement role-based access control for code scripts          src/routes/page/agent/code-scripts/+page.svelte Import myInfo from auth-service and ADMIN_ROLES constant Add user state variable to store current user information Fetch user data on component mount via myInfo() Wrap save/reset button section with role-based conditional check Only display buttons if user role is in ADMIN_ROLES +10/-2
Bug fix	agent-llm-config.svelte Fix missing modelType properties in LLM configs                    src/routes/page/agent/[agentId]/agent-components/agent-llm-config.svelte Add missing modelType={LlmModelType.Audio} property to AudioTranscription config Add missing modelType={LlmModelType.Realtime} property to Realtime config Ensure consistency with other LLM configuration components +2/-0

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[qodo-merge-pro]

PR Compliance Guide 🔍

Below is a summary of compliance checks for this PR:

Security Compliance
🟢	No security concerns identified No security vulnerabilities detected by AI analysis. Human verification advised for critical code.
Ticket Compliance
⚪	🎫 No ticket provided Create ticket/issue
Codebase Duplication Compliance
⚪	Codebase context is not defined Follow the guide to enable codebase context checks.
Custom Compliance
🟢	Generic: Meaningful Naming and Self-Documenting Code Objective: Ensure all identifiers clearly express their purpose and intent, making code self-documenting Status: Passed
	Generic: Secure Error Handling Objective: To prevent the leakage of sensitive system information through error messages while providing sufficient detail for internal debugging. Status: Passed
	Generic: Secure Logging Practices Objective: To ensure logs are useful for debugging and auditing without exposing sensitive information like PII, PHI, or cardholder data. Status: Passed
⚪	Generic: Comprehensive Audit Trails Objective: To create a detailed and reliable record of critical system actions for security analysis and compliance. Status: Missing audit logs: The new role-based restriction hides Save/Reset UI but there is no added auditing for attempted or successful save/reset actions, making it unclear if critical actions are logged with user context. Referred Code {#if ADMIN_ROLES.includes(user?.role || '')} <Row> <div class="hstack gap-2 my-4"> <Button class="btn btn-soft-primary" disabled={!selectedAgentId} on:click={() => saveCodeScripts()} > {$_('Save')} </Button> <Button class="btn btn-warning" disabled={!selectedAgentId} on:click={() => resetCodeScripts()}> {$_('Reset')} </Button> </div> </Row> {/if}
	Generic: Robust Error Handling and Edge Case Management Objective: Ensure comprehensive error handling that provides meaningful context and graceful degradation Status: Unhandled failures: The added user fetch via myInfo() and subsequent logic do not include error handling for failed calls or null user states before role checks. Referred Code onMount(async () => { user = await myInfo(); await loadAgentOptions(); });
	Generic: Security-First Input Validation and Data Handling Objective: Ensure all data inputs are validated, sanitized, and handled securely to prevent vulnerabilities Status: Client-side auth only: The UI hides Save/Reset buttons based on ADMIN_ROLES but there is no evidence of server-side authorization or validation for updateAgentCodeScripts, risking bypass via direct calls. Referred Code {#if ADMIN_ROLES.includes(user?.role || '')} <Row> <div class="hstack gap-2 my-4"> <Button class="btn btn-soft-primary" disabled={!selectedAgentId} on:click={() => saveCodeScripts()} > {$_('Save')} </Button> <Button class="btn btn-warning" disabled={!selectedAgentId} on:click={() => resetCodeScripts()}> {$_('Reset')} </Button> </div> </Row> {/if}

Compliance status legend

🟢 - Fully Compliant
🟡 - Partial Compliant
🔴 - Not Compliant
⚪ - Requires Further Human Verification
🏷️ - Compliance label

[qodo-merge-pro]

PR Code Suggestions ✨

Explore these optional code suggestions:

Category	Suggestion	Impact
High-level	Enforce authorization checks on the backend The PR introduces a client-side authorization check by hiding UI elements, but this is insecure. A corresponding role-based authorization check must be added to the backend API for updateAgentCodeScripts to prevent unauthorized access. Examples: src/routes/page/agent/code-scripts/+page.svelte [210-229] {#if ADMIN_ROLES.includes(user?.role || '')} <Row> <div class="hstack gap-2 my-4"> <Button class="btn btn-soft-primary" disabled={!selectedAgentId} on:click={() => saveCodeScripts()} > {$_('Save')} </Button> ... (clipped 10 lines) Solution Walkthrough: Before: // src/routes/page/agent/code-scripts/+page.svelte onMount(async () => { user = await myInfo(); // ... }); // ... {#if ADMIN_ROLES.includes(user?.role || '')} <Button on:click={() => saveCodeScripts()}> Save </Button> {/if} // Assumed backend implementation (vulnerable) // function update_agent_scripts_endpoint(request): // data = request.json() // update_database(data) // No role check // return Response(success) After: // src/routes/page/agent/code-scripts/+page.svelte // No change needed on the client-side. // ... {#if ADMIN_ROLES.includes(user?.role || '')} <Button on:click={() => saveCodeScripts()}> Save </Button> {/if} // Suggested backend implementation (secure) // function update_agent_scripts_endpoint(request): // user = get_user_from_request(request) // if user.role not in ADMIN_ROLES: // return Response(error="Forbidden", status=403) // data = request.json() // update_database(data) // return Response(success) Suggestion importance[1-10]: 10 __ Why: This suggestion correctly identifies a critical security vulnerability where the PR only implements client-side authorization, leaving the backend endpoint for updateAgentCodeScripts unprotected.	High
Possible issue	Handle potential errors in async call Wrap the myInfo() async call within the onMount function in a try...catch block to handle potential errors gracefully. src/routes/page/agent/code-scripts/+page.svelte [54-57] onMount(async () => { - user = await myInfo(); + try { + user = await myInfo(); + } catch (error) { + console.error('Failed to fetch user info:', error); + isError = true; + } await loadAgentOptions(); }); Apply / Chat Suggestion importance[1-10]: 6 __ Why: The suggestion correctly identifies a missing try...catch block for an async call, which is important for robust error handling and preventing unhandled promise rejections.	Low
Security	Add authorization check to event handlers Add a redundant authorization check inside the on:click handlers for the 'Save' and 'Reset' buttons to add another layer of client-side security. src/routes/page/agent/code-scripts/+page.svelte [210-228] -{#if ADMIN_ROLES.includes(user?.role || '')} +{#if user && ADMIN_ROLES.includes(user.role)} <Row> <div class="hstack gap-2 my-4"> <Button class="btn btn-soft-primary" disabled={!selectedAgentId} - on:click={() => saveCodeScripts()} + on:click={() => { + if (ADMIN_ROLES.includes(user?.role || '')) { + saveCodeScripts(); + } + }} > {$_('Save')} </Button> <Button class="btn btn-warning" disabled={!selectedAgentId} - on:click={() => resetCodeScripts()}> + on:click={() => { + if (ADMIN_ROLES.includes(user?.role || '')) { + resetCodeScripts(); + } + }}> {$_('Reset')} </Button> </div> </Row> {/if} Apply / Chat Suggestion importance[1-10]: 2 __ Why: While the suggestion correctly points out that client-side authorization is insufficient, the proposed fix of adding a redundant check within the click handlers offers negligible security benefits, as a user bypassing the first check can also bypass the second.	Low
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