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DNS amplification
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infra.rst

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@@ -713,6 +713,47 @@ effects in and beyond China.
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<https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2317307.2317311>`__. Computer
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Communications Review, July 2012.
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.. sidebar:: DNS Amplification Attacks
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*There is a class of denial-of-service (DoS) attack that leverages
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the properties of DNS to attack other systems, rather than being an
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attack on DNS itself. Recall that DNS is UDP-based. A name server
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sends a response back to the IP address from which a query was
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sent, and since there is no TCP connection to establish, it is
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relatively easy to use a fake source address in a query. In this
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case, the name server can be tricked into sending traffic to some
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unsuspecting host. And it is not hard to see how this can be turned
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into a* distributed *denial-of-service attack: many hosts (e.g., a
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set of hosts in a botnet) can make coordinated requests to a set
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of name servers, with all the requests using the same spoofed
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source address. Not only does this lead to a lot of traffic heading
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to the target address, but the name servers can be make to perform
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a traffic* amplification *function, because the response to a DNS
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query can be much larger than the query that triggered it. In
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particular, the DNS query type "ANY" causes all records for a
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domain to be returned, which can be a lot of data returned for a
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simple query. The handling of such queries has recently been
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clarified in an RFC to reduce the impact of ANY queries, but that
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is not a complete solution to DNS amplification attacks.*
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*Three main steps can be taken to reduce these attacks. The first
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is to avoid the deployment of "open" resolvers, i.e., resolvers
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which will accept queries from anywhere. For example, the resolver
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for an enterprise should be configured such that only clients
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within that enterprise can send queries to it; it should not accept
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queries from the broader Internet.*
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*The second step is source address validation. Source address
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filtering is a tool that can be applied at the boundaries of
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autonomous systems to reject traffic with spoofed source
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addresses. It may not be 100% effective but it will reduce the
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effectiveness of large scale attacks.*
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*Finally, there are ways to deal with DoS attacks such as the use
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of content distribution networks and black-holing of DoS
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traffic. We discuss these further in Chapter 9.*
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8.2.1 DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)

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