Create "dynamic markup" explainer

dynamic-markup-revamped-explainer.md

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+# Dynamic markup - revamped
+
+## Overview
+The web platform has multiple various ways to dynamically inject HTML into an existing document using script:
+- `setHTML`
+- `setHTMLUnsafe`
+- `innerHTML` and `outerHTML` setters
+- `createContextualFragment`
+- `insertAdjacentHTML`
+
+Additionally, there is emerging work to allow injecting markup via stream, with the `streamHTML` and `streamHTMLUnsafe` methods. See https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/2142.
+
+These methods all have explicit and implicit knobs and consideration:
+- What is the insertion point (replace children? append? etc)
+- Synchronous vs. streaming
+- [Safe vs. unsafe](https://wicg.github.io/sanitizer-api/#safe-and-unsafe)
+- Is there a sanitizer?
+- Do scripts run? If so, when?
+- Relationship with trusted-types.
+- Element creation side-effects (e.g. image preloading).
+
+The purpose of this explainer is to set a coherent way forward with dynamic markup insertion, in a way that takes all of these considerations into account while remaining consistent in terms of API.
+
+## API design
+
+Following API decisions in the DOM spec, the direction of the APIs here is to expose separate methods for the following permutations:
+- Synchronous vs. streaming, as those have different arguments and return values
+- Insertion point (replaceChildren, replaceWith, before, after, append, prepend),
+  as making a "positional" argument doesn't add much to readability and discoverability.
+- Safe vs. unsafe, to have the differences explicit when looking at call sites.
+
+The following are optional (or implicit):
+- Sanitizer
+- Do scripts run
+
+## Script Execution
+
+### `runScripts`
+
+Currently, only `createContextualFragment` is capable of running scripts in dynamic markup.
+The scripts are executed after the markup is inserted. Unlike regular parsing, classic external scripts are not
+parser-blocking, as it's awkward to block a synchronous call on an asynchronous fetch.
+
+The new proposal here is to add a `{runScripts: boolean}` option, false by default, to the `SetHTMLUnsafeOptions` dictionary.
+This would allow any unsafe HTML setter to run scripts in a similar fashion to `createContextualFragment`.
+
+Note that `runScripts` is not available for safe dynamic markup injection.
+
+### Scripts & streaming
+
+For streaming, the processing model would be different, as the streaming parser is not a synchronous call.
+In the streaming case, script execution would behave more like the main parser, where classic scripts block furher parsing,
+and scripts with `defer` (including `module` scripts) are executed when the stream is closed and the parser finishes
+processing the entire markup.
+
+## Sanitizer integration
+
+Both safe and unafe variants can receive a `sanitizer` option. As per the sanitizer spec,
+the safe variants ensure that the sanitizer config has a few baseline features. See https://wicg.github.io/sanitizer-api/.
+
+## Trusted types integration
+
+The current API for trusted types policies rely on transforming HTML strings before they are passed to the parser.
+This is incompatible with how the sanitizer works, and also doesn't work well with streaming, as userspace sanitation
+libraries such as `DOMPurify` would have to support streaming as well.
+
+The proposal is that trusted types would be able to participate in a flow that involves streaming and/or sanitizer
+by transforming or "blessing" a parser options dictionary ([`SetHTMLOptions`](https://wicg.github.io/sanitizer-api/#dictdef-sethtmloptions) or [`SetHTMLUnsafeOptions`](https://wicg.github.io/sanitizer-api/#dictdef-sethtmloptions):
+
+```webidl
+interface TrustedTypePolicy {
+  TrustedHTMLParserOptions createHTMLParserOptions((SetHTMLOptions or SetHTMLUnsafeOptions) options = {});
+}
+```
+
+By providing a method as such, the policy can:
+- modify a sanitizer, or inject one if it doesn't exist
+- Change the `runScripts` option
+- Bless the options as-is, e.g. to allow first-party scripts to inject unsafe and non-sanitized markup.
+
+Passing a (non-fungible) `TrustedHTMLParserOptions` to one of the HTML setting/streaming methods would bypass the default policy,
+and unlike `createHTML`, would also allow streaming.
+If this method is provided in the default policy, it would transform any incoming options, after also going through the `createHTML` call.
+(Alternatively, they can be mutually exclusive, using `createHTML` as graceful degradation).
+
+See [discussion](https://github.com/w3c/trusted-types/issues/594).
+
+## Node-creation side effects
+
+Currently, `createContextualFragment` has a somewhat quirky side-effect of preloading images, even before the fragment is connected.
+See https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/12010.
+
+This is intended to stay as a quirk specific to `createContextualFragment`, as no other API separates between the fragment creation and insertion.
+
+
+## Resulting API
+
+This results in the following API, which includes 24 methods:
+
+```webidl
+enum SanitizerPresets { "default" };
+dictionary SetHTMLOptions {
+  (Sanitizer or SanitizerConfig or SanitizerPresets) sanitizer = "default";
+};
+dictionary SetHTMLUnsafeOptions {
+  (Sanitizer or SanitizerConfig or SanitizerPresets) sanitizer = {};
+  boolean runScripts = false;
+};
+
+interface TrustedSetHTMLOptions {
+  (Sanitizer or SanitizerConfig or SanitizerPresets) sanitizer;
+}
+
+interface TrustedSetHTMLUnsafeOptions {
+  (Sanitizer or SanitizerConfig or SanitizerPresets) sanitizer;  
+  boolean runScripts;
+}
+
+typedef (SetHTMLUnsafeOptions or TrustedSetHTMLUnsafeOptions) UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions;
+typedef (SetHTMLOptions or TrustedSetHTMLOptions) SafeHTMLSetterOptions;
+
+[Exposed=Window]
+mixin interface ElementOrShadowRoot {
+  void setHTML((DOMString or TrustedHTML) html, SafeHTMLSetterOptions options);
+  void setHTMLUnsafe((DOMString or TrustedHTML) html, optional UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions options = {});
+  void beforeHTML((DOMString or TrustedHTML) html, SafeHTMLSetterOptions options);
+  void beforeHTMLUnsafe((DOMString or TrustedHTML) html, optional UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions options = {});
+  void afterHTML((DOMString or TrustedHTML) html, SafeHTMLSetterOptions options);
+  void afterHTMLUnsafe((DOMString or TrustedHTML) html, optional UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions options = {});
+  void appendHTML((DOMString or TrustedHTML) html, SafeHTMLSetterOptions options);
+  void appendHTMLUnsafe((DOMString or TrustedHTML) html, optional UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions options = {});
+  void prependHTML((DOMString or TrustedHTML) html, SafeHTMLSetterOptions options);
+  void prependHTMLUnsafe((DOMString or TrustedHTML) html, optional UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions options = {});
+  void replaceWithHTML((DOMString or TrustedHTML) html, SafeHTMLSetterOptions options);
+  void replaceWithHTMLUnsafe((DOMString or TrustedHTML) html, optional UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions options = {});
+  WritableStream streamHTML(SafeHTMLSetterOptions options);
+  WritableStream streamHTMLUnsafe(optional UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions options = {});
+  WritableStream streamBeforeHTML(SafeHTMLSetterOptions options);
+  WritableStream streamBeforeHTMLUnsafe(optional UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions options = {});
+  WritableStream streamAfterHTML(SafeHTMLSetterOptions options);
+  WritableStream streamAfterHTMLUnsafe(optional UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions options = {});
+  WritableStream streamAppendHTML(SafeHTMLSetterOptions options);
+  WritableStream streamAppendHTMLUnsafe(optional UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions options = {});
+  WritableStream streamPrependHTML(SafeHTMLSetterOptions options);
+  WritableStream streamPrependHTMLUnsafe(optional UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions options = {});
+  WritableStream streamReplaceWithHTML(SafeHTMLSetterOptions options);
+  WritableStream streamReplaceWithHTMLUnsafe(optional UnsafeHTMLSetterOptions options = {});
+};
+```
+
+## Existing methods
+
+Apart from the `createContextualFragment` quirk, all of the existing APIs can be expressed in terms of the above APIs,
+implicitly being unsafe, having a false `runScripts` and no sanitizer:
+
+```js
+class Element {
+  set innerHTML(html) {
+     this.setHTMLUnsafe(html);
+  }
+
+  set outerHTML(html) {
+     this.replaceWithHTMLUnsafe(html);
+  }
+
+  insertAdjacentHTML(html, insertion_point) {
+    switch (insertion_point) {
+      case "beforebegin":
+         this.beforeHTMLUnsafe(html);
+         break;
+      case "afterbegin":
+         this.prependHTMLUnsafe(html);
+         break;
+      case "beforeend":
+         this.appendHTMLUnsafe(html);
+         break;
+      case "afterend":
+         this.afterHTMLUnsafe(html);
+         break;
+    }
+  }
+};
+
+```
+
+## Security & Privacy Questionnaire
+1. What information does this feature expose, and for what purposes?
+It does not expose new information.
+
+2. Do features in your specification expose the minimum amount of information necessary to implement the intended functionality?
+N/A
+
+3. Do the features in your specification expose personal information, personally-identifiable information (PII), or information derived from either?
+No
+
+4. How do the features in your specification deal with sensitive information?
+N/A 
+
+5. Does data exposed by your specification carry related but distinct information that may not be obvious to users?
+
+No
+
+6. Do the features in your specification introduce state that persists across browsing sessions?
+No
+
+7. Do the features in your specification expose information about the underlying platform to origins?
+No
+
+8. Does this specification allow an origin to send data to the underlying platform?
+No
+
+9. Do features in this specification enable access to device sensors?
+No
+
+10. Do features in this specification enable new script execution/loading mechanisms?
+Yes, and this is handled specifically and deliberately by integrating with the sanitizer, trusted types, and the `runScripts` option.
+
+11. Do features in this specification allow an origin to access other devices?
+No.
+
+12. Do features in this specification allow an origin some measure of control over a user agent's native UI?
+No.
+
+13. What temporary identifiers do the features in this specification create or expose to the web?
+N/A
+
+14. How does this specification distinguish between behavior in first-party and third-party contexts?
+It integrates with trusted types. The 1st party can create separate trusted-types policies for 1st party and 3rd party contexts.
+
+15. How do the features in this specification work in the context of a browser’s Private Browsing or Incognito mode?
+N/A
+
+16. Does this specification have both "Security Considerations" and "Privacy Considerations" sections?
+It is intended to be part of the HTML standard, so yes.
+
+117. Do features in your specification enable origins to downgrade default security protections?
+No
+
+18. What happens when a document that uses your feature is kept alive in BFCache (instead of getting destroyed) after navigation, and potentially gets reused on future navigations back to the document?
+Nothing in particular.
+
+19. What happens when a document that uses your feature gets disconnected?
+Being connected/disconnected doesn't affect this feature atm.
+
+20. Does your spec define when and how new kinds of errors should be raised?
+It will.
+
+21. Does your feature allow sites to learn about the user's use of assistive technology?
+No
+
+22. What should this questionnaire have asked?
+Does this feature allow new ways of changing the DOM/injecting HTML.
+
+
+
+