An issue was discovered in the COROS application through...
Critical severity
Unreviewed
Published
Jun 20, 2025
to the GitHub Advisory Database
•
Updated Jun 20, 2025
Description
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Jun 20, 2025
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Jun 20, 2025
Last updated
Jun 20, 2025
An issue was discovered in the COROS application through 3.8.12 for Android. Bluetooth pairing and bonding is neither initiated nor enforced by the application itself. Also, the watch does not enforce pairing and bonding. As a result, any data transmitted via BLE remains unencrypted, allowing attackers within Bluetooth range to eavesdrop on the communication. Furthermore, even if a user manually initiates pairing and bonding in the Android settings, the application continues to transmit data without requiring the watch to be bonded. This fallback behavior enables attackers to exploit the communication, for example, by conducting an active machine-in-the-middle attack.
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