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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been...

Unreviewed Published Sep 17, 2025 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Sep 17, 2025

Package

No package listedSuggest a package

Affected versions

Unknown

Patched versions

Unknown

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tracing: Fix race issue between cpu buffer write and swap

Warning happened in rb_end_commit() at code:
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !local_read(&cpu_buffer->committing)))

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 139 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3142
rb_commit+0x402/0x4a0
Call Trace:
ring_buffer_unlock_commit+0x42/0x250
trace_buffer_unlock_commit_regs+0x3b/0x250
trace_event_buffer_commit+0xe5/0x440
trace_event_buffer_reserve+0x11c/0x150
trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch+0x23c/0x2c0
__traceiter_sched_switch+0x59/0x80
__schedule+0x72b/0x1580
schedule+0x92/0x120
worker_thread+0xa0/0x6f0

It is because the race between writing event into cpu buffer and swapping
cpu buffer through file per_cpu/cpu0/snapshot:

Write on CPU 0 Swap buffer by per_cpu/cpu0/snapshot on CPU 1


                         tracing_snapshot_write()
                           [...]

ring_buffer_lock_reserve()
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu]; // 1. Suppose find 'cpu_buffer_a';
[...]
rb_reserve_next_event()
[...]

                           ring_buffer_swap_cpu()
                             if (local_read(&cpu_buffer_a->committing))
                                 goto out_dec;
                             if (local_read(&cpu_buffer_b->committing))
                                 goto out_dec;
                             buffer_a->buffers[cpu] = cpu_buffer_b;
                             buffer_b->buffers[cpu] = cpu_buffer_a;
                             // 2. cpu_buffer has swapped here.

  rb_start_commit(cpu_buffer);
  if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer)
      != buffer)) { // 3. This check passed due to 'cpu_buffer->buffer'
    [...]           //    has not changed here.
    return NULL;
  }
                             cpu_buffer_b->buffer = buffer_a;
                             cpu_buffer_a->buffer = buffer_b;
                             [...]

  // 4. Reserve event from 'cpu_buffer_a'.

ring_buffer_unlock_commit()
[...]
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu]; // 5. Now find 'cpu_buffer_b' !!!
rb_commit(cpu_buffer)
rb_end_commit() // 6. WARN for the wrong 'committing' state !!!

Based on above analysis, we can easily reproduce by following testcase:

#!/bin/bash

dmesg -n 7
sysctl -w kernel.panic_on_warn=1
TR=/sys/kernel/tracing
echo 7 > ${TR}/buffer_size_kb
echo "sched:sched_switch" > ${TR}/set_event
while [ true ]; do
        echo 1 > ${TR}/per_cpu/cpu0/snapshot
done &
while [ true ]; do
        echo 1 > ${TR}/per_cpu/cpu0/snapshot
done &
while [ true ]; do
        echo 1 > ${TR}/per_cpu/cpu0/snapshot
done &

To fix it, IIUC, we can use smp_call_function_single() to do the swap on
the target cpu where the buffer is located, so that above race would be
avoided.

References

Published by the National Vulnerability Database Sep 17, 2025
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Sep 17, 2025
Last updated Sep 17, 2025

Severity

Unknown

EPSS score

Weaknesses

No CWEs

CVE ID

CVE-2023-53368

GHSA ID

GHSA-mrjw-9wmf-9mph

Source code

No known source code

Dependabot alerts are not supported on this advisory because it does not have a package from a supported ecosystem with an affected and fixed version.

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