Summary
Prior to Memray 1.19.2, Memray rendered the command line of the tracked process directly into generated HTML reports without escaping. Because there was no escaping, attacker-controlled command line arguments were inserted as raw HTML into the generated report.
This allowed JavaScript execution when a victim opened the generated report in a browser.
Affected Version
- Memray version:
1.19.1 and earlier
Remediation
Upgrade to Memray 1.19.2, and avoid attaching Memray to untrusted processes until you have upgraded.
Root Cause
Jinja is used to embed the process's command line arguments into the generated flame graph or table report. Memray has not been telling Jinja to HTML escape the command line arguments when writing them into the HTML, leading to a stored XSS vulnerability.
Impact
An attacker who can influence the script name or command-line arguments of a profiled program can inject HTML/JavaScript into Memray-generated HTML reports (both memray flamegraph and memray table reports, both with and without --no-web). When a victim opens the generated report in a browser, the injected JavaScript executes in the context of the report.
Note that in the case of memray attach, the user attaching Memray and generating the report may be a different user than the one who ran the command and set up the command line arguments.
Proof of Concept
Run Memray on a script with an attacker-controlled filename:
touch '<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>'
python -m memray run -o poc.bin '<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>'
Generate a report:
python -m memray flamegraph -o poc.html poc.bin
Observed Result
The generated HTML contains raw unescaped attacker-controlled HTML.
Opening or reloading the generated report in a browser triggers JavaScript execution.
References
0xmrma Reporter
Summary
Prior to Memray 1.19.2, Memray rendered the command line of the tracked process directly into generated HTML reports without escaping. Because there was no escaping, attacker-controlled command line arguments were inserted as raw HTML into the generated report.
This allowed JavaScript execution when a victim opened the generated report in a browser.
Affected Version
1.19.1and earlierRemediation
Upgrade to Memray 1.19.2, and avoid attaching Memray to untrusted processes until you have upgraded.
Root Cause
Jinja is used to embed the process's command line arguments into the generated flame graph or table report. Memray has not been telling Jinja to HTML escape the command line arguments when writing them into the HTML, leading to a stored XSS vulnerability.
Impact
An attacker who can influence the script name or command-line arguments of a profiled program can inject HTML/JavaScript into Memray-generated HTML reports (both
memray flamegraphandmemray tablereports, both with and without--no-web). When a victim opens the generated report in a browser, the injected JavaScript executes in the context of the report.Note that in the case of
memray attach, the user attaching Memray and generating the report may be a different user than the one who ran the command and set up the command line arguments.Proof of Concept
Run Memray on a script with an attacker-controlled filename:
Generate a report:
Observed Result
The generated HTML contains raw unescaped attacker-controlled HTML.
Opening or reloading the generated report in a browser triggers JavaScript execution.
References