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DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 briefly compromised with malware

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Sep 9, 2025 in duckdb/duckdb-node • Updated Sep 10, 2025

Package

npm @duckdb/duckdb-wasm (npm)

Affected versions

= 1.29.2

Patched versions

1.30.0
npm @duckdb/node-api (npm)
= 1.3.3
1.3.4-alpha.27
npm @duckdb/node-bindings (npm)
= 1.3.3
1.3.4-alpha.27
npm duckdb (npm)
= 1.3.3
1.3.4

Description

The DuckDB distribution for Node.js on npm was compromised with malware (along with several other packages). An attacker published new versions of four of duckdb’s packages that included malicious code to interfere with cryptocoin transactions. The following packages and versions are affected:

Note: The current release version of DuckDB is 1.3.2, with 1.4.0 expected to be released on Sept 10th, 2025 (tomorrow as of this writing). We do not plan to ever release a “legit” DuckDB 1.3.3. Users should double-check that they are not accidentally updating to those affected versions.

We have ourselves noticed this within four hours of it happening. Here’s our response:

  • As an immediate response, we have deprecated the specific versions.
  • We have reached out to npm support to delete the affected versions. They were so kind to do so.
  • We have also re-released the node packages with higher version numbers (1.3.4/1.30.0) as a further safeguard so the latest version of the package points to a safe version

We apologize for this issue. We are reviewing our internal processes to ensure the safety of future releases.

Postmortem

On September 8th (Monday), the DuckDB maintainers received the following message from "[email protected]":

Screenshot 2025-09-09 at 11 07 09

One of the maintainers read through this text and found it somewhat reasonable. He followed the link (now defunct) to a website hosted under the domain npmjs.help. This website contained a pixel-perfect copy of the npmjs.com website. He logged in using the duckdb_admin user and password, followed by 2FA. Again, the user profile, settings etc. were a perfect copy of the npmjs.com website including all user data. As requested by the email, he then re-set the 2FA setup.

In the background, the copycat website forwarded all actions to the actual npm website, so the 2FA was actually updated there, too. But they also added a new API token, which they then used to publish the malicious package versions. In hindsight, the fact that his browser did not auto-complete the login should have been a red flag. It's painful to spell out, but we fell for a classic phishing attack.

We again apologize for this mishap. We are reviewing our internal processes to ensure the safety of future releases. It is fortunate that we noticed this within a few hours of it happening. The DuckDBLabs team was able to set up a call at 7AM to perform an immediate response. Fortunately we were not locked out of our NPM account, which also easily could have happened. We were able to rotate passwords, tokens and API keys immediately.

References

@hannes hannes published to duckdb/duckdb-node Sep 9, 2025
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Sep 9, 2025
Reviewed Sep 9, 2025
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Sep 9, 2025
Last updated Sep 10, 2025

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required None
User interaction Active
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity High
Availability High
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(12th percentile)

Weaknesses

Embedded Malicious Code

The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2025-59037

GHSA ID

GHSA-w62p-hx95-gf2c

Source code

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