Impact
In shared Slack workspace deployments that rely on sender restrictions (allowFrom, DM policy, or channel user allowlists), some interactive callbacks (block_action, view_submission, view_closed) could be accepted before full sender authorization checks.
In that scenario, an unauthorized workspace member could enqueue system-event text into an active session. This issue did not provide unauthenticated access, cross-gateway isolation bypass, or host-level privilege escalation by itself.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw (npm)
- Vulnerable versions:
<= 2026.2.24
- Patched version:
2026.2.25 (planned next npm release)
Fix Commit(s)
ce8c67c314b93f570f53c2a9abc124e1e3a54715
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the release (2026.2.25). Advisory published with npm release 2026.2.25.
Trust Model Scope Note
OpenClaw does not support adversarial multi-user isolation on a single shared gateway instance. The supported model is one trust boundary per gateway (separate gateways/hosts for mutually untrusted users). See: https://docs.openclaw.ai/gateway/security
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
References
Impact
In shared Slack workspace deployments that rely on sender restrictions (
allowFrom, DM policy, or channel user allowlists), some interactive callbacks (block_action,view_submission,view_closed) could be accepted before full sender authorization checks.In that scenario, an unauthorized workspace member could enqueue system-event text into an active session. This issue did not provide unauthenticated access, cross-gateway isolation bypass, or host-level privilege escalation by itself.
Affected Packages / Versions
openclaw(npm)<= 2026.2.242026.2.25(planned next npm release)Fix Commit(s)
ce8c67c314b93f570f53c2a9abc124e1e3a54715Release Process Note
patched_versionsis pre-set to the release (2026.2.25). Advisory published with npm release2026.2.25.Trust Model Scope Note
OpenClaw does not support adversarial multi-user isolation on a single shared gateway instance. The supported model is one trust boundary per gateway (separate gateways/hosts for mutually untrusted users). See: https://docs.openclaw.ai/gateway/security
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
References