fix(@angular/ssr): prevent malicious URL from overriding host #31475
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A request with a specially crafted URL starting with a double slash (e.g., `//example.com`) could cause the server-side rendering logic to interpret the request as being for a different host. This is due to the behavior of the `URL` constructor when a protocol-relative URL is passed as the first argument. This vulnerability could be exploited to make the server execute requests to a malicious domain when relative paths are used within the application (e.g., via `HttpClient`), potentially leading to content injection or other security risks. The fix ensures that the request URL is always constructed as a full URL string, including the protocol and host, before being passed to the `URL` constructor. This prevents the host from being overridden by the path. Closes angular#31464 (cherry picked from commit 619c6bc)
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A request with a specially crafted URL starting with a double slash (e.g.,
//example.com) could cause the server-side rendering logic to interpret the request as being for a different host. This is due to the behavior of theURLconstructor when a protocol-relative URL is passed as the first argument.This vulnerability could be exploited to make the server execute requests to a malicious domain when relative paths are used within the application (e.g., via
HttpClient), potentially leading to content injection or other security risks.The fix ensures that the request URL is always constructed as a full URL string, including the protocol and host, before being passed to the
URLconstructor. This prevents the host from being overridden by the path.Closes #31464
(cherry picked from commit 619c6bc)