(wip/feat) working on pre-abstract section on research items

Author: chickymonkeys

content/research/research-3.md

@@ -16,31 +16,10 @@ coauthors:
     name:   "Lena Lindbjerg Sperling"
 date:       "2024-12-25"
 type: "Publications"
+infos:
+  - info: "New draft available soon! or Conditionally accepted at **Somewhere**."
+  - info: "Presented at: [**EHA 2025**](fakelink), etc."
+  - info: "Press coverage: [The Economist](fakelink)."
 ---
 
-<!-- Non devono esserci tutte queste cose per forza, è un esempio di tutte le cose che ci potrebbero andare -->
-<!-- Magari si tolgono gli spazi tra newlines tra i vari item -->
-(example paper update) _New draft available soon!_ or _Conditionally accepted_ at **bla bla bla**.
-
-(example link published paper) [Review of Economic Studies, 2024. Vol. XX, Issue 3, pp. XXXX-XXXX](fakelink).
-
-(example presentations list) Presented at: ASSA 2025, [**EHA 2025**](fakelink), _WEHC 2025_, bla bla.
-
-(example press coverage list) Press coverage: [The Economist](fakelink), [The New York Times](fakelink), [The Washington Post](fakelink).
-
-(example awards list) Awarded the _Best Supercazzola Price_ at the 2024 _Festival della Supercazzola_.
-
-
-How do strengthened church-state relations impact religiosity and social values? To examine, we exploit the staggered introduction of the faith-based initiatives across US states. Introduced by conservative Protestants in the 1990s, these policies aimed to improve conditions for faith-based groups and to increase their numbers. Our difference-in-differences analysis reveals that the initiatives managed to increase the number of faith-based nonprofits and to strengthen religiosity and conservative-religious social views — such as attitudes against LGBTQ+ and abortion. Effects were only felt by Protestants. Notably, 9% of Americans who were not regular churchgoers started attending monthly or more. Of the 10,274 new faith-based organizations during the period, 15% may have opened due to the faith-based initiatives. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that these organizations may potentially have reached 8.2% of American Protestants. Effects are plausibly causal; we find no systematic differences prior to implementation, evidence is robust to using novel staggered-rollout designs, restricting comparison to contiguous counties, and to estimation based on triple differences exploiting religious group heterogeneity. Our results contribute to explaining US polarization and highlight consequences of tightened church-state relations.
-
-
-<!-- 
-
-Questa sezione qui dovrebbe apparire sempre e prima dell'abstract a tendina, serve per indicare ulteriori informazioni tipo il journal dove è stato pubblicato (e.g. "Conditionally accepted at American Economic Journal: Applied Economics", oppure "Review of Economic Studies, 2024. Vol. XX, Issue 3, pp. XXXX-XXXX"), oppure per indicare se e dove è stato presentato a una conferenza, oppure press coverage con i links a eventuali articoli online, ecc.
-
-L'abstract a tendina in realtà se viene brutto lascia stare, era una mia idea. Se non ti piace, cancellalo pure.
-
-_Conditionally Accepted_ at **American Economic Journal: Applied Economics**.
-
--->
-
+How do strengthened church-state relations impact religiosity and social values? To examine, we exploit the staggered introduction of the faith-based initiatives across US states. Introduced by conservative Protestants in the 1990s, these policies aimed to improve conditions for faith-based groups and to increase their numbers. Our difference-in-differences analysis reveals that the initiatives managed to increase the number of faith-based nonprofits and to strengthen religiosity and conservative-religious social views — such as attitudes against LGBTQ+ and abortion. Effects were only felt by Protestants. Notably, 9% of Americans who were not regular churchgoers started attending monthly or more. Of the 10,274 new faith-based organizations during the period, 15% may have opened due to the faith-based initiatives. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that these organizations may potentially have reached 8.2% of American Protestants. Effects are plausibly causal; we find no systematic differences prior to implementation, evidence is robust to using novel staggered-rollout designs, restricting comparison to _contiguous_ counties, and to estimation based on triple differences exploiting religious group heterogeneity. Our results contribute to explaining US polarization and highlight consequences of tightened church-state relations.

pages/research.vue

@@ -60,6 +60,18 @@
                 link.label }}</a>
             </div>
           </div>
+          <!-- NEW SUBSECTION START -->
+          <div class="pre-abstract" v-if="res.meta.infos && res.meta.infos.length">
+            <div
+              v-for="info in res.meta.infos"
+              :key="info.info"
+              class="info"
+            >
+              <!-- <ContentRendererMarkdown :value="item.info" /> -->
+              {{ info.info }}
+            </div>
+          </div>
+          <!-- NEW SUBSECTION END -->
           <div class="copy small">
             <ContentRenderer :value="res" />
           </div>