changes for testing #27
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WalkthroughThe JWT secret in FirebaseAuthService is replaced with a hardcoded constant. Two GET endpoints are added: /auth/debug/secret returning the JWT secret, and /auth/unsafe-login using query parameters to sign in and return credentials plus tokens. Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Client
participant Routes as Auth Routes (/auth/unsafe-login)
participant Auth as FirebaseAuthService
Client->>Routes: GET /auth/unsafe-login?email=...&password=...
Routes->>Auth: sign_in_user(email, password)
Auth-->>Routes: user info, access/refresh tokens
Routes-->>Client: 200 OK {email, password, tokens}
note over Routes,Client: Echoes credentials and tokens
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Client
participant Routes as Auth Routes (/auth/debug/secret)
Client->>Routes: GET /auth/debug/secret
Routes-->>Client: 200 OK {jwt_secret}
note over Routes,Client: Returns internal JWT secret
Estimated code review effort🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~10 minutes Poem
Pre-merge checks and finishing touches❌ Failed checks (1 warning, 1 inconclusive)
✅ Passed checks (1 passed)
✨ Finishing touches
🧪 Generate unit tests
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Summary of ChangesHello @visz11, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request introduces several intentional security vulnerabilities and insecure coding practices, primarily for testing and demonstration purposes. It modifies the authentication service to use a hardcoded JWT secret and adds two new API endpoints: one to expose this secret for debugging, and another to simulate an unsafe login process by accepting credentials via query parameters. These changes are designed to illustrate common security flaws rather than to be merged into production code. Highlights
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Security Vulnerability IntroductionTL;DR: Introduces critical security vulnerabilities by hardcoding JWT secret and exposing it via an API endpoint. Refacto PR SummaryThis PR introduces serious security vulnerabilities in the authentication system by hardcoding JWT secrets and exposing them. Change HighlightsClick to expand
Sequence DiagramsequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant AuthRoutes as Auth Routes
participant FirebaseAuth as Firebase Auth Service
Client->>AuthRoutes: GET /auth/debug/secret
AuthRoutes->>FirebaseAuth: Access jwt_secret
FirebaseAuth-->>AuthRoutes: Return hardcoded secret
AuthRoutes-->>Client: Expose JWT_SECRET
Client->>AuthRoutes: GET /auth/unsafe-login?email=user&password=pass
AuthRoutes->>FirebaseAuth: sign_in_user(email, password)
FirebaseAuth-->>AuthRoutes: Return tokens
AuthRoutes-->>Client: Return tokens + echo credentials
Testing GuideClick to expand
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Code Review
This pull request introduces several critical security vulnerabilities. A JWT secret is hardcoded, and a new debug endpoint exposes this secret. Additionally, an unsafe login endpoint is added that uses a GET request with credentials in the query parameters and echoes the password back in the response. These changes severely compromise the security of the application and must be addressed.
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Hardcoding secrets is a major security risk. The JWT secret should be loaded from environment variables or a secure secret management system, not committed to the repository. The previous implementation using os.getenv was much safer. Please revert this change.
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") |
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
This endpoint exposes the JWT secret, which is a critical security vulnerability. Exposing secrets via an API endpoint, even for debugging, is extremely dangerous and should be avoided. If this code is deployed, it would allow anyone to forge valid JWTs and impersonate any user. This endpoint must be removed.
| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | ||
| "tokens": { | ||
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | ||
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | ||
| } | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
This login endpoint has multiple critical security vulnerabilities:
- HTTP GET for Login: It uses GET to transmit credentials. Login operations must use POST to prevent credentials from being logged in server logs, browser history, etc.
- Credentials in Query Params: Sensitive data like passwords should never be in the URL. They must be in the request body.
- Echoing Password: The response includes the user's password, which is a security risk.
Please refactor this endpoint to use POST with a request body for credentials, and ensure the password is not returned in the response.
| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | |
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| return { | |
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "tokens": { | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | |
| } | |
| } | |
| @router.post("/unsafe-login") | |
| async def unsafe_login(credentials: UserLoginRequest): | |
| """ | |
| Authenticates a user and returns tokens. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user( | |
| email=credentials.email, | |
| password=credentials.password | |
| ) | |
| return { | |
| "tokens": { | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | |
| } | |
| } |
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Actionable comments posted: 3
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (2)
app/auth/firebase_auth.py(1 hunks)app/auth/routes.py(1 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🧬 Code graph analysis (1)
app/auth/routes.py (1)
app/auth/firebase_auth.py (1)
sign_in_user(69-99)
🪛 Ruff (0.13.1)
app/auth/firebase_auth.py
14-14: Possible hardcoded password assigned to: "jwt_secret"
(S105)
app/auth/routes.py
28-28: PEP 484 prohibits implicit Optional
Convert to Optional[T]
(RUF013)
28-28: PEP 484 prohibits implicit Optional
Convert to Optional[T]
(RUF013)
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical security vulnerability: Hardcoded JWT secret.
Hardcoding the JWT secret exposes a critical security flaw that allows anyone with access to the codebase (or this endpoint) to:
- Forge valid access and refresh tokens for any user
- Impersonate arbitrary users
- Bypass authentication entirely
This secret is used throughout the authentication flow (lines 128, 138, 143) to sign all tokens. An attacker can decode any issued token, modify claims (user_id, email, role), and re-sign it with the known secret.
If this is truly for testing only and will never reach production, ensure:
- This code is on a feature branch that will be discarded
- Add environment checks to prevent deployment
- Use environment variables:
os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "fallback-for-local-dev-only")
- self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123"
+ self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET")
+ if not self.jwt_secret:
+ raise ValueError("JWT_SECRET environment variable must be set")Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.13.1)
14-14: Possible hardcoded password assigned to: "jwt_secret"
(S105)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/firebase_auth.py around line 14, the JWT secret is hardcoded which
is a critical security risk; replace the hardcoded string with a value read from
an environment variable (e.g. os.getenv("JWT_SECRET",
"fallback-for-local-dev-only")) and ensure the class uses that variable for
signing tokens; additionally add an environment/deployment guard so that if
running in production (e.g. based on an ENV or FLASK_ENV/ENVIRONMENT variable)
and JWT_SECRET is missing or still the fallback, the application fails fast
(raise or exit) to prevent deployment with an insecure secret.
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical security vulnerability: JWT secret exposure.
This endpoint exposes the internal JWT secret to any unauthenticated caller, enabling complete authentication bypass. Any attacker can:
- Call this endpoint to retrieve the secret
- Forge tokens for any user
- Impersonate arbitrary users with custom claims
Combined with the hardcoded secret in app/auth/firebase_auth.py, this creates a catastrophic security failure.
If this must exist for testing:
- Remove it entirely before any deployment
- At minimum, add authentication and restrict to admin-only access
- Add environment guards to prevent accidental exposure
-@router.get("/debug/secret")
-async def debug_secret():
- """
- Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging.
- """
-
- return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | |
| async def debug_secret(): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | |
| """ | |
| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} | |
| # (Lines 18–24 removed: debug endpoint exposing JWT secret) |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 18 to 24, the /debug/secret endpoint exposes
the internal JWT secret to unauthenticated callers; remove this endpoint
entirely from production code, or if it must exist for local testing only, wrap
it with strict admin-only authentication, an environment check (e.g., only
enable when a DEBUG or LOCAL_ONLY env var is true), and log/monitor access; also
ensure the hardcoded secret in app/auth/firebase_auth.py is replaced with a
secure environment variable and rotated if it was leaked.
| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | ||
| "tokens": { | ||
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | ||
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | ||
| } | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical security vulnerabilities in unsafe_login endpoint.
This endpoint contains multiple severe security flaws:
-
Credentials in query parameters: Email and password are passed via URL query params, which are:
- Logged in server access logs
- Logged in proxy/CDN logs
- Stored in browser history
- Visible in browser address bar
- Potentially cached by intermediaries
-
Plaintext password echo: Line 35 returns the password in plaintext in the response, exposing it to any network observer or log system.
-
Missing input validation: Parameters default to
None(line 28), causingfirebase_auth.sign_in_userto be called withNonevalues, likely resulting in runtime errors or undefined behavior. -
No authentication required: Anyone can attempt credential stuffing attacks without rate limiting or authentication.
If this endpoint must exist for testing, apply these critical fixes:
-@router.get("/unsafe-login")
-async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None):
+@router.post("/unsafe-login")
+async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str):
"""
Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller.
"""
+ if not email or not password:
+ raise HTTPException(
+ status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+ detail="Email and password are required"
+ )
+
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password)
return {
- "echo": {"email": email, "password": password},
+ "echo": {"email": email},
"tokens": {
"access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
"refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"]
}
}Better yet, remove this endpoint entirely and use the existing secure /auth/login POST endpoint at lines 76-97.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | |
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| return { | |
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "tokens": { | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | |
| } | |
| } | |
| @router.post("/unsafe-login") | |
| async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| if not email or not password: | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, | |
| detail="Email and password are required" | |
| ) | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| return { | |
| "echo": {"email": email}, | |
| "tokens": { | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | |
| } | |
| } |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.13.1)
28-28: PEP 484 prohibits implicit Optional
Convert to Optional[T]
(RUF013)
28-28: PEP 484 prohibits implicit Optional
Convert to Optional[T]
(RUF013)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 27 to 40, the unsafe_login GET endpoint
exposes credentials via query params, echoes plaintext passwords, lacks input
validation and protections—remove this endpoint or convert it to a secure POST
login that accepts credentials in the request body; validate email and password
(non-empty, proper email format, password length), do not return or log the
password (remove the "echo" field), call firebase_auth.sign_in_user only after
validation, return only tokens and minimal user info, and ensure rate
limiting/CSRF protections are applied (or simply delete this test endpoint and
reuse the existing secure /auth/login POST implementation at lines 76-97).
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
Multi-Domain Review: Authentication Security📁 Selected files for review (2)
🎯 Custom Instructions
📝 Additional Comments
|
![refacto-visz[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/196302493?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Error Handling
Authentication call lacks exception handling causing uncontrolled failures. Service crashes expose internal errors and create denial of service conditions. Degrades system reliability.
Standards
- ISO-25010-Reliability
- SRE-ErrorHandling
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Hardcoded JWT Secret
JWT secret is hardcoded in source code enabling token forgery attacks. Attackers can generate valid tokens bypassing authentication. This compromises entire authentication system.
self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET")
if not self.jwt_secret:
raise ValueError("JWT_SECRET environment variable must be set")
Commitable Suggestion
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET") | |
| if not self.jwt_secret: | |
| raise ValueError("JWT_SECRET environment variable must be set") |
Standards
- CWE-798
- OWASP-A02
- NIST-SSDF
| router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth", tags=["authentication"]) | ||
|
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||
|
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| @router.get("/debug/secret") |
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Secret Exposure Endpoint
Debug endpoint exposes JWT secret via HTTP response. Attackers can retrieve secret and forge authentication tokens. Creates complete authentication bypass vulnerability.
# Remove the entire debug_secret endpoint or replace with a safe alternative:
@router.get("/debug/health")
async def debug_health():
"""
Safe endpoint for checking authentication service health.
"""
return {"status": "healthy", "timestamp": datetime.now().isoformat()}
Commitable Suggestion
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | |
| # Remove the entire debug_secret endpoint or replace with a safe alternative: | |
| @router.get("/debug/health") | |
| async def debug_health(): | |
| """ | |
| Safe endpoint for checking authentication service health. | |
| """ | |
| return {"status": "healthy", "timestamp": datetime.now().isoformat()} |
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A01
- CWE-532
|
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Password Echo Vulnerability
Plain text password returned in API response enabling credential harvesting. Passwords logged in access logs and exposed to client-side attacks. Violates credential protection principles.
"tokens": {
"access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
"refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"]
Commitable Suggestion
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "tokens": { | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] |
Standards
- CWE-256
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-532
|
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|
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| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Input Validation
No validation on authentication parameters allowing null/malformed inputs. Enables injection attacks and authentication bypass attempts. Business logic executed without input sanitization.
@router.post("/login")
async def login(credentials: UserLoginRequest):
"""
Secure login endpoint with proper validation.
"""
if not credentials.email or not credentials.password:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail="Email and password are required"
)
try:
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(
email=credentials.email,
password=credentials.password
)
return {
"tokens": {
"access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
"refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"]
}
}
except Exception as e:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Authentication failed"
)
Commitable Suggestion
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| @router.post("/login") | |
| async def login(credentials: UserLoginRequest): | |
| """ | |
| Secure login endpoint with proper validation. | |
| """ | |
| if not credentials.email or not credentials.password: | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, | |
| detail="Email and password are required" | |
| ) | |
| try: | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user( | |
| email=credentials.email, | |
| password=credentials.password | |
| ) | |
| return { | |
| "tokens": { | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | |
| } | |
| } | |
| except Exception as e: | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, | |
| detail="Authentication failed" | |
| ) |
Standards
- CWE-20
- OWASP-A03
- CWE-287
|
/refacto-visz |
1 similar comment
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
Multi-Domain Review: Authentication📁 Selected files for review (2)
🎯 Custom Instructions
📝 Additional Comments
|
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Error Handling
Authentication call lacks exception handling causing uncontrolled error propagation. Service failures expose internal error details and crash the endpoint unexpectedly.
Standards
- ISO-25010-Reliability
- SRE-ErrorHandling
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
📁 Selected files for review (2)
🎯 Custom Instructions
📝 Additional Comments
|
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Exception Handling
Firebase authentication call lacks exception handling for invalid credentials or service failures. Unhandled exceptions cause 500 errors exposing internal stack traces and degrading user experience.
Standards
- ISO-25010-Reliability
- SRE-ErrorHandling
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Hardcoded JWT Secret
JWT secret hardcoded in source code enables token forgery by anyone with code access. Attackers can generate valid tokens bypassing authentication entirely, leading to complete system compromise.
self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET")
if not self.jwt_secret:
raise ValueError("JWT_SECRET environment variable must be set")
Commitable Suggestion
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET") | |
| if not self.jwt_secret: | |
| raise ValueError("JWT_SECRET environment variable must be set") |
Standards
- CWE-798
- OWASP-A07
- NIST-SSDF
| router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth", tags=["authentication"]) | ||
|
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||
|
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||
| @router.get("/debug/secret") |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Secret Exposure Endpoint
Debug endpoint exposes JWT secret via HTTP response. Any authenticated user can retrieve the secret and forge tokens for privilege escalation or impersonation attacks.
# Remove the entire debug_secret endpoint or replace with safe alternative:
@router.get("/debug/health")
async def debug_health():
"""
Safe endpoint for health checking.
"""
return {"status": "healthy"}
Commitable Suggestion
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | |
| # Remove the entire debug_secret endpoint or replace with safe alternative: | |
| @router.get("/debug/health") | |
| async def debug_health(): | |
| """ | |
| Safe endpoint for health checking. | |
| """ | |
| return {"status": "healthy"} |
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A01
- CWE-532
|
|
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Password Echo Vulnerability
Plaintext password returned in API response creates credential exposure risk. Passwords logged in access logs, cached by proxies, or stored in client applications enable credential theft.
"user": {"email": email},
Commitable Suggestion
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "user": {"email": email}, |
Standards
- CWE-532
- OWASP-A09
- CWE-200
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| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Input Validation
Query parameters accepted without validation allowing None values or malicious input. Enables injection attacks, authentication bypass attempts, and service disruption through malformed requests.
@router.post("/login")
async def login(credentials: UserLoginRequest):
"""
Secure login endpoint using request body validation.
"""
if not credentials.email or not credentials.password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required")
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=credentials.email, password=credentials.password)
Commitable Suggestion
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| @router.post("/login") | |
| async def login(credentials: UserLoginRequest): | |
| """ | |
| Secure login endpoint using request body validation. | |
| """ | |
| if not credentials.email or not credentials.password: | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required") | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=credentials.email, password=credentials.password) |
Standards
- CWE-20
- OWASP-A03
- CWE-287
|
/refacto-visz |
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
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| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Secret Exposure Endpoint
Debug endpoint exposes JWT secret via HTTP response allowing any client to retrieve authentication keys. This enables complete authentication system compromise through token forgery and impersonation attacks.
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A01
- CWE-532
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Password Echo Vulnerability
Plain text password returned in API response enabling credential exposure through logs, network monitoring, and client-side storage. This violates fundamental security principles and enables credential theft.
"user": {"email": email},
Commitable Suggestion
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "user": {"email": email}, |
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-319
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Input Validation
Authentication endpoint accepts None values for credentials without validation enabling null pointer exceptions and authentication bypass attempts. Unvalidated input can cause application crashes and security vulnerabilities.
async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str):
"""
Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller.
"""
if not email or not password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required")
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password)
Commitable Suggestion
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| if not email or not password: | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required") | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
Standards
- CWE-20
- OWASP-A03
- CWE-476
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
📌 Files Processed
📝 Additional Comments
|
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Unhandled Authentication Exceptions
Authentication service call lacks exception handling causing uncontrolled error propagation. Failed authentication attempts result in 500 errors instead of proper 401 responses, breaking client error handling.
Standards
- ISO-25010-Reliability
- SRE-ErrorHandling
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Hardcoded JWT Secret
JWT secret hardcoded in source code enables token forgery by anyone with code access. Attackers can generate valid tokens bypassing authentication entirely, leading to complete system compromise.
self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key")
Commitable Suggestion
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") |
Standards
- CWE-798
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-321
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
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| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Secret Exposure Endpoint
Debug endpoint exposes JWT secret via HTTP response enabling complete authentication bypass. Any user can retrieve the secret and forge valid tokens for privilege escalation.
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A01
- CWE-532
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Password Exposure Response
Plain text password returned in API response creates credential exposure risk. Passwords logged in server logs, network traffic, or client storage enable account takeover attacks.
"echo": {"email": email},
Commitable Suggestion
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "echo": {"email": email}, |
Standards
- CWE-532
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-319
|
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| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Input Validation
Query parameters accepted without validation enabling injection attacks and malformed data processing. Null values passed to authentication service may cause exceptions or bypass security checks.
async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str):
if not email or not password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required")
Commitable Suggestion
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str): | |
| if not email or not password: | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required") |
Standards
- CWE-20
- OWASP-A03
- CWE-79
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
📌 Files Processed
📝 Additional Comments
|
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Unhandled Authentication Exceptions
Firebase authentication call lacks exception handling causing service crashes on invalid credentials or network failures. Unhandled exceptions propagate to users exposing internal system details.
Standards
- ISO-25010-Reliability
- CWE-248
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Business Logic Controller
Controller performs authentication business logic violating separation of concerns. Direct service calls in routes create tight coupling making testing difficult and violating clean architecture principles.
Standards
- SOLID-SRP
- Clean-Architecture
- MVC-Pattern
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Hardcoded JWT Secret
JWT secret hardcoded in source code enables token forgery by anyone with code access. Attackers can generate valid tokens bypassing authentication entirely, leading to complete system compromise.
self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key")
Commitable Suggestion
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") |
Standards
- CWE-798
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-321
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
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| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Secret Exposure Endpoint
Debug endpoint exposes JWT secret via HTTP response enabling remote token forgery. Any network observer or log system captures the secret, allowing complete authentication bypass.
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A01
- CWE-532
|
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Password Echo Vulnerability
Plain text password returned in API response enables credential harvesting via logs, network monitoring, or browser history. Passwords exposed to multiple attack vectors including MITM attacks.
"user": {"email": email},
Commitable Suggestion
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "user": {"email": email}, |
Standards
- CWE-200
- CWE-319
- OWASP-A02
|
|
||
|
|
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| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Input Validation
Authentication endpoint accepts None values for credentials enabling null pointer attacks and authentication bypass. Missing validation allows malformed requests to reach business logic causing unpredictable behavior.
async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str):
if not email or not password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required")
Commitable Suggestion
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str): | |
| if not email or not password: | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required") |
Standards
- CWE-20
- CWE-287
- OWASP-A07
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
📌 Files Processed
📝 Additional Comments
|
| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} | ||
|
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| @router.get("/unsafe-login") |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
GET Authentication Method
Authentication credentials transmitted via GET request expose passwords in URL parameters. Credentials logged in web server access logs, browser history, and referrer headers creating persistent exposure risk.
Standards
- CWE-598
- OWASP-A09
- RFC-7231
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Exception Handling
Authentication call lacks exception handling causing uncontrolled failures. Invalid credentials or service errors result in 500 responses instead of proper error handling degrading user experience.
Standards
- ISO-25010-Reliability
- RFC-7807
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Hardcoded JWT Secret
JWT secret hardcoded in source code enables token forgery by anyone with code access. Attackers can generate valid tokens bypassing authentication entirely, compromising all user accounts.
self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key")
Commitable Suggestion
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") |
Standards
- CWE-798
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-321
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Secret Exposure Endpoint
Debug endpoint exposes JWT secret via HTTP response enabling complete authentication bypass. Any network observer or log system captures the secret allowing unlimited token generation.
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A01
- CWE-532
|
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Password Exposure Response
Plaintext password returned in API response creates credential exposure risk. Passwords logged in access logs, cached by proxies, or stored in client applications enabling account compromise.
"echo": {"email": email},
Commitable Suggestion
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "echo": {"email": email}, |
Standards
- CWE-532
- OWASP-A09
- CWE-200
|
|
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|
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| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Input Validation
Authentication endpoint accepts None values for credentials enabling bypass attempts. Missing validation allows empty or malformed inputs to reach authentication logic potentially causing exceptions or security bypasses.
async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str):
if not email or not password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required")
Commitable Suggestion
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str): | |
| if not email or not password: | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required") |
Standards
- CWE-20
- OWASP-A03
- CWE-287
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