changes for testing #29
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Summary of ChangesHello @visz11, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request introduces several intentional security vulnerabilities and debugging endpoints within the authentication module. The changes appear to be for testing or demonstration purposes, specifically to showcase insecure configurations and practices, rather than implementing new features or fixing bugs for a production environment. Highlights
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WalkthroughThe auth service now uses a hardcoded JWT secret instead of an environment variable. Two new HTTP endpoints were added: one returns the JWT secret, and another performs sign-in using query parameters and returns credentials and tokens. Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant C as Client
participant R as Auth Routes
participant S as FirebaseAuthService
rect rgb(240,248,255)
note over R,S: New endpoint: GET /debug/secret
C->>R: GET /debug/secret
R->>S: Access jwt_secret
R-->>C: 200 OK (jwt_secret)
end
rect rgb(245,255,240)
note over R,S: New endpoint: GET /unsafe-login
C->>R: GET /unsafe-login?email&password
R->>S: sign_in_with_email(email, password)
S-->>R: tokens (id_token, refresh_token, ...)
R-->>C: 200 OK (echo email/password + tokens)
end
Estimated code review effort🎯 3 (Moderate) | ⏱️ ~20 minutes Poem
Pre-merge checks and finishing touches❌ Failed checks (1 warning, 1 inconclusive)
✅ Passed checks (1 passed)
✨ Finishing touches
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Code Review
This pull request introduces several changes for testing purposes which contain critical security vulnerabilities. My review highlights these issues, including a hardcoded JWT secret, a debug endpoint that exposes this secret, and an insecure login endpoint. These changes pose a severe security risk and should not be merged into a production environment.
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
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Hardcoding secrets like the jwt_secret is a critical security vulnerability. Secrets should be loaded from a secure source, such as environment variables or a secret management service, and never be checked into version control. The previous implementation using os.getenv was the correct approach.
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") |
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
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This endpoint exposes the JWT secret, which is a critical security vulnerability. If an attacker gains access to this endpoint, they can forge their own authentication tokens and impersonate any user. Debug endpoints that expose sensitive information should never be present in production code. If needed for local development, they should be strictly guarded and disabled by default.
| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | ||
| "tokens": { | ||
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | ||
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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This unsafe_login endpoint has multiple critical security flaws:
- HTTP Method and Credential Handling: It uses a
GETrequest and passes credentials (email,password) in query parameters. This is highly insecure as it can expose credentials in server logs, browser history, and network traffic. Login operations must usePOSTwith credentials in the request body. - Credential Exposure in Response: The response echoes the password, which is a serious security risk. Passwords should never be returned to the client.
- Missing Input Validation: The
emailandpasswordare used without validation. If they are not provided, this will likely cause an unhandled exception.
This endpoint should be removed or completely refactored to follow standard security practices, similar to the existing /login endpoint in this file.
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
app/auth/routes.py (1)
28-28: Add explicitOptionaltype hints.The function parameters should use explicit
Optional[str]type hints for clarity and PEP 484 compliance.Apply this diff:
-async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): +async def unsafe_login(email: Optional[str] = None, password: Optional[str] = None):Add the import at the top of the file:
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, status, Depends from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer +from typing import Dict, Any, Optional -from typing import Dict, AnyNote: This is a minor style issue. The endpoint itself has critical security flaws (see previous comment) and should be removed entirely.
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (2)
app/auth/firebase_auth.py(1 hunks)app/auth/routes.py(1 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🧬 Code graph analysis (1)
app/auth/routes.py (1)
app/auth/firebase_auth.py (1)
sign_in_user(69-99)
🪛 Ruff (0.13.3)
app/auth/routes.py
28-28: PEP 484 prohibits implicit Optional
Convert to Optional[T]
(RUF013)
28-28: PEP 484 prohibits implicit Optional
Convert to Optional[T]
(RUF013)
app/auth/firebase_auth.py
14-14: Possible hardcoded password assigned to: "jwt_secret"
(S105)
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
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Critical: Never hardcode secrets in source control.
Hardcoding the JWT secret directly in code creates multiple severe security risks:
- Total authentication bypass: Anyone with access to the codebase can forge valid tokens to impersonate any user.
- Git history exposure: The secret persists in version control history even if later removed.
- Accidental deployment: "Demo" or "test" code can be accidentally deployed to production environments.
- Supply chain risk: The secret can leak through stolen credentials, public repository accidents, or insider threats.
Revert to reading from environment variables:
- self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123"
+ self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET")
+ if not self.jwt_secret:
+ raise ValueError("JWT_SECRET environment variable is required")If this is intentionally insecure for testing purposes only, implement runtime environment checks to prevent production deployment:
import os
class FirebaseAuthService:
def __init__(self):
self._initialize_firebase()
# Fail-safe: Only allow demo secret in development
env = os.getenv("APP_ENV", "production")
if env == "development":
self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123"
else:
self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET")
if not self.jwt_secret:
raise ValueError("JWT_SECRET environment variable is required in production")
self.jwt_algorithm = "HS256"
self.access_token_expiry = timedelta(hours=1)
self.refresh_token_expiry = timedelta(days=7)🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.13.3)
14-14: Possible hardcoded password assigned to: "jwt_secret"
(S105)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/firebase_auth.py around line 14, remove the hardcoded JWT secret and
instead read JWT_SECRET from environment variables; allow a demo secret only
when APP_ENV equals "development" (otherwise raise an error if JWT_SECRET is
missing), keep jwt_algorithm and token expiry settings as before, and ensure the
class initialization fails fast in non-development environments when the secret
is not provided.
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
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Critical: Secret exposure endpoint enables complete authentication bypass.
Exposing the JWT secret through a public endpoint is an immediate and catastrophic security vulnerability:
- Authentication bypass: Any user can forge valid tokens for any account, gaining unauthorized access to the entire system.
- Privilege escalation: Attackers can create admin tokens to gain full system control.
- Data breach: All user data becomes accessible through token forgery.
- No authentication: The endpoint has no access control, making it publicly accessible.
This endpoint must be removed entirely before any deployment:
-@router.get("/debug/secret")
-async def debug_secret():
- """
- Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging.
- """
-
- return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret}
-
-If debugging capabilities are genuinely needed for local development, implement these safeguards:
- Environment restriction: Only enable in development mode
- Strong authentication: Require admin-level authentication
- Audit logging: Log all access attempts
- Network isolation: Bind to localhost only
Example safer implementation:
@router.get("/debug/secret")
async def debug_secret(current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user)):
"""
DEBUG ONLY: Returns obfuscated secret info
"""
# Require development environment
if os.getenv("APP_ENV") != "development":
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Not found")
# Require admin role
if current_user.get("role") != "admin":
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
# Return only partial/obfuscated info
secret = firebase_auth.jwt_secret
return {
"secret_length": len(secret),
"secret_prefix": secret[:4] + "..." if len(secret) > 4 else "***",
"algorithm": firebase_auth.jwt_algorithm
}🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 18 to 24, the debug endpoint returns the raw
JWT secret which must be removed or locked down: delete the endpoint entirely
for production; if a debug endpoint is genuinely required, wrap it in an
environment check (only APP_ENV==development), require an authenticated admin
via Depends(get_current_user) and role check, add audit logging of access
attempts, bind the server to localhost for dev-only access, and return only
obfuscated/metadata (e.g., length, prefix, algorithm) rather than the secret
itself; ensure the route is not registered in non-development deployments.
| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | ||
| "tokens": { | ||
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | ||
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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Critical: Multiple severe security vulnerabilities in authentication flow.
This endpoint contains at least four critical security issues:
- Credentials in query parameters: Query params are logged by web servers, proxies, and browsers, exposing credentials in plaintext across multiple systems.
- Password echoed in response: Returning the password in the response violates security fundamentals and creates additional leak vectors.
- No input validation:
Nonevalues can crash the authentication flow or cause undefined behavior. - Missing HTTPS enforcement: Credentials transmitted over unencrypted connections are vulnerable to interception.
Remove this endpoint entirely:
-@router.get("/unsafe-login")
-async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None):
- """
- Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller.
- """
-
- auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password)
- return {
- "echo": {"email": email, "password": password},
- "tokens": {
- "access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
- "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"]
- }
- }
-
-The existing /login endpoint (lines 76-97) already implements authentication correctly using POST with request body validation.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | |
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| return { | |
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "tokens": { | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | |
| } | |
| } |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.13.3)
28-28: PEP 484 prohibits implicit Optional
Convert to Optional[T]
(RUF013)
28-28: PEP 484 prohibits implicit Optional
Convert to Optional[T]
(RUF013)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 27 to 40, remove the entire unsafe
/unsafe-login GET endpoint that accepts credentials via query params, echoes the
password back in responses, and lacks validation and HTTPS enforcement; delete
the function and its route registration and any references to it, and rely on
the existing /login POST endpoint (lines ~76-97) which performs validated
body-based authentication instead.
|
/refacto-visz |
2 similar comments
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/refacto-visz |
|
/refacto-visz |
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📝 Additional Comments
|
![refacto-visz[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/196302493?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
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Missing Error Handling
Authentication call lacks exception handling causing uncontrolled error propagation. Service failures expose internal stack traces and crash the endpoint instead of graceful error responses.
Standards
- ISO-25010-Fault-Tolerance
- CWE-248
| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
GET Request Credentials
Credentials transmitted via GET query parameters get logged in web server access logs and browser history. Password exposure through URL parameters violates secure authentication practices.
Standards
- CWE-598
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-319
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Hardcoded JWT Secret
JWT secret hardcoded in source code enables token forgery by anyone with code access. Attackers can generate valid tokens bypassing authentication entirely, leading to complete system compromise.
self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key")
Commitable Suggestion
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") |
Standards
- CWE-798
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-321
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Secret Exposure Endpoint
Debug endpoint exposes JWT secret via HTTP response enabling complete authentication bypass. Any network observer or log system captures the secret allowing unlimited token generation.
return {"status": "debug endpoint - secret not exposed"}
Commitable Suggestion
| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} | |
| return {"status": "debug endpoint - secret not exposed"} |
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A01
- CWE-532
|
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||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Password Exposure Logging
Plain text password returned in API response gets logged in access logs and browser history. Credential exposure enables account takeover and violates data protection regulations.
"echo": {"email": email},
Commitable Suggestion
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "echo": {"email": email}, |
Standards
- CWE-532
- OWASP-A09
- CWE-319
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Input Validation
No validation on email/password parameters allows null values and malformed input to reach authentication service. Enables injection attacks and service disruption through malformed requests.
async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str):
if not email or not password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required")
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password)
Commitable Suggestion
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str): | |
| if not email or not password: | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required") | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
Standards
- CWE-20
- OWASP-A03
- CWE-79
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
📌 Files Processed
📝 Additional Comments
|
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Input Validation
No validation on email and password parameters allows null values and malformed input to reach authentication service. This enables enumeration attacks and potential service disruption through invalid data injection.
Standards
- CWE-20
- OWASP-A03
- CWE-287
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Hardcoded JWT Secret
JWT secret hardcoded in source code enables token forgery by anyone with code access. Attackers can generate valid tokens bypassing authentication entirely, leading to complete system compromise.
self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key")
Commitable Suggestion
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") |
Standards
- CWE-798
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-321
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Secret Exposure Endpoint
Debug endpoint exposes JWT secret via HTTP response enabling complete authentication bypass. Any network observer or log system captures the secret allowing unlimited token generation and system access.
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A01
- CWE-532
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Password Query Parameter
Password transmitted via URL query parameters gets logged in web server logs, proxy caches, and browser history. Credentials become permanently exposed in multiple systems enabling account takeover attacks.
@router.post("/unsafe-login")
async def unsafe_login(credentials: UserLoginRequest):
"""
Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated request body and performs business logic in controller.
"""
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=credentials.email, password=credentials.password)
return {
"echo": {"email": credentials.email},
"tokens": {
"access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
"refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"]
}
}
Commitable Suggestion
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| return { | |
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| @router.post("/unsafe-login") | |
| async def unsafe_login(credentials: UserLoginRequest): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated request body and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=credentials.email, password=credentials.password) | |
| return { | |
| "echo": {"email": credentials.email}, | |
| "tokens": { | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | |
| } | |
| } |
Standards
- CWE-598
- OWASP-A04
- CWE-532
|
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Password Echo Response
Plain text password returned in API response gets logged and cached throughout network infrastructure. Credentials become permanently exposed in application logs, monitoring systems, and client-side storage.
"echo": {"email": email},
Commitable Suggestion
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "echo": {"email": email}, |
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A09
- CWE-532
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
📌 Files Processed
📝 Additional Comments
|
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Exception Handling
Authentication service call lacks try-catch blocks allowing unhandled exceptions to propagate. Failed authentication attempts crash the endpoint returning 500 errors instead of proper authentication failure responses.
Standards
- ISO-25010-Fault-Tolerance
- SRE-Error-Handling
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Hardcoded JWT Secret
JWT secret hardcoded in source code enables token forgery by anyone with code access. Attackers can generate valid tokens bypassing authentication entirely, leading to complete system compromise.
self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key")
Commitable Suggestion
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") |
Standards
- CWE-798
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-321
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Secret Exposure Endpoint
Debug endpoint exposes JWT secret via HTTP response enabling complete authentication bypass. Any user can retrieve the secret and forge tokens for any account, causing total security failure.
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A01
- CWE-209
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
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Password Query Parameter
Password transmitted via query parameters gets logged in server logs, proxy logs, and browser history. Credentials become permanently exposed in multiple systems enabling account takeover attacks.
@router.post("/unsafe-login")
async def unsafe_login(credentials: UserLoginRequest):
"""
Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated request body and performs business logic in controller.
"""
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=credentials.email, password=credentials.password)
return {
"echo": {"email": credentials.email},
"tokens": {
"access_token": auth_result["access_token"],
"refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"]
}
}
Commitable Suggestion
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| return { | |
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| @router.post("/unsafe-login") | |
| async def unsafe_login(credentials: UserLoginRequest): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated request body and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=credentials.email, password=credentials.password) | |
| return { | |
| "echo": {"email": credentials.email}, | |
| "tokens": { | |
| "access_token": auth_result["access_token"], | |
| "refresh_token": auth_result["refresh_token"] | |
| } | |
| } |
Standards
- CWE-598
- OWASP-A04
- CWE-319
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
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Password Echo Response
Plain text password returned in API response exposes credentials to client-side logging, network monitoring, and response caching. Password becomes visible to multiple attack vectors beyond initial transmission.
"echo": {"email": email},
Commitable Suggestion
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "echo": {"email": email}, |
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A04
- CWE-256
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
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||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Input Validation
Null email and password parameters passed directly to authentication service without validation. Service will fail with null pointer exceptions causing authentication system crashes and denial of service.
if not email or not password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required")
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password)
Commitable Suggestion
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| if not email or not password: | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required") | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
Standards
- CWE-476
- ISO-25010-Reliability
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
Multi-Domain Review: Authentication📌 Files Processed
📝 Additional Comments
|
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Error Handling
Authentication call lacks exception handling causing unhandled errors to propagate as 500 responses. Service becomes unreliable with poor error recovery and debugging difficulty.
Standards
- ISO-25010-Reliability
- SRE-ErrorHandling
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| @router.get("/unsafe-login") | ||
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Insecure Authentication Method
Credentials transmitted via URL query parameters exposing them in server logs, browser history, and referrer headers. Authentication data becomes visible to intermediate systems and cached inappropriately.
Standards
- CWE-598
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-319
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self._initialize_firebase() | ||
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") | ||
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" |
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Hardcoded JWT Secret
JWT secret is hardcoded in source code making it visible to all developers and version control. Attackers can forge authentication tokens leading to complete authentication bypass and unauthorized access.
self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key")
Commitable Suggestion
| self.jwt_secret = "DEMO_HARDCODED_JWT_SECRET_123" | |
| self.jwt_secret = os.getenv("JWT_SECRET", "your-secret-key") |
Standards
- CWE-798
- OWASP-A02
- CWE-321
| @router.get("/debug/secret") | ||
| async def debug_secret(): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Exposes internal JWT secret for debugging. | ||
| """ | ||
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| return {"jwt_secret": firebase_auth.jwt_secret} |
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Secret Exposure Endpoint
Debug endpoint exposes JWT secret via HTTP response allowing any authenticated user to retrieve signing key. Attackers can forge tokens for privilege escalation and complete authentication bypass.
Standards
- CWE-200
- OWASP-A01
- CWE-532
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| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | ||
| return { | ||
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Password Exposure Logging
Plain text password returned in API response and potentially logged in access logs. Credentials exposed to monitoring systems, log aggregators, and anyone with log access enabling account compromise.
"echo": {"email": email},
Commitable Suggestion
| "echo": {"email": email, "password": password}, | |
| "echo": {"email": email}, |
Standards
- CWE-532
- OWASP-A09
- CWE-200
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | ||
| """ | ||
|
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||
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Input Validation
Query parameters accepted without validation allowing null values and malformed input to reach authentication logic. Enables injection attacks and authentication bypass through malformed requests.
async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str):
if not email or not password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required")
auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password)
Commitable Suggestion
| async def unsafe_login(email: str = None, password: str = None): | |
| """ | |
| Intentional violation: Uses unvalidated query params and performs business logic in controller. | |
| """ | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) | |
| async def unsafe_login(email: str, password: str): | |
| if not email or not password: | |
| raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email and password are required") | |
| auth_result = await firebase_auth.sign_in_user(email=email, password=password) |
Standards
- CWE-20
- OWASP-A03
- CWE-287
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
📁 Selected files for review (2)
🎯 Custom Instructions
|
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No review comments were generated during this review iteration of the PR. |
|
/refacto-visz |
|
Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
📁 Selected files for review (2)
🎯 Custom Instructions
|
|
No review comments were generated during this review iteration of the PR. |
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