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WalkthroughThis pull request introduces comprehensive authentication and security enhancements, adding role-based user management, session tracking, audit logging capabilities, password validation, security headers, IP whitelisting, and rate limiting middleware to the application. Changes
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
actor Client
participant RateLimitMW as Rate Limit<br/>Middleware
participant AuthRoute as Auth Route<br/>Handler
participant Security as Security<br/>Utilities
participant AuditLog as Audit<br/>Logger
Client->>RateLimitMW: HTTP Request + IP
RateLimitMW->>RateLimitMW: Check IP request count
alt Limit Exceeded
RateLimitMW-->>Client: 429 Too Many Requests
else Within Limit
RateLimitMW->>AuthRoute: Forward Request
AuthRoute->>Security: Validate password strength
Security-->>AuthRoute: Validation result
AuthRoute->>AuthRoute: Extract user role
AuthRoute->>AuditLog: Log audit event
AuditLog->>AuditLog: Store event (in-memory)
AuthRoute-->>Client: Response + Role Info
end
sequenceDiagram
actor User
participant UpdateProfile as Update Profile<br/>Endpoint
participant Security as Security<br/>Checks
participant AuditLog as Audit Log
User->>UpdateProfile: PUT /profile with updates
UpdateProfile->>Security: Verify current user token
alt User is ADMIN
Security-->>UpdateProfile: Allow role change
else User is non-ADMIN
Security-->>UpdateProfile: Deny role change
end
UpdateProfile->>UpdateProfile: Update profile fields
UpdateProfile->>AuditLog: Log profile change
AuditLog->>AuditLog: Record action + IP + user_agent
UpdateProfile-->>User: Updated UserResponse
Estimated code review effort🎯 4 (Complex) | ⏱️ ~45 minutes
Poem
Pre-merge checks and finishing touches❌ Failed checks (1 warning, 1 inconclusive)
✅ Passed checks (1 passed)
✨ Finishing touches
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Summary of ChangesHello @visz11, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request significantly upgrades the FastAPI authentication API by integrating a suite of new security and user management features. It introduces capabilities for users to manage their profiles and change passwords, along with robust role-based access control. Furthermore, the API now includes essential security mechanisms such as rate limiting, trusted host validation, and a dedicated audit logging system, enhancing both the security posture and operational visibility of the application. Highlights
Using Gemini Code AssistThe full guide for Gemini Code Assist can be found on our documentation page, here are some quick tips. Invoking Gemini You can request assistance from Gemini at any point by creating a comment using either
Customization To customize Gemini Code Assist for GitHub experience, repository maintainers can create a configuration file and/or provide a custom code review style guide (such as PEP-8 for Python) by creating and adding files to a Limitations & Feedback Gemini Code Assist may make mistakes. Please leave feedback on any instances where its feedback is incorrect or counter productive. You can react with 👍 and 👎 on @gemini-code-assist comments. If you're interested in giving your feedback about your experience with Gemini Code Assist for Github and other Google products, sign up here. You can also get AI-powered code generation, chat, as well as code reviews directly in the IDE at no cost with the Gemini Code Assist IDE Extension. Footnotes
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Refacto PR SummaryThis pull request significantly enhances the authentication and security features of the application. It introduces role-based access control (RBAC), user profile management, session management, and audit logging. Security is hardened at the application level with rate limiting, trusted host validation, and a new module of security utilities. Key Changes:
Confidence Score: 2/5
Change HighlightsClick to expand
Sequence DiagramsequenceDiagram
actor User
participant API as FastAPI App
participant FirebaseAuth as Firebase Auth
participant AuditLog as Audit Logger
User->>API: PUT /auth/profile (with token & update data)
API->>API: get_current_user() verifies token
alt Role change attempted
API->>API: Check if current_user.role == 'admin'
Note over API: If not, return 403 Forbidden
end
API->>FirebaseAuth: update_user(uid, update_data)
FirebaseAuth-->>API: Success
API->>AuditLog: _log_audit_event(action='profile_update', details=...)
Note over AuditLog: (Currently prints to console)
API->>FirebaseAuth: get_user(uid)
FirebaseAuth-->>API: Return updated user object
API-->>User: 200 OK with UserResponse
Testing GuideClick to expand
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Refacto is reviewing this PR. Please wait for the review comments to be posted. |
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Code Review
This pull request introduces significant new functionality, including user profile management, password changes, session handling, and audit logging, along with security enhancements like rate limiting and security headers. While these are valuable additions, the current implementation has several critical security vulnerabilities and design flaws that must be addressed. Key issues include a password change endpoint that doesn't verify the current password, exposure of internal error details, and a name resolution error that will crash the application. I've provided detailed comments and suggestions to fix these problems and improve the overall quality and security of the code.
| last_name: str | ||
| is_active: bool | ||
| created_at: str | ||
| role: UserRole = UserRole.USER |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The UserRole enum is used here as a type hint and default value, but it is defined later in the file (lines 46-49). This will cause a NameError when Python interprets this file. To fix this, please move the definition of the UserRole enum to be before the UserResponse class.
| await firebase_auth.sign_in_user( | ||
| email=current_user["email"], | ||
| password=password_data.current_password | ||
| ) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The current password is not being verified before updating to a new one. The firebase_auth.sign_in_user method is called, but its mock implementation in app/auth/firebase_auth.py does not actually use the password parameter to verify credentials. This allows any authenticated user to change their password without knowing their current one, which is a critical security flaw. You must implement proper password verification.
| except Exception as e: | ||
| raise HTTPException( | ||
| status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, | ||
| detail=str(e) | ||
| ) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Catching a generic Exception and returning its string representation (str(e)) in the response detail is dangerous as it can leak sensitive internal information about your application. This could expose details about your code, libraries, or infrastructure that could be exploited by an attacker. It's better to catch specific exceptions and return a generic error message for unexpected ones, while logging the full error for debugging purposes.
| common_passwords = [ | ||
| "password", "123456", "password123", "admin", "qwerty", | ||
| "letmein", "welcome", "monkey", "dragon", "master" | ||
| ] |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The list of common passwords is very small and hardcoded. This provides a weak security check that can be easily bypassed. For a more robust implementation, consider:
- Using a much larger, standard list of common passwords.
- Integrating with a service like Have I Been Pwned's Pwned Passwords API to check against a massive database of breached passwords.
| profile_data: UserUpdateRequest, | ||
| current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user), | ||
| request: Request = None |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
In FastAPI, parameters without default values must come before parameters with default values. Also, to inject the Request object, you should declare it as request: Request. The current ordering and default value for request are not idiomatic. Please reorder the parameters to follow Python's syntax rules and FastAPI conventions.
| profile_data: UserUpdateRequest, | |
| current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user), | |
| request: Request = None | |
| profile_data: UserUpdateRequest, | |
| request: Request, | |
| current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user), |
| session_id: str, | ||
| current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user), | ||
| request: Request = None |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The function parameters should be reordered. In Python, parameters without default values must be defined before parameters with default values. The request: Request parameter should be moved before current_user.
| session_id: str, | |
| current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user), | |
| request: Request = None | |
| session_id: str, | |
| request: Request, | |
| current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user), |
| Security utilities and helpers for authentication | ||
| """ | ||
| import re | ||
| import hashlib |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The hashlib module is imported but never used in this file. Unused imports should be removed to keep the code clean and avoid confusion.
| return { | ||
| "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff", | ||
| "X-Frame-Options": "DENY", | ||
| "X-XSS-Protection": "1; mode=block", |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The X-XSS-Protection header is deprecated and no longer recommended. Modern browsers do not support it, and it can even introduce security vulnerabilities in older browsers. It's better to rely on a strong Content-Security-Policy (CSP) header, which you are already using, for protection against XSS attacks.
| if len(rate_limit_storage[client_ip]) >= 100: | ||
| return JSONResponse( | ||
| status_code=429, | ||
| content={"detail": "Rate limit exceeded. Maximum 100 requests per minute."} | ||
| ) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The rate limit (100 requests per minute) is hardcoded. This makes it inflexible for different environments (e.g., development, testing, production) or for future adjustments. It's a best practice to make these values configurable through environment variables.
For example:
RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS = int(os.getenv("RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS", 100))
RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS = int(os.getenv("RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS", 60))
# ... in middleware
if len(rate_limit_storage[client_ip]) >= RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS:
# ...| redis==5.2.1 | ||
| cryptography==43.0.3 | ||
| bcrypt==4.2.1 |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The dependencies redis, cryptography, and bcrypt are added to requirements.txt but are not used in the codebase. Unused dependencies add bloat and can increase the application's attack surface. If they are not required for the current functionality, they should be removed.
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Actionable comments posted: 6
Caution
Some comments are outside the diff and can’t be posted inline due to platform limitations.
⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
app/auth/models.py (1)
19-27: Critical:UserRoleis used before it's defined.
UserRoleis referenced on line 26 but defined on line 46. This will raise aNameErrorat module import time.Move the
UserRoleenum definition beforeUserResponse, or use a forward reference string:+class UserRole(str, Enum): + ADMIN = "admin" + USER = "user" + MODERATOR = "moderator" + + class UserResponse(BaseModel): id: str email: str first_name: str last_name: str is_active: bool created_at: str role: UserRole = UserRole.USER last_login: Optional[datetime] = None - - -class UserRole(str, Enum): - ADMIN = "admin" - USER = "user" - MODERATOR = "moderator"Also applies to: 46-49
🧹 Nitpick comments (4)
app/auth/security.py (2)
117-138: Consider thread-safety for concurrent access.The
allowed_ipsandblocked_ipssets can be modified by one thread while being read by another, leading to undefined behavior in a multi-threaded/async environment.For production use, consider using a
threading.Lockor a thread-safe data structure:+import threading + class IPWhitelist: """IP whitelist management""" def __init__(self): self.allowed_ips = set() self.blocked_ips = set() + self._lock = threading.Lock() def add_allowed_ip(self, ip: str): """Add IP to whitelist""" - self.allowed_ips.add(ip) + with self._lock: + self.allowed_ips.add(ip)
4-8: Remove unused imports.
hashlibandtimedeltaare imported but never used in this module.import re -import hashlib import secrets from typing import Optional -from datetime import datetime, timedelta +from datetime import datetimeapp/auth/routes.py (2)
145-149: Consider makingrequesta required parameter or handleNonemore explicitly.
request: Request = Noneas a default parameter could lead to confusion. Ifrequestis always expected to be provided by FastAPI's dependency injection, consider removing the default or usingRequest | Nonetype hint for clarity.Also applies to: 202-206, 261-265
233-237: Unused exception variable and broad exception handling.The variable
eis assigned but never used, and catching allExceptiontypes may mask specific errors.- except Exception as e: + except Exception: raise HTTPException( status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail="Invalid current password or unable to update password" - ) + ) from NoneConsider catching more specific exceptions if Firebase provides them.
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (5)
app/auth/models.py(3 hunks)app/auth/routes.py(2 hunks)app/auth/security.py(1 hunks)app/main.py(2 hunks)requirements.txt(1 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🧬 Code graph analysis (1)
app/auth/models.py (1)
app/auth/routes.py (1)
refresh_token(83-104)
🪛 Ruff (0.14.5)
app/auth/models.py
26-26: Undefined name UserRole
(F821)
26-26: Undefined name UserRole
(F821)
app/main.py
16-16: Undefined name app
(F821)
app/auth/routes.py
148-148: Do not perform function call Depends in argument defaults; instead, perform the call within the function, or read the default from a module-level singleton variable
(B008)
165-168: Abstract raise to an inner function
(TRY301)
195-195: Do not catch blind exception: Exception
(BLE001)
196-199: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
205-205: Do not perform function call Depends in argument defaults; instead, perform the call within the function, or read the default from a module-level singleton variable
(B008)
231-231: Consider moving this statement to an else block
(TRY300)
233-233: Do not catch blind exception: Exception
(BLE001)
233-233: Local variable e is assigned to but never used
Remove assignment to unused variable e
(F841)
234-237: Within an except clause, raise exceptions with raise ... from err or raise ... from None to distinguish them from errors in exception handling
(B904)
242-242: Unused function argument: current_user
(ARG001)
242-242: Do not perform function call Depends in argument defaults; instead, perform the call within the function, or read the default from a module-level singleton variable
(B008)
264-264: Do not perform function call Depends in argument defaults; instead, perform the call within the function, or read the default from a module-level singleton variable
(B008)
283-283: Do not perform function call Depends in argument defaults; instead, perform the call within the function, or read the default from a module-level singleton variable
(B008)
🔇 Additional comments (9)
requirements.txt (1)
41-43: Solid dependency selections for security enhancements.The redis==5.2.1 package (redis-py client library) is a valid, well-maintained version with a safety score of 100 and no known vulnerabilities. cryptography==43.0.3 is a healthy, actively maintained package, and bcrypt==4.2.1 is a reasonable choice for systems requiring lower GLIBC compatibility.
All three dependencies are properly pinned and align well with the authentication and security objectives of this PR.
Operational note: Ensure your Redis server instances (if deployed as part of this change) are updated to patched versions (7.2.11+, 7.4.6+, 8.0.4+, or 8.2.2+) to address CVE-2025-49844. The redis-py client library itself is not affected by server-side vulnerabilities, but runtime security depends on the server configuration.
app/auth/models.py (2)
52-60: LGTM!The
UserUpdateRequestandChangePasswordRequestmodels are well-structured with appropriate field validations.
63-77: LGTM!
SessionInfoandAuditLogEntrymodels are properly typed for session tracking and audit logging.app/auth/security.py (2)
73-89: LGTM with a note onX-XSS-Protection.The security headers are well-chosen. Note that
X-XSS-Protectionis deprecated in modern browsers (Chrome removed support), but including it doesn't cause harm for legacy browser compatibility.
92-114: LGTM!Token generation uses
secretsmodule which is cryptographically secure. The implementations are correct.app/auth/routes.py (1)
240-258: LGTM!The session listing endpoint is correctly structured. The
current_userparameter is intentionally present for authentication even though mock data is returned.app/main.py (3)
57-64: Reminder: CORSallow_origins=["*"]is insecure for production.The comment correctly notes this needs proper configuration. Ensure this is addressed before deployment.
86-106: LGTM!The root endpoint provides helpful API information and feature listing.
108-128: LGTM!The security-info endpoint provides useful transparency about security features and recommendations.
| if profile_data.role is not None: | ||
| if current_user.get("role") != UserRole.ADMIN: | ||
| raise HTTPException( | ||
| status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, | ||
| detail="Only administrators can change user roles" | ||
| ) | ||
| update_data["role"] = profile_data.role.value |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Type mismatch: comparing string to enum.
current_user.get("role") likely returns a string (e.g., "admin"), while UserRole.ADMIN is an enum member. This comparison will always be False.
Apply this fix:
- if profile_data.role is not None:
- if current_user.get("role") != UserRole.ADMIN:
+ if profile_data.role is not None:
+ if current_user.get("role") != UserRole.ADMIN.value:Or normalize to enum before comparison:
- if current_user.get("role") != UserRole.ADMIN:
+ if current_user.get("role") not in (UserRole.ADMIN, UserRole.ADMIN.value):📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| if profile_data.role is not None: | |
| if current_user.get("role") != UserRole.ADMIN: | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, | |
| detail="Only administrators can change user roles" | |
| ) | |
| update_data["role"] = profile_data.role.value | |
| if profile_data.role is not None: | |
| if current_user.get("role") != UserRole.ADMIN.value: | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, | |
| detail="Only administrators can change user roles" | |
| ) | |
| update_data["role"] = profile_data.role.value |
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.14.5)
165-168: Abstract raise to an inner function
(TRY301)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 163-169, the code compares
current_user.get("role") (a string) to UserRole.ADMIN (an enum), causing the
check to always fail; convert or normalize the value before comparing — either
compare to the enum's value (UserRole.ADMIN.value) or coerce the string into the
enum (e.g., UserRole(current_user.get("role"))) and handle possible
ValueError/None, then perform the comparison; keep the assignment
update_data["role"] = profile_data.role.value as-is.
| if current_user.get("role") != UserRole.ADMIN: | ||
| raise HTTPException( | ||
| status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, | ||
| detail="Only administrators can view audit logs" | ||
| ) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Same type mismatch issue for admin role check.
Similar to the update_profile endpoint, this comparison will always fail because it compares a string to an enum.
- if current_user.get("role") != UserRole.ADMIN:
+ if current_user.get("role") != UserRole.ADMIN.value:📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| if current_user.get("role") != UserRole.ADMIN: | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, | |
| detail="Only administrators can view audit logs" | |
| ) | |
| if current_user.get("role") != UserRole.ADMIN.value: | |
| raise HTTPException( | |
| status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, | |
| detail="Only administrators can view audit logs" | |
| ) |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/routes.py around lines 289 to 293, the admin role check compares
current_user.get("role") (a string) to UserRole.ADMIN (an enum) which always
fails; change the comparison to compare like types — e.g., compare the string to
UserRole.ADMIN.value (current_user.get("role") != UserRole.ADMIN.value) or
coerce the string into the enum (UserRole(current_user.get("role")) !=
UserRole.ADMIN); ensure you handle a missing/invalid role value
(KeyError/ValueError) before raising the 403.
| # Common password check | ||
| common_passwords = [ | ||
| "password", "123456", "password123", "admin", "qwerty", | ||
| "letmein", "welcome", "monkey", "dragon", "master" | ||
| ] | ||
|
|
||
| if password.lower() in common_passwords: | ||
| issues.append("Password is too common") | ||
| score -= 1 | ||
|
|
||
| strength_levels = ["Very Weak", "Weak", "Fair", "Good", "Strong", "Very Strong"] | ||
| strength = strength_levels[min(score, len(strength_levels) - 1)] |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Potential IndexError when score is negative.
If the password is a common one (line 60: score -= 1) and fails other checks, score can become negative, causing an IndexError when accessing strength_levels[min(score, ...)].
Apply this fix:
- strength = strength_levels[min(score, len(strength_levels) - 1)]
+ strength = strength_levels[max(0, min(score, len(strength_levels) - 1))]📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| # Common password check | |
| common_passwords = [ | |
| "password", "123456", "password123", "admin", "qwerty", | |
| "letmein", "welcome", "monkey", "dragon", "master" | |
| ] | |
| if password.lower() in common_passwords: | |
| issues.append("Password is too common") | |
| score -= 1 | |
| strength_levels = ["Very Weak", "Weak", "Fair", "Good", "Strong", "Very Strong"] | |
| strength = strength_levels[min(score, len(strength_levels) - 1)] | |
| # Common password check | |
| common_passwords = [ | |
| "password", "123456", "password123", "admin", "qwerty", | |
| "letmein", "welcome", "monkey", "dragon", "master" | |
| ] | |
| if password.lower() in common_passwords: | |
| issues.append("Password is too common") | |
| score -= 1 | |
| strength_levels = ["Very Weak", "Weak", "Fair", "Good", "Strong", "Very Strong"] | |
| strength = strength_levels[max(0, min(score, len(strength_levels) - 1))] |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/security.py around lines 52 to 63, the code can produce an
IndexError because `score` may be negative (e.g., after `score -= 1`) before
indexing into `strength_levels`; clamp the index by ensuring you use a
non-negative bounded index when selecting strength (e.g., compute index =
min(max(score, 0), len(strength_levels) - 1) or otherwise ensure `score` never
drops below 0) and use that index to pick the strength string.
| class AuditLogger: | ||
| """Audit logging utility""" | ||
|
|
||
| def __init__(self): | ||
| self.logs = [] | ||
|
|
||
| def log_event(self, | ||
| user_id: str, | ||
| action: str, | ||
| ip_address: Optional[str] = None, | ||
| user_agent: Optional[str] = None, | ||
| details: Optional[dict] = None): | ||
| """ | ||
| Log an audit event | ||
| """ | ||
| log_entry = { | ||
| "timestamp": datetime.now().isoformat(), | ||
| "user_id": user_id, | ||
| "action": action, | ||
| "ip_address": ip_address, | ||
| "user_agent": user_agent, | ||
| "details": details or {} | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| self.logs.append(log_entry) | ||
|
|
||
| # In production, this would save to a database | ||
| print(f"AUDIT: {log_entry}") | ||
|
|
||
| def get_user_logs(self, user_id: str, limit: int = 100) -> list: | ||
| """ | ||
| Get audit logs for a specific user | ||
| """ | ||
| user_logs = [log for log in self.logs if log["user_id"] == user_id] | ||
| return sorted(user_logs, key=lambda x: x["timestamp"], reverse=True)[:limit] |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Unbounded in-memory log storage will cause memory leak.
The self.logs list grows indefinitely without any size limit. In a long-running application, this will exhaust memory.
Consider adding a maximum size with eviction:
class AuditLogger:
"""Audit logging utility"""
+ MAX_LOGS = 10000
def __init__(self):
self.logs = []
def log_event(self, ...):
...
self.logs.append(log_entry)
+
+ # Evict oldest entries if limit exceeded
+ if len(self.logs) > self.MAX_LOGS:
+ self.logs = self.logs[-self.MAX_LOGS:]📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| class AuditLogger: | |
| """Audit logging utility""" | |
| def __init__(self): | |
| self.logs = [] | |
| def log_event(self, | |
| user_id: str, | |
| action: str, | |
| ip_address: Optional[str] = None, | |
| user_agent: Optional[str] = None, | |
| details: Optional[dict] = None): | |
| """ | |
| Log an audit event | |
| """ | |
| log_entry = { | |
| "timestamp": datetime.now().isoformat(), | |
| "user_id": user_id, | |
| "action": action, | |
| "ip_address": ip_address, | |
| "user_agent": user_agent, | |
| "details": details or {} | |
| } | |
| self.logs.append(log_entry) | |
| # In production, this would save to a database | |
| print(f"AUDIT: {log_entry}") | |
| def get_user_logs(self, user_id: str, limit: int = 100) -> list: | |
| """ | |
| Get audit logs for a specific user | |
| """ | |
| user_logs = [log for log in self.logs if log["user_id"] == user_id] | |
| return sorted(user_logs, key=lambda x: x["timestamp"], reverse=True)[:limit] | |
| class AuditLogger: | |
| """Audit logging utility""" | |
| MAX_LOGS = 10000 | |
| def __init__(self): | |
| self.logs = [] | |
| def log_event(self, | |
| user_id: str, | |
| action: str, | |
| ip_address: Optional[str] = None, | |
| user_agent: Optional[str] = None, | |
| details: Optional[dict] = None): | |
| """ | |
| Log an audit event | |
| """ | |
| log_entry = { | |
| "timestamp": datetime.now().isoformat(), | |
| "user_id": user_id, | |
| "action": action, | |
| "ip_address": ip_address, | |
| "user_agent": user_agent, | |
| "details": details or {} | |
| } | |
| self.logs.append(log_entry) | |
| # Evict oldest entries if limit exceeded | |
| if len(self.logs) > self.MAX_LOGS: | |
| self.logs = self.logs[-self.MAX_LOGS:] | |
| # In production, this would save to a database | |
| print(f"AUDIT: {log_entry}") | |
| def get_user_logs(self, user_id: str, limit: int = 100) -> list: | |
| """ | |
| Get audit logs for a specific user | |
| """ | |
| user_logs = [log for log in self.logs if log["user_id"] == user_id] | |
| return sorted(user_logs, key=lambda x: x["timestamp"], reverse=True)[:limit] |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/auth/security.py around lines 141 to 175, the AuditLogger stores all
events in self.logs with no bounds causing unbounded memory growth; replace the
plain list with a bounded structure (e.g., collections.deque with a maxlen or
implement a circular buffer) to cap stored entries, ensure eviction of oldest
entries when capacity is reached, and preserve current behavior of
append/get_user_logs; also consider making additions thread-safe
(threading.Lock) if AuditLogger is used concurrently.
| # Rate limiting storage (in production, use Redis or database) | ||
| rate_limit_storage: Dict[str, list] = defaultdict(list) | ||
|
|
||
| # Rate limiting middleware | ||
| @app.middleware("http") | ||
| async def rate_limit_middleware(request: Request, call_next): | ||
| # Get client IP | ||
| client_ip = request.client.host | ||
|
|
||
| # Current time | ||
| current_time = time.time() | ||
|
|
||
| # Clean old entries (older than 1 minute) | ||
| rate_limit_storage[client_ip] = [ | ||
| timestamp for timestamp in rate_limit_storage[client_ip] | ||
| if current_time - timestamp < 60 | ||
| ] | ||
|
|
||
| # Check if rate limit exceeded (100 requests per minute) | ||
| if len(rate_limit_storage[client_ip]) >= 100: | ||
| return JSONResponse( | ||
| status_code=429, | ||
| content={"detail": "Rate limit exceeded. Maximum 100 requests per minute."} | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
||
| # Add current request timestamp | ||
| rate_limit_storage[client_ip].append(current_time) | ||
|
|
||
| # Process request | ||
| response = await call_next(request) | ||
| return response |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical: app is referenced before it's defined.
The @app.middleware("http") decorator on line 16 references app, but app is created on line 45. This will raise a NameError at module import time.
Move the middleware registration after the app is created:
-# Rate limiting storage (in production, use Redis or database)
-rate_limit_storage: Dict[str, list] = defaultdict(list)
-
-# Rate limiting middleware
-@app.middleware("http")
-async def rate_limit_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
- ...
- return response
-
# Create FastAPI app
app = FastAPI(
title="Authentication API",
description="A FastAPI application with Firebase authentication and enhanced security features",
version="2.0.0"
)
+
+# Rate limiting storage (in production, use Redis or database)
+rate_limit_storage: Dict[str, list] = defaultdict(list)
+
+# Rate limiting middleware
+@app.middleware("http")
+async def rate_limit_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
+ ...
+ return responseCommittable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.14.5)
16-16: Undefined name app
(F821)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/main.py around lines 12 to 42, the @app.middleware("http") decorator is
applied before app is created at line 45 causing a NameError; move the
middleware registration after creating app (i.e., define or re-decorate the
rate_limit_middleware after app = FastAPI()), or alternatively register it using
app.add_middleware or the Middleware stack once app exists; ensure the function
and needed imports (Request, JSONResponse, time, defaultdict/Dict) remain in
scope and that the rate_limit_storage is accessible after the move.
| rate_limit_storage[client_ip] = [ | ||
| timestamp for timestamp in rate_limit_storage[client_ip] | ||
| if current_time - timestamp < 60 | ||
| ] | ||
|
|
||
| # Check if rate limit exceeded (100 requests per minute) | ||
| if len(rate_limit_storage[client_ip]) >= 100: | ||
| return JSONResponse( | ||
| status_code=429, | ||
| content={"detail": "Rate limit exceeded. Maximum 100 requests per minute."} | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
||
| # Add current request timestamp | ||
| rate_limit_storage[client_ip].append(current_time) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Memory leak: stale IP entries are never evicted.
While timestamps older than 60 seconds are cleaned within each IP's list, the IP keys themselves are never removed from rate_limit_storage. Over time, this can accumulate many empty lists.
Consider removing empty entries:
# Clean old entries (older than 1 minute)
rate_limit_storage[client_ip] = [
timestamp for timestamp in rate_limit_storage[client_ip]
if current_time - timestamp < 60
]
+
+ # Remove empty entries to prevent memory leak
+ if not rate_limit_storage[client_ip]:
+ del rate_limit_storage[client_ip]
+ rate_limit_storage[client_ip] = [] # Re-add for current requestOr simply:
+ # Check if rate limit exceeded (100 requests per minute)
+ requests_in_window = rate_limit_storage[client_ip]
- if len(rate_limit_storage[client_ip]) >= 100:
+ if len(requests_in_window) >= 100:🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In app/main.py around lines 25 to 38, the per-IP timestamp list is pruned but
empty lists are left in rate_limit_storage causing unbounded growth; after
filtering out old timestamps, check if the resulting list is empty and if so
delete the client_ip key from rate_limit_storage, otherwise assign the filtered
list back (or use a short-lived eviction mechanism/TTL map) so stale IP entries
are removed and storage does not leak.
Code Review: Auth Security & Performance Enhancements👍 Well Done
📁 Selected files for review (5)
🎯 Custom Instructions
📝 Additional Comments
|
![refacto-visz[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/1889637?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
| from typing import Dict | ||
|
|
||
| # Rate limiting storage (in production, use Redis or database) | ||
| rate_limit_storage: Dict[str, list] = defaultdict(list) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Unreliable In-Memory Rate Limiting
The rate limiting is implemented using an in-memory dictionary. This is not suitable for production as the state is not shared between processes or server instances, rendering the rate limit ineffective in a distributed environment and leading to data loss on restart.
import redis.asyncio as redis
import os
import time
from fastapi import Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
# Rate limiting storage (in production, use Redis)
rate_limit_redis_client = redis.from_url(os.getenv("REDIS_URL", "redis://localhost"))
# Rate limiting middleware
@app.middleware("http")
async def rate_limit_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
client_ip = request.client.host
key = f"rate_limit:{client_ip}"
current_time = time.time()
async with rate_limit_redis_client.pipeline(transaction=True) as pipe:
# Use a transaction to ensure atomicity
await pipe.zremrangebyscore(key, 0, current_time - 60) # Remove old requests
await pipe.zadd(key, {str(current_time): current_time}) # Add current request
await pipe.expire(key, 60) # Set expiry to auto-clean key
await pipe.zcard(key) # Get current request count
results = await pipe.execute()
request_count = results[-1]
if request_count > 100:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=429,
content={"detail": "Rate limit exceeded. Maximum 100 requests per minute."}
)
response = await call_next(request)
return response
Commitable Suggestion
| rate_limit_storage: Dict[str, list] = defaultdict(list) | |
| import redis.asyncio as redis | |
| import os | |
| import time | |
| from fastapi import Request | |
| from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse | |
| # Rate limiting storage (in production, use Redis) | |
| rate_limit_redis_client = redis.from_url(os.getenv("REDIS_URL", "redis://localhost")) | |
| # Rate limiting middleware | |
| @app.middleware("http") | |
| async def rate_limit_middleware(request: Request, call_next): | |
| client_ip = request.client.host | |
| key = f"rate_limit:{client_ip}" | |
| current_time = time.time() | |
| async with rate_limit_redis_client.pipeline(transaction=True) as pipe: | |
| # Use a transaction to ensure atomicity | |
| await pipe.zremrangebyscore(key, 0, current_time - 60) # Remove old requests | |
| await pipe.zadd(key, {str(current_time): current_time}) # Add current request | |
| await pipe.expire(key, 60) # Set expiry to auto-clean key | |
| await pipe.zcard(key) # Get current request count | |
| results = await pipe.execute() | |
| request_count = results[-1] | |
| if request_count > 100: | |
| return JSONResponse( | |
| status_code=429, | |
| content={"detail": "Rate limit exceeded. Maximum 100 requests per minute."} | |
| ) | |
| response = await call_next(request) | |
| return response |
Standards
- SRE-XX
- ISO-IEC-25010-Reliability-Availability
| async def get_user_sessions( | ||
| current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user) | ||
| ): | ||
| """ |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing Endpoint Pagination on Session Data
The /sessions endpoint returns a list of all active sessions without any pagination mechanism. If a user accumulates many sessions over time, this can lead to large response payloads, causing performance degradation or a potential denial-of-service vector.
Standards
- Org-Guideline-Very critical to consider apply pagination to queries
- CWE-770
| # For demo purposes, return a mock session | ||
| sessions = [ | ||
| SessionInfo( | ||
| session_id=str(uuid.uuid4()), | ||
| created_at=datetime.now(), | ||
| last_activity=datetime.now(), | ||
| ip_address="127.0.0.1", | ||
| user_agent="Mozilla/5.0 (Demo Browser)" | ||
| ) | ||
| ] | ||
| return sessions |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Mocked Data Returned in Endpoints
The /sessions and /audit-logs endpoints return hardcoded mock data instead of fetching from a persistent store. While acknowledged in comments, this represents significant technical debt and must be replaced with a real database implementation before the feature is considered complete.
Standards
- Maintainability-Quality-Testability
| raise HTTPException( | ||
| status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, | ||
| detail=str(e) | ||
| ) | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Broad Exception Handling Leaks Implementation Details
The endpoint catches a generic Exception and returns its string representation in the error detail. This can leak sensitive internal implementation details to the client and masks the specific type of error, hindering proper error handling and debugging.
| TrustedHostMiddleware, | ||
| allowed_hosts=["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "*.yourdomain.com"] |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Hardcoded Configuration Values for Middleware
The TrustedHostMiddleware is configured with a hardcoded list of hosts, including a placeholder. This violates security best practices and reduces modifiability, as code changes are required for different environments. These values should be externalized and loaded from environment variables.
Standards
- Org-Guideline-No hard-coded secrets or credentials.
- Maintainability-Quality-Configuration
| current_user: Dict[str, Any] = Depends(get_current_user), | ||
| limit: int = 50 | ||
| ): | ||
| """ |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Incomplete Audit Log Pagination
The /audit-logs endpoint implements a limit parameter but lacks an offset or cursor-based mechanism. This prevents clients from navigating beyond the first page of results, rendering the endpoint ineffective for browsing large audit histories. Full pagination should be implemented.
Standards
- Org-Guideline-Very critical to consider apply pagination to queries
![codeant-ai[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/646884?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
| last_name: str | ||
| is_active: bool | ||
| created_at: str | ||
| role: UserRole = UserRole.USER |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Suggestion: UserResponse references UserRole directly (for both the annotation and the default) before UserRole is defined, so importing this module will raise NameError and prevent the app from starting; use a forward-reference annotation plus a delayed default (e.g., Field(default_factory=...)) so the enum is only looked up after its definition. [logic error]
Severity Level: Minor
| role: UserRole = UserRole.USER | |
| role: "UserRole" = Field(default_factory=lambda: UserRole.USER) |
Why it matters? ⭐
UserRole is declared below UserResponse, so evaluating the annotation/default during class creation hits a NameError and the auth module can't load; changing to a forward-reference annotation plus Field(default_factory=…) defers the lookup until after UserRole exists, eliminating the import-time crash.
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is a comment left during a code review.
**Path:** app/auth/models.py
**Line:** 26:26
**Comment:**
*Logic Error: `UserResponse` references `UserRole` directly (for both the annotation and the default) before `UserRole` is defined, so importing this module will raise `NameError` and prevent the app from starting; use a forward-reference annotation plus a delayed default (e.g., `Field(default_factory=...)`) so the enum is only looked up after its definition.
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
Pull Request Feedback 🔍
|
| strength = strength_levels[min(score, len(strength_levels) - 1)] | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Suggestion: Clamp the computed score at zero before indexing into strength_levels so a penalized score never resolves to a high-strength label. [possible bug]
|
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User description
Summary by CodeRabbit
Release Notes
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CodeAnt-AI Description
Add profile, session, and audit controls along with new security guardrails
What Changed
/security-infoendpoint plus rate limiting (100 requests per minute per IP) and trusted-host checks make the guardrails explicitImpact
✅ Fewer brute-force requests per minute✅ Stronger oversight of user actions✅ More control over personal account access💡 Usage Guide
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