Update module github.com/quic-go/quic-go to v0.49.1 [SECURITY] - autoclosed #232
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This PR contains the following updates:
v0.48.2->v0.49.1GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2025-59530
Summary
A misbehaving or malicious server can trigger an assertion in a quic-go client (and crash the process) by sending a premature HANDSHAKE_DONE frame during the handshake.
Impact
A misbehaving or malicious server can cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the quic-go client by triggering an assertion failure, leading to a process crash. This requires no authentication and can be exploited during the handshake phase. Observed in the wild with certain server implementations (e.g. Solana's Firedancer QUIC).
Affected Versions
Users are recommended to upgrade to the latest patched version in their respective maintenance branch or to v0.55.0 or later.
Details
For a regular 1-RTT handshake, QUIC uses three sets of keys to encrypt / decrypt QUIC packets:
On the client side, Initial keys are discarded when the first Handshake packet is sent. Handshake keys are discarded when the server's HANDSHAKE_DONE frame is received, as specified in section 4.9.2 of RFC 9001. Crucially, Initial keys are always dropped before Handshake keys in a standard handshake.
Due to packet reordering, it is possible to receive a packet with a higher encryption level before the key for that encryption level has been derived. For example, the server's Handshake packets (containing, among others, the TLS certificate) might arrive before the server's Initial packet (which contains the TLS ServerHello). In that case, the client queues the Handshake packets and decrypts them as soon as it has processed the ServerHello and derived Handshake keys.
After completion of the handshake, Initial and Handshake packets are not needed anymore and will be dropped. quic-go implements an assertion that no packets are queued after completion of the handshake.
A misbehaving or malicious server can trigger this assertion, and thereby cause a panic, by sending a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame before actually completing the handshake. In that case, Handshake keys would be dropped before Initial keys.
This can only happen if the server implementation is misbehaving: the server can only complete the handshake after receiving the client's TLS Finished message (which is sent in Handshake packets).
The Fix
quic-go needs to be able to handle misbehaving server implementations, including those that prematurely send a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame. We now discard Initial keys when receiving a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame, thereby correctly handling premature HANDSHAKE_DONE frames. The fix was implemented in https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/pull/5354.
quic-go: Panic occurs when queuing undecryptable packets after handshake completion
CVE-2025-59530 / GHSA-47m2-4cr7-mhcw
More information
Details
Summary
A misbehaving or malicious server can trigger an assertion in a quic-go client (and crash the process) by sending a premature HANDSHAKE_DONE frame during the handshake.
Impact
A misbehaving or malicious server can cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the quic-go client by triggering an assertion failure, leading to a process crash. This requires no authentication and can be exploited during the handshake phase. Observed in the wild with certain server implementations (e.g. Solana's Firedancer QUIC).
Affected Versions
Users are recommended to upgrade to the latest patched version in their respective maintenance branch or to v0.55.0 or later.
Details
For a regular 1-RTT handshake, QUIC uses three sets of keys to encrypt / decrypt QUIC packets:
On the client side, Initial keys are discarded when the first Handshake packet is sent. Handshake keys are discarded when the server's HANDSHAKE_DONE frame is received, as specified in section 4.9.2 of RFC 9001. Crucially, Initial keys are always dropped before Handshake keys in a standard handshake.
Due to packet reordering, it is possible to receive a packet with a higher encryption level before the key for that encryption level has been derived. For example, the server's Handshake packets (containing, among others, the TLS certificate) might arrive before the server's Initial packet (which contains the TLS ServerHello). In that case, the client queues the Handshake packets and decrypts them as soon as it has processed the ServerHello and derived Handshake keys.
After completion of the handshake, Initial and Handshake packets are not needed anymore and will be dropped. quic-go implements an assertion that no packets are queued after completion of the handshake.
A misbehaving or malicious server can trigger this assertion, and thereby cause a panic, by sending a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame before actually completing the handshake. In that case, Handshake keys would be dropped before Initial keys.
This can only happen if the server implementation is misbehaving: the server can only complete the handshake after receiving the client's TLS Finished message (which is sent in Handshake packets).
The Fix
quic-go needs to be able to handle misbehaving server implementations, including those that prematurely send a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame. We now discard Initial keys when receiving a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame, thereby correctly handling premature HANDSHAKE_DONE frames. The fix was implemented in https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/pull/5354.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
quic-go/quic-go (github.com/quic-go/quic-go)
v0.49.1Compare Source
v0.49.0Compare Source
In this release, we added support for HTTP client traces. We also fixed a large number of bugs that could lead to connection stalls, deadlocks and memory leaks. See the "Major Fixes" section for more details.
New Features
net/http/httptrace.ClientTrace: #4749. Thanks to @lRoccoon for the contribution!Major Fixes
Transport.Closewas reworked: calls toTransport.Dialare now canceled, and return the newly introducedErrTransportClosed, as do calls toTransport.Listen: #4883Enhancements
Transportwhen no server is set: #4789Transportdoesn't send a stateless for: #4826time.Nowall over the code base: #4731, #4885, #4886, #4906Transportlistens on any givennet.PacketConn: #4851Other Fixes
ErrClosedfromAccept: #4846. Thanks to @sukunrt for discovering this bug and providing very helpful reviews!SendStream.Writeif it is closed after is canceled: #4882Transport.DialandTransport.Close: #4904errors.Iserror comparisons: #4824, #4825, #4877http.Response.Body.Close: #4798. Thanks to @RPRX for the contribution!http.Request.Bodyis now properly closed on all code paths that return a non-nilerror: #4874Transport.MaxTokenAge: #4763Behind the Scenes
In the v0.48.0 release, we started migrating our test suite away from Ginkgo (tracking issue: #3652). This is an absolutely massive endeavor. Before we started, the number of LOC of Ginkgo tests was more than 41,000.
In this release, we're bringing this number down to less than 8,500 LOC: #4736, #4746, #4775, #4783, #4788, #4790, #4795, #4796, #4797, #4799, #4814, #4816, #4817, #4823, #4837, #4842, #4847, #4848, #4849, #4853, #4857, #4860, #4861, #4862, #4863, #4864, #4865, #4869, #4876, #4881, #4907.
There's still a lot of work ahead, but we'll hopefully be able to finish this item in the next couple of months.
Changelog
New Contributors
Full Changelog: quic-go/quic-go@v0.48.2...v0.49.0
Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
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♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
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