Gvrose fips legacy 8 compliant/4.18.0 425.13.1 #2

gvrose8192 · 2024-10-21T21:12:56Z

Latest work on the FIPS 8 compliant kernel Various linked tasks:
VULN-429
VULN-4095
VULN-597
SECO-169
SECO-94

Kernel selftests have passed https://github.com/user-attachments/files/17512330/kernel-selftest.log with no change in results from previous run.

I've been running netfilter tests in a loop overnight - for i in {1..50000}; do sudo valgrind --log-file=valgrind-results$i.log ./run-tests.sh; done
Typical output, unchanged over any number runs.
nftables-test.log

Valgrind out put from any of hundreds of runs is all the same -
valgrind-results.log

With lockdep enabled and running sudo stress --cpu 28 --io 28 --vm 28 --vm-bytes 1G --timeout 3h I ran multiple passes of the nftables tests with valgrind: for i in {1..4}; do sudo valgrind --log-file=valgrind-results$i.log ./run-tests.sh; done

The nftables tests all pass with no difference from the original tests. Valgrind logs here:
valgrind-results1.log
valgrind-results2.log
valgrind-results3.log
valgrind-results4.log

No lockdep splats, any other splats, no OOMs, no panics, nor any other error messages during the run.

After pulling in the missing patch "netfilter: nf_tables: set backend .flush always succeeds" I reran the netfilter tests overnight with lockdep and kmemleak enabled in the kernel and running "sudo stress --cpu 28 --io 28 --vm 28 --vm-bytes 1G --timeout 8h" and found no issues. The logfiles are unchanged from the previous night's runs.

gvrose8192 · 2024-10-21T21:16:19Z

The 2nd commit is crap - the code is right but whacked the commit message metadata. I'll fix that up. Leaving the rest for your review.

gvrose8192 · 2024-10-21T21:24:20Z

The 2nd commit is crap - the code is right but whacked the commit message metadata. I'll fix that up. Leaving the rest for your review.

OK, fixed with a force push.

gvrose8192 · 2024-10-24T20:25:50Z

This PR is now ready for full review.
CVE's addressed by this PR:
CVE-2023-4244
CVE-2023-52581
CVE-2024-26925

Github actions build checks here:
https://github.com/ctrliq/kernel-src-tree/actions/runs/11505520259 Checked the PR for valid commit messages
https://github.com/ctrliq/kernel-src-tree/actions/runs/11505519609 Checked the compile/build for x86_64
https://github.com/ctrliq/kernel-src-tree/actions/runs/11505519601 Checked the compile/build for aarch64 - this is not really valid for fips8, but it demonstrates the code changes are portable.

Kernel selftest log shows no new errors or consistent discrepancies from the base kernel from before this PR. I.E things that failed before still fail, things that passed before, still pass.

kernel-selftest.log

What remains to do:

This will require some close inspection of those commits marked with an 'upstream-diff' tag.
Netfilter testsuite - will run it against the current fips-compliant8 branch and then against the same branch with this PR. Checking for no new errors. If something passes that didn't used to then that's great and I will note it in the PR conversation.

@PlaidCat This PR is ready for review. I'll be configuring and running the netfilter tests in parallel and record the results here.

gvrose8192 · 2024-10-24T20:40:35Z

Oh - totally forgot about this included patch: 5647beb

So that adds an additional CVE fixed by this PR - CVE-2024-39502

So we have 4 total CVEs addressed by this PR, not 3.

gvrose8192 · 2024-10-24T22:00:57Z

nft-test-results.log

Sample results from an nftables testsuite run on my dev system running Rocky 9.4. This was a sanity check to make sure I could actually build and install the nftables testsuite available here: https://git.netfilter.org/nftables/

Next step is collect the results from a run with the currently available fips8-compliant kernel and compare to the results when I run the kernel built from this PR.

PlaidCat

EDIT: previous version invalid do to wrong reference

drivers/net/ethernet/pensando/ionic/ionic_lif.c

net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c

include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h

PlaidCat

EDIT: previous version invalid do to wrong reference

net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c

gvrose8192 · 2024-10-25T20:52:10Z

"in nf_tables_commit under case NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM: also uses nft_setelem_remove
https://github.com/ctrliq/kernel-src-tree/blob/centos_kernel-4.18.0-534.el8/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c#L8341

Same as above in __nf_tables_abort NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM
https://github.com/ctrliq/kernel-src-tree/blob/centos_kernel-4.18.0-534.el8/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c#L8547"

Acked - requires more investigation.

net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c

gvrose8192 · 2024-10-28T16:10:13Z

Closing this pull request - will post an updated PR

gvrose8192 · 2024-10-28T20:43:40Z

All kernel selftests continue to show no new errors or consistent discrepancies between the base version and with this patch series.
I am running the nftables testing run-tests.sh in continuous loop with valgrind. No memory leaks detected so far after hundreds of loops. The logs are too big to store but I ran a single loops manually and got the following results:

test-results.log
valgrind-results.log

I'll resume valgrind checking of the nftables nfct checks for an overnight run, make sure no long term (within a day) damage is found and to increase confidence in the PR.

PlaidCat

For netfilter: nf_tables: mark set as dead when unbinding anonymous set with timeout 240a26d

it should be jira VULN-835

include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h

gvrose8192 · 2024-10-28T21:08:59Z

For netfilter: nf_tables: mark set as dead when unbinding anonymous set with timeout 240a26d

it should be jira VULN-835

Good catch - I wondered about pulling that in with a different jira and meant to ask you but then got distracted by other work. I'll fix that up.

gvrose8192 · 2024-10-28T21:52:35Z

"in nf_tables_commit under case NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM: also uses nft_setelem_remove https://github.com/ctrliq/kernel-src-tree/blob/centos_kernel-4.18.0-534.el8/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c#L8341

Same as above in __nf_tables_abort NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM https://github.com/ctrliq/kernel-src-tree/blob/centos_kernel-4.18.0-534.el8/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c#L8547"

Acked - requires more investigation.

OK, yes. Found and fixed - just missed it in an otherwise large commit. Fix incoming with next branch force push.

PlaidCat

subsystem-sync netfilter:nf_tables 4.18.0-553
These should be:
subsystem-sync netfilter:nf_tables 4.18.0-534

PlaidCat

netfilter: nf_tables: fix table flag updates 95b04bb

Is the upstream-diff here just contextual information in the fuzz?

net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c

include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h

Problem description =================== Lockdep reports a possible circular locking dependency (AB/BA) between &pl->state_mutex and &phy->lock, as follows. phylink_resolve() // acquires &pl->state_mutex -> phylink_major_config() -> phy_config_inband() // acquires &pl->phydev->lock whereas all the other call sites where &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock have the locking scheme reversed. Everywhere else, &pl->phydev->lock is acquired at the top level, and &pl->state_mutex at the lower level. A clear example is phylink_bringup_phy(). The outlier is the newly introduced phy_config_inband() and the existing lock order is the correct one. To understand why it cannot be the other way around, it is sufficient to consider phylink_phy_change(), phylink's callback from the PHY device's phy->phy_link_change() virtual method, invoked by the PHY state machine. phy_link_up() and phy_link_down(), the (indirect) callers of phylink_phy_change(), are called with &phydev->lock acquired. Then phylink_phy_change() acquires its own &pl->state_mutex, to serialize changes made to its pl->phy_state and pl->link_config. So all other instances of &pl->state_mutex and &phydev->lock must be consistent with this order. Problem impact ============== I think the kernel runs a serious deadlock risk if an existing phylink_resolve() thread, which results in a phy_config_inband() call, is concurrent with a phy_link_up() or phy_link_down() call, which will deadlock on &pl->state_mutex in phylink_phy_change(). Practically speaking, the impact may be limited by the slow speed of the medium auto-negotiation protocol, which makes it unlikely for the current state to still be unresolved when a new one is detected, but I think the problem is there. Nonetheless, the problem was discovered using lockdep. Proposed solution ================= Practically speaking, the phy_config_inband() requirement of having phydev->lock acquired must transfer to the caller (phylink is the only caller). There, it must bubble up until immediately before &pl->state_mutex is acquired, for the cases where that takes place. Solution details, considerations, notes ======================================= This is the phy_config_inband() call graph: sfp_upstream_ops :: connect_phy() | v phylink_sfp_connect_phy() | v phylink_sfp_config_phy() | | sfp_upstream_ops :: module_insert() | | | v | phylink_sfp_module_insert() | | | | sfp_upstream_ops :: module_start() | | | | | v | | phylink_sfp_module_start() | | | | v v | phylink_sfp_config_optical() phylink_start() | | | phylink_resume() v v | | phylink_sfp_set_config() | | | v v v phylink_mac_initial_config() | phylink_resolve() | | phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set() v v v phylink_major_config() | v phy_config_inband() phylink_major_config() caller #1, phylink_mac_initial_config(), does not acquire &pl->state_mutex nor do its callers. It must acquire &pl->phydev->lock prior to calling phylink_major_config(). phylink_major_config() caller #2, phylink_resolve() acquires &pl->state_mutex, thus also needs to acquire &pl->phydev->lock. phylink_major_config() caller #3, phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set(), is completely uninteresting, because it only calls phylink_major_config() if pl->phydev is NULL (otherwise it calls phy_ethtool_ksettings_set()). We need to change nothing there. Other solutions =============== The lock inversion between &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock has occurred at least once before, as seen in commit c718af2 ("net: phylink: fix ethtool -A with attached PHYs"). The solution there was to simply not call phy_set_asym_pause() under the &pl->state_mutex. That cannot be extended to our case though, where the phy_config_inband() call is much deeper inside the &pl->state_mutex section. Fixes: 5fd0f1a ("net: phylink: add negotiation of in-band capabilities") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"") simplified code by using the for_each_of_range() iterator, but it broke PCI enumeration on Turris Omnia (and probably other mvebu targets). Issue #1: To determine range.flags, of_pci_range_parser_one() uses bus->get_flags(), which resolves to of_bus_pci_get_flags(), which already returns an IORESOURCE bit field, and NOT the original flags from the "ranges" resource. Then mvebu_get_tgt_attr() attempts the very same conversion again. Remove the misinterpretation of range.flags in mvebu_get_tgt_attr(), to restore the intended behavior. Issue #2: The driver needs target and attributes, which are encoded in the raw address values of the "/soc/pcie/ranges" resource. According to of_pci_range_parser_one(), the raw values are stored in range.bus_addr and range.parent_bus_addr, respectively. range.cpu_addr is a translated version of range.parent_bus_addr, and not relevant here. Use the correct range structure member, to extract target and attributes. This restores the intended behavior. Fixes: 5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"") Reported-by: Jan Palus <[email protected]> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220479 Signed-off-by: Klaus Kudielka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Tested-by: Tony Dinh <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jan Palus <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-106845 commit a9c83a0 Author: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Date: Mon Dec 30 14:15:17 2024 -0700 io_uring/timeout: flush timeouts outside of the timeout lock syzbot reports that a recent fix causes nesting issues between the (now) raw timeoutlock and the eventfd locking: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f #29 Not tainted ----------------------------- kworker/u32:0/68094 is trying to lock: ffff000014d7a520 (&ctx->wqh#2){..-.}-{3:3}, at: eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 6 locks held by kworker/u32:0/68094: #0: ffff0000c1d98148 ((wq_completion)iou_exit){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4e8/0xfc0 #1: ffff80008d927c78 ((work_completion)(&ctx->exit_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53c/0xfc0 #2: ffff0000c59bc3d8 (&ctx->completion_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x40/0x180 #3: ffff0000c59bc358 (&ctx->timeout_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x48/0x180 #4: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 #5: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 stack backtrace: CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 68094 Comm: kworker/u32:0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f #29 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: iou_exit io_ring_exit_work Call trace: show_stack+0x1c/0x30 (C) __dump_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 dump_stack+0x14/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x19f8/0x60c8 lock_acquire+0x1a4/0x540 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x90/0xd0 eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180 io_eventfd_signal+0x64/0x108 io_req_local_work_add+0x294/0x430 __io_req_task_work_add+0x1c0/0x270 io_kill_timeout+0x1f0/0x288 io_kill_timeouts+0xd4/0x180 io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x2e8/0x388 io_ring_exit_work+0x150/0x550 process_one_work+0x5e8/0xfc0 worker_thread+0x7ec/0xc80 kthread+0x24c/0x300 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 because after the preempt-rt fix for the timeout lock nesting inside the io-wq lock, we now have the eventfd spinlock nesting inside the raw timeout spinlock. Rather than play whack-a-mole with other nesting on the timeout lock, split the deletion and killing of timeouts so queueing the task_work for the timeout cancelations can get done outside of the timeout lock. Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: 020b40f ("io_uring: make ctx->timeout_lock a raw spinlock") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-106845 commit 9dc7a88 Author: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Date: Mon May 5 22:18:00 2025 +0800 block: move hctx debugfs/sysfs registering out of freezing queue Move hctx debugfs/sysfs register out of freezing queue in __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues(), so that the following lockdep dependency can be killed: #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#16){++++}-{0:0}: #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}: //debugfs And registering/un-registering hctx debugfs/sysfs does not require queue to be frozen: - hctx sysfs attributes show() are drained when removing kobject, and there isn't store() implementation for hctx sysfs attributes - debugfs entry read() is drained too when removing debugfs directory, and there isn't write() implementation for hctx debugfs too - so it is safe to register/unregister hctx sysfs/debugfs without freezing queue because the cod paths changes nothing, and we just need to keep hctx live Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>

…xit() JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-106845 commit 78c2713 Author: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Date: Mon May 5 22:18:03 2025 +0800 block: move wbt_enable_default() out of queue freezing from sched ->exit() scheduler's ->exit() is called with queue frozen and elevator lock is held, and wbt_enable_default() can't be called with queue frozen, otherwise the following lockdep warning is triggered: #6 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: #5 (&eq->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: #4 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#3){++++}-{0:0}: #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}: #0 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: Fix the issue by moving wbt_enable_default() out of bfq's exit(), and call it from elevator_change_done(). Meantime add disk->rqos_state_mutex for covering wbt state change, which matches the purpose more than ->elevator_lock. Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-106845 commit 8b428f4 Author: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Date: Wed Jul 9 19:17:44 2025 +0800 nbd: fix lockdep deadlock warning nbd grabs device lock nbd->config_lock for updating nr_hw_queues, this ways cause the following lock dependency: -> #2 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x448 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5828 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:602 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x166/0x1292 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 mutex_lock_nested+0x14/0x1c kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __del_gendisk+0x132/0xac6 block/genhd.c:706 del_gendisk+0xf6/0x19a block/genhd.c:819 nbd_dev_remove+0x3c/0xf2 drivers/block/nbd.c:268 nbd_dev_remove_work+0x1c/0x26 drivers/block/nbd.c:284 process_one_work+0x96a/0x1f32 kernel/workqueue.c:3238 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3321 [inline] worker_thread+0x5ce/0xde8 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x39c/0x7d4 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork_kernel+0x2a/0xbb2 arch/riscv/kernel/process.c:214 ret_from_fork_kernel_asm+0x16/0x18 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S:327 -> #1 (&set->update_nr_hwq_lock){++++}-{4:4}: lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x448 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5828 down_write+0x9c/0x19a kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1577 blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x3e/0xb86 block/blk-mq.c:5041 nbd_start_device+0x140/0xb2c drivers/block/nbd.c:1476 nbd_genl_connect+0xae0/0x1b24 drivers/block/nbd.c:2201 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x206/0x2e6 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x514/0x78e net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x206/0x3be net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534 genl_rcv+0x36/0x4c net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4f0/0x82c net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 netlink_sendmsg+0x85e/0xdd6 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xcc/0x160 net/socket.c:727 ____sys_sendmsg+0x63e/0x79c net/socket.c:2566 ___sys_sendmsg+0x144/0x1e6 net/socket.c:2620 __sys_sendmsg+0x188/0x246 net/socket.c:2652 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2657 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2655 [inline] __riscv_sys_sendmsg+0x70/0xa2 net/socket.c:2655 syscall_handler+0x94/0x118 arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall.h:112 do_trap_ecall_u+0x396/0x530 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c:341 handle_exception+0x146/0x152 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S:197 -> #0 (&nbd->config_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_noncircular+0x132/0x146 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2178 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3168 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3287 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3911 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x12b2/0x24ea kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5240 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x448 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5828 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:602 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x166/0x1292 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 mutex_lock_nested+0x14/0x1c kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock+0x60/0xd8 lib/refcount.c:118 nbd_config_put+0x3a/0x610 drivers/block/nbd.c:1423 nbd_release+0x94/0x15c drivers/block/nbd.c:1735 blkdev_put_whole+0xac/0xee block/bdev.c:721 bdev_release+0x3fe/0x600 block/bdev.c:1144 blkdev_release+0x1a/0x26 block/fops.c:684 __fput+0x382/0xa8c fs/file_table.c:465 ____fput+0x1c/0x26 fs/file_table.c:493 task_work_run+0x16a/0x25e kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x118/0x134 kernel/entry/common.c:114 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:330 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:414 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:449 [inline] do_trap_ecall_u+0x3f0/0x530 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c:355 handle_exception+0x146/0x152 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S:197 Also it isn't necessary to require nbd->config_lock, because blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues() does grab tagset lock for sync everything. Fixes the issue by releasing ->config_lock & retry in case of concurrent updating nr_hw_queues. Fixes: 98e68f6 ("block: prevent adding/deleting disk during updating nr_hw_queues") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]> Cc: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>

jira LE-4159 cve CVE-2025-38392 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-570.41.1.el9_6 commit-author Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> commit b2beb5b With VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER enabled, the following warning is generated on module load: [ 324.701677] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578 [ 324.701684] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1582, name: NetworkManager [ 324.701689] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 [ 324.701693] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 324.701697] 2 locks held by NetworkManager/1582: [ 324.701702] #0: ffffffff9f7be770 (rtnl_mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x791/0x21e0 [ 324.701730] #1: ff1100216c380368 (_xmit_ETHER){....}-{2:2}, at: __dev_open+0x3f0/0x870 [ 324.701749] Preemption disabled at: [ 324.701752] [<ffffffff9cd23b9d>] __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701765] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 1582 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 324.701771] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50FCP2SBSTD/M50FCP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C741.86B.01.01.0001.2211140926 11/14/2022 [ 324.701774] Call Trace: [ 324.701777] <TASK> [ 324.701779] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 324.701788] ? __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701793] __might_resched.cold+0x1ef/0x23d <..> [ 324.701818] __mutex_lock+0x113/0x1b80 <..> [ 324.701917] idpf_ctlq_clean_sq+0xad/0x4b0 [idpf] [ 324.701935] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 324.701941] idpf_mb_clean+0x143/0x380 [idpf] <..> [ 324.701991] idpf_send_mb_msg+0x111/0x720 [idpf] [ 324.702009] idpf_vc_xn_exec+0x4cc/0x990 [idpf] [ 324.702021] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 324.702035] idpf_add_del_mac_filters+0x3ed/0xb50 [idpf] <..> [ 324.702122] __hw_addr_sync_dev+0x1cf/0x300 [ 324.702126] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 324.702134] idpf_set_rx_mode+0x317/0x390 [idpf] [ 324.702152] __dev_open+0x3f8/0x870 [ 324.702159] ? __pfx___dev_open+0x10/0x10 [ 324.702174] __dev_change_flags+0x443/0x650 <..> [ 324.702208] netif_change_flags+0x80/0x160 [ 324.702218] do_setlink.isra.0+0x16a0/0x3960 <..> [ 324.702349] rtnl_newlink+0x12fd/0x21e0 The sequence is as follows: rtnl_newlink()-> __dev_change_flags()-> __dev_open()-> dev_set_rx_mode() - > # disables BH and grabs "dev->addr_list_lock" idpf_set_rx_mode() -> # proceed only if VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER is ON __dev_uc_sync() -> idpf_add_mac_filter -> idpf_add_del_mac_filters -> idpf_send_mb_msg() -> idpf_mb_clean() -> idpf_ctlq_clean_sq() # mutex_lock(cq_lock) Fix by converting cq_lock to a spinlock. All operations under the new lock are safe except freeing the DMA memory, which may use vunmap(). Fix by requesting a contiguous physical memory for the DMA mapping. Fixes: a251eee ("idpf: add SRIOV support and other ndo_ops") Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Samuel Salin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit b2beb5b) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-4159 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-570.41.1.el9_6 commit-author Dave Marquardt <[email protected]> commit 053f3ff v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <[email protected]> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 053f3ff) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira VULN-136697 jira VULN-136696 cve CVE-2025-38392 commit-author Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> commit b2beb5b With VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER enabled, the following warning is generated on module load: [ 324.701677] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578 [ 324.701684] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1582, name: NetworkManager [ 324.701689] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 [ 324.701693] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 324.701697] 2 locks held by NetworkManager/1582: [ 324.701702] #0: ffffffff9f7be770 (rtnl_mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x791/0x21e0 [ 324.701730] #1: ff1100216c380368 (_xmit_ETHER){....}-{2:2}, at: __dev_open+0x3f0/0x870 [ 324.701749] Preemption disabled at: [ 324.701752] [<ffffffff9cd23b9d>] __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701765] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 1582 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 324.701771] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50FCP2SBSTD/M50FCP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C741.86B.01.01.0001.2211140926 11/14/2022 [ 324.701774] Call Trace: [ 324.701777] <TASK> [ 324.701779] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 324.701788] ? __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701793] __might_resched.cold+0x1ef/0x23d <..> [ 324.701818] __mutex_lock+0x113/0x1b80 <..> [ 324.701917] idpf_ctlq_clean_sq+0xad/0x4b0 [idpf] [ 324.701935] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 324.701941] idpf_mb_clean+0x143/0x380 [idpf] <..> [ 324.701991] idpf_send_mb_msg+0x111/0x720 [idpf] [ 324.702009] idpf_vc_xn_exec+0x4cc/0x990 [idpf] [ 324.702021] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 324.702035] idpf_add_del_mac_filters+0x3ed/0xb50 [idpf] <..> [ 324.702122] __hw_addr_sync_dev+0x1cf/0x300 [ 324.702126] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 324.702134] idpf_set_rx_mode+0x317/0x390 [idpf] [ 324.702152] __dev_open+0x3f8/0x870 [ 324.702159] ? __pfx___dev_open+0x10/0x10 [ 324.702174] __dev_change_flags+0x443/0x650 <..> [ 324.702208] netif_change_flags+0x80/0x160 [ 324.702218] do_setlink.isra.0+0x16a0/0x3960 <..> [ 324.702349] rtnl_newlink+0x12fd/0x21e0 The sequence is as follows: rtnl_newlink()-> __dev_change_flags()-> __dev_open()-> dev_set_rx_mode() - > # disables BH and grabs "dev->addr_list_lock" idpf_set_rx_mode() -> # proceed only if VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER is ON __dev_uc_sync() -> idpf_add_mac_filter -> idpf_add_del_mac_filters -> idpf_send_mb_msg() -> idpf_mb_clean() -> idpf_ctlq_clean_sq() # mutex_lock(cq_lock) Fix by converting cq_lock to a spinlock. All operations under the new lock are safe except freeing the DMA memory, which may use vunmap(). Fix by requesting a contiguous physical memory for the DMA mapping. Fixes: a251eee ("idpf: add SRIOV support and other ndo_ops") Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Samuel Salin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit b2beb5b) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

…ostcopy When you run a KVM guest with vhost-net and migrate that guest to another host, and you immediately enable postcopy after starting the migration, there is a big chance that the network connection of the guest won't work anymore on the destination side after the migration. With a debug kernel v6.16.0, there is also a call trace that looks like this: FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing 881 CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 549 Comm: kworker/6:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0 #56 NONE Hardware name: IBM 3931 LA1 400 (LPAR) Workqueue: events irqfd_inject [kvm] Call Trace: [<00003173cbecc634>] dump_stack_lvl+0x104/0x168 [<00003173cca69588>] handle_userfault+0xde8/0x1310 [<00003173cc756f0c>] handle_pte_fault+0x4fc/0x760 [<00003173cc759212>] __handle_mm_fault+0x452/0xa00 [<00003173cc7599ba>] handle_mm_fault+0x1fa/0x6a0 [<00003173cc73409a>] __get_user_pages+0x4aa/0xba0 [<00003173cc7349e8>] get_user_pages_remote+0x258/0x770 [<000031734be6f052>] get_map_page+0xe2/0x190 [kvm] [<000031734be6f910>] adapter_indicators_set+0x50/0x4a0 [kvm] [<000031734be7f674>] set_adapter_int+0xc4/0x170 [kvm] [<000031734be2f268>] kvm_set_irq+0x228/0x3f0 [kvm] [<000031734be27000>] irqfd_inject+0xd0/0x150 [kvm] [<00003173cc00c9ec>] process_one_work+0x87c/0x1490 [<00003173cc00dda6>] worker_thread+0x7a6/0x1010 [<00003173cc02dc36>] kthread+0x3b6/0x710 [<00003173cbed2f0c>] __ret_from_fork+0xdc/0x7f0 [<00003173cdd737ca>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 3 locks held by kworker/6:2/549: #0: 00000000800bc958 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7ee/0x1490 #1: 000030f3d527fbd0 ((work_completion)(&irqfd->inject)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x81c/0x1490 #2: 00000000f99862b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: get_map_page+0xa8/0x190 [kvm] The "FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing" indicates that handle_userfaultfd() saw a page fault request without ALLOW_RETRY flag set, hence userfaultfd cannot remotely resolve it (because the caller was asking for an immediate resolution, aka, FAULT_FLAG_NOWAIT, while remote faults can take time). With that, get_map_page() failed and the irq was lost. We should not be strictly in an atomic environment here and the worker should be sleepable (the call is done during an ioctl from userspace), so we can allow adapter_indicators_set() to just sleep waiting for the remote fault instead. Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-42486 Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]> [thuth: Assembled patch description and fixed some cosmetical issues] Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]> Acked-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]> Fixes: f654706 ("KVM: s390/interrupt: do not pin adapter interrupt pages") [frankja: Added fixes tag] Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>

syzkaller has caught us red-handed once more, this time nesting regular spinlocks behind raw spinlocks: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.16.0-rc3-syzkaller-g7b8346bd9fce #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- syz.0.29/3743 is trying to lock: a3ff80008e2e9e18 (&xa->xa_lock#20){....}-{3:3}, at: vgic_put_irq+0xb4/0x190 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:137 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 3 locks held by syz.0.29/3743: #0: a3ff80008e2e90a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vgic_destroy+0x50/0x624 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:499 #1: a3ff80008e2e9fa0 (&kvm->arch.config_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vgic_destroy+0x5c/0x624 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:500 #2: 58f0000021be1428 (&vgic_cpu->ap_list_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: vgic_flush_pending_lpis+0x3c/0x31c arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:150 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3743 Comm: syz.0.29 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-syzkaller-g7b8346bd9fce #0 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:466 (C) __dump_stack+0x30/0x40 lib/dump_stack.c:94 dump_stack_lvl+0xd8/0x12c lib/dump_stack.c:120 dump_stack+0x1c/0x28 lib/dump_stack.c:129 print_lock_invalid_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4833 [inline] check_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4905 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x978/0x299c kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5190 lock_acquire+0x14c/0x2e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x7c kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 vgic_put_irq+0xb4/0x190 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:137 vgic_flush_pending_lpis+0x24c/0x31c arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:158 __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy+0x44/0x500 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:455 kvm_vgic_destroy+0x100/0x624 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:505 kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x80/0x138 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:244 kvm_destroy_vm virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1308 [inline] kvm_put_kvm+0x800/0xff8 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1344 kvm_vm_release+0x58/0x78 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1367 __fput+0x4ac/0x980 fs/file_table.c:465 ____fput+0x20/0x58 fs/file_table.c:493 task_work_run+0x1bc/0x254 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] do_notify_resume+0x1b4/0x270 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:151 exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline] exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline] el0_svc+0xb4/0x160 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:768 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:786 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600 This is of course no good, but is at odds with how LPI refcounts are managed. Solve the locking mess by deferring the release of unreferenced LPIs after the ap_list_lock is released. Mark these to-be-released LPIs specially to avoid racing with vgic_put_irq() and causing a double-free. Since references can only be taken on LPIs with a nonzero refcount, extending the lifetime of freed LPIs is still safe. Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-106051 CVE: CVE-2025-38392 commit b2beb5b Author: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Date: Fri May 23 14:55:37 2025 -0600 idpf: convert control queue mutex to a spinlock With VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER enabled, the following warning is generated on module load: [ 324.701677] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578 [ 324.701684] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1582, name: NetworkManager [ 324.701689] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 [ 324.701693] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 324.701697] 2 locks held by NetworkManager/1582: [ 324.701702] #0: ffffffff9f7be770 (rtnl_mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x791/0x21e0 [ 324.701730] #1: ff1100216c380368 (_xmit_ETHER){....}-{2:2}, at: __dev_open+0x3f0/0x870 [ 324.701749] Preemption disabled at: [ 324.701752] [<ffffffff9cd23b9d>] __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701765] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 1582 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 324.701771] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50FCP2SBSTD/M50FCP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C741.86B.01.01.0001.2211140926 11/14/2022 [ 324.701774] Call Trace: [ 324.701777] <TASK> [ 324.701779] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 324.701788] ? __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701793] __might_resched.cold+0x1ef/0x23d <..> [ 324.701818] __mutex_lock+0x113/0x1b80 <..> [ 324.701917] idpf_ctlq_clean_sq+0xad/0x4b0 [idpf] [ 324.701935] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 324.701941] idpf_mb_clean+0x143/0x380 [idpf] <..> [ 324.701991] idpf_send_mb_msg+0x111/0x720 [idpf] [ 324.702009] idpf_vc_xn_exec+0x4cc/0x990 [idpf] [ 324.702021] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 324.702035] idpf_add_del_mac_filters+0x3ed/0xb50 [idpf] <..> [ 324.702122] __hw_addr_sync_dev+0x1cf/0x300 [ 324.702126] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 324.702134] idpf_set_rx_mode+0x317/0x390 [idpf] [ 324.702152] __dev_open+0x3f8/0x870 [ 324.702159] ? __pfx___dev_open+0x10/0x10 [ 324.702174] __dev_change_flags+0x443/0x650 <..> [ 324.702208] netif_change_flags+0x80/0x160 [ 324.702218] do_setlink.isra.0+0x16a0/0x3960 <..> [ 324.702349] rtnl_newlink+0x12fd/0x21e0 The sequence is as follows: rtnl_newlink()-> __dev_change_flags()-> __dev_open()-> dev_set_rx_mode() - > # disables BH and grabs "dev->addr_list_lock" idpf_set_rx_mode() -> # proceed only if VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER is ON __dev_uc_sync() -> idpf_add_mac_filter -> idpf_add_del_mac_filters -> idpf_send_mb_msg() -> idpf_mb_clean() -> idpf_ctlq_clean_sq() # mutex_lock(cq_lock) Fix by converting cq_lock to a spinlock. All operations under the new lock are safe except freeing the DMA memory, which may use vunmap(). Fix by requesting a contiguous physical memory for the DMA mapping. Fixes: a251eee ("idpf: add SRIOV support and other ndo_ops") Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Samuel Salin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-106059 CVE: CVE-2025-38392 commit b2beb5b Author: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Date: Fri May 23 14:55:37 2025 -0600 idpf: convert control queue mutex to a spinlock With VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER enabled, the following warning is generated on module load: [ 324.701677] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578 [ 324.701684] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1582, name: NetworkManager [ 324.701689] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 [ 324.701693] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 324.701697] 2 locks held by NetworkManager/1582: [ 324.701702] #0: ffffffff9f7be770 (rtnl_mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x791/0x21e0 [ 324.701730] #1: ff1100216c380368 (_xmit_ETHER){....}-{2:2}, at: __dev_open+0x3f0/0x870 [ 324.701749] Preemption disabled at: [ 324.701752] [<ffffffff9cd23b9d>] __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701765] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 1582 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 324.701771] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50FCP2SBSTD/M50FCP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C741.86B.01.01.0001.2211140926 11/14/2022 [ 324.701774] Call Trace: [ 324.701777] <TASK> [ 324.701779] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 324.701788] ? __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701793] __might_resched.cold+0x1ef/0x23d <..> [ 324.701818] __mutex_lock+0x113/0x1b80 <..> [ 324.701917] idpf_ctlq_clean_sq+0xad/0x4b0 [idpf] [ 324.701935] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 324.701941] idpf_mb_clean+0x143/0x380 [idpf] <..> [ 324.701991] idpf_send_mb_msg+0x111/0x720 [idpf] [ 324.702009] idpf_vc_xn_exec+0x4cc/0x990 [idpf] [ 324.702021] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 324.702035] idpf_add_del_mac_filters+0x3ed/0xb50 [idpf] <..> [ 324.702122] __hw_addr_sync_dev+0x1cf/0x300 [ 324.702126] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 324.702134] idpf_set_rx_mode+0x317/0x390 [idpf] [ 324.702152] __dev_open+0x3f8/0x870 [ 324.702159] ? __pfx___dev_open+0x10/0x10 [ 324.702174] __dev_change_flags+0x443/0x650 <..> [ 324.702208] netif_change_flags+0x80/0x160 [ 324.702218] do_setlink.isra.0+0x16a0/0x3960 <..> [ 324.702349] rtnl_newlink+0x12fd/0x21e0 The sequence is as follows: rtnl_newlink()-> __dev_change_flags()-> __dev_open()-> dev_set_rx_mode() - > # disables BH and grabs "dev->addr_list_lock" idpf_set_rx_mode() -> # proceed only if VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER is ON __dev_uc_sync() -> idpf_add_mac_filter -> idpf_add_del_mac_filters -> idpf_send_mb_msg() -> idpf_mb_clean() -> idpf_ctlq_clean_sq() # mutex_lock(cq_lock) Fix by converting cq_lock to a spinlock. All operations under the new lock are safe except freeing the DMA memory, which may use vunmap(). Fix by requesting a contiguous physical memory for the DMA mapping. Fixes: a251eee ("idpf: add SRIOV support and other ndo_ops") Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Samuel Salin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: CKI Backport Bot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]>

MR: https://gitlab.com/redhat/rhel/src/kernel/rhel-10/-/merge_requests/294 JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-106059 CVE: CVE-2025-38392 commit b2beb5b Author: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Date: Fri May 23 14:55:37 2025 -0600 idpf: convert control queue mutex to a spinlock With VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER enabled, the following warning is generated on module load: [ 324.701677] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578 [ 324.701684] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1582, name: NetworkManager [ 324.701689] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 [ 324.701693] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 324.701697] 2 locks held by NetworkManager/1582: [ 324.701702] #0: ffffffff9f7be770 (rtnl_mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x791/0x21e0 [ 324.701730] #1: ff1100216c380368 (_xmit_ETHER){....}-{2:2}, at: __dev_open+0x3f0/0x870 [ 324.701749] Preemption disabled at: [ 324.701752] [<ffffffff9cd23b9d>] __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701765] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 1582 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 324.701771] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50FCP2SBSTD/M50FCP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C741.86B.01.01.0001.2211140926 11/14/2022 [ 324.701774] Call Trace: [ 324.701777] <TASK> [ 324.701779] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 324.701788] ? __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701793] __might_resched.cold+0x1ef/0x23d <..> [ 324.701818] __mutex_lock+0x113/0x1b80 <..> [ 324.701917] idpf_ctlq_clean_sq+0xad/0x4b0 [idpf] [ 324.701935] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 324.701941] idpf_mb_clean+0x143/0x380 [idpf] <..> [ 324.701991] idpf_send_mb_msg+0x111/0x720 [idpf] [ 324.702009] idpf_vc_xn_exec+0x4cc/0x990 [idpf] [ 324.702021] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 324.702035] idpf_add_del_mac_filters+0x3ed/0xb50 [idpf] <..> [ 324.702122] __hw_addr_sync_dev+0x1cf/0x300 [ 324.702126] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 324.702134] idpf_set_rx_mode+0x317/0x390 [idpf] [ 324.702152] __dev_open+0x3f8/0x870 [ 324.702159] ? __pfx___dev_open+0x10/0x10 [ 324.702174] __dev_change_flags+0x443/0x650 <..> [ 324.702208] netif_change_flags+0x80/0x160 [ 324.702218] do_setlink.isra.0+0x16a0/0x3960 <..> [ 324.702349] rtnl_newlink+0x12fd/0x21e0 The sequence is as follows: rtnl_newlink()-> __dev_change_flags()-> __dev_open()-> dev_set_rx_mode() - > # disables BH and grabs "dev->addr_list_lock" idpf_set_rx_mode() -> # proceed only if VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER is ON __dev_uc_sync() -> idpf_add_mac_filter -> idpf_add_del_mac_filters -> idpf_send_mb_msg() -> idpf_mb_clean() -> idpf_ctlq_clean_sq() # mutex_lock(cq_lock) Fix by converting cq_lock to a spinlock. All operations under the new lock are safe except freeing the DMA memory, which may use vunmap(). Fix by requesting a contiguous physical memory for the DMA mapping. Fixes: a251eee ("idpf: add SRIOV support and other ndo_ops") Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Samuel Salin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: CKI Backport Bot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> Approved-by: Murphy Zhou <[email protected]> Approved-by: Kamal Heib <[email protected]> Approved-by: CKI KWF Bot <[email protected]> Merged-by: Julio Faracco <[email protected]>

This attemps to fix possible UAFs caused by struct mgmt_pending being freed while still being processed like in the following trace, in order to fix mgmt_pending_valid is introduce and use to check if the mgmt_pending hasn't been removed from the pending list, on the complete callbacks it is used to check and in addtion remove the cmd from the list while holding mgmt_pending_lock to avoid TOCTOU problems since if the cmd is left on the list it can still be accessed and freed. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880709d4dc0 by task kworker/u11:0/55 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 55 Comm: kworker/u11:0 Not tainted 6.16.4 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16.4/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 12210: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4364 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269 mgmt_pending_add+0x35/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296 __add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x130/0x200 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5247 add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x214/0x360 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5364 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729 sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1133 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x5c9/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 12221: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4648 [inline] kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4847 mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline] mgmt_pending_foreach+0x30d/0x380 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257 __mgmt_power_off+0x169/0x350 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9444 hci_dev_close_sync+0x754/0x1330 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5290 hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:501 [inline] hci_dev_close+0x108/0x200 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:526 sock_do_ioctl+0xd9/0x300 net/socket.c:1192 sock_ioctl+0x576/0x790 net/socket.c:1313 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: cf75ad8 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_SET_POWERED") Fixes: 2bd1b23 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_DISCOVERABLE to use cmd_sync") Fixes: f056a65 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_CONNECTABLE to use cmd_sync") Fixes: 3244845 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SSP") Fixes: d81a494 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_LE") Fixes: b338d91 ("Bluetooth: Implement support for Mesh") Fixes: 6f6ff38 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME") Fixes: 71efbb0 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_PHY_CONFIGURATION") Fixes: b747a83 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Refactor add Adv Monitor") Fixes: abfeea4 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY") Fixes: 26ac4c5 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_ADVERTISING") Reported-by: cen zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

Ido Schimmel says: ==================== nexthop: Various fixes Patch #1 fixes a NPD that was recently reported by syzbot. Patch #2 fixes an issue in the existing FIB nexthop selftest. Patch #3 extends the selftest with test cases for the bug that was fixed in the first patch. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-107597 Upstream Status: 2af781a Conflict(s): Patching file drivers/pci/pci.h, Hunk #2 FAILED at 558. Same conflict that was encountered upstream and addressed via the merge commit (see: bb5c909 Merge branch 'pci/hotplug'). commit 2af781a Author: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]> Date: Thu Apr 10 17:27:12 2025 +0200 PCI: pciehp: Ignore Link Down/Up caused by Secondary Bus Reset When a Secondary Bus Reset is issued at a hotplug port, it causes a Data Link Layer State Changed event as a side effect. On hotplug ports using in-band presence detect, it additionally causes a Presence Detect Changed event. These spurious events should not result in teardown and re-enumeration of the device in the slot. Hence commit 2e35afa ("PCI: pciehp: Add reset_slot() method") masked the Presence Detect Changed Enable bit in the Slot Control register during a Secondary Bus Reset. Commit 06a8d89 ("PCI: pciehp: Disable link notification across slot reset") additionally masked the Data Link Layer State Changed Enable bit. However masking those bits only disables interrupt generation (PCIe r6.2 sec 6.7.3.1). The events are still visible in the Slot Status register and picked up by the IRQ handler if it runs during a Secondary Bus Reset. This can happen if the interrupt is shared or if an unmasked hotplug event occurs, e.g. Attention Button Pressed or Power Fault Detected. The likelihood of this happening used to be small, so it wasn't much of a problem in practice. That has changed with the recent introduction of bandwidth control in v6.13-rc1 with commit 665745f ("PCI/bwctrl: Re-add BW notification portdrv as PCIe BW controller"): Bandwidth control shares the interrupt with PCIe hotplug. A Secondary Bus Reset causes a Link Bandwidth Notification, so the hotplug IRQ handler runs, picks up the masked events and tears down the device in the slot. As a result, Joel reports VFIO passthrough failure of a GPU, which Ilpo root-caused to the incorrect handling of masked hotplug events. Clearly, a more reliable way is needed to ignore spurious hotplug events. For Downstream Port Containment, a new ignore mechanism was introduced by commit a97396c ("PCI: pciehp: Ignore Link Down/Up caused by DPC"). It has been working reliably for the past four years. Adapt it for Secondary Bus Resets. Introduce two helpers to annotate code sections which cause spurious link changes: pci_hp_ignore_link_change() and pci_hp_unignore_link_change() Use those helpers in lieu of masking interrupts in the Slot Control register. Introduce a helper to check whether such a code section is executing concurrently and if so, await it: pci_hp_spurious_link_change() Invoke the helper in the hotplug IRQ thread pciehp_ist(). Re-use the IRQ thread's existing code which ignores DPC-induced link changes unless the link is unexpectedly down after reset recovery or the device was replaced during the bus reset. That code block in pciehp_ist() was previously only executed if a Data Link Layer State Changed event has occurred. Additionally execute it for Presence Detect Changed events. That's necessary for compatibility with PCIe r1.0 hotplug ports because Data Link Layer State Changed didn't exist before PCIe r1.1. DPC was added with PCIe r3.1 and thus DPC-capable hotplug ports always support Data Link Layer State Changed events. But the same cannot be assumed for Secondary Bus Reset, which already existed in PCIe r1.0. Secondary Bus Reset is only one of many causes of spurious link changes. Others include runtime suspend to D3cold, firmware updates or FPGA reconfiguration. The new pci_hp_{,un}ignore_link_change() helpers may be used by all kinds of drivers to annotate such code sections, hence their declarations are publicly visible in <linux/pci.h>. A case in point is the Mellanox Ethernet driver which disables a firmware reset feature if the Ethernet card is attached to a hotplug port, see commit 3d7a3f2 ("net/mlx5: Nack sync reset request when HotPlug is enabled"). Going forward, PCIe hotplug will be able to cope gracefully with all such use cases once the code sections are properly annotated. The new helpers internally use two bits in struct pci_dev's priv_flags as well as a wait_queue. This mirrors what was done for DPC by commit a97396c ("PCI: pciehp: Ignore Link Down/Up caused by DPC"). That may be insufficient if spurious link changes are caused by multiple sources simultaneously. An example might be a Secondary Bus Reset issued by AER during FPGA reconfiguration. If this turns out to happen in real life, support for it can easily be added by replacing the PCI_LINK_CHANGING flag with an atomic_t counter incremented by pci_hp_ignore_link_change() and decremented by pci_hp_unignore_link_change(). Instead of awaiting a zero PCI_LINK_CHANGING flag, the pci_hp_spurious_link_change() helper would then simply await a zero counter. Fixes: 665745f ("PCI/bwctrl: Re-add BW notification portdrv as PCIe BW controller") Reported-by: Joel Mathew Thomas <[email protected]> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219765 Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Tested-by: Joel Mathew Thomas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/d04deaf49d634a2edf42bf3c06ed81b4ca54d17b.1744298239.git.lukas@wunner.de Signed-off-by: Myron Stowe <[email protected]>

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-107597 Upstream Status: b816265 commit b816265 Author: Klaus Kudielka <[email protected]> Date: Sun Sep 7 12:21:46 2025 +0200 PCI: mvebu: Fix use of for_each_of_range() iterator 5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"") simplified code by using the for_each_of_range() iterator, but it broke PCI enumeration on Turris Omnia (and probably other mvebu targets). Issue #1: To determine range.flags, of_pci_range_parser_one() uses bus->get_flags(), which resolves to of_bus_pci_get_flags(), which already returns an IORESOURCE bit field, and NOT the original flags from the "ranges" resource. Then mvebu_get_tgt_attr() attempts the very same conversion again. Remove the misinterpretation of range.flags in mvebu_get_tgt_attr(), to restore the intended behavior. Issue #2: The driver needs target and attributes, which are encoded in the raw address values of the "/soc/pcie/ranges" resource. According to of_pci_range_parser_one(), the raw values are stored in range.bus_addr and range.parent_bus_addr, respectively. range.cpu_addr is a translated version of range.parent_bus_addr, and not relevant here. Use the correct range structure member, to extract target and attributes. This restores the intended behavior. Fixes: 5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"") Reported-by: Jan Palus <[email protected]> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220479 Signed-off-by: Klaus Kudielka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Tested-by: Tony Dinh <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jan Palus <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Myron Stowe <[email protected]>

Leon Hwang says: ==================== bpf: Allow union argument in trampoline based programs While tracing 'release_pages' with bpfsnoop[0], the verifier reports: The function release_pages arg0 type UNION is unsupported. However, it should be acceptable to trace functions that have 'union' arguments. This patch set enables such support in the verifier by allowing 'union' as a valid argument type. Changes: v3 -> v4: * Address comments from Alexei: * Trim bpftrace output in patch #1 log. * Drop the referenced commit info and the test output in patch #2 log. v2 -> v3: * Address comments from Alexei: * Reuse the existing flag BTF_FMODEL_STRUCT_ARG. * Update the comment of the flag BTF_FMODEL_STRUCT_ARG. v1 -> v2: * Add 16B 'union' argument support in x86_64 trampoline. * Update selftests using bpf_testmod. * Add test case about 16-bytes 'union' argument. * Address comments from Alexei: * Study the patch set about 'struct' argument support. * Update selftests to cover more cases. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ Links: [0] https://github.com/bpfsnoop/bpfsnoop ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

jira LE-4297 cve CVE-2025-38392 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-6.12.0-55.34.1.el10_0 commit-author Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> commit b2beb5b With VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER enabled, the following warning is generated on module load: [ 324.701677] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578 [ 324.701684] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1582, name: NetworkManager [ 324.701689] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 [ 324.701693] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 324.701697] 2 locks held by NetworkManager/1582: [ 324.701702] #0: ffffffff9f7be770 (rtnl_mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x791/0x21e0 [ 324.701730] #1: ff1100216c380368 (_xmit_ETHER){....}-{2:2}, at: __dev_open+0x3f0/0x870 [ 324.701749] Preemption disabled at: [ 324.701752] [<ffffffff9cd23b9d>] __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701765] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 1582 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 324.701771] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50FCP2SBSTD/M50FCP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C741.86B.01.01.0001.2211140926 11/14/2022 [ 324.701774] Call Trace: [ 324.701777] <TASK> [ 324.701779] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 324.701788] ? __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701793] __might_resched.cold+0x1ef/0x23d <..> [ 324.701818] __mutex_lock+0x113/0x1b80 <..> [ 324.701917] idpf_ctlq_clean_sq+0xad/0x4b0 [idpf] [ 324.701935] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 324.701941] idpf_mb_clean+0x143/0x380 [idpf] <..> [ 324.701991] idpf_send_mb_msg+0x111/0x720 [idpf] [ 324.702009] idpf_vc_xn_exec+0x4cc/0x990 [idpf] [ 324.702021] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 324.702035] idpf_add_del_mac_filters+0x3ed/0xb50 [idpf] <..> [ 324.702122] __hw_addr_sync_dev+0x1cf/0x300 [ 324.702126] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 324.702134] idpf_set_rx_mode+0x317/0x390 [idpf] [ 324.702152] __dev_open+0x3f8/0x870 [ 324.702159] ? __pfx___dev_open+0x10/0x10 [ 324.702174] __dev_change_flags+0x443/0x650 <..> [ 324.702208] netif_change_flags+0x80/0x160 [ 324.702218] do_setlink.isra.0+0x16a0/0x3960 <..> [ 324.702349] rtnl_newlink+0x12fd/0x21e0 The sequence is as follows: rtnl_newlink()-> __dev_change_flags()-> __dev_open()-> dev_set_rx_mode() - > # disables BH and grabs "dev->addr_list_lock" idpf_set_rx_mode() -> # proceed only if VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER is ON __dev_uc_sync() -> idpf_add_mac_filter -> idpf_add_del_mac_filters -> idpf_send_mb_msg() -> idpf_mb_clean() -> idpf_ctlq_clean_sq() # mutex_lock(cq_lock) Fix by converting cq_lock to a spinlock. All operations under the new lock are safe except freeing the DMA memory, which may use vunmap(). Fix by requesting a contiguous physical memory for the DMA mapping. Fixes: a251eee ("idpf: add SRIOV support and other ndo_ops") Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Samuel Salin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit b2beb5b) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

jira LE-4321 cve CVE-2025-38392 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.76.1.el8_10 commit-author Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> commit b2beb5b With VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER enabled, the following warning is generated on module load: [ 324.701677] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578 [ 324.701684] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1582, name: NetworkManager [ 324.701689] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 [ 324.701693] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 324.701697] 2 locks held by NetworkManager/1582: [ 324.701702] #0: ffffffff9f7be770 (rtnl_mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x791/0x21e0 [ 324.701730] #1: ff1100216c380368 (_xmit_ETHER){....}-{2:2}, at: __dev_open+0x3f0/0x870 [ 324.701749] Preemption disabled at: [ 324.701752] [<ffffffff9cd23b9d>] __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701765] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 1582 Comm: NetworkManager Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 324.701771] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50FCP2SBSTD/M50FCP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C741.86B.01.01.0001.2211140926 11/14/2022 [ 324.701774] Call Trace: [ 324.701777] <TASK> [ 324.701779] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 [ 324.701788] ? __dev_open+0x3dd/0x870 [ 324.701793] __might_resched.cold+0x1ef/0x23d <..> [ 324.701818] __mutex_lock+0x113/0x1b80 <..> [ 324.701917] idpf_ctlq_clean_sq+0xad/0x4b0 [idpf] [ 324.701935] ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 324.701941] idpf_mb_clean+0x143/0x380 [idpf] <..> [ 324.701991] idpf_send_mb_msg+0x111/0x720 [idpf] [ 324.702009] idpf_vc_xn_exec+0x4cc/0x990 [idpf] [ 324.702021] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 324.702035] idpf_add_del_mac_filters+0x3ed/0xb50 [idpf] <..> [ 324.702122] __hw_addr_sync_dev+0x1cf/0x300 [ 324.702126] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 324.702134] idpf_set_rx_mode+0x317/0x390 [idpf] [ 324.702152] __dev_open+0x3f8/0x870 [ 324.702159] ? __pfx___dev_open+0x10/0x10 [ 324.702174] __dev_change_flags+0x443/0x650 <..> [ 324.702208] netif_change_flags+0x80/0x160 [ 324.702218] do_setlink.isra.0+0x16a0/0x3960 <..> [ 324.702349] rtnl_newlink+0x12fd/0x21e0 The sequence is as follows: rtnl_newlink()-> __dev_change_flags()-> __dev_open()-> dev_set_rx_mode() - > # disables BH and grabs "dev->addr_list_lock" idpf_set_rx_mode() -> # proceed only if VIRTCHNL2_CAP_MACFILTER is ON __dev_uc_sync() -> idpf_add_mac_filter -> idpf_add_del_mac_filters -> idpf_send_mb_msg() -> idpf_mb_clean() -> idpf_ctlq_clean_sq() # mutex_lock(cq_lock) Fix by converting cq_lock to a spinlock. All operations under the new lock are safe except freeing the DMA memory, which may use vunmap(). Fix by requesting a contiguous physical memory for the DMA mapping. Fixes: a251eee ("idpf: add SRIOV support and other ndo_ops") Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Samuel Salin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit b2beb5b) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>

generic/091 may fail, then it bisects to the bad commit ba8dac3 ("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page"). What will cause generic/091 to fail is something like below Testcase #1: 1. write 16k as compressed blocks 2. truncate to 12k 3. truncate to 20k 4. verify data in range of [12k, 16k], however data is not zero as expected Script of Testcase #1 mkfs.f2fs -f -O extra_attr,compression /dev/vdb mount -t f2fs -o compress_extension=* /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=12k count=1 dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=1 seek=3 conv=notrunc sync truncate -s $((12*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((20*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file dd if=/mnt/f2fs/file of=/mnt/f2fs/data bs=4k count=1 skip=3 od /mnt/f2fs/data umount /mnt/f2fs Analisys: in step 2), we will redirty all data pages from #0 to #3 in compressed cluster, and zero page #3, in step 3), f2fs_setattr() will call f2fs_zero_post_eof_page() to drop all page cache post eof, includeing dirtied page #3, in step 4) when we read data from page #3, it will decompressed cluster and extra random data to page #3, finally, we hit the non-zeroed data post eof. However, the commit ba8dac3 ("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page") just let the issue be reproduced easily, w/o the commit, it can reproduce this bug w/ below Testcase #2: 1. write 16k as compressed blocks 2. truncate to 8k 3. truncate to 12k 4. truncate to 20k 5. verify data in range of [12k, 16k], however data is not zero as expected Script of Testcase #2 mkfs.f2fs -f -O extra_attr,compression /dev/vdb mount -t f2fs -o compress_extension=* /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=12k count=1 dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=1 seek=3 conv=notrunc sync truncate -s $((8*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((12*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((20*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches dd if=/mnt/f2fs/file of=/mnt/f2fs/data bs=4k count=1 skip=3 od /mnt/f2fs/data umount /mnt/f2fs Anlysis: in step 2), we will redirty all data pages from #0 to #3 in compressed cluster, and zero page #2 and #3, in step 3), we will truncate page #3 in page cache, in step 4), expand file size, in step 5), hit random data post eof w/ the same reason in Testcase #1. Root Cause: In f2fs_truncate_partial_cluster(), after we truncate partial data block on compressed cluster, all pages in cluster including the one post eof will be dirtied, after another tuncation, dirty page post eof will be dropped, however on-disk compressed cluster is still valid, it may include non-zero data post eof, result in exposing previous non-zero data post eof while reading. Fix: In f2fs_truncate_partial_cluster(), let change as below to fix: - call filemap_write_and_wait_range() to flush dirty page - call truncate_pagecache() to drop pages or zero partial page post eof - call f2fs_do_truncate_blocks() to truncate non-compress cluster to last valid block Fixes: 3265d3d ("f2fs: support partial truncation on compressed inode") Reported-by: Jan Prusakowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

As JY reported in bugzilla [1], Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 pc : [0xffffffe51d249484] f2fs_is_cp_guaranteed+0x70/0x98 lr : [0xffffffe51d24adbc] f2fs_merge_page_bio+0x520/0x6d4 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 6790 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Tainted: P B W OE 6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 5f7701c9cbf727d1eebe77c89bbbeb3371e895e5 Tainted: [P]=PROPRIETARY_MODULE, [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-254:49) Call trace: f2fs_is_cp_guaranteed+0x70/0x98 f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x174/0x2f4 f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x214/0x81c f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x28c/0x764 f2fs_write_data_pages+0x78c/0xce4 do_writepages+0xe8/0x2fc __writeback_single_inode+0x4c/0x4b4 writeback_sb_inodes+0x314/0x540 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xa4/0xf4 wb_writeback+0x160/0x448 wb_workfn+0x2f0/0x5dc process_scheduled_works+0x1c8/0x458 worker_thread+0x334/0x3f0 kthread+0x118/0x1ac ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220575 The panic was caused by UAF issue w/ below race condition: kworker - writepages - f2fs_write_cache_pages - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_do_write_data_page - f2fs_inplace_write_data - f2fs_merge_page_bio - add_inu_page : cache page #1 into bio & cache bio in io->bio_list - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_do_write_data_page - f2fs_inplace_write_data - f2fs_merge_page_bio - add_inu_page : cache page #2 into bio which is linked in io->bio_list write - f2fs_write_begin : write page #1 - f2fs_folio_wait_writeback - f2fs_submit_merged_ipu_write - f2fs_submit_write_bio : submit bio which inclues page #1 and #2 software IRQ - f2fs_write_end_io - fscrypt_free_bounce_page : freed bounced page which belongs to page #2 - inc_page_count( , WB_DATA_TYPE(data_folio), false) : data_folio points to fio->encrypted_page the bounced page can be freed before accessing it in f2fs_is_cp_guarantee() It can reproduce w/ below testcase: Run below script in shell #1: for ((i=1;i>0;i++)) do xfs_io -f /mnt/f2fs/enc/file \ -c "pwrite 0 32k" -c "fdatasync" Run below script in shell #2: for ((i=1;i>0;i++)) do xfs_io -f /mnt/f2fs/enc/file \ -c "pwrite 0 32k" -c "fdatasync" So, in f2fs_merge_page_bio(), let's avoid using fio->encrypted_page after commit page into internal ipu cache. Fixes: 0b20fce ("f2fs: cache global IPU bio") Reported-by: JY <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

When running as an SNP or TDX guest under KVM, force the legacy PCI hole, i.e. memory between Top of Lower Usable DRAM and 4GiB, to be mapped as UC via a forced variable MTRR range. In most KVM-based setups, legacy devices such as the HPET and TPM are enumerated via ACPI. ACPI enumeration includes a Memory32Fixed entry, and optionally a SystemMemory descriptor for an OperationRegion, e.g. if the device needs to be accessed via a Control Method. If a SystemMemory entry is present, then the kernel's ACPI driver will auto-ioremap the region so that it can be accessed at will. However, the ACPI spec doesn't provide a way to enumerate the memory type of SystemMemory regions, i.e. there's no way to tell software that a region must be mapped as UC vs. WB, etc. As a result, Linux's ACPI driver always maps SystemMemory regions using ioremap_cache(), i.e. as WB on x86. The dedicated device drivers however, e.g. the HPET driver and TPM driver, want to map their associated memory as UC or WC, as accessing PCI devices using WB is unsupported. On bare metal and non-CoCO, the conflicting requirements "work" as firmware configures the PCI hole (and other device memory) to be UC in the MTRRs. So even though the ACPI mappings request WB, they are forced to UC- in the kernel's tracking due to the kernel properly handling the MTRR overrides, and thus are compatible with the drivers' requested WC/UC-. With force WB MTRRs on SNP and TDX guests, the ACPI mappings get their requested WB if the ACPI mappings are established before the dedicated driver code attempts to initialize the device. E.g. if acpi_init() runs before the corresponding device driver is probed, ACPI's WB mapping will "win", and result in the driver's ioremap() failing because the existing WB mapping isn't compatible with the requested WC/UC-. E.g. when a TPM is emulated by the hypervisor (ignoring the security implications of relying on what is allegedly an untrusted entity to store measurements), the TPM driver will request UC and fail: [ 1.730459] ioremap error for 0xfed40000-0xfed45000, requested 0x2, got 0x0 [ 1.732780] tpm_tis MSFT0101:00: probe with driver tpm_tis failed with error -12 Note, the '0x2' and '0x0' values refer to "enum page_cache_mode", not x86's memtypes (which frustratingly are an almost pure inversion; 2 == WB, 0 == UC). E.g. tracing mapping requests for TPM TIS yields: Mapping TPM TIS with req_type = 0 WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:530 memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460 Modules linked in: CPU: 22 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.16.0-rc7+ #2 VOLUNTARY Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/29/2025 RIP: 0010:memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460 __ioremap_caller+0x16d/0x3d0 ioremap_cache+0x17/0x30 x86_acpi_os_ioremap+0xe/0x20 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x1f3/0x240 acpi_os_map_memory+0xe/0x20 acpi_ex_system_memory_space_handler+0x273/0x440 acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch+0x176/0x4c0 acpi_ex_access_region+0x2ad/0x530 acpi_ex_field_datum_io+0xa2/0x4f0 acpi_ex_extract_from_field+0x296/0x3e0 acpi_ex_read_data_from_field+0xd1/0x460 acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value+0x2ee/0x530 acpi_ex_resolve_to_value+0x1f2/0x540 acpi_ds_evaluate_name_path+0x11b/0x190 acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x456/0x960 acpi_ps_parse_loop+0x27a/0xa50 acpi_ps_parse_aml+0x226/0x600 acpi_ps_execute_method+0x172/0x3e0 acpi_ns_evaluate+0x175/0x5f0 acpi_evaluate_object+0x213/0x490 acpi_evaluate_integer+0x6d/0x140 acpi_bus_get_status+0x93/0x150 acpi_add_single_object+0x43a/0x7c0 acpi_bus_check_add+0x149/0x3a0 acpi_bus_check_add_1+0x16/0x30 acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0x22c/0x360 acpi_walk_namespace+0x15c/0x170 acpi_bus_scan+0x1dd/0x200 acpi_scan_init+0xe5/0x2b0 acpi_init+0x264/0x5b0 do_one_initcall+0x5a/0x310 kernel_init_freeable+0x34f/0x4f0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x186/0x1b0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> The above traces are from a Google-VMM based VM, but the same behavior happens with a QEMU based VM that is modified to add a SystemMemory range for the TPM TIS address space. The only reason this doesn't cause problems for HPET, which appears to require a SystemMemory region, is because HPET gets special treatment via x86_init.timers.timer_init(), and so gets a chance to create its UC- mapping before acpi_init() clobbers things. Disabling the early call to hpet_time_init() yields the same behavior for HPET: [ 0.318264] ioremap error for 0xfed00000-0xfed01000, requested 0x2, got 0x0 Hack around the ACPI gap by forcing the legacy PCI hole to UC when overriding the (virtual) MTRRs for CoCo guest, so that ioremap handling of MTRRs naturally kicks in and forces the ACPI mappings to be UC. Note, the requested/mapped memtype doesn't actually matter in terms of accessing the device. In practically every setup, legacy PCI devices are emulated by the hypervisor, and accesses are intercepted and handled as emulated MMIO, i.e. never access physical memory and thus don't have an effective memtype. Even in a theoretical setup where such devices are passed through by the host, i.e. point at real MMIO memory, it is KVM's (as the hypervisor) responsibility to force the memory to be WC/UC, e.g. via EPT memtype under TDX or real hardware MTRRs under SNP. Not doing so cannot work, and the hypervisor is highly motivated to do the right thing as letting the guest access hardware MMIO with WB would likely result in a variety of fatal #MCs. In other words, forcing the range to be UC is all about coercing the kernel's tracking into thinking that it has established UC mappings, so that the ioremap code doesn't reject mappings from e.g. the TPM driver and thus prevent the driver from loading and the device from functioning. Note #2, relying on guest firmware to handle this scenario, e.g. by setting virtual MTRRs and then consuming them in Linux, is not a viable option, as the virtual MTRR state is managed by the untrusted hypervisor, and because OVMF at least has stopped programming virtual MTRRs when running as a TDX guest. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] Fixes: 8e690b8 ("x86/kvm: Override default caching mode for SEV-SNP and TDX") Cc: [email protected] Cc: Peter Gonda <[email protected]> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Cc: Jürgen Groß <[email protected]> Cc: Korakit Seemakhupt <[email protected]> Cc: Jianxiong Gao <[email protected]> Cc: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Korakit Seemakhupt <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

We're generally not proponents of rewrites (nasty uncomfortable things that make you late for dinner!). So why rewrite Binder? Binder has been evolving over the past 15+ years to meet the evolving needs of Android. Its responsibilities, expectations, and complexity have grown considerably during that time. While we expect Binder to continue to evolve along with Android, there are a number of factors that currently constrain our ability to develop/maintain it. Briefly those are: 1. Complexity: Binder is at the intersection of everything in Android and fulfills many responsibilities beyond IPC. It has become many things to many people, and due to its many features and their interactions with each other, its complexity is quite high. In just 6kLOC it must deliver transactions to the right threads. It must correctly parse and translate the contents of transactions, which can contain several objects of different types (e.g., pointers, fds) that can interact with each other. It controls the size of thread pools in userspace, and ensures that transactions are assigned to threads in ways that avoid deadlocks where the threadpool has run out of threads. It must track refcounts of objects that are shared by several processes by forwarding refcount changes between the processes correctly. It must handle numerous error scenarios and it combines/nests 13 different locks, 7 reference counters, and atomic variables. Finally, It must do all of this as fast and efficiently as possible. Minor performance regressions can cause a noticeably degraded user experience. 2. Things to improve: Thousand-line functions [1], error-prone error handling [2], and confusing structure can occur as a code base grows organically. After more than a decade of development, this codebase could use an overhaul. [1]: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/drivers/android/binder.c?h=v6.5#n2896 [2]: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/drivers/android/binder.c?h=v6.5#n3658 3. Security critical: Binder is a critical part of Android's sandboxing strategy. Even Android's most de-privileged sandboxes (e.g. the Chrome renderer, or SW Codec) have direct access to Binder. More than just about any other component, it's important that Binder provide robust security, and itself be robust against security vulnerabilities. It's #1 (high complexity) that has made continuing to evolve Binder and resolving #2 (tech debt) exceptionally difficult without causing #3 (security issues). For Binder to continue to meet Android's needs, we need better ways to manage (and reduce!) complexity without increasing the risk. The biggest change is obviously the choice of programming language. We decided to use Rust because it directly addresses a number of the challenges within Binder that we have faced during the last years. It prevents mistakes with ref counting, locking, bounds checking, and also does a lot to reduce the complexity of error handling. Additionally, we've been able to use the more expressive type system to encode the ownership semantics of the various structs and pointers, which takes the complexity of managing object lifetimes out of the hands of the programmer, reducing the risk of use-after-frees and similar problems. Rust has many different pointer types that it uses to encode ownership semantics into the type system, and this is probably one of the most important aspects of how it helps in Binder. The Binder driver has a lot of different objects that have complex ownership semantics; some pointers own a refcount, some pointers have exclusive ownership, and some pointers just reference the object and it is kept alive in some other manner. With Rust, we can use a different pointer type for each kind of pointer, which enables the compiler to enforce that the ownership semantics are implemented correctly. Another useful feature is Rust's error handling. Rust allows for more simplified error handling with features such as destructors, and you get compilation failures if errors are not properly handled. This means that even though Rust requires you to spend more lines of code than C on things such as writing down invariants that are left implicit in C, the Rust driver is still slightly smaller than C binder: Rust is 5.5kLOC and C is 5.8kLOC. (These numbers are excluding blank lines, comments, binderfs, and any debugging facilities in C that are not yet implemented in the Rust driver. The numbers include abstractions in rust/kernel/ that are unlikely to be used by other drivers than Binder.) Although this rewrite completely rethinks how the code is structured and how assumptions are enforced, we do not fundamentally change *how* the driver does the things it does. A lot of careful thought has gone into the existing design. The rewrite is aimed rather at improving code health, structure, readability, robustness, security, maintainability and extensibility. We also include more inline documentation, and improve how assumptions in the code are enforced. Furthermore, all unsafe code is annotated with a SAFETY comment that explains why it is correct. We have left the binderfs filesystem component in C. Rewriting it in Rust would be a large amount of work and requires a lot of bindings to the file system interfaces. Binderfs has not historically had the same challenges with security and complexity, so rewriting binderfs seems to have lower value than the rest of Binder. Correctness and feature parity ------------------------------ Rust binder passes all tests that validate the correctness of Binder in the Android Open Source Project. We can boot a device, and run a variety of apps and functionality without issues. We have performed this both on the Cuttlefish Android emulator device, and on a Pixel 6 Pro. As for feature parity, Rust binder currently implements all features that C binder supports, with the exception of some debugging facilities. The missing debugging facilities will be added before we submit the Rust implementation upstream. Tracepoints ----------- I did not include all of the tracepoints as I felt that the mechansim for making C access fields of Rust structs should be discussed on list separately. I also did not include the support for building Rust Binder as a module since that requires exporting a bunch of additional symbols on the C side. Original RFC Link with old benchmark numbers: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Co-developed-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Matt Gilbride <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matt Gilbride <[email protected]> Acked-by: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Check for an invalid length during LAUNCH_UPDATE at the start of snp_launch_update() instead of subtly relying on kvm_gmem_populate() to detect the bad state. Code that directly handles userspace input absolutely should sanitize those inputs; failure to do so is asking for bugs where KVM consumes an invalid "npages". Keep the check in gmem, but wrap it in a WARN to flag any bad usage by the caller. Note, this is technically an ABI change as KVM would previously allow a length of '0'. But allowing a length of '0' is nonsensical and creates pointless conundrums in KVM. E.g. an empty range is arguably neither private nor shared, but LAUNCH_UPDATE will fail if the starting gpa can't be made private. In practice, no known or well-behaved VMM passes a length of '0'. Note #2, the PAGE_ALIGNED(params.len) check ensures that lengths between 1 and 4095 (inclusive) are also rejected, i.e. that KVM won't end up with npages=0 when doing "npages = params.len / PAGE_SIZE". Cc: Thomas Lendacky <[email protected]> Cc: Michael Roth <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Don't emulate branch instructions, e.g. CALL/RET/JMP etc., that are affected by Shadow Stacks and/or Indirect Branch Tracking when said features are enabled in the guest, as fully emulating CET would require significant complexity for no practical benefit (KVM shouldn't need to emulate branch instructions on modern hosts). Simply doing nothing isn't an option as that would allow a malicious entity to subvert CET protections via the emulator. To detect instructions that are subject to IBT or affect IBT state, use the existing IsBranch flag along with the source operand type to detect indirect branches, and the existing NearBranch flag to detect far JMPs and CALLs, all of which are effectively indirect. Explicitly check for emulation of IRET, FAR RET (IMM), and SYSEXIT (the ret-like far branches) instead of adding another flag, e.g. IsRet, as it's unlikely the emulator will ever need to check for return-like instructions outside of this one specific flow. Use an allow-list instead of a deny-list because (a) it's a shorter list and (b) so that a missed entry gets a false positive, not a false negative (i.e. reject emulation instead of clobbering CET state). For Shadow Stacks, explicitly track instructions that directly affect the current SSP, as KVM's emulator doesn't have existing flags that can be used to precisely detect such instructions. Alternatively, the em_xxx() helpers could directly check for ShadowStack interactions, but using a dedicated flag is arguably easier to audit, and allows for handling both IBT and SHSTK in one fell swoop. Note! On far transfers, do NOT consult the current privilege level and instead treat SHSTK/IBT as being enabled if they're enabled for User *or* Supervisor mode. On inter-privilege level far transfers, SHSTK and IBT can be in play for the target privilege level, i.e. checking the current privilege could get a false negative, and KVM doesn't know the target privilege level until emulation gets under way. Note #2, FAR JMP from 64-bit mode to compatibility mode interacts with the current SSP, but only to ensure SSP[63:32] == 0. Don't tag FAR JMP as SHSTK, which would be rather confusing and would result in FAR JMP being rejected unnecessarily the vast majority of the time (ignoring that it's unlikely to ever be emulated). A future commit will add the #GP(0) check for the specific FAR JMP scenario. Note #3, task switches also modify SSP and so need to be rejected. That too will be addressed in a future commit. Suggested-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]> Originally-by: Yang Weijiang <[email protected]> Cc: Mathias Krause <[email protected]> Cc: John Allen <[email protected]> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 #7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 #8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 #9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 #10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]

…uctions JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-78202 commit ff3afe5 Author: Peilin Ye <[email protected]> Date: Tue Mar 4 01:06:46 2025 +0000 selftests/bpf: Add selftests for load-acquire and store-release instructions Add several ./test_progs tests: - arena_atomics/load_acquire - arena_atomics/store_release - verifier_load_acquire/* - verifier_store_release/* - verifier_precision/bpf_load_acquire - verifier_precision/bpf_store_release The last two tests are added to check if backtrack_insn() handles the new instructions correctly. Additionally, the last test also makes sure that the verifier "remembers" the value (in src_reg) we store-release into e.g. a stack slot. For example, if we take a look at the test program: #0: r1 = 8; /* store_release((u64 *)(r10 - 8), r1); */ #1: .8byte %[store_release]; #2: r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); #3: r2 = r10; #4: r2 += r1; #5: r0 = 0; #6: exit; At #1, if the verifier doesn't remember that we wrote 8 to the stack, then later at #4 we would be adding an unbounded scalar value to the stack pointer, which would cause the program to be rejected: VERIFIER LOG: ============= ... math between fp pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed For easier CI integration, instead of using built-ins like __atomic_{load,store}_n() which depend on the new __BPF_FEATURE_LOAD_ACQ_STORE_REL pre-defined macro, manually craft load-acquire/store-release instructions using __imm_insn(), as suggested by Eduard. All new tests depend on: (1) Clang major version >= 18, and (2) ENABLE_ATOMICS_TESTS is defined (currently implies -mcpu=v3 or v4), and (3) JIT supports load-acquire/store-release (currently arm64 and x86-64) In .../progs/arena_atomics.c: /* 8-byte-aligned */ __u8 __arena_global load_acquire8_value = 0x12; /* 1-byte hole */ __u16 __arena_global load_acquire16_value = 0x1234; That 1-byte hole in the .addr_space.1 ELF section caused clang-17 to crash: fatal error: error in backend: unable to write nop sequence of 1 bytes To work around such llvm-17 CI job failures, conditionally define __arena_global variables as 64-bit if __clang_major__ < 18, to make sure .addr_space.1 has no holes. Ideally we should avoid compiling this file using clang-17 at all (arena tests depend on __BPF_FEATURE_ADDR_SPACE_CAST, and are skipped for llvm-17 anyway), but that is a separate topic. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1b46c6feaf0f1b6984d9ec80e500cc7383e9da1a.1741049567.git.yepeilin@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Gregory Bell <[email protected]>

The test starts a workload and then opens events. If the events fail to open, for example because of perf_event_paranoid, the gopipe of the workload is leaked and the file descriptor leak check fails when the test exits. To avoid this cancel the workload when opening the events fails. Before: ``` $ perf test -vv 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: --- start --- test child forked, pid 1189568 Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-B7-1 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 Attempt to add: software/cpu-clock/ ..after resolving event: software/config=0/ cpu-clock -> software/cpu-clock/ ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE) size 136 config 0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY) sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU read_format ID|LOST disabled 1 inherit 1 mmap 1 comm 1 enable_on_exec 1 task 1 sample_id_all 1 mmap2 1 comm_exec 1 ksymbol 1 bpf_event 1 { wakeup_events, wakeup_watermark } 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 1189569 cpu 0 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 perf_evlist__open: Permission denied ---- end(-2) ---- Leak of file descriptor 6 that opened: 'pipe:[14200347]' ---- unexpected signal (6) ---- iFailed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon #0 0x565358f6666e in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:311 #1 0x7f29ce849df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 #2 0x7f29ce89e95c in __pthread_kill_implementation pthread_kill.c:44 #3 0x7f29ce849cc2 in raise raise.c:27 #4 0x7f29ce8324ac in abort abort.c:81 #5 0x565358f662d4 in check_leaks builtin-test.c:226 #6 0x565358f6682e in run_test_child builtin-test.c:344 #7 0x565358ef7121 in start_command run-command.c:128 #8 0x565358f67273 in start_test builtin-test.c:545 #9 0x565358f6771d in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:647 #10 0x565358f682bd in cmd_test builtin-test.c:849 #11 0x565358ee5ded in run_builtin perf.c:349 #12 0x565358ee6085 in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 #13 0x565358ee61de in run_argv perf.c:448 #14 0x565358ee6527 in main perf.c:555 #15 0x7f29ce833ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 #16 0x7f29ce833d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 #17 0x565358e391c1 in _start perf[851c1] 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : FAILED! ``` After: ``` $ perf test 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions) ``` Fixes: 16d00fe ("perf tests: Move test__PERF_RECORD into separate object") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Cc: Chun-Tse Shao <[email protected]> Cc: Howard Chu <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

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