[FIPS 9.2] Multiple VULNS 03/10/2025

drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c

@@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ static int vmw_event_fence_action_create(struct drm_file *file_priv,
 	}
 
 	event->event.base.type = DRM_VMW_EVENT_FENCE_SIGNALED;
-	event->event.base.length = sizeof(*event);
+	event->event.base.length = sizeof(event->event);
 	event->event.user_data = user_data;
 
 	ret = drm_event_reserve_init(dev, file_priv, &event->base, &event->event.base);

fs/locks.c

@@ -1227,6 +1227,7 @@ static int posix_lock_inode(struct inode *inode, struct file_lock *request,
 		locks_wake_up_blocks(left);
 	}
  out:
+	trace_posix_lock_inode(inode, request, error);
 	spin_unlock(&ctx->flc_lock);
 	percpu_up_read(&file_rwsem);
 	/*
@@ -1237,7 +1238,6 @@ static int posix_lock_inode(struct inode *inode, struct file_lock *request,
 	if (new_fl2)
 		locks_free_lock(new_fl2);
 	locks_dispose_list(&dispose);
-	trace_posix_lock_inode(inode, request, error);
 
 	return error;
 }

kernel/events/core.c

@@ -1806,31 +1806,34 @@ static inline void perf_event__state_init(struct perf_event *event)
 					      PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE;
 }
 
-static void __perf_event_read_size(struct perf_event *event, int nr_siblings)
+static int __perf_event_read_size(u64 read_format, int nr_siblings)
 {
 	int entry = sizeof(u64); /* value */
 	int size = 0;
 	int nr = 1;
 
-	if (event->attr.read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_ENABLED)
+	if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_ENABLED)
 		size += sizeof(u64);
 
-	if (event->attr.read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_RUNNING)
+	if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_RUNNING)
 		size += sizeof(u64);
 
-	if (event->attr.read_format & PERF_FORMAT_ID)
+	if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_ID)
 		entry += sizeof(u64);
 
-	if (event->attr.read_format & PERF_FORMAT_LOST)
+	if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_LOST)
 		entry += sizeof(u64);
 
-	if (event->attr.read_format & PERF_FORMAT_GROUP) {
+	if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_GROUP) {
 		nr += nr_siblings;
 		size += sizeof(u64);
 	}
 
-	size += entry * nr;
-	event->read_size = size;
+	/*
+	 * Since perf_event_validate_size() limits this to 16k and inhibits
+	 * adding more siblings, this will never overflow.
+	 */
+	return size + nr * entry;
 }
 
 static void __perf_event_header_size(struct perf_event *event, u64 sample_type)
@@ -1880,8 +1883,9 @@ static void __perf_event_header_size(struct perf_event *event, u64 sample_type)
  */
 static void perf_event__header_size(struct perf_event *event)
 {
-	__perf_event_read_size(event,
-			       event->group_leader->nr_siblings);
+	event->read_size =
+		__perf_event_read_size(event->attr.read_format,
+				       event->group_leader->nr_siblings);
 	__perf_event_header_size(event, event->attr.sample_type);
 }
 
@@ -1912,23 +1916,44 @@ static void perf_event__id_header_size(struct perf_event *event)
 	event->id_header_size = size;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check that adding an event to the group does not result in anybody
+ * overflowing the 64k event limit imposed by the output buffer.
+ *
+ * Specifically, check that the read_size for the event does not exceed 16k,
+ * read_size being the one term that grows with groups size. Since read_size
+ * depends on per-event read_format, also (re)check the existing events.
+ *
+ * This leaves 48k for the constant size fields and things like callchains,
+ * branch stacks and register sets.
+ */
 static bool perf_event_validate_size(struct perf_event *event)
 {
-	/*
-	 * The values computed here will be over-written when we actually
-	 * attach the event.
-	 */
-	__perf_event_read_size(event, event->group_leader->nr_siblings + 1);
-	__perf_event_header_size(event, event->attr.sample_type & ~PERF_SAMPLE_READ);
-	perf_event__id_header_size(event);
+	struct perf_event *sibling, *group_leader = event->group_leader;
+
+	if (__perf_event_read_size(event->attr.read_format,
+				   group_leader->nr_siblings + 1) > 16*1024)
+		return false;
+
+	if (__perf_event_read_size(group_leader->attr.read_format,
+				   group_leader->nr_siblings + 1) > 16*1024)
+		return false;
 
 	/*
-	 * Sum the lot; should not exceed the 64k limit we have on records.
-	 * Conservative limit to allow for callchains and other variable fields.
+	 * When creating a new group leader, group_leader->ctx is initialized
+	 * after the size has been validated, but we cannot safely use
+	 * for_each_sibling_event() until group_leader->ctx is set. A new group
+	 * leader cannot have any siblings yet, so we can safely skip checking
+	 * the non-existent siblings.
 	 */
-	if (event->read_size + event->header_size +
-	    event->id_header_size + sizeof(struct perf_event_header) >= 16*1024)
-		return false;
+	if (event == group_leader)
+		return true;
+
+	for_each_sibling_event(sibling, group_leader) {
+		if (__perf_event_read_size(sibling->attr.read_format,
+					   group_leader->nr_siblings + 1) > 16*1024)
+			return false;
+	}
 
 	return true;
 }

net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c

@@ -1074,6 +1074,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 	struct ebt_table_info *newinfo;
 	struct ebt_replace tmp;
 
+	if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -1337,6 +1339,8 @@ static int update_counters(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 {
 	struct ebt_replace hlp;
 
+	if (len < sizeof(hlp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (copy_from_sockptr(&hlp, arg, sizeof(hlp)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -2267,6 +2271,8 @@ static int compat_update_counters(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg,
 {
 	struct compat_ebt_replace hlp;
 
+	if (len < sizeof(hlp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (copy_from_sockptr(&hlp, arg, sizeof(hlp)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 

net/core/net_namespace.c

@@ -68,12 +68,15 @@ DEFINE_COOKIE(net_cookie);
 
 static struct net_generic *net_alloc_generic(void)
 {
+	unsigned int gen_ptrs = READ_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs);
+	unsigned int generic_size;
 	struct net_generic *ng;
-	unsigned int generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[max_gen_ptrs]);
+
+	generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[gen_ptrs]);
 
 	ng = kzalloc(generic_size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (ng)
-		ng->s.len = max_gen_ptrs;
+		ng->s.len = gen_ptrs;
 
 	return ng;
 }
@@ -1210,7 +1213,11 @@ static int register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list,
 		if (error < 0)
 			return error;
 		*ops->id = error;
-		max_gen_ptrs = max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1);
+		/* This does not require READ_ONCE as writers already hold
+		 * pernet_ops_rwsem. But WRITE_ONCE is needed to protect
+		 * net_alloc_generic.
+		 */
+		WRITE_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs, max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1));
 	}
 	error = __register_pernet_operations(list, ops);
 	if (error) {

net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c

@@ -955,6 +955,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 	void *loc_cpu_entry;
 	struct arpt_entry *iter;
 
+	if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -963,6 +965,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
@@ -1253,6 +1257,8 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 	void *loc_cpu_entry;
 	struct arpt_entry *iter;
 
+	if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -1261,6 +1267,8 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 

net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c

@@ -1110,6 +1110,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 	void *loc_cpu_entry;
 	struct ipt_entry *iter;
 
+	if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -1118,6 +1120,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
@@ -1494,6 +1498,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 	void *loc_cpu_entry;
 	struct ipt_entry *iter;
 
+	if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -1502,6 +1508,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 

net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c

@@ -151,6 +151,12 @@ int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sktw, void *twp)
 	if (tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp &&
 	    (!twp || (reuse && time_after32(ktime_get_seconds(),
 					    tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp)))) {
+		/* inet_twsk_hashdance() sets sk_refcnt after putting twsk
+		 * and releasing the bucket lock.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&sktw->sk_refcnt)))
+			return 0;
+
 		/* In case of repair and re-using TIME-WAIT sockets we still
 		 * want to be sure that it is safe as above but honor the
 		 * sequence numbers and time stamps set as part of the repair
@@ -171,7 +177,7 @@ int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sktw, void *twp)
 			tp->rx_opt.ts_recent	   = tcptw->tw_ts_recent;
 			tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp;
 		}
-		sock_hold(sktw);
+
 		return 1;
 	}
 

net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c

@@ -1127,6 +1127,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 	void *loc_cpu_entry;
 	struct ip6t_entry *iter;
 
+	if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -1135,6 +1137,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
@@ -1503,6 +1507,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 	void *loc_cpu_entry;
 	struct ip6t_entry *iter;
 
+	if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -1511,6 +1517,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if ((u64)len < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 

net/ipv6/route.c

@@ -5355,26 +5355,20 @@ static int ip6_route_multipath_add(struct fib6_config *cfg,
 	err_nh = NULL;
 	list_for_each_entry(nh, &rt6_nh_list, next) {
 		err = __ip6_ins_rt(nh->fib6_info, info, extack);
-		fib6_info_release(nh->fib6_info);
-
-		if (!err) {
-			/* save reference to last route successfully inserted */
-			rt_last = nh->fib6_info;
-
-			/* save reference to first route for notification */
-			if (!rt_notif)
-				rt_notif = nh->fib6_info;
-		}
 
-		/* nh->fib6_info is used or freed at this point, reset to NULL*/
-		nh->fib6_info = NULL;
 		if (err) {
 			if (replace && nhn)
 				NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack,
 						   "multipath route replace failed (check consistency of installed routes)");
 			err_nh = nh;
 			goto add_errout;
 		}
+		/* save reference to last route successfully inserted */
+		rt_last = nh->fib6_info;
+
+		/* save reference to first route for notification */
+		if (!rt_notif)
+			rt_notif = nh->fib6_info;
 
 		/* Because each route is added like a single route we remove
 		 * these flags after the first nexthop: if there is a collision,
@@ -5435,8 +5429,7 @@ static int ip6_route_multipath_add(struct fib6_config *cfg,
 
 cleanup:
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(nh, nh_safe, &rt6_nh_list, next) {
-		if (nh->fib6_info)
-			fib6_info_release(nh->fib6_info);
+		fib6_info_release(nh->fib6_info);
 		list_del(&nh->next);
 		kfree(nh);
 	}