fix: SHA-pin all 3rd-party GitHub Actions (supply chain hardening)#19
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fix: SHA-pin all 3rd-party GitHub Actions (supply chain hardening)#19
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Summary
Pin all 3rd-party action references to immutable SHA digests.
Why
Mutable tags can be force-pushed by attackers to point at malicious commits (as happened with aquasecurity/trivy-action on 2026-03-19). SHA-pinned references are immutable and safe from this class of attack.
No functional changes -- all SHAs resolve to the same versions previously referenced by tag.