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This change broadens the policy from allowing a specific, read-only agent (
codebase_investigator) to allowing any tool namedSubagentInvocation. This means any current or future subagent invoked through this mechanism will be automatically allowed, regardless of its capabilities (e.g., file writing, shell execution). This poses a potential security risk by granting overly broad permissions.While the PR title indicates this is a temporary fix, a safer approach would be to make this rule more specific. If the logic that creates the
SubagentInvocationtool call can include the agent's name in the arguments (e.g., asagentName), you could use anargsPatternto restrict this permission. The rule would look something like this:This would ensure only the intended read-only agent is allowed, mitigating the risk of unintentionally permitting more powerful subagents.