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Signed-off-by: Jan Pokorný <JenomPokorny@gmail.com>
Summary of ChangesHello, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request addresses a bug related to OIDC provider configuration and validation within the Highlights
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Code Review
This pull request adjusts the OIDC authentication flow to better support insecure transport for development environments by relaxing validation for http scheme issuers and conditionally skipping jwks_uri and introspection_endpoint validation for non-HTTPS issuers. However, this change introduces a significant security vulnerability by increasing the risk of sensitive credential leakage (e.g., client_secret) over unencrypted channels and potentially allowing the acceptance of malicious OIDC metadata due to skipped validations. Additionally, there's an opportunity to improve maintainability by refactoring duplicated code in the discovery logic.
| if self.issuer.scheme != "http": | ||
| raise ValueError("Insecure transport is only allowed when the issuer URL uses http:// scheme!") |
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The application allows enabling insecure transport for OIDC authentication for any host. When insecure_transport is enabled and an HTTP issuer is used, sensitive credentials such as the client_secret will be transmitted over an unencrypted channel during token introspection and basic authentication. This exposes the credentials to interception by a man-in-the-middle attacker. The previous implementation restricted this to a specific host ('keycloak'), which likely limited the risk to internal traffic.
| if provider.issuer.scheme == "https": | ||
| metadata.validate_jwks_uri() | ||
| metadata.validate_introspection_endpoint() |
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The code skips validation of the JWKS URI and introspection endpoint when the OIDC issuer uses the 'http' scheme. This is done to support the insecure_transport configuration. However, by skipping these validations, the application may accept insecure or malformed metadata from an unencrypted source, which could be manipulated by an attacker to point to malicious endpoints.
| if provider.issuer.scheme == "https": | ||
| metadata.validate_jwks_uri() | ||
| metadata.validate_introspection_endpoint() |
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Summary
Linked Issues
Documentation
If this PR adds new feature or changes existing. Make sure documentation is adjusted accordingly. If the docs is not needed, please explain why.