20250227 - edits

Author: isaactpetersen

sports-cognitive-psychology.qmd

@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ When asked about how he makes the decision about whether to go for two after a t
 > It's an emotional one played by emotional and driven men.
 > That's an element of the game you can't measure.
 > Often times decisions such as that weigh heavily into the equation.
+> 
 > --- [Steelers Head Coach Mike Tomlin, 2015](https://steelersdepot.com/2015/09/tomlin-prefers-feel-over-analytics/) (archived at <https://perma.cc/7CHJ-BTWX>)
 
 That is, Mike Tomlin, suggested that he does not take into account analytics when making decisions.
@@ -89,10 +90,10 @@ Examples of changes in football due to the use of analytics include more often g
 
 It had been known for a long time that going for it on fourth down would frequently increase a team's chances of winning.
 Despite that, historically, teams rarely went for it on fourth down and elected to punt or kick a field goal instead.
-It is curious that there was such a discrepancy between.
-One potential explanation for the discrepancy was because of coaches' risk aversion.
+It is curious that there was such a discrepancy between the decisions that would maximize teams' winning percentage and the decisions coaches actually made.
+One potential explanation for the discrepancy is because of coaches' risk aversion.
+As noted in @sec-cognitiveBiasesRiskAversion, when it is possible to experience either a gain or a loss from a decision, [loss aversion bias](#sec-cognitiveBiasesLossAversion) tends to lead people to make risk-averse decisions [@Kahneman2011].
 According to this idea, in the case of failing to successfully convert on fourth down, coaches do not want to have to defend their decision to go for it to the media or the owner or general manager.
-That is, they may often play not to lose, rather than to win, in order to keep their job.
 
 ```{r}
 nfl_pbp4thDown <- nfl_pbp %>%