BPF Signing v3 #9453
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BPF Signing v3 #9453
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Signed-off-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
Exclusive maps restrict map access to specific programs using a hash. The current hash used for this is SHA1, which is prone to collisions. This patch uses SHA256, which is more resilient against collisions. This new hash is stored in bpf_prog and used by the verifier to determine if a program can access a given exclusive map. The original 64-bit tags are kept, as they are used by users as a short, possibly colliding program identifier for non-security purposes. Signed-off-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
Exclusive maps allow maps to only be accessed by program with a program with a matching hash which is specified in the excl_prog_hash attr. For the signing use-case, this allows the trusted loader program to load the map and verify the integrity Signed-off-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
Use AF_ALG sockets to not have libbpf depend on OpenSSL. The helper is used for the loader generation code to embed the metadata hash in the loader program and also by the bpf_map__make_exclusive API to calculate the hash of the program the map is exclusive to. Signed-off-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
Implement setters and getters that allow map to be registers as exclusive to the specified program. The registration should be done before the exclusive program is loaded.
Check if access is denied to another program for an exclusive map Signed-off-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
Currently only array maps are supported, but the implementation can be extended for other maps and objects. The hash is memoized only for exclusive and frozen maps as their content is stable until the exclusive program modifies the map. This is required for BPF signing, enabling a trusted loader program to verify a map's integrity. The loader retrieves the map's runtime hash from the kernel and compares it against an expected hash computed at build time. Signed-off-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
No functional changes, except for the addition of the headers for the kfuncs so that they can be used for signature verification.
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This patch extends the BPF_PROG_LOAD command by adding three new fields
to `union bpf_attr` in the user-space API:
- signature: A pointer to the signature blob.
- signature_size: The size of the signature blob.
- keyring_id: The serial number of a loaded kernel keyring (e.g.,
the user or session keyring) containing the trusted public keys.
When a BPF program is loaded with a signature, the kernel:
1. Retrieves the trusted keyring using the provided `keyring_id`.
2. Verifies the supplied signature against the BPF program's
instruction buffer.
3. If the signature is valid and was generated by a key in the trusted
keyring, the program load proceeds.
4. If no signature is provided, the load proceeds as before, allowing
for backward compatibility. LSMs can chose to restrict unsigned
programs and implement a security policy.
5. If signature verification fails for any reason,
the program is not loaded.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
* The metadata map is created with as an exclusive map (with an excl_prog_hash) This restricts map access exclusively to the signed loader program, preventing tampering by other processes. * The map is then frozen, making it read-only from userspace. * BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_ID instructs the kernel to compute the hash of the metadata map (H') and store it in bpf_map->sha. * The loader is then loaded with the signature which is then verified by the kernel. The sekeleton currently uses the session keyring (KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING) by default but this can be overridden by the user of the skeleton. loading signed programs prebuilt into the kernel are not currently supported. These can supported by enabling BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_ID to be called from the kernel. Signed-off-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
To fulfill the BPF signing contract, represented as Sig(I_loader ||
H_meta), the generated trusted loader program must verify the integrity
of the metadata. This signature cryptographically binds the loader's
instructions (I_loader) to a hash of the metadata (H_meta).
The verification process is embedded directly into the loader program.
Upon execution, the loader loads the runtime hash from struct bpf_map
i.e. BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX and compares this runtime hash against an
expected hash value that has been hardcoded directly by
bpf_obj__gen_loader.
The load from bpf_map can be improved by calling
BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD from the kernel context after BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD
has been updated for being called from the kernel context.
The following instructions are generated:
ld_imm64 r1, const_ptr_to_map // insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);
ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part1 // constant precomputed by
bpftool (part of H_meta)
if r2 != r3 goto out;
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 8);
ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part2 // (part of H_meta)
if r2 != r3 goto out;
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 16);
ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part3 // (part of H_meta)
if r2 != r3 goto out;
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 24);
ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part4 // (part of H_meta)
if r2 != r3 goto out;
...
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
Two modes of operation being added:
Add two modes of operation:
* For prog load, allow signing a program immediately before loading. This
is essential for command-line testing and administration.
bpftool prog load -S -k <private_key> -i <identity_cert> fentry_test.bpf.o
* For gen skeleton, embed a pre-generated signature into the C skeleton
file. This supports the use of signed programs in compiled applications.
bpftool gen skeleton -S -k <private_key> -i <identity_cert> fentry_test.bpf.o
Generation of the loader program and its metadata map is implemented in
libbpf (bpf_obj__gen_loader). bpftool generates a skeleton that loads
the program and automates the required steps: freezing the map, creating
an exclusive map, loading, and running. Users can use standard libbpf
APIs directly or integrate loader program generation into their own
toolchains.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
The test harness uses the verify_sig_setup.sh to generate the required key material for program signing. Generate key material for signing LSKEL some lskel programs and use xxd to convert the verification certificate into a C header file. Finally, update the main test runner to load this certificate into the session keyring via the add_key() syscall before executing any tests. Signed-off-by: KP Singh <[email protected]>
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v3 of the BPF signing patches