chore(deps): update dependency @astrojs/node to v9.5.4 [security]#1311
chore(deps): update dependency @astrojs/node to v9.5.4 [security]#1311renovate[bot] wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
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Renovate PR Review Results⚖️ Safety Assessment: ✅ Safe🔍 Release Content AnalysisThis security update addresses three critical vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-25545, CVE-2026-27829, CVE-2026-27729) in the Version Updates:
Security Fixes:
No Breaking Changes:
🎯 Impact Scope InvestigationCodebase Configuration:
Vulnerability Exposure Assessment: ✅ CVE-2026-25545 (SSRF): NOT VULNERABLE
✅ CVE-2026-27829 (Image SSRF): NOT VULNERABLE
✅ CVE-2026-27729 (DoS): NOT VULNERABLE
Dependency Analysis:
Files Reviewed:
💡 Recommended ActionsImmediate Action: Rationale:
Optional Follow-up:
Testing Recommendation:
🔗 Reference Links
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This PR contains the following updates:
9.5.2→9.5.4GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2026-25545
Summary
Server-Side Rendered pages that return an error with a prerendered custom error page (eg.
404.astroor500.astro) are vulnerable to SSRF. If theHost:header is changed to an attacker's server, it will be fetched on/500.htmland they can redirect this to any internal URL to read the response body through the first request.Details
The following line of code fetches
statusURLand returns the response back to the client:https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/bf0b4bfc7439ddc565f61a62037880e4e701eb05/packages/astro/src/core/app/base.ts#L534
statusURLcomes fromthis.baseWithoutTrailingSlash, which is built from theHost:header.prerenderedErrorPageFetch()is justfetch(), and follows redirects. This makes it possible for an attacker to set theHost:header to their server (eg.Host: attacker.tld), and if the server still receives the request without normalization, Astro will now fetchhttp://attacker.tld/500.html.The attacker can then redirect this request to http://localhost:8000/ssrf.txt, for example, to fetch any locally listening service. The response code is not checked, because as the comment in the code explains, this fetch may give a 200 OK. The body and headers are returned back to the attacker.
Looking at the vulnerable code, the way to reach this is if the
renderError()function is called (error response during SSR) and the error page is prerendered (custom500.astroerror page). The PoC below shows how a basic project with these requirements can be set up.Note: Another common vulnerable pattern for
404.astrowe saw is:Also, it does not matter what
allowedDomainsis set to, since it only checks theX-Forwarded-Host:header.https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/9e16d63cdd2537c406e50d005b389ac115755e8e/packages/astro/src/core/app/base.ts#L146
PoC
poc/src/pages/error.astrowhich throws an error with SSR:poc/src/pages/500.astrowith any content like:ssrf.txtand host it locally on http://localhost:8000:$ curl -i http://localhost:4321/error -H 'Host: localhost:5000' HTTP/1.1 500 OK content-type: text/plain date: Tue, 03 Feb 2026 09:51:28 GMT last-modified: Tue, 03 Feb 2026 09:51:09 GMT server: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.3 Connection: keep-alive Keep-Alive: timeout=5 Transfer-Encoding: chunked SECRET CONTENTImpact
An attacker who can access the application without
Host:header validation (eg. through finding the origin IP behind a proxy, or just by default) can fetch their own server to redirect to any internal IP. With this they can fetch cloud metadata IPs and interact with services in the internal network or localhost.For this to be vulnerable, a common feature needs to be used, with direct access to the server (no proxies).
CVE-2026-27829
Summary
A bug in Astro's image pipeline allows bypassing
image.domains/image.remotePatternsrestrictions, enabling the server to fetch content from unauthorized remote hosts.Details
Astro provides an
inferSizeoption that fetches remote images at render time to determine their dimensions. Remote image fetches are intended to be restricted to domains the site developer has manually authorized (using theimage.domainsorimage.remotePatternsoptions).However, when
inferSizeis used, no domain validation is performed — the image is fetched from any host regardless of the configured restrictions. An attacker who can influence the image URL (e.g., via CMS content or user-supplied data) can cause the server to fetch from arbitrary hosts.PoC
Details
Setup
Create a new Astro project with the following files:
package.json:{ "name": "poc-ssrf-infersize", "private": true, "scripts": { "dev": "astro dev --port 4322", "build": "astro build" }, "dependencies": { "astro": "5.17.2", "@​astrojs/node": "9.5.3" } }astro.config.mjs— onlylocalhost:9000is authorized:internal-service.mjs— simulates an internal service on a non-allowlisted host (127.0.0.1:8888):src/pages/test.astro:Steps to reproduce
npm installand start the internal service:internal-service.mjslogsReceived: GET /internal-api— the request was sent to127.0.0.1:8888despite onlylocalhost:9000being in the allowlist.Impact
Allows bypassing
image.domains/image.remotePatternsrestrictions to make server-side requests to unauthorized hosts. This includes the risk of server-side request forgery (SSRF) against internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints.CVE-2026-27729
Summary
Astro server actions have no default request body size limit, which can lead to memory exhaustion DoS. A single large POST to a valid action endpoint can crash the server process on memory-constrained deployments.
Details
On-demand rendered sites built with Astro can define server actions, which automatically parse incoming request bodies (JSON or FormData). The body is buffered entirely into memory with no size limit — a single oversized request is sufficient to exhaust the process heap and crash the server.
Astro's Node adapter (
mode: 'standalone') creates an HTTP server with no body size protection. In containerized environments, the crashed process is automatically restarted, and repeated requests cause a persistent crash-restart loop.Action names are discoverable from HTML form attributes on any public page, so no authentication is required.
PoC
Details
Setup
Create a new Astro project with the following files:
package.json:{ "name": "poc-dos", "private": true, "scripts": { "build": "astro build", "start:128mb": "node --max-old-space-size=128 dist/server/entry.mjs" }, "dependencies": { "astro": "5.17.2", "@​astrojs/node": "9.5.3" } }astro.config.mjs:src/actions/index.ts:src/pages/index.astro:crash-test.mjs:Reproduction
The server process crashes with
FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory. The payload is buffered entirely into memory before any validation, exceeding the 128 MB heap limit.Impact
Allows unauthenticated denial of service against SSR standalone deployments using server actions. A single oversized request crashes the server process, and repeated requests cause a persistent crash-restart loop in containerized environments.
Release Notes
withastro/astro (@astrojs/node)
v9.5.4Compare Source
Patch Changes
#15564
522f880Thanks @matthewp! - Add a default body size limit for server actions to prevent oversized requests from exhausting memory.#15572
ef851bfThanks @matthewp! - Upgrade astro package supportastro@5.17.3 includes a fix to prevent Action payloads from exhausting memory. @astrojs/node now depends on this version of Astro as a minimum requirement.
v9.5.3Compare Source
Patch Changes
c13b536Thanks @matthewp! - Improves error page loading to read from disk first before falling back to configured hostConfiguration
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