Bugfix/withdrawal queue guard#1654
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Dev-In-Crypt wants to merge 2 commits intolidofinance:masterfrom
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Context
This touches the withdrawal request flow. The requested stETH amount and share amount are later handled in a context that expects values to fit into uint128, so we should fail early with a clear error instead of allowing an implicit truncation or a confusing downstream revert.
Problem
_requestWithdrawal and _requestWithdrawalWstETH accept user supplied amounts that can exceed type(uint128).max. If oversized values pass through, they can cause incorrect casting behavior or unexpected reverts later in the flow.
Solution
Add a dedicated error AmountTooLarge(uint256 _amount) and introduce explicit bounds checks in _requestWithdrawal and _requestWithdrawalWstETH. If amountOfStETH or amountOfShares is greater than type(uint128).max, the call reverts with AmountTooLarge, preventing unsafe or ambiguous behavior.