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MSC3083: Restricting room membership based on membership in other rooms #3083
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d5633d1
Add pointer to draft.
clokep dfcc467
Include the proposed MSC.
clokep c81947a
Document the error response.
clokep 4fc5acf
Update a placeholder.
clokep 13e3f18
Rework bits about peeking.
clokep 36b19fb
Clarify link.
clokep 2919e57
Update dependencies to include MSC3173.
clokep fab5eaa
Add notes from @madlittlemods.
clokep 5afe23a
More wrapping.
clokep 590b7a4
Fill in the TODO about what how to mark access via spaces for the sum…
clokep cbc4515
Spacing.
clokep 4eeb27f
Add more notes about edge-cases.
clokep 0f49611
Remove spaces summary changes.
clokep c7ab867
Fix broken backlink.
clokep c1eb461
Remove bit about user IDs being listed directly.
clokep 41dd06d
Clarify an edge case.
clokep e81686c
Many clarifications.
clokep 8a3ad47
A bit less passive.
clokep 1d1d356
Space -> room.
clokep 7061e19
Add a type field.
clokep 5a58af6
Namespace the allow type.
clokep f3e7fba
Re-iterate that ban and server-acls matter.
clokep ed679c7
Clarify membership checking over federation.
clokep bfa0dfe
Clarify auth rules for restrictedjoin rules.
clokep 39b9a9d
Clarify security concerns.
clokep 91c7612
Handle feedback from Travis.
clokep 39fdfa3
Add a list of trusted servers.
clokep 3bab6bd
Remove via field.
clokep 8e0b001
Add a note about ensuring each allowed room has at least one server i…
clokep 0b49932
Clarifications.
clokep b4296ef
Remove the authorised servers list.
clokep e5305a7
Clarifications / simplifications.
clokep 6d041d4
Fix typos.
clokep 69aec55
Clarify soft-failure is extension of current algorithm.
clokep 42a34de
Clarify that signature checks only apply to joining users.
clokep 808bb1b
Pull note about ban & ACLs out of each join rule description.
clokep 87f9938
Use a different room version to specify changes in join rules.
clokep 182c806
Clarify what happens if a homeserver cannot verify membership.
clokep 1be4019
Clarify implications of signing events.
clokep 76333ee
Add notes about the via key and authorised servers being out of sync.
clokep 5f2240a
Fix typo.
clokep 3037232
Fix typo.
clokep 2c65a03
Fix typo.
clokep b9204cc
Remove extraneous paragraph.
clokep d95200f
Add domains to the example room aliases.
clokep dc945a4
Reword intro.
clokep 2012466
Clarify users must be joined to an allowed room.
clokep db40a1c
Reflow.
clokep 81a588e
Add note about including the authorising server in the content.
clokep b41a1a3
Update the information on signature checking.
clokep 290f903
Updates from review.
clokep ffb9095
Add a note about resident servers.
clokep 7caff82
Add information about errors over federation.
clokep 55b99d2
Clarify if a resident server cannot issue a join vs. if they're unsur…
clokep 48c1d9d
Apply suggestions from code review
clokep 88a9404
Review feedback.
clokep c0b7f07
Move back section about errors for make/send_join & some review comme…
clokep 77422e2
Move changes to make/send_join out of auth rules section.
clokep 3885a94
Include an additional error situation.
clokep d9cae9b
More review comments.
clokep d128869
Fix typos.
clokep 2e7db4a
Clarify error conditions.
clokep 72ffbfe
Rename MSC.
clokep 31a9b2a
Clarifications.
clokep db089aa
De-indent section.
clokep 9699aa8
Note unstable prefix.
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| # Restricting room membership based on space membership | ||
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| A desirable feature is to give room admins the power to restrict membership of | ||
| their room based on the membership of one or more spaces from | ||
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| [MSC1772: spaces](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/1772), | ||
| for example: | ||
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| > members of the #doglovers space can join this room without an invitation<sup id="a1">[1](#f1)</sup> | ||
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| ## Proposal | ||
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| A new `join_rule` (`restricted`) will be used to reflect a cross between `invite` | ||
| and `public` join rules. The content of the join rules would include the rooms | ||
| to trust for membership. For example: | ||
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| ```json | ||
| { | ||
| "type": "m.room.join_rules", | ||
| "state_key": "", | ||
| "content": { | ||
| "join_rule": "restricted", | ||
| "allow": [ | ||
| { | ||
| "space": "!mods:example.org", | ||
| "via": ["example.org"] | ||
| }, | ||
| { | ||
| "space": "!users:example.org", | ||
| "via": ["example.org"] | ||
| } | ||
| ] | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| ``` | ||
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| This means that a user must be a member of the `!mods:example.org` space or | ||
| `!users:example.org` space in order to join without an invite<sup id="a2">[2](#f2)</sup>. | ||
| Membership in a single space is enough. | ||
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| If the `allow` key is an empty list (or not a list at all), then no users are | ||
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| allowed to join without an invite. Each entry is expected to be an object with the | ||
| following keys, or a string representing the MXID of the user exempted: | ||
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| * `space`: The room ID of the space to check the membership of. | ||
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| * `via`: A list of servers which may be used to peek for membership of the space. | ||
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| Any entries in the list which do not match the expected format are ignored. | ||
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| When a homeserver receives a `/join` request from a client or a `/make_join` / `/send_join` | ||
| request from a server, the request should only be permitted if the user has a valid | ||
| invite or is in one of the listed spaces. Note that the server may not know if the user | ||
| is in a particular space, this is left to a future MSC to solve. | ||
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| If the user is not part of the proper space, the homeserver should return an error | ||
| response with HTTP status code of 403 and an `errcode` of `M_FORBIDDEN`. | ||
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| Unlike the `invite` join rule, confirmation that the `allow` rules were properly | ||
| checked cannot be enforced over federation by event authorization, so servers in | ||
| the room are trusted not to allow invalid users to join.<sup id="a3">[3](#f3)</sup> | ||
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| However, user IDs listed as strings can be properly checked over federation. | ||
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| ### Discovery of restricted rooms | ||
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| The discovery of rooms in a space, as discussed in | ||
| [MSC2946](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2946): spaces summary, | ||
| must be updated to allow for discovery of restricted rooms. | ||
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| MSC2946 defines that a room should be included in the spaces summary if it is | ||
| accessible (world-readable or if the user is already in the room). [MSC3173](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3173) | ||
| declares that if a user can view the stripped state of a room if they are *able* | ||
| to join the room. Combining these two MSCs, the spaces summary should include | ||
| rooms with restricted join rule which a user is able to join (i.e. they're a | ||
| member of one of the spaces declared in the join rule). | ||
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| The server-server API discussed in [MSC2946](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2946) | ||
| does not know the user who is requesting a summary of the space, but should divulge | ||
| the above information if any member of a server could see it. It is up to the | ||
| calling server to properly filter this information. | ||
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| Trust is placed in the calling server: if there are any users on the calling | ||
| server in the correct space, that calling server has a right to know about the | ||
| rooms in that space and should return the relevant summaries, along with enough | ||
| information that the calling server can then do some filtering, thus an | ||
| additional field is added to the server-server response of the spaces summary: | ||
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| *TODO* | ||
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| Consider that Alice and Bob share a server; Alice is a member of a space, but Bob | ||
| is not. The remote server will not know whether the request is on behalf of Alice | ||
| or Bob (and hence whether it should share details of restricted rooms within that | ||
| space). | ||
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| Consider the above with a restricted room on a different server which defers | ||
| access to the above space. When summarizing the space, the homeserver must make | ||
| a request over federation for information on the room. The response would include | ||
| the room (since Alice is able to join it), but the calling server does not know | ||
| *why* they received the room, without additional information the server cannot | ||
| properly filter the returned results. | ||
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| (The alternative, where the calling server sends the requesting `user_id`, and | ||
| the target server does the filtering, is unattractive because it rules out a | ||
| future world where the calling server can cache the result.) | ||
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| This does not decrease security since a server could lie and make a request on | ||
| behalf of a user in the proper space to see the given information. I.e. the | ||
| calling server must be trusted anyway. | ||
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| ## Summary of the behaviour of join rules | ||
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| See the [join rules](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1#m-room-join-rules) | ||
| specification for full details, but the summary below should highlight the differences | ||
| between `public`, `invite`, and `restricted`. | ||
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| * `public`: anyone can join, subject to `ban` and `server_acls`, as today. | ||
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| * `invite`: only people with membership `invite` can join, as today. | ||
| * `knock`: the same as `invite`, except anyone can knock, subject to `ban` and | ||
| `server_acls`. See [MSC2403](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2403). | ||
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| * `private`: This is reserved and not implemented. | ||
| * `restricted`: the same as `public` from the perspective of the auth rules, but | ||
| with the additional caveat that servers are expected to check the `allow` rules | ||
| before generating a `join` event (whether for a local or a remote user). | ||
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| ## Security considerations | ||
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| The `allow` feature for `join_rules` places increased trust in the servers in the | ||
| room. We consider this acceptable: if you don't want evil servers randomly | ||
| joining spurious users into your rooms, then: | ||
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| 1. Don't let evil servers in your room in the first place | ||
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| 2. Don't use `allow` lists, given the expansion increases the attack surface anyway | ||
| by letting members in other rooms dictate who's allowed into your room. | ||
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| ## Unstable prefix | ||
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| The `restricted` join rule will be included in a future room version to ensure | ||
| that servers and clients opt-into the new functionality. | ||
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| During development it is expected that an unstable room version of | ||
| `org.matrix.msc3083` is used. Since the room version namespaces the behaviour, | ||
| the `allow` key and the `restricted` value do not need unstable prefixes. | ||
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| ## History / Rationale | ||
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| Note that this replaces the second half of an older version of | ||
| [MSC2962](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2962). | ||
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| It may seem that just having the `allow` key with `public` join rules is enough, | ||
| as suggested in [MSC2962](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2962), | ||
| but there are concerns that having a `public` join rule that is restricted may | ||
| cause issues if an implementation does not understand the semantics of the `allow` | ||
| keyword. Using an `allow` key with `invite` join rules also does not make sense as | ||
| from the perspective of the auth rules, this is akin to `public` (since the checking | ||
| of whether a member is in the space is done during the call to `/join` | ||
| or `/make_join` / `/send_join`). | ||
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| The above concerns about an implementation not understanding the semantics of `allow` | ||
| could be solved by introducing a new room version, but if this is done it seems clearer | ||
| to just introduce a a new join rule - `restricted` - as described above. | ||
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| ## Future extensions | ||
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| Potential future extensions which should not be designed out | ||
| include, but are not included in this MSC. | ||
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| ### Checking space membership over federation | ||
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| If a server is not in a space (and thus doesn't know the membership of a space) it | ||
| cannot enforce membership of a space during a join. Peeking over federation, | ||
| as described in [MSC2444](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2444), | ||
| could be used to establish if the user is in any of the proper spaces. | ||
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| Note that there are additional security considerations with this, namely that | ||
| the peek server has significant power. For example, a poorly chosen peek | ||
| server could lie about the space membership and add an `@evil_user:example.org` | ||
| to a space to gain membership to a room. | ||
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| ### Kicking users out when they leave the allowed space | ||
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| In the above example, suppose `@bob:server.example` leaves `!users:example.org`: | ||
| should they be removed from the room? Likely not, by analogy with what happens | ||
| when you switch the join rules from public to invite. Join rules currently govern | ||
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| joins, not existing room membership. | ||
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| It is left to a future MSC to consider this, but some potential thoughts are | ||
| given below. | ||
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| If you assume that a user *should* be removed in this case, one option is to | ||
| leave the departure up to Bob's server `server.example`, but this places a | ||
| relatively high level of trust in that server. Additionally, if `server.example` | ||
| were offline, other users in the room would still see Bob in the room (and their | ||
| servers would attempt to send message traffic to it). | ||
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| Another consideration is that users may have joined via a direct invite, not via | ||
| access through a space. | ||
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| Fixing this is thorny. Some sort of annotation on the membership events might | ||
| help. but it's unclear what the desired semantics are: | ||
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| * Assuming that users in a given space are *not* kicked when that space is | ||
| removed from `allow`, are those users then given a pass to remain | ||
| in the room indefinitely? What happens if the space is added back to | ||
| `allow` and *then* the user leaves it? | ||
| * Suppose a user joins a room via a space (SpaceA). Later, SpaceB is added to | ||
| the `allow` list and SpaceA is removed. What should happen when the | ||
| user leaves SpaceB? Are they exempt from the kick? | ||
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| It is possible that completely different state should be kept, or a different | ||
| `m.room.member` state could be used in a more reasonable way to track this. | ||
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| ### Inheriting join rules | ||
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| If you make a parent space invite-only, should that (optionally?) cascade into | ||
| child rooms? Seems to have some of the same problems as inheriting power levels, | ||
| as discussed in [MSC2962](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2962). | ||
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| ## Footnotes | ||
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| <a id="f1"/>[1]: The converse restriction, "anybody can join, provided they are not members | ||
| of the '#catlovers' space" is less useful since: | ||
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| 1. Users in the banned space could simply leave it at any time | ||
| 2. This functionality is already somewhat provided by [Moderation policy lists](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1#moderation-policy-lists). [↩](#a1) | ||
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| <a id="f2"/>[2]: Note that there is nothing stopping users sending and | ||
| receiving invites in `public` rooms today, and they work as you might expect. | ||
| The only difference is that you are not *required* to hold an invite when | ||
| joining the room. [↩](#a2) | ||
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| <a id="f3"/>[3]: This is a marginal decrease in security from the current | ||
| situation. Currently, a misbehaving server can allow unauthorized users to join | ||
| any room by first issuing an invite to that user. In theory that can be | ||
| prevented by raising the PL required to send an invite, but in practice that is | ||
| rarely done. [↩](#a2) | ||
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