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doc: remove CORB section #40123
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doc: remove CORB section #40123
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Flaws (3)Note! 1 document with no flaws that don't need to be listed. 🎉 URL:
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URL: (comment last updated: 2025-07-09 07:17:36) |
CORB is a retired concept that is now non-standard: whatwg/fetch#1441 I'm not sure if we need to mention it |
There's a bit of chat about CORB here: #3526, I'm +1 on removing it. |
I had a small suggestion not to link the second occurrence, but I agree it's better to remove the references instead. |
@Josh-Cena @wbamberg @bsmth I've removed the section about CORB, you can edit this PR directly. FYI, Chrome is planning to remove to whole md file of this page: https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/corb-for-developers/ The discussion can be found here, but it's still ongoing https://issues.chromium.org/issues/428412051 I'm +1 on removing the reference of CORB |
Co-authored-by: Brian Smith <[email protected]>
@@ -50,8 +49,6 @@ The concept was originally proposed in 2012 (as `From-Origin`), but [resurrected | |||
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In early 2018, two side-channel hardware vulnerabilities known as _Meltdown_ and _Spectre_ were disclosed. These vulnerabilities allowed sensitive data disclosure due to a race condition which arose as part of speculative execution functionality, designed to improve performance. | |||
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In response, Chromium shipped [Cross-Origin Read Blocking](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#corb), which automatically protects certain resources (of `Content-Type` HTML, JSON and XML) against cross-origin reads. If the application does not serve a [`no-sniff` directive](/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options), Chromium will attempt to guess the `Content-Type` and apply the protection anyway. |
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I'd suggest changing the History section to be something like:
The concept was originally proposed in 2012 (as a `From-Origin` header), but [resurrected](https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/issues/687) in Q2 of 2018 and implemented in Safari and Chromium.
In early 2018, two side-channel hardware vulnerabilities known as _Meltdown_ and _Spectre_ were disclosed.
These vulnerabilities allowed sensitive data disclosure due to a race condition which arose as part of speculative execution functionality, designed to improve performance.
Cross-Origin Resource Policy was developed as a direct way for sites to block unwanted `no-cors` cross-origin requests.
This is an effective defense against Spectre-like attacks, as the browser strips the body from given responses before an attacker can access them.
References:
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Update at b54c980
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Thanks a lot. I think this is good now. Does anyone else want a quick look? @wbamberg?
OK I'm going to merge this as-is now! Thanks a lot, @samuel871211 |
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