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6 changes: 3 additions & 3 deletions draft-zaeschke-scion-quic-multipath.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ An attacker could use endpoints with identical 4-tuple to reroute traffic
to a different machine without triggering path validation, see
{{attack-path-injection}} and {{token}}.

The implication of a skipped path validation is that a sever can be coaxed into
The implication of a skipped path validation is that a server can be coaxed into
sending QUIC packets to an unexpecting client. This is similar to the attacks
described in {{Section 8 of QUIC-TRANSPORT}} and
{{Section 21.5.4 of QUIC-TRANSPORT}}.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ relevant to security or performance.

## Recommendations for SCION Implementations

- SCION implementations can prevent attackers from expoloiting a skipped
- SCION implementations can prevent attackers from exploiting a skipped
path validation by preventing path injection ({{attack-path-injection}}).
To prevent path injection:

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ IP+port, so the attacker must guess the victims port when launching the attack.
- SCION libraries could us port/IP mangling when they detect multiple paths with
the same IP/port. However, this may have unintended consequences in the
application layer.
- Higher level libraries, such as QUIC(-MP) should be carefuol to not
- Higher level libraries, such as QUIC(-MP) should be careful to not
rely only on IP addresses to trigger path validation or resetting
congestion control or RTT estimation algorithms. Instead, QUIC-MP should
rely on the QUIC Path ID.
Expand Down