Snyk Dockerfile Scan + slack v5f

[Wolfgang-Romanowski]

Description

Adds revamp to automated Snyk security scanning for training runtime Dockerfiles.
Scans differentiate between inherited base image vulnerabilities and new vulnerabilities introduced by Dockerfile changes.

• Fails builds on critical/high severity vulnerabilities introduced by Dockerfile
• Allows builds to proceed with only inherited base image vulnerabilities

Trigger Conditions:

• Push to main branch (when training Dockerfiles change)
• Pull requests with changes to training Dockerfiles
• Nightly scheduled runs at 03:00 UTC
• Manual workflow dispatch with debug options
• Fork PRs after applying run-snyk label
• Tested on fork

will require:
SNYK_TOKEN secret
SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL secret

Tested
Tested on fork thoroughly

[openshift-ci]

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[sutaakar]

When should this third condition be applied?
First condition applies for anything else apart from PRs from forks (I suppose), second covers pull_request_target with proper label.

[Wolfgang-Romanowski]

1: should be applied for all events except for pull request target, this includes events from forks which are safe since they run in the forks context.

2: applies for events with manual labeling

3: events from within the same repository

fork PRs run safely under condition 1 via regular pull request events, not pull request target.

sorry for not making that clearer

[sutaakar]

Thanks, makes me think, why do you have there both pull_request and pull_request_target?

[Wolfgang-Romanowski]

No worries at all!
So the reason why is because pull_request automatically scans trusted PRs within the same reo and pull_request_target ends up allowing scanning fork PRs after manual approval via label.

Without the dual approach we'd either never scan fork PRs or always give fork PRs access to secrets

[sutaakar]

Ran the code in my fork, it seems that there are missing ${PYTHON_VERSION}:${IMAGE_TAG} placeholder values in Individual Dockerfile Analysis.
See https://github.com/sutaakar/distributed-workloads/actions/runs/15442769297

Edit: I suppose it is taken from the Dockerfile itself, where we have placeholder, right?
In that case I guess there is not much to do apart from simulating container engine itself (overkill).
Although in the GitHub logs I see Scanning base image: registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/python-311:9.5-1741671866

[Wolfgang-Romanowski]

Ran the code in my fork, it seems that there are missing ${PYTHON_VERSION}:${IMAGE_TAG} placeholder values in Individual Dockerfile Analysis. See https://github.com/sutaakar/distributed-workloads/actions/runs/15442769297

Edit: I suppose it is taken from the Dockerfile itself, where we have placeholder, right? In that case I guess there is not much to do apart from simulating container engine itself (overkill). Although in the GitHub logs I see Scanning base image: registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/python-311:9.5-1741671866

i can try updating the extraction logic to use build time values or read from a config files where values are defined

but from what i gather the scan itself is fine and its just a confusing display