chore(deps): update dependency astro to v5.15.9 [security] #527

renovate · 2025-11-19T23:46:54Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
astro (source)	`5.14.4` -> `5.15.9`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2025-64745

Summary

A Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Astro's development server error pages when the trailingSlash configuration option is used. An attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript code that executes in the victim's browser context by crafting a malicious URL. While this vulnerability only affects the development server and not production builds, it could be exploited to compromise developer environments through social engineering or malicious links.

Details

Vulnerability Location

https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/5bc37fd5cade62f753aef66efdf40f982379029a/packages/astro/src/template/4xx.ts#L133-L149

Root Cause

The vulnerability was introduced in commit 536175528 (PR #12994) , as part of a feature to "redirect trailing slashes on on-demand rendered pages." The feature added a helpful 404 error page in development mode to alert developers of trailing slash mismatches.

Issue: The corrected variable, which is derived from the user-controlled pathname parameter, is directly interpolated into the HTML without proper escaping. While the pathname variable itself is escaped elsewhere in the same file (line 114: escape(pathname)), the corrected variable is not sanitized before being inserted into both the href attribute and the link text.

Attack Vector

When a developer has configured trailingSlash to 'always' or 'never' and visits a URL with a mismatched trailing slash, the development server returns a 404 page containing the vulnerable template. An attacker can craft a URL with JavaScript payloads that will be executed when the page is rendered.

PoC

Local Testing (localhost)

Basic vulnerability verification in local development environment

Show details

astro.config.mjs:

import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';

export default defineConfig({
  trailingSlash: 'never', // or 'always'
  server: {
    port: 3000,
    host: true
  }
});

package.json:

{
  "name": "astro-xss-poc-victim",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "scripts": {
    "dev": "astro dev"
  },
  "dependencies": {
    "astro": "5.15.5"
  }
}

Start the development server:

npm install
npm run dev

Access the following malicious URL depending on your configuration:

For trailingSlash: 'never' (requires trailing slash):

http://localhost:3000/"></code><script>alert(document.domain)</script><!--/

For trailingSlash: 'always' (no trailing slash):

http://localhost:3000/"></code><script>alert(document.domain)</script><!--

When accessing the malicious URL:

The development server returns a 404 page due to trailing slash mismatch
The JavaScript payload (alert(document.domain)) executes in the browser
An alert dialog appears, demonstrating arbitrary code execution

Remote Testing (ngrok)

Reproduce realistic attack scenario via external malicious link

Show details

Prerequisites: ngrok account and authtoken configured (ngrok config add-authtoken <key>)

Setup and Execution:

#!/bin/bash
set -e

mkdir -p logs

npm i
npm run dev > ./logs/victim.log 2>&1 &

ngrok http 3000 > ./logs/ngrok.log 2>&1 &

sleep 3

NGROK_URL=$(curl -s http://localhost:4040/api/tunnels | grep -o '"public_url":"https://[^"]*' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4)
echo ""
echo "=== Attack URLs ==="
echo ""
echo "For trailingSlash: 'never' (requires trailing slash):"
echo "${NGROK_URL}/\"></code><script>alert(document.domain)</script><!--/"
echo ""
echo "For trailingSlash: 'always' (no trailing slash):"
echo "${NGROK_URL}/\"></code><script>alert(document.domain)</script><!--"
echo ""
wait

When a remote user accesses either of the generated attack URLs:

The request is tunneled through ngrok to the local development server
The development server returns a 404 page due to trailing slash mismatch
The JavaScript payload (alert(document.domain)) executes in the user's browser

Both URL patterns work depending on your trailingSlash configuration ('never' or 'always').

Impact

This only affects the development server. Risk depends on how and where the dev server is exposed.

Security impact

Developer environment compromise: Visiting a crafted URL can run arbitrary JS in the developer's browser.
Session hijacking: Active developer sessions can be stolen if services are open in the browser.
Local resource access: JS may probe localhost endpoints or dev tools depending on browser policies.
Supply-chain risk: Malicious packages or CI that start dev servers can widen exposure.

Attack scenarios

Social engineering: Malicious link sent to a developer triggers the XSS when opened.
Malicious documentation: Attack URLs embedded in issues, PRs, chat, or docs.
Dependency/CI abuse: Packages or automation that spawn public dev servers expose many targets.

CVE-2025-64525

Summary

In impacted versions of Astro using on-demand rendering, request headers x-forwarded-proto and x-forwarded-port are insecurely used, without sanitization, to build the URL. This has several consequences the most important of which are:

Middleware-based protected route bypass (only via x-forwarded-proto)
DoS via cache poisoning (if a CDN is present)
SSRF (only via x-forwarded-proto)
URL pollution (potential SXSS, if a CDN is present)
WAF bypass

Details

The x-forwarded-proto and x-forwarded-port headers are used without sanitization in two parts of the Astro server code. The most important is in the createRequest() function. Any configuration, including the default one, is affected:

https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/970ac0f51172e1e6bff4440516a851e725ac3097/packages/astro/src/core/app/node.ts#L97
https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/970ac0f51172e1e6bff4440516a851e725ac3097/packages/astro/src/core/app/node.ts#L121

These header values are then used directly to construct URLs.

By injecting a payload at the protocol level during URL creation (via the x-forwarded-proto header), the entire URL can be rewritten, including the host, port and path, and then pass the rest of the URL, the real hostname and path, as a query so that it doesn't affect (re)routing.

If the following header value is injected when requesting the path /ssr:

x-forwarded-proto: https://www.malicious-url.com/?tank=

The complete URL that will be created is: https://www.malicious-url.com/?tank=://localhost/ssr

As a reminder, URLs are created like this:

url = new URL(`${protocol}://${hostnamePort}${req.url}`);

The value is injected at the beginning of the string (${protocol}), and ends with a query ?tank= whose value is the rest of the string, ://${hostnamePort}${req.url}.

This way there is control over the routing without affecting the path, and the URL can be manipulated arbitrarily. This behavior can be exploited in various ways, as will be seen in the PoC section.

The same logic applies to x-forwarded-port, with a few differences.

Note

The createRequest function is called every time a non-static page is requested. Therefore, all non-static pages are exploitable for reproducing the attack.

PoC

The PoC will be tested with a minimal repository:

Latest Astro version at the time (2.16.0)
The Node adapter
Two simple pages, one SSR (/ssr), the other simulating an admin page (/admin) protected by a middleware
A middleware example copied and pasted from the official Astro documentation to protect the admin page based on the path

Download the PoC repository

Middleware-based protected route bypass - x-forwarded-proto only

The middleware has been configured to protect the /admin route based on the official documentation:

// src/middleware.ts
import { defineMiddleware } from "astro/middleware";

export const onRequest = defineMiddleware(async (context, next) => {
  const isAuthed = false; // auth logic
  if (context.url.pathname === "/admin" && !isAuthed) {
    return context.redirect("/");
  }
  return next();
});

When tryint to access /admin the attacker is naturally redirected :
```
curl -i http://localhost:4321/admin
```
The attackr can bypass the middleware path check using a malicious header value:
```
curl -i -H "x-forwarded-proto: x:admin?" http://localhost:4321/admin
```

How is this possible?

Here, with the payload x:admin?, the attacker can use the URL API parser to their advantage:

x: is considered the protocol
Since there is no //, the parser considers there to be no authority, and everything before the ? character is therefore considered part of the path: admin

During a path-based middleware check, the path value begins with a /: context.url.pathname === "/admin". However, this is not the case with this payload; context.url.pathname === "admin", the absence of a slash satisfies both the middleware check and the router and consequently allows us to bypass the protection and access the page.

SSRF

As seen, the request URL is built from untrusted input via the x-forwarded-protocol header, if it turns out that this URL is subsequently used to perform external network calls, for an API for example, this allows an attacker to supply a malicious URL that the server will fetch, resulting in server-side request forgery (SSRF).

Example of code reusing the "origin" URL, concatenating it to the API endpoint :

DoS via cache poisoning

If a CDN is present, it is possible to force the caching of bad pages/resources, or 404 pages on the application routes, rendering the application unusable.

A 404 cab be forced, causing an error on the /ssr page like this : curl -i -H "x-forwarded-proto: https://localhost/vulnerable?" http://localhost:4321/ssr

Same logic applies to x-forwarded-port : curl -i -H "x-forwarded-port: /vulnerable?" http://localhost:4321/ssr

How is this possible?

The router sees the request for the path /vulnerable, which does not exist, and therefore returns a 404, while the potential CDN sees /ssr and can then cache the 404 response, consequently serving it to all users requesting the path /ssr.

URL pollution

The exploitability of the following is also contingent on the presence of a CDN, and is therefore cache poisoning.

If the value of request.url is used to create links within the page, this can lead to Stored XSS with x-forwarded-proto and the following value:

x-forwarded-proto: javascript:alert(document.cookie)//

results in the following URL object:

It is also possible to inject any link, always, if the value of request.url is used on the server side to create links.

x-forwarded-proto: https://www.malicious-site.com/bad?

The attacker is more limited with x-forwarded-port

If the value of request.url is used to create links within the page, this can lead to broken links, with the header and the following value:

X-Forwarded-Port: /nope?

Example of an Astro website:

WAF bypass

For this section, Astro invites users to read previous research on the React-Router/Remix framework, in the section "Exploitation - WAF bypass and escalations". This research deals with a similar case, the difference being that the vulnerable header was x-forwarded-host in their case:

https://zhero-web-sec.github.io/research-and-things/react-router-and-the-remixed-path

Note: A section addressing DoS attacks via cache poisoning using the same vector was also included there.

CVE-2025-61925 complete bypass

It is possible to completely bypass the vulnerability patch related to the X-Forwarded-Host header.

By sending x-forwarded-host with an empty value, the forwardedHostname variable is assigned an empty string. Then, during the subsequent check, the condition fails because forwardedHostname returns false, its value being an empty string:

if (forwardedHostname && !App.validateForwardedHost(...))

Consequently, the implemented check is bypassed. From this point on, since the request has no host (its value being an empty string), the path value is retrieved by the URL parser to set it as the host. This is because the http/https schemes are considered special schemes by the WHATWG URL Standard Specification, requiring an authority state.

From there, the following request on the example SSR application (astro repo) yields an SSRF:

empty x-forwarded-host + the target host in the path

Credits

Allam Rachid (zhero;)
Allam Yasser (inzo)

CVE-2025-64764

Summary

After some research it appears that it is possible to obtain a reflected XSS when the server islands feature is used in the targeted application, regardless of what was intended by the component template(s).

Details

Server islands run in their own isolated context outside of the page request and use the following pattern path to hydrate the page: /_server-islands/[name]. These paths can be called via GET or POST and use three parameters:

e: component to export
p: the transmitted properties, encrypted
s: for the slots

Slots are placeholders for external HTML content, and therefore allow, by default, the injection of code if the component template supports it, nothing exceptional in principle, just a feature.

This is where it becomes problematic: it is possible, independently of the component template used, even if it is completely empty, to inject a slot containing an XSS payload, whose parent is a tag whose name is is the absolute path of the island file. Enabling reflected XSS on any application, regardless of the component templates used, provided that the server islands is used at least once.

How ?

By default, when a call is made to the endpoint /_server-islands/[name], the value of the parameter e is default, pointing to a function exported by the component's module.

Upon further investigation, we find that two other values are possible for the component export (param e) in a typical configuration: url and file. file returns a string value corresponding to the absolute path of the island file. Since the value is of type string, it fulfills the following condition and leads to this code block:

An entire template is created, completely independently, and then returned:

the absolute path name is sanitized and then injected as the tag name
childSlots, the value provided to the s parameter, is injected as a child

All of this is done using markHTMLString. This allows the injection of any XSS payload, even if the component template intended by the application is initially empty or does not provide for the use of slots.

Proof of concept

For our Proof of Concept (PoC), we will use a minimal repository:

Latest Astro version at the time (5.15.6)
Use of Island servers, with a completely empty component, to demonstrate what we explained previously

Download the PoC repository

Access the following URL and note the opening of the popup, demonstrating the reflected XSS:

http://localhost:4321/_server-islands/ServerTime?e=file&p=&s={%22zhero%22:%22%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(0)%3E%22}

The value of the parameter s must be in JSON format and the payload must be injected at the value level, not the key level :

Despite the initial template being empty, it is created because the value of the URL parameter e is set to file, as explained earlier. The parent tag is the name of the component's internal route, and its child is the value of the key "zhero" (the name doesn't matter) of the URL parameter s.

Credits

Allam Rachid (zhero;)
Allam Yasser (inzo)

CVE-2025-64765

A mismatch exists between how Astro normalizes request paths for routing/rendering and how the application’s middleware reads the path for validation checks. Astro internally applies decodeURI() to determine which route to render, while the middleware uses context.url.pathname without applying the same normalization (decodeURI).

This discrepancy may allow attackers to reach protected routes (e.g., /admin) using encoded path variants that pass routing but bypass validation checks.

https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/ebc4b1cde82c76076d5d673b5b70f94be2c066f3/packages/astro/src/vite-plugin-astro-server/request.ts#L40-L44

/** The main logic to route dev server requests to pages in Astro. */
export async function handleRequest({
    pipeline,
    routesList,
    controller,
    incomingRequest,
    incomingResponse,
}: HandleRequest) {
    const { config, loader } = pipeline;
    const origin = `${loader.isHttps() ? 'https' : 'http'}://${
        incomingRequest.headers[':authority'] ?? incomingRequest.headers.host
    }`;

    const url = new URL(origin + incomingRequest.url);
    let pathname: string;
    if (config.trailingSlash === 'never' && !incomingRequest.url) {
        pathname = '';
    } else {
        // We already have a middleware that checks if there's an incoming URL that has invalid URI, so it's safe
        // to not handle the error: packages/astro/src/vite-plugin-astro-server/base.ts
        pathname = decodeURI(url.pathname); // here this url is for routing/rendering
    }

    // Add config.base back to url before passing it to SSR
    url.pathname = removeTrailingForwardSlash(config.base) + url.pathname; // this is used for middleware context

Consider an application having the following middleware code:

import { defineMiddleware } from "astro/middleware";

export const onRequest = defineMiddleware(async (context, next) => {
  const isAuthed = false;  // simulate no auth
  if (context.url.pathname === "/admin" && !isAuthed) {
    return context.redirect("/");
  }
  return next();
});

context.url.pathname is validated , if it's equal to /admin the isAuthed property must be true for the next() method to be called. The same example can be found in the official docs https://docs.astro.build/en/guides/authentication/

context.url.pathname returns the raw version which is /%61admin while pathname which is used for routing/rendering /admin, this creates a path normalization mismatch.

By sending the following request, it's possible to bypass the middleware check

GET /%61dmin HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000

Remediation

Ensure middleware context has the same normalized pathname value that Astro uses internally, because any difference could allow it to bypass such checks. In short maybe something like this

        pathname = decodeURI(url.pathname);
    }

    // Add config.base back to url before passing it to SSR
-    url.pathname = removeTrailingForwardSlash(config.base) + url.pathname;
+    url.pathname = removeTrailingForwardSlash(config.base) + decodeURI(url.pathname);

Thankyou, let me know if any more info is needed happy to help :)

CVE-2025-65019

Summary
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Astro when using the @astrojs/cloudflare adapter with output: 'server'. The built-in image optimization endpoint (/_image) uses isRemoteAllowed() from Astro’s internal helpers, which unconditionally allows data: URLs. When the endpoint receives a valid data: URL pointing to a malicious SVG containing JavaScript, and the Cloudflare-specific implementation performs a 302 redirect back to the original data: URL, the browser directly executes the embedded JavaScript. This completely bypasses any domain allow-listing (image.domains / image.remotePatterns) and typical Content Security Policy mitigations.

Affected Versions

@astrojs/cloudflare ≤ 12.6.10 (and likely all previous versions)
Astro ≥ 4.x when used with output: 'server' and the Cloudflare adapter

Root Cause – Vulnerable Code
File: node_modules/@astrojs/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts

export function isRemoteAllowed(src: string, ...): boolean {
  if (!URL.canParse(src)) {
    return false;
  }
  const url = new URL(src);

  // Data URLs are always allowed 
  if (url.protocol === 'data:') {
    return true;
  }

  // Non-http(s) protocols are never allowed
  if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(url.protocol)) {
    return false;
  }
  // ... further http/https allow-list checks
}

In the Cloudflare adapter, the /_image endpoint contains logic similar to:

	const href = ctx.url.searchParams.get('href');
	if (!href) {
		// return error 
	}

	if (isRemotePath(href)) {
		if (isRemoteAllowed(href, imageConfig) === false) {
			// return error
		} else {
            //redirect to return the image 
			return Response.redirect(href, 302);
		}
	}

Because data: URLs are considered “allowed”, a request such as:
https://example.com/_image?href=... (base64-encoded malicious SVG)

triggers a 302 redirect directly to the data: URL, causing the browser to render and execute the malicious JavaScript inside the SVG.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

Create a minimal Astro project with Cloudflare adapter (output: 'server').
Deploy to Cloudflare Pages or Workers.
Request the image endpoint with the following payload:

https://yoursite.com/_image?href=

(Base64 decodes to: <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>alert('zomasec')</script></svg>)

The endpoint returns a 302 redirect to the data: URL → browser executes the <script> → alert() fires.

Impact

Reflected/Strored XSS (depending on application usage)
Session hijacking (access to cookies, localStorage, etc.)
Account takeover when combined with CSRF
Data exfiltration to attacker-controlled servers
Bypasses image.domains / image.remotePatterns configuration entirely

Safe vs Vulnerable Behavior
Other Astro adapters (Node, Vercel, etc.) typically proxy and rasterize SVGs, stripping JavaScript. The Cloudflare adapter currently redirects to remote resources (including data: URLs), making it uniquely vulnerable.

References

Vulnerable function: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/main/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts
Similar data: URL bypass in WordPress: CVE-2025-2575

Minor Changes

#14543 9b3241d Thanks @matthewp! - Adds two new adapter configuration options assetQueryParams and internalFetchHeaders to the Adapter API.

Official and community-built adapters can now use client.assetQueryParams to specify query parameters that should be appended to asset URLs (CSS, JavaScript, images, fonts, etc.). The query parameters are automatically appended to all generated asset URLs during the build process.

Adapters can also use client.internalFetchHeaders to specify headers that should be included in Astro's internal fetch calls (Actions, View Transitions, Server Islands, Prefetch).

This enables features like Netlify's skew protection, which requires the deploy ID to be sent with both internal requests and asset URLs to ensure client and server versions match during deployments.
#14489 add4277 Thanks @dev-shetty! - Adds a new Copy to Clipboard button to the error overlay stack trace.

When an error occurs in dev mode, you can now copy the stack trace with a single click to more easily share it in a bug report, a support thread, or with your favorite LLM.
#14564 5e7cebb Thanks @florian-lefebvre! - Updates astro add cloudflare to scaffold more configuration files

Running astro add cloudflare will now emit wrangler.jsonc and public/.assetsignore, allowing your Astro project to work out of the box as a worker.

Patch Changes

#14591 3e887ec Thanks @matthewp! - Adds TypeScript support for the components prop on MDX Content component when using await render(). Developers now get proper IntelliSense and type checking when passing custom components to override default MDX element rendering.
#14598 7b45c65 Thanks @delucis! - Reduces terminal text styling dependency size by switching from kleur to picocolors
#13826 8079482 Thanks @florian-lefebvre! - Adds the option to specify in the preload directive which weights, styles, or subsets to preload for a given font family when using the experimental Fonts API:
```
---
import { Font } from 'astro:assets';
---

<Font
  cssVariable="--font-roboto"
  preload={[{ subset: 'latin', style: 'normal' }, { weight: '400' }]}
/>
```
Variable weight font files will be preloaded if any weight within its range is requested. For example, a font file for font weight 100 900 will be included when 400 is specified in a preload object.

`v5.14.8`

Compare Source

Patch Changes

#14590 577d051 Thanks @matthewp! - Fixes image path resolution in content layer collections to support bare filenames. The image() helper now normalizes bare filenames like "cover.jpg" to relative paths "./cover.jpg" for consistent resolution behavior between markdown frontmatter and JSON content collections.

`v5.14.7`

Compare Source

Patch Changes

#14582 7958c6b Thanks @florian-lefebvre! - Fixes a regression that caused Actions to throw errors while loading
#14567 94500bb Thanks @matthewp! - Fixes the actions endpoint to return 404 for non-existent actions instead of throwing an unhandled error
#14566 946fe68 Thanks @matthewp! - Fixes handling malformed cookies gracefully by returning the unparsed value instead of throwing

When a cookie with an invalid value is present (e.g., containing invalid URI sequences), Astro.cookies.get() now returns the raw cookie value instead of throwing a URIError. This aligns with the behavior of the underlying cookie package and prevents crashes when manually-set or corrupted cookies are encountered.
#14142 73c5de9 Thanks @P4tt4te! - Updates handling of CSS for hydrated client components to prevent duplicates
#14576 2af62c6 Thanks @aprici7y! - Fixes a regression that caused Astro.site to always be undefined in getStaticPaths()

`v5.14.6`

Compare Source

Patch Changes

#14562 722bba0 Thanks @erbierc! - Fixes a bug where the behavior of the "muted" HTML attribute was inconsistent with that of other attributes.
#14538 51ebe6a Thanks @florian-lefebvre! - Improves how Actions are implemented
#14548 6cdade4 Thanks @ascorbic! - Removes support for the maxAge property in cacheHint objects returned by live loaders.

⚠️ Breaking change for experimental live content collections only

Feedback showed that this did not make sense to set at the loader level, since the loader does not know how long each individual entry should be cached for.

If your live loader returns cache hints with maxAge, you need to remove this property:

return {
  entries: [...],
  cacheHint: {
    tags: ['my-tag'],
-   maxAge: 60,
    lastModified: new Date(),
  },
};

The cacheHint object now only supports tags and lastModified properties. If you want to set the max age for a page, you can set the headers manually:

`v5.14.5`

Compare Source

Patch Changes

#14525 4f55781 Thanks @penx! - Fixes defineLiveCollection() types
#14441 62ec8ea Thanks @upsuper! - Updates redirect handling to be consistent across static and server output, aligning with the behavior of other adapters.

Previously, the Node.js adapter used default HTML files with meta refresh tags when in static output. This often resulted in an extra flash of the page on redirect, while also not applying the proper status code for redirections. It's also likely less friendly to search engines.

This update ensures that configured redirects are always handled as HTTP redirects regardless of output mode, and the default HTML files for the redirects are no longer generated in static output. It makes the Node.js adapter more consistent with the other official adapters.

No change to your project is required to take advantage of this new adapter functionality. It is not expected to cause any breaking changes. However, if you relied on the previous redirecting behavior, you may need to handle your redirects differently now. Otherwise you should notice smoother redirects, with more accurate HTTP status codes, and may potentially see some SEO gains.
#14506 ec3cbe1 Thanks @abdo-spices! - Updates the <Font /> component so that preload links are generated after the style tag, as recommended by capo.js

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chore(deps): update dependency astro to v5.15.9 [security]

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chore(deps): update dependency astro to v5.15.9 [security] #527

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GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

Summary

Details

Vulnerability Location

Root Cause

Attack Vector

PoC

Local Testing (localhost)

Remote Testing (ngrok)

Impact

Security impact

Attack scenarios

Summary

Details

PoC

Middleware-based protected route bypass - x-forwarded-proto only

How ​​is this possible?

SSRF

DoS via cache poisoning

How ​​is this possible?

URL pollution

WAF bypass

CVE-2025-61925 complete bypass

Credits

Summary

Details

Proof of concept

Credits

Release Notes

Patch Changes

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⚠️ Breaking change for experimental live content collections only

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changeset-bot bot commented Nov 19, 2025

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renovate bot commented Nov 19, 2025 •

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