ReadEmail Step #1299

CTY-git · 2025-02-13T05:47:26Z

PR Checklist

The commit message follows our guidelines: Code of conduct
Tests for the changes have been added (for bug fixes / features)
Docs have been added / updated (for bug fixes / features)
Does this PR introduce a breaking change?
Include PR in release notes?

PR Type

What is the current behavior?

Issue Number: N/A

What is the new behavior?

Other information

patched-admin · 2025-02-19T05:26:53Z

File Changed: `patchwork/common/client/llm/aio.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: The code modification introduces a potential bug in error handling. The new 'file' parameter is added to the input dictionary only if it's not NotGiven, but there's no validation of the Path object or checking if the file exists before passing it to the client.

Affected Code Snippet:

if file is not NotGiven:
    inputs["file"] = file
return client.chat_completion(**inputs)

Start Line: 101
End Line: 133

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: The addition of the file parameter introduces a potential security vulnerability. The code accepts a Path object without validating its location, which could lead to path traversal attacks if not properly sanitized by the underlying client implementation.

Affected Code Snippet:

file: Path | NotGiven = NOT_GIVEN,

Start Line: 58
End Line: 58

File Changed: `patchwork/common/client/llm/anthropic.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: The addition of file: Path | NotGiven = NOT_GIVEN parameter to both methods (is_prompt_supported and chat_completion) is not being used in the function implementation, which could lead to potential bugs. The parameter is declared but not handled in __adapt_chat_completion_request.

Affected Code Snippet:

def is_prompt_supported(
    ...
    file: Path | NotGiven = NOT_GIVEN,
) -> int:
    model_limit = self.__get_model_limit(model)
    input_kwargs = self.__adapt_chat_completion_request(
        messages=messages,
        ...
    )

Start Line: 225
End Line: 232

File Changed: `patchwork/common/client/llm/google.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: Potential bug in error handling where exceptions are silently caught and ignored in the __upload method. This could mask important errors and make debugging difficult.

Affected Code Snippet:

try:
    mime_type = magic.Magic(mime=True, uncompress=True).from_buffer(file_bytes)
    return types.Part.from_bytes(data=file_bytes, mime_type=mime_type)
except Exception as e:
    pass

# ... and similar patterns below
try:
    file_ref = self.client.files.get(name=cleaned_name)
    if file_ref.error is None:
        return file_ref
except Exception as e:
    pass

Start Line: 71
End Line: 89

Details: Potential bug in token counting where model input limits are checked without verifying if input_token_limit exists.

Affected Code Snippet:

def __get_model_limits(self, model: str) -> int:
    for model_info in self.__get_models_info():
        if model_info.name == f"{self.__MODEL_PREFIX}{model}" and model_info.input_token_limit is not None:
            return model_info.input_token_limit
    return 1_000_000

Start Line: 51
End Line: 55

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: Security vulnerability in file handling where the code processes arbitrary file types without proper validation or sanitization. The mime type detection could be exploited with malicious files.

Affected Code Snippet:

def __upload(self, file: Path | NotGiven) -> Part | File | None:
    if file is NotGiven:
        return None

    file_bytes = file.read_bytes()

    try:
        mime_type = magic.Magic(mime=True, uncompress=True).from_buffer(file_bytes)
        return types.Part.from_bytes(data=file_bytes, mime_type=mime_type)
    except Exception as e:
        pass

Start Line: 63
End Line: 89

File Changed: `patchwork/common/client/llm/openai_.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: The addition of the file parameter in both is_prompt_supported and chat_completion functions creates a potential bug since the parameter is added but not used in either function's implementation. Unused parameters can lead to confusion and unexpected behavior.

Affected Code Snippet:

def is_prompt_supported(
    ...
    file: Path | NotGiven = NOT_GIVEN,
) -> int:
    # might not implement model endpoint
    if self.__is_not_openai_url():
        return False

Start Line: 83
End Line: 89

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: The addition of the Path parameter without validation could potentially lead to path traversal vulnerabilities if the file parameter is used to read or write files in future implementations. While not currently used, the presence of this parameter without documentation or validation guidelines creates a security concern.

Affected Code Snippet:

from pathlib import Path

...

def chat_completion(
    ...
    file: Path | NotGiven = NOT_GIVEN,
) -> ChatCompletion:

Start Line: 4
End Line: 130

File Changed: `patchwork/common/client/llm/protocol.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: The added file parameter of type Path | NotGiven in both functions doesn't have any apparent validation or error handling. This could lead to potential bugs if the file path is invalid or inaccessible.

Affected Code Snippet:

def is_prompt_supported(
    ...
    file: Path | NotGiven = NOT_GIVEN,
) -> int:
    ...

def chat_completion(
    ...
    file: Path | NotGiven = NOT_GIVEN,
) -> ChatCompletion:
    ...

Start Line: 56
End Line: 58

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: The introduction of file path handling without proper path validation could lead to path traversal vulnerabilities. The Path parameter should be sanitized and validated to prevent unauthorized access to system files.

Affected Code Snippet:

def is_prompt_supported(
    ...
    file: Path | NotGiven = NOT_GIVEN,
) -> int:
    ...

def chat_completion(
    ...
    file: Path | NotGiven = NOT_GIVEN,
) -> ChatCompletion:
    ...

Start Line: 56
End Line: 58

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/CallLLM/CallLLM.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: Potential bug in error handling and truncation logic. The code checks is_prompt_supported with new kwargs including 'file' parameter but truncates messages without passing these kwargs, which could lead to inconsistent behavior.

Affected Code Snippet:

kwargs = dict(parsed_model_args)
if self.file is not None:
    kwargs["file"] = Path(self.file)

for prompt in prompts:
    is_input_accepted = self.client.is_prompt_supported(model=self.model, messages=prompt, **kwargs) > 0
    if not is_input_accepted:
        self.set_status(StepStatus.WARNING, "Input token limit exceeded.")
        prompt = self.client.truncate_messages(prompt, self.model)  # kwargs not passed here

Start Line: 118
End Line: 127

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: Potential security vulnerability in file path handling. The code uses os.path.abspath() without sanitizing the input path, which could lead to path traversal attacks if save_responses_to_file is user-controlled.

Affected Code Snippet:

def __persist_to_file(self, contents):
    # Convert relative path to absolute path
    file_path = os.path.abspath(self.save_responses_to_file)

Start Line: 67
End Line: 69

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/CallLLM/typed.py`

Rule 1: Potential Bugs

Details: The addition of the file parameter with is_path=True flag could potentially lead to a bug if the path validation and error handling for non-existent or inaccessible files is not properly implemented in the underlying code. However, since we can only see the type definition, this is a cautionary note rather than a confirmed violation.

Affected Code Snippet:

file: Annotated[str, StepTypeConfig(is_path=True)]

Start Line: 38
End Line: 38

Rule 2: Security Vulnerabilities

Details: The addition of a file path parameter introduces a potential security vulnerability. Without proper path sanitization and access controls, this could lead to path traversal attacks where malicious users might attempt to access sensitive files outside the intended directory structure.

Affected Code Snippet:

file: Annotated[str, StepTypeConfig(is_path=True)]

Start Line: 38
End Line: 38

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/CreateIssue/CreateIssue.py`

Details: Potential bug introduced by making scm_url optional without proper validation. The code assumes self.scm_client has a default URL or can operate without a URL being set, which may not be true.

Affected Code Snippet:

if "scm_url" in inputs.keys():
    self.scm_client.set_url(inputs["scm_url"])

Start Line: 30
End Line: 31

Details: Security vulnerability introduced by removing mandatory SCM URL requirement. This change could allow the creation of issues in unintended repositories if a default URL exists in the SCM client, or could enable potential injection attacks if the default URL is not properly sanitized.

Affected Code Snippet:

required_keys = {"issue_title", "issue_text", "scm_url"}
# Changed to
required_keys = {"issue_title", "issue_text"}

Start Line: 15
End Line: 15

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/LLM/LLM.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: The modification removes explicit input validation that checks for missing required keys. While the new code uses type hints (input_class=LLMInputs, output_class=LLMOutputs), it's not clear if this provides the same level of runtime validation. This could lead to potential bugs where missing required fields are not caught until later in the execution.

Affected Code Snippet:

-        missing_keys = LLMInputs.__required_keys__.difference(set(inputs.keys()))
-        if len(missing_keys) > 0:
-            raise ValueError(f'Missing required data: "{missing_keys}"')

Start Line: 10
End Line: 12

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/LLM/typed.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: Potential bug risk identified. The addition of a file path parameter without validation logic could lead to path traversal bugs if the path is not properly sanitized.

Affected Code Snippet:

file: Annotated[str, StepTypeConfig(is_path=True)]

Start Line: 46
End Line: 46

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: Security vulnerability identified. The new file path parameter could introduce path traversal vulnerabilities if the path is not properly validated and sanitized before use. The is_path=True flag alone may not provide sufficient security controls.

Affected Code Snippet:

file: Annotated[str, StepTypeConfig(is_path=True)]

Start Line: 46
End Line: 46

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/ReadEmail/ReadEmail.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: Potential bug in decoding logic. The __decode method doesn't handle cases where content_transfer_encoding might be invalid or unsupported, which could lead to silent failures or unexpected behavior.

Affected Code Snippet:

def __decode(self, content_transfer_encoding: str, content: bytes) -> bytes:
    if content_transfer_encoding.lower() == "base64":
        return base64.b64decode(content)
    elif content_transfer_encoding.lower() == "quoted‑printable":
        return quopri.decodestring(content)

    return content

Start Line: 56
End Line: 63

Details: Another potential bug in attachment handling where the code doesn't validate if the file path is safe or if there's enough disk space before writing attachments.

Affected Code Snippet:

file_path = base_path / attachment.filename
with file_path.open("wb") as f:
    content = attachment.raw
    for content_transfer_encoding in attachment.content_header.content_transfer_encoding:
        content = self.__decode(content_transfer_encoding, content)
    f.write(content)

Start Line: 87
End Line: 93

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: Critical security vulnerability in attachment handling. The code directly uses the attachment filename without sanitization, which could lead to path traversal attacks or overwriting existing files.

Affected Code Snippet:

file_path = base_path / attachment.filename
with file_path.open("wb") as f:
    content = attachment.raw
    for content_transfer_encoding in attachment.content_header.content_transfer_encoding:
        content = self.__decode(content_transfer_encoding, content)
    f.write(content)

Start Line: 87
End Line: 93

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/ReadEmail/typed.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: Potential bug detected in the Attachment TypedDict definition where the 'content' field is defined as str, which might not handle binary attachments correctly.

Affected Code Snippet:

class Attachment(TypedDict):
    path: str
    content: str

Start Line: 13
End Line: 16

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: Security vulnerability identified in file path handling. The code accepts file paths without validation, which could lead to path traversal attacks. Both eml_file_path and base_path should have additional security checks.

Affected Code Snippet:

class __ReadEmailRequiredInputs(TypedDict):
    eml_file_path: Annotated[str, StepTypeConfig(is_path=True)]

class ReadEmailInputs(__ReadEmailRequiredInputs, total=False):
    base_path: Annotated[str, StepTypeConfig(is_path=True)]

Start Line: 6
End Line: 11

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/SendEmail/SendEmail.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: The code introduces potential bugs by not validating SMTP connection and login. No error handling for SMTP connection failures, authentication errors, or sending failures is implemented. This could lead to silent failures or unexpected behavior.

Affected Code Snippet:

with smtp_clazz(host=self.smtp_host, port=self.smtp_port) as mailserver:
    mailserver.login(self.smtp_username, self.smtp_password)
    mailserver.sendmail(self.sender_email, self.recipient_email, msg.as_string())

Start Line: 38
End Line: 40

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: Several security concerns are present:

SMTP without SSL is now allowed by default (port 25, is_ssl=False), which could expose credentials and email content
No input validation for reply_message_id which could potentially be used for header injection attacks
No verification of SSL certificates when using SMTP_SSL

Affected Code Snippet:

self.smtp_port = int(inputs.get("smtp_port", 25))
self.reply_message_id = inputs.get("reply_message_id")
self.is_ssl = bool(inputs.get("is_smtp_ssl", False))

if self.reply_message_id is not None:
    msg.add_header("Reference", self.reply_message_id)
    msg.add_header("In-Reply-To", self.reply_message_id)

Start Line: 22
End Line: 31

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/SendEmail/typed.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: Potential bug identified in the type definition of is_smtp_ssl. The parameter is defined as string type but should likely be boolean.

Affected Code Snippet:

    is_smtp_ssl: str

Start Line: 18
End Line: 18

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: The code changes credentials parameter names from sender_email_password to smtp_username and smtp_password, which is more secure as it's more explicit. However, there's no indication of secure transport requirements or password handling guidelines.

Affected Code Snippet:

-    sender_email_password: str
+    smtp_username: str
+    smtp_password: str

Start Line: 8
End Line: 9

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/SimplifiedLLM/SimplifiedLLM.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: Potential bug detected in type validation. The removal of explicit input validation (missing_keys check) in favor of input_class/output_class decoration could lead to runtime errors if the class decoration implementation doesn't provide equivalent validation.

Affected Code Snippet:

# Removed code:
missing_keys = SimplifiedLLMInputs.__required_keys__.difference(set(inputs.keys()))
if len(missing_keys) > 0:
    raise ValueError(f'Missing required data: "{missing_keys}"')

# Replaced with class decoration:
class SimplifiedLLM(Step, input_class=SimplifiedLLMInputs, output_class=SimplifiedLLMOutputs):

Start Line: 24
End Line: 27

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: The addition of "file" to the list of preserved keys could potentially expose sensitive file system information if not properly sanitized. Security review needed for the file handling implementation.

Affected Code Snippet:

"file",
*model_keys,

Start Line: 153
End Line: 153

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/SimplifiedLLM/typed.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: Potential bug risk detected. The new file field is added with StepTypeConfig(is_path=True) but there's no validation to ensure the path exists or is accessible. This could lead to runtime errors if the file path is invalid.

Affected Code Snippet:

file: Annotated[str, StepTypeConfig(is_path=True)]

Start Line: 43
End Line: 43

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: Security vulnerability identified. The new file field with is_path=True could potentially lead to path traversal attacks if not properly sanitized. The code should include path validation and sanitization to prevent unauthorized access to system files.

Affected Code Snippet:

file: Annotated[str, StepTypeConfig(is_path=True)]

Start Line: 43
End Line: 43

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/SimplifiedLLMOnce/typed.py`

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: Potential security vulnerability detected. The addition of a file parameter with is_path=True without path validation could lead to path traversal attacks if not properly sanitized during runtime.

Affected Code Snippet:

file: Annotated[str, StepTypeConfig(is_path=True)]

Start Line: 41
End Line: 41

Recommendation: Consider adding path validation logic or using safe path resolution methods to prevent directory traversal attacks. The is_path=True configuration should be accompanied by proper runtime checks.

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/init.py`

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

The addition of a new ReadEmail module raises security considerations:

Email handling often involves parsing potentially untrusted input
The name suggests interaction with email systems which could expose sensitive data
While the actual implementation isn't visible in this diff, the module registration should trigger security review

Details: The addition of an email reading module should be flagged for security review to ensure proper input sanitization and data handling.

Affected Code Snippet:

from patchwork.steps.ReadEmail.ReadEmail import ReadEmail

Start Line: 43

End Line: 43

File Changed: `pyproject.toml`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: Potential compatibility issue detected with version updates. The change from requests ~2.31.0 to ~2.32.3 might introduce compatibility issues as version 2.32.3 does not exist in the PyPI repository (latest is 2.31.0 as of now).

Affected Code Snippet:

-requests = "~2.31.0"
+requests = "~2.32.3"

Start Line: 42
End Line: 42

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: Multiple package version updates need security review:

python-gitlab upgrade from 4.4.0 to 4.13.0 spans multiple major versions which could include security-critical changes
New dependencies (eml_parser and python-magic) introduced without explicit version pinning for security
Migration from google-generativeai to google-genai package requires security assessment

Affected Code Snippet:

-python-gitlab = "^4.4.0"
+python-gitlab = "^4.13.0"
-google-generativeai = "~0.8.1"
+google-genai = "^1.2.0"
+eml_parser = "^2.0.0"
+python-magic = "^0.4.27"

Start Line: 31, 45, 48-49
End Line: 31, 45, 48-49

File Changed: `tests/steps/test_CreateIssue.py`

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Details: The removal of test case with github_api_key but without scm_url reduces test coverage for invalid input combinations, potentially allowing bugs to go undetected.

Affected Code Snippet:

{"issue_title": "my issue", "issue_text": "my issue text", "github_api_key": "my api key"}

Start Line: 10
End Line: 10

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

Details: The test file contains hardcoded API keys in plaintext, which is a security vulnerability. Even in test files, sensitive credentials should be handled securely using environment variables or mock values.

Affected Code Snippet:

{"issue_title": "my issue", "scm_url": "https://github.com/my/repo", "github_api_key": "my api key"},
{"issue_text": "my issue text", "scm_url": "https://github.com/my/repo", "github_api_key": "my api key"}

Start Line: 11
End Line: 12

jonahdc

lgtm

CTY-git added 3 commits February 13, 2025 13:46

bump to pre release version

3937479

remove attachment content from outputs

5d549b6

Add message-id to email steps

8201bd6

CTY-git force-pushed the read-email branch from e3da057 to 8201bd6 Compare February 13, 2025 08:46

CTY-git added 9 commits February 13, 2025 21:38

make most email properties optional

9ae98c7

fix gemini issue

7a7d4bc

fix llm client by force

ce362bf

undo scm url requirement

6984e3e

bump

45108f4

Update send email

5e2b619

fix test

25be973

better way to pass files

b2e19fd

finalise

724eaae

CTY-git requested a review from jonahdc February 19, 2025 05:22

CTY-git marked this pull request as ready for review February 19, 2025 05:22

jonahdc approved these changes Feb 19, 2025

View reviewed changes

CTY-git merged commit 4cc8d3e into main Feb 19, 2025
5 checks passed

CTY-git deleted the read-email branch February 19, 2025 05:53

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ReadEmail Step #1299

ReadEmail Step #1299

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CTY-git commented Feb 13, 2025 •

edited

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patched-admin commented Feb 19, 2025

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ReadEmail Step #1299

ReadEmail Step #1299

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CTY-git commented Feb 13, 2025 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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PR Checklist

PR Type

What is the current behavior?

What is the new behavior?

Other information

Uh oh!

patched-admin commented Feb 19, 2025

File Changed: patchwork/common/client/llm/aio.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/common/client/llm/anthropic.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

File Changed: patchwork/common/client/llm/google.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/common/client/llm/openai_.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/common/client/llm/protocol.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/steps/CallLLM/CallLLM.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/steps/CallLLM/typed.py

Rule 1: Potential Bugs

Rule 2: Security Vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/steps/CreateIssue/CreateIssue.py

File Changed: patchwork/steps/LLM/LLM.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

File Changed: patchwork/steps/LLM/typed.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/steps/ReadEmail/ReadEmail.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/steps/ReadEmail/typed.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/steps/SendEmail/SendEmail.py

File Changed: patchwork/steps/SendEmail/typed.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/steps/SimplifiedLLM/SimplifiedLLM.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/steps/SimplifiedLLM/typed.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/steps/SimplifiedLLMOnce/typed.py

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: patchwork/steps/__init__.py

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: pyproject.toml

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

File Changed: tests/steps/test_CreateIssue.py

Rule 1: Do not ignore potential bugs in the code

Rule 2: Do not overlook possible security vulnerabilities

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CTY-git commented Feb 13, 2025 •

edited

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File Changed: `patchwork/common/client/llm/aio.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/common/client/llm/anthropic.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/common/client/llm/google.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/common/client/llm/openai_.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/common/client/llm/protocol.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/CallLLM/CallLLM.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/CallLLM/typed.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/CreateIssue/CreateIssue.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/LLM/LLM.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/LLM/typed.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/ReadEmail/ReadEmail.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/ReadEmail/typed.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/SendEmail/SendEmail.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/SendEmail/typed.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/SimplifiedLLM/SimplifiedLLM.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/SimplifiedLLM/typed.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/SimplifiedLLMOnce/typed.py`

File Changed: `patchwork/steps/init.py`

File Changed: `pyproject.toml`

File Changed: `tests/steps/test_CreateIssue.py`