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@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from 8e7e051 to c8c5d4d Compare October 29, 2025 21:00
Comment on lines 98 to 114
run: |
AGENT_NAME="${{ steps.image-name.outputs.agent_name }}"
VERSION_TAG="${{ inputs.version_tag }}"
REPOSITORY_NAME="${{ github.repository }}/tutorial-agents/${AGENT_NAME}"
FULL_IMAGE="${REGISTRY}/${REPOSITORY_NAME}:${VERSION_TAG}"
agentex agents build \
--manifest "${{ inputs.agent_path }}/manifest.yaml" \
--registry "${REGISTRY}" \
--tag "${VERSION_TAG}" \
--platforms "linux/amd64" \
--repository-name "${REPOSITORY_NAME}" \
--push
echo "Successfully built and pushed: ${FULL_IMAGE}"
echo "### Build Complete" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- **Image**: \`${FULL_IMAGE}\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
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Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Using variable interpolation ${{...}} with github context data in a run: step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. github context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with env: to store the data and use the environment variable in the run: script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".

To resolve this comment:

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💬 Ignore this finding

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  • /fp <comment> for false positive
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Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by run-shell-injection.

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Comment on lines 81 to 87
run: |
# Remove examples/tutorials/ prefix and replace / with -
AGENT_NAME=$(echo "${{ inputs.agent_path }}" | sed 's|^examples/tutorials/||' | sed 's|/|-|g')
echo "AGENT_NAME=$AGENT_NAME" >> $GITHUB_ENV
echo "agent_name=$AGENT_NAME" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "Agent name set to $AGENT_NAME"
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Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Using variable interpolation ${{...}} with github context data in a run: step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. github context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with env: to store the data and use the environment variable in the run: script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".

To resolve this comment:

🔧 No guidance has been designated for this issue. Fix according to your organization's approved methods.

💬 Ignore this finding

Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.

  • /fp <comment> for false positive
  • /ar <comment> for acceptable risk
  • /other <comment> for all other reasons

Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by run-shell-injection.

You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.

Comment on lines 51 to 61
run: |
if [ ! -f "${{ inputs.agent_path }}/manifest.yaml" ]; then
echo "❌ Error: manifest.yaml not found in '${{ inputs.agent_path }}'"
exit 1
fi
echo "✅ manifest.yaml found"
echo "### Validation Summary" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- **Agent Path**: ${{ inputs.agent_path }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- **Version Tag**: ${{ inputs.version_tag }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- **Status**: ✅ Validation passed" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
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Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Using variable interpolation ${{...}} with github context data in a run: step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. github context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with env: to store the data and use the environment variable in the run: script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".

To resolve this comment:

🔧 No guidance has been designated for this issue. Fix according to your organization's approved methods.

💬 Ignore this finding

Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.

  • /fp <comment> for false positive
  • /ar <comment> for acceptable risk
  • /other <comment> for all other reasons

Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by run-shell-injection.

You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.

Comment on lines 43 to 49
run: |
if [ ! -d "${{ inputs.agent_path }}" ]; then
echo "❌ Error: Agent path '${{ inputs.agent_path }}' does not exist"
exit 1
fi
echo "✅ Agent path verified: ${{ inputs.agent_path }}"
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Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
Using variable interpolation ${{...}} with github context data in a run: step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. github context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with env: to store the data and use the environment variable in the run: script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".

To resolve this comment:

🔧 No guidance has been designated for this issue. Fix according to your organization's approved methods.

💬 Ignore this finding

Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.

  • /fp <comment> for false positive
  • /ar <comment> for acceptable risk
  • /other <comment> for all other reasons

Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by run-shell-injection.

You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.

@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from 41fdfc5 to 75ac121 Compare October 29, 2025 22:21
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch 5 times, most recently from 0f5077c to 020984e Compare October 29, 2025 23:10
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from 020984e to 54996c2 Compare October 29, 2025 23:13
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from ce263ca to 7023a18 Compare November 2, 2025 15:47
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from 7023a18 to e10ad36 Compare November 2, 2025 16:05
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from 6f4b382 to fcb8313 Compare November 2, 2025 17:20
@socket-security
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socket-security bot commented Nov 2, 2025

Review the following changes in direct dependencies. Learn more about Socket for GitHub.

Diff Package Supply Chain
Security
Vulnerability Quality Maintenance License
Updatedhttpx-aiohttp@​0.1.8 ⏵ 0.1.9100100100100100
Updatedagentex-sdk@​0.4.19 ⏵ 0.5.3100 +9100100100100

View full report

@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch 2 times, most recently from 65181e4 to 7e9b901 Compare November 2, 2025 17:43
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from 22c90b5 to 5b8f23b Compare November 2, 2025 18:39
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from 5b8f23b to b4d87d7 Compare November 2, 2025 18:42
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from 960c3c6 to 6c7de97 Compare November 3, 2025 14:40
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from 1d1f77c to 1feda9f Compare November 3, 2025 17:54
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from 1feda9f to 5a13b31 Compare November 3, 2025 18:30
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from 6294dbb to 87f0fdf Compare November 3, 2025 19:22
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch 2 times, most recently from e4f3636 to 134d3ef Compare November 3, 2025 19:45
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch 5 times, most recently from 69eb4e4 to dc04e1a Compare November 3, 2025 22:55
@RoxyFarhad RoxyFarhad force-pushed the RF/feat/integration-pipeline branch from dc04e1a to bfab5aa Compare November 3, 2025 23:02
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2 participants