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tpantelis
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sridhargaddam
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🤖 Created branch: z_pr232/tpantelis/test_cr |
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WalkthroughAdds a new GitHub Actions workflow file that triggers on pull_request and delegates to an external reusable workflow (submariner-io/submariner-bot) with a fixed Changes
Estimated code review effort🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~10 minutes
Pre-merge checksCaution Pre-merge checks failedPlease resolve all errors before merging. Addressing warnings is optional.
❌ Failed checks (1 error, 1 inconclusive)
✅ Passed checks (1 passed)
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
.github/workflows/test-coderabbit-trigger.yml (1)
1-10: Consider adding a basic guardrail/UX hint forpr_number.
type: numberhelps in the UI, but it’s still easy to pass0/negative/non-integers via API; consider adding an example in the description here and/or ensure the reusable workflow validatespr_numberbefore acting.
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.github/workflows/test-coderabbit-trigger.yml(1 hunks)
⏰ Context from checks skipped due to timeout of 90000ms. You can increase the timeout in your CodeRabbit configuration to a maximum of 15 minutes (900000ms). (1)
- GitHub Check: Go
| jobs: | ||
| test: | ||
| uses: submariner-io/submariner-bot/.github/workflows/coderabbit-trigger.yml@add-coderabbit-dependabot-workflow | ||
| with: | ||
| pr_number: ${{ inputs.pr_number }} | ||
| secrets: inherit |
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🧩 Analysis chain
🌐 Web query:
GitHub Actions reusable workflows best practices pinning commit SHA tag security
💡 Result:
Key recommendations for securely reusing/pinning GitHub Actions workflows (concise):
- Pin to a full commit SHA when referencing reusable workflows or actions. SHA pinning gives immutability and prevents tag/branch swaps. [1][2][4]
- Prefer repository-local reusable workflows (./.github/workflows/...) for internal reuse; when calling external repos include @. [2][5]
- Treat reusable workflows like third‑party code: audit their YAML, inspect any downloads/remote code, and avoid “unpinnable” workflows that fetch dynamic code. [4][1]
- Enforce SHA pinning and blocklists via GitHub’s “Allowed actions and reusable workflows” policy (repo/org/enterprise). Use the new block/sha enforcement features where available. [3][1]
- Use Dependabot + Dependabot security updates to surface upgrades for pinned actions and reusable workflows; keep pins current after review. [6][4]
- Apply least privilege: restrict workflow permissions, set persist-credentials: false when appropriate, and scope secrets narrowly. [1][4]
- Prefer OIDC for cloud creds (avoid long‑lived secrets) and rotate credentials immediately if compromise is suspected. [6][4]
- Favor actions from verified/maintained authors and check for signs of supply‑chain risk (recent account changes, unusual releases). [4][1]
- If convenience requires tags, only use them for highly trusted, vetted repositories and consider immutable releases (if the project supports them). [3][4]
Quick example (call reusable workflow safely):
- uses: org/repo/.github/workflows/build.yml@
Sources: GitHub security docs and guidance on reusing workflows and SHA pinning, GitHub Well‑Architected / security hardening, and GitHub changelog about SHA/block enforcement. [1][2][3][4][6]
References
- GitHub: Security hardening for GitHub Actions / secure use reference. [4]
- GitHub Docs: Reuse workflows / calling a reusable workflow. [2][5]
- GitHub Changelog: Allowed actions policy — block & SHA pinning (Aug 2025). [3]
- GitHub Well‑Architected / Actions security recommendations. [0]
- GitHub Docs: Reusing workflow configurations. [5]
- GitHub Docs: Dependabot / keeping actions up to date. [8]
🌐 Web query:
GitHub Actions secrets inherit risks vs explicit secret mapping
💡 Result:
Short summary — risks of "inheriting" secrets (using the secrets context broadly) vs explicitly mapping/passing them, and practical mitigations.
Key risks of broad/inherited secrets
- Wider exposure surface: any step that can read the secrets context or any action you call that accepts env/with can receive the secret value (accidental export, mistake in step, or malicious third‑party action). [1][2]
- Log leakage & masking gaps: GitHub masks exact secret strings in logs, but transformed secrets (encoded, embedded in JSON, truncated, or altered) may bypass masking and leak. [3]
- Over‑privilege: GITHUB_TOKEN and repo/org secrets available to whole workflow/job may have more scope than a specific step needs, increasing blast radius. [1][2]
- Cross‑workflow/ownership issues: organization or environment secrets made available broadly can be accessed by more runs/users than intended (including via reused workflows) unless restricted. [2]
- Fork and PR traps: secrets are not exposed to workflows from forked PRs by default, but misconfigured reusable workflows or explicit mapping can accidentally expose values if not reviewed. [1][2]
Benefits of explicit secret mapping (pass only what’s needed, where it’s needed)
- Least privilege: you only set env/inputs for the specific step/action that needs the secret, reducing which code paths can access it. [1]
- Easier audit & reasoning: explicit env/with lines show exactly where secrets are used, simplifying reviews and automated scanning. [1][2]
- Safer with composite/reusable actions: composite actions cannot read the secrets context — you must pass secrets explicitly as inputs, which forces deliberate decisions. [1]
- Reduced accidental export: not exporting secrets into a job‑level env reduces the chance they get propagated to child steps or subprocesses. [2][4]
Practical controls and best practices (short)
- Prefer explicit mapping: set secrets on the smallest scope (step level env or action input) rather than job/workflow wide when possible. [1][2]
- Use environments with required reviewers and scoped secrets for deploys. [2]
- Minimize GITHUB_TOKEN permissions per job via permissions: to follow least privilege. [1]
- Replace long‑lived secrets with OIDC where possible to avoid storing credentials. [2]
- Don’t pass secrets on command lines; use env or stdin. Quote/escape carefully. [2]
- Treat third‑party actions as untrusted — prefer audited actions or retrieve secrets at runtime from a vault and map explicitly (e.g., actions that output secrets as outputs rather than env exports). [3][4]
Bottom line
Explicit, step‑level mapping of secrets (and using environments/OIDC/vaults) materially reduces exposure compared with broadly inheriting secrets in job/workflow scope. Use explicit mapping + least‑privilege permissions + runtime secret retrieval as your default pattern. [1][2][3]
Sources
[1] GitHub Actions contexts & secrets behavior — GitHub Docs. (docs.github.com)
[2] Using secrets in GitHub Actions — GitHub Docs (secrets, env, environments, OIDC guidance). (docs.github.com)
[3] Practical notes on masking failures and secret handling in Actions (analysis/guidance). (sourcetrail.com)
Citations:
- 1: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/learn-github-actions/contexts?utm_source=openai
- 2: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/administering-github-actions/sharing-workflows-secrets-and-runners-with-your-organization?utm_source=openai
- 3: https://www.sourcetrail.com/yaz%C4%B1l%C4%B1m/secure-secret-management-in-github-actions/?utm_source=openai
🏁 Script executed:
# Check if there's any documentation or other workflow files that reference the coderabbit-trigger workflow
rg "coderabbit-trigger" --type yaml -A 5 -B 5Repository: submariner-io/submariner-bot
Length of output: 54
🏁 Script executed:
# Look for any GitHub Actions documentation or comments in the repository about this workflow
rg "secrets:" --type yaml | head -20Repository: submariner-io/submariner-bot
Length of output: 54
🏁 Script executed:
# Check if there are any other references to this workflow or patterns for how secrets are typically handled
rg "uses:.*submariner-bot" --type yaml -B 2 -A 2Repository: submariner-io/submariner-bot
Length of output: 54
🏁 Script executed:
# Check if the repo has any documentation about secret handling or workflow security policies
find . -type f \( -name "*.md" -o -name "SECURITY*" -o -name "*.txt" \) | xargs grep -l "secret\|workflow" 2>/dev/null | head -5Repository: submariner-io/submariner-bot
Length of output: 83
🏁 Script executed:
# Quick check of README.md for any context on this workflow or secret handling
head -50 README.mdRepository: submariner-io/submariner-bot
Length of output: 2296
Pin the reusable workflow ref to a commit SHA and use explicit secret mapping.
Using a mutable branch ref (add-coderabbit-dependabot-workflow) creates supply-chain and reproducibility risks. Pinning to a commit SHA ensures immutability. Additionally, secrets: inherit exposes all caller secrets to the reusable workflow, violating least-privilege. Explicitly pass only the secrets the called workflow actually requires.
jobs:
test:
- uses: submariner-io/submariner-bot/.github/workflows/coderabbit-trigger.yml@add-coderabbit-dependabot-workflow
+ uses: submariner-io/submariner-bot/.github/workflows/coderabbit-trigger.yml@<commit-sha>
with:
pr_number: ${{ inputs.pr_number }}
- secrets: inherit
+ secrets:
+ <secret-name>: ${{ secrets.<secret-name> }}Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
.github/workflows/test-coderabbit-trigger.yml lines 11-16: the reusable workflow
reference uses a mutable branch name and secrets: inherit, which risks
supply-chain and overexposure; replace the branch ref with the exact commit SHA
of the target workflow (update the uses to
.../coderabbit-trigger.yml@<COMMIT_SHA>) and remove secrets: inherit, then
explicitly map only the secrets the called workflow requires (e.g., secrets: {
REQUIRED_SECRET: ${{ secrets.REQUIRED_SECRET }}, ANOTHER_SECRET: ${{
secrets.ANOTHER_SECRET }} }) after verifying the called workflow's
inputs/secrets, so only those specific secrets are passed.
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Signed-off-by: Tom Pantelis <tompantelis@gmail.com>
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🤖 Closed branches: [z_pr232/tpantelis/test_cr] |
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